1. ASCMD,
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
5.2.4 ASCMD, OCMD, and TBMD Deficiencies and the Programs to Correct Them
Over the past several years, lower levels of R&D investment have allowed the ASCM threat to evolve somewhat more rapidly than shipboard defenses have been improved. Future threats, which are projected to have much smaller radar signatures, greater agility, and electronic countermeasure (ECM)-resistant sen- sors, may well overstress these defenses when the Navy is constrained to operate in a littoral environment. The proposed acquisition and deployment of SPY-3 and the X-band horizon search MFR, along with some advances in the Navy’s electronic warfare techniques, should redress some but not all of the Navy’s projected ASCMD deficiencies. The committee is concerned that there are no programs in place to develop additional techniques to increase the Navy’s ASCMD effectiveness.
In the final analysis, the ASCMD problem relates to the fact that a low- altitude cruise missile can get relatively close to a surface ship before it crosses the radar horizon of the ship’s defensive sensors. If the number of incoming cruise missiles is sufficiently large, their agility and speed sufficiently high, and their RCS sufficiently low, the defensive system will be overwhelmed. A strong layer of short-range self-defense is needed, but robust defense requires a depth of fire that can be provided only by employing elevated sensors, such as the JLENS, that extend the horizon of the defensive sensors, along with the use of a missile that is designed to intercept targets beyond the line-of-sight horizon of the firing platform. The committee was not briefed on any systems other than the Army’s JLENS for solving this ASCMD problem.
With respect to OCMD, the committee observes that there is still no pro- gram that will provide a means for the ship-based defense of forces ashore against cruise missile attacks. Although ship-launched interceptor missiles of suitable range are available, the sensors that would permit them to engage cruise missiles not observable from the ship have not been developed or otherwise acquired.
The Navy will have to develop the necessary airborne sensors to support an OCMD capability or seek ways in which systems of the other Services, such as JLENS, might be brought into position and employed.
Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the development of a competent cruise missile defense against anti- ship and overland cruise missiles. Beyond supporting the programmed development and acquisition of multifunction radar (MFR) and volume search radar (VSR), such a capability should include the following compo- nents:
• An elevated AMTI radar—possibly AWACS or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based—with robust overland clutter negation capabilities and with future capabilities to operate in a multistatic mode so that low-radar- cross-section overland targets can be engaged;
• An overland, over-the-horizon variant of the SM-2 missile with dual- mode, semiactive, and active terminal guidance; and
• The extension of cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to allow the employment of air-directed surface-to-air missiles (ADSAMs) against targets that are beyond the line-of-sight horizon of weapon launch platforms.
The NAD program is designed to enable the defense of nearby forces against attack by shorter-range ballistic missiles. The committee observes that the program appears to be sound and adequately funded and that the necessary under- lying R&D work is in place, including several improvements to SPY-1 signal processing that are also necessary for NTW. No significant deficiencies were noted.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 139 The NTW program is not fully defined, and the portion defined so far is not completely funded. Although needed by the Navy for the defense of larger areas in a theater, including forces ashore, there is no funded program beyond the Aegis LEAP intercept effort funded mostly by congressional budgetary adjust- ments beyond those requested by the Navy. This effort includes the addition of a high-resolution-range unit to the SPY-1 radar, in addition to the upgrades made as part of the NAD program. In an effort to cope with the low funding priority that has been assigned to NTW by BMDO, Navy staff have laid out a spiral development concept, which is being implemented at a slow rate with small amounts of Navy and BMDO money. This concept, if fully funded, would provide for an interceptor missile and shipboard system upgrades that evolve from a basic (“contingency”) NTW capability (Block IA). The deployable ver- sion to follow would not permit simultaneous conduct of other Aegis missions (Block IB). A final Block I capability (Block IC) would restore the ability to conduct all Aegis missions simultaneously.
An evolving NTW capability, designated Block II but not yet fully defined, would cope with the threat as it evolves in the next 10 to 15 years. This will require improvements to interceptor and radar performance, neither of which appears to be fully defined or funded as of yet. It appears possible that some system components will be developed incident to the cooperative program with Japan.
Recommendation: Beyond supporting the SPY-1 upgrades to improve NAD and NTW discrimination capabilities, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should pursue an aggressive R&D effort aimed at producing the following capabilities:
• A high-resolution, X-band adjunct to the S-band SPY-1 radar that will allow discrimination among warheads, decoys, and debris and reduce the need for salvo launches;
• A hit-to-kill (HTK) vehicle with greater agility, divert capability, and lethal radius than the Block I HTK vehicle, giving it the ability to handle tethered and tumbling target complexes;
• A multicolor infrared sensor with improved sensitivity to extend ac- quisition ranges against low-infrared-signature targets and aid in discrimi- nation; and
• A radar and/or LADAR on the hit-to-kill vehicle that could precisely measure body dynamics for effective discrimination against replica decoys.
Recommendation: In an effort to examine countermeasures beyond the design threat of naval theater ballistic missile defense systems, the Depart- ment of the Navy should maintain an ongoing red-blue effort that provides continuous analysis, design, and testing of potential theater ballistic missile
defense countermeasures and defense responses and works closely with cor- responding Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) efforts. This effort could be conducted in a manner similar to the prior Advanced Ballistic Reentry System Program, which developed penetration aids for U.S. inter- continental ballistic missile systems, or an extension of the current project Hercules, supported by BMDO, that is looking at advanced discrimination techniques.
5.2.5 Current and Projected Marine Corps OCMD Capabilities