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144 CULTURE AND SOCIETY 1780-1950

with

the inspiration of a

Hebrew

prophet,

must be

stirring

up young minds

ina promising

way.

3

The

writeris

George

Eliot,in alettertoMiss Sara Hennell.

If

one

takesher

comment

point

by

point,

and

setsitbeside the conventional

modern

reaction,thedifficultyofa return to

Ruskin becomes

sufficiently apparent.

We

should, of course,

be

far less sure than she

was

of his 'arrogant

ab

surdity

on some

economical points'. It is true that

Ruskin

has

now no

sort of authority as

an

economist, but his

ap proach

to social

and economic problems

is very

much

nearer our

own

than is the

normal approach

of his

con

temporaries.

With George

Eliot's reservation discounted,

however, we

should begin adifferentkind of

amendment.

'The

grand

doctrines of truth

and

sincerity inart', if

indeed such a

formulation

meant

anything tous at all,

would be merely

a

cue

forour rejection of Ruskin'saesthetics.

The

nobleness

and

solemnity ofour

human

life',

when we had pondered

thephrase,

would seem

a very general thingto begin teaching upon. 'Theinspiration ofa

Hebrew

prophet',

and

the'magnificent passages', indicateonly

why Ruskin

is

now

reputedso difficultto read.

And

the

Ruskin

Societies are dead, the books

with

their extraordinary titles

neg

lected,while

we occupy

ourselves

with

a discussion of his sexuallife

more

sterilethan

any

nullity.Yet,without

ques

tion,

Ruskin must

still

be

readifthetraditionisto

be under

stood. It does not

seem

to

me

(as it does to

Dr

Leavis)

'fairlyeasytosay

what

hisplace

and

significanceare'.

The

reading has to

be

done,

and

in relation to the tradition- otherwise

we

shallfallinto the othererror,of

Mr Graham Hough,

in

assuming

that'the

new

ideas

about

thearts

and

their relations to religion

and

thesocialorderall (seem) to originate

somewhere

inthe

dense

jungleofRuskin's works'.

Ruskin

is best understood,

and

necessarily read, as

a major

contributor to the

development

of our

complex

ideas of Culture.

Ruskin was an

artcriticbefore

he was

asocialcritic,

but

his

work must now be

seenasa whole.

The

worst biogra phies

have put

into circulation a

number

of discreditable

ART AND

SOCIETY

motives forhis 'transfer of interest*

from

art to society. It

has

been

suggestedthat hissocial criticism

was

a passing-onofthe indictment ofEffie, asuit for nullityproclaimed againstEngland.4

Mr

Wilenski,

who can

seethecrudity of

this, implies that thesocialcriticism

was

theresultofRuskinsfailuretocap ture

something

called the 'Art Dictatorship' in the fifties.

But

in factthe natureof Ruskin'sthinking,

and

ofthetra dition as a whole,

made

theinclusive examination ofboth art

and

society a quite natural thing.

There

is, also, suffi cient evidence of Ruskin's direct reaction to the evils of industrialism;

and

it isperhaps

we,

not Ruskin,

who

are

on

questionable

ground when we

supposethatsocial criticism requires

some

special (usually disreputable) explanation.

It remains true, however, that Ruskin's social criticism

would

not

have

taken the

same form

if it

had

notarisen,as it didinevitably,

from

his kindofthinkingabout the

pur

posesofart.

The

centralnature of Ruskin's concern

may be

seenin

one

ofhisearlydefinitions ofBeauty:

By

the

term Beauty

. . . properly are signified

two

things. First, that external quality of bodies . . .

which,

whether

it occurina stone, flower, beast, or in

man,

isabsolutelyidentical;

which

, . .

may be shown

to

be

in

some

sorttypicaloftheDivineattributes,

and which

therefore I

...

call Typical Beauty:

and

sec ondarily, the appearance of felicitous fulfilment of functionin living things,

more

especially ofthejoyful

and

right exertion of perfect

Me

in

man; and

thiskind of

beauty

I

...

callVitalBeauty.5

Here, indeed,isthe basis ofhis

whole

work. Inhiscriticism of art, his standard

was

always this

Typical

Beauty*, the absolute evidence, in

works

ofart, ofthe 'universal

grand

design*. In his social criticism, his concern

was with

the 'felicitous fulfilment of functionin livingthings',

and with

the conditions ofthe 'joyful

and

right exertion of perfect

lifeinman'.

The

absolutestandardof perfection in

works

of art;theconditions of perfection in

man:

these arethe

com-

146

CULTUBJE

AND

SOCIETY

mon

basesofthetradition.

Both

sides ofRaskin's

work

are

comprised

in

an

allegiancetothe

same

singleterm, Beauty;

and

the idea of

Beauty (which

inhis writings is virtually interchangeable

with

Truth) restsfundamentally

on

belief ina universal, divinely

appointed

order.

The

art criticism

and

thesocial criticism, that is to say, are inherently

and

essentially related,not

because one

follows

from

the other,

but because both

areapplications, in particular directions, ofa

fundamental

conviction.

The purpose

ofart, according toRuskin,istorevealas pects oftheuniversal *Beauty'or'Truth'. The.artistis

one who,

in Carlyle's words, "readsthe

open

secret of the uni

verse*. Artis not'imitation', inthe senseofillusionistrep resentation,or

an adherence

totherules ofmodels;

but

Art

is'imitation*,intheoldersenseof

an embodiment

of aspects oftheuniversal,'ideal'truth.

These

essentialdoctrines

were ready

to Ruskin's hand,

from Romantic

theory,

and

there

was

theadditionalemphasis, seenin

Pugin and

theideas of

The

Ecdesiologist

and

the

Camden

Society,

on

theneces sarygoodness (moral goodness) oftheartist,

charged with

thishigh functionof revelation.

Any

corruptionoftheart ist's nature

would

bluror distort his capacity for realizing

and communicating

theideal,essentialbeauty. But,

Ruskin added (and

here again

he

is influenced

by

the

Pugin

rela tion

between

thequality ofa society

and

thequality ofits art),it isimpossible,finally,fortheartistto

be good

ifhis societyiscorrupt.Ruskin'sconstantdefinition ofthis

theme

is

now

unfashionable,

but

is stillsignificant.

The

artof

any

countryisthe

exponent

ofitssocial

and

political virtues.

The

art, or general productive

and

formative energy, of

any

country,is

an

exact

exponent

ofits ethical life.

You can have

noble artonly

from

noble persons, associated

under

laws fitted to their

time and

circumstances.6

The

question ofthe'goodness* ofthe artistis,

however,

c*ttimes

ambiguous. At

times,

he must be good

inorderto reveal essentialBeauty; atother times

he

is

good because

he

reveals essential

Beauty

other criteria of goodness are irrelevant.

The

latterwill

be

recognizedascharacteristicof

ART AND

SOCIETY

147