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1. ASCMD,

3.2 SUBSYSTEM TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

3.2.2 Weapons

3.2.2.3 ASCMD Weapons

SM-2 Blocks III and IV today provide Aegis’s area AAW engagement capa- bility. SM-2 Block III is a medium-range weapon with a semiactive RF guid- ance augmented by a nonimaging IR seeker for countermeasure robustness.

SM-2 Block IV is a long-range weapon designed to handle fast, high-flying threats. SM-2 Block IVA, now under development for TBMD, has the same propulsion system as (but greater maneuverability than) Block IV. Block IVA’s imaging IR seeker will not be used against cruise missile or aircraft threats.

Apart from air defense systems employing standard missiles, the Navy’s current engagement systems for hard-kill ship self-defense include the NATO sea sparrow missile system (NSSMS), the RAM, and the phalanx close-in weap- on system. These weapons are described in Appendix D.

NSSMS is the principal air defense system on today’s aircraft carriers, on amphibious vessels (LHDs), on DD-963 destroyers, and on some under way replenishment ships. It employs the venerable semiactive sea sparrow missile, which has limited capability against today’s threats. Sea sparrow has a range of about 10 miles.

RAM, now deployed in its Block 0 version on many amphibious ships and DD-963 class destroyers, is a shorter-range missile. Block 0 RAM is a fire-and- forget missile that homes on an incoming missile’s radiation until the RAM’s

ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR TMD 71 nonimaging IR seeker can acquire it. It is only effective against threats that employ active radar for terminal guidance. The Block I variant of RAM over- comes this limitation. Successfully completing its operational evaluation (OPEVAL) last year, RAM Block I has a much wider field-of-view IR seeker, which can acquire incoming threats based on shipboard radar handover alone.

The RAM Block I is planned for installation on carriers and many amphibious ships. RAM’s ability to attack at minimum range gives it capability against threats difficult for other missiles: some threats maneuver at a distance from the ship but reduce their maneuvering as they draw close to ensure that they hit the ship. The principal disadvantage of RAM’s short range is its inability to handle high raid densities.

The close-in weapon system (CIWS) is on virtually all combatant ships. It is a closed-loop system in which a radar tracks both the threat and a gun’s projectiles, judges the distance by which the projectiles are missing the incoming threat, and adjusts the gun’s direction of fire. Its very short range makes it a last- ditch defense. CIWS was first introduced 20 years ago. Although many variants and upgrades of CIWS are now operational, there are some threats the system cannot handle. The Navy plans to replace CIWS with RAM.

The Navy is developing the evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM) to handle emerging cruise missile threats, especially fast and highly maneuverable ones.

The ESSM is a greatly improved upgrade of the sea sparrow; it provides a more powerful rocket motor, better aerodynamic control, and a new guidance system.

ESSM is currently in development flight test, and at the time of this writing it is having some difficulty with radome failures. Navy presentations to the commit- tee showed that either ESSM or SM-2 Block IVA is necessary to give surface ships adequate self-defense against the most serious air threats expected to emerge in 2005 or so. At present, the Navy plans to install one or the other missile only on Aegis ships, with ESSMs packed four missiles per vertical launch system (VLS) cell. The Navy once planned to install ESSMs on other ship classes, but to do this it needs an ESSM launcher, for which there is no program of record.

The SM-2 Block IVA provides Aegis ships with another weapon that could be used in self-defense, as well as in area defense or TBMD, as discussed else- where. Neither SM-2 Block IVA nor ESSM would be adequate against potential future air threats employing certain advanced countermeasures.

The MFR discussed above could be made to serve as an illuminator for semiactive missiles such as the standard missile or ESSM. The MFR will have a phased-array antenna, which should enable it to handle multiple missiles in ter- minal guidance, thereby improving defense against high raid densities. This is another reason to consider its use on Aegis ships.

The combination of the VSR, MFR, a weapon control architecture similar to that in Aegis, the SSDS, ESSM, and a robust electronic warfare (EW) capability should provide future combatants other than Aegis an adequate self-defense capability against most threats in the near term. Again, the threat can be expected

to continue to increase, and future upgrades—to handle, for example, advanced countermeasures—will surely be required.

Weapons in Air-to-Air Combat

Current and potential future carrier-based fighter aircraft include the F-14, the F/A-18 (undergoing significant upgrade to the E and F versions), and the joint strike fighter (now in competitive flight test). The E-2C aircraft provides early warning and fighter direction. Marine air squadrons are often incorporated into the carrier air wing and most likely will continue to be in the future.

The Navy and the Air Force have adopted different approaches to fighter aircraft design. The Air Force’s F-22 pushes the state of the art; it is fast, stealthy, and expensive. The F/A-E/F is less expensive and somewhat less capa- ble; it will rely more on jamming support, on networked operations, and on air- to-air weapon effectiveness. Since the principal air-to-air weapons are devel- oped jointly, the different approaches to fighter design can lead to differences of opinion on weapon requirements.

The F-14 can carry the long-range AIM-54 (Phoenix) missile. The active- RF-guided Phoenix was developed for the outer air battle the Navy was prepared to fight during the Cold War. Its inability to achieve long-range combat identifi- cation limits its usefulness today.

The AMRAAM is carried on F-14 and F-18 aircraft. It is initially com- mand-guided, with communication via the aircraft’s radar, and then employs an active radar for terminal guidance.

The IR-guided AIM-9 sidewinder missile used in short-range air-to-air com- bat is undergoing a significant upgrade made necessary by the greater maneuver- ability of new air-to-air threat missiles such as the Russian AA-10, which is being widely exported.

As a last-ditch weapon for air-to-air combat, current Navy fighter and strike aircraft carry a small-caliber cannon that can also be used for air-to-ground strafing. The utility of such a weapon has long been debated (the F-4 was built without one), and today the joint strike fighter operational requirements docu- ment (ORD) requires a “missionized” gun, that is, a weapon that can be easily removed and reinstalled.

The Navy appears to be moving toward greater reliance on networked oper- ations in air-to-air combat. Long used to cueing from the E-2C, fighters are now developing capabilities for fighter-to-fighter off-board targeting. Link 16 may be key to this communication.

Weapon Control in ASCMD

The speed of many antiship cruise missiles, their ability to delay detection, and the adversary’s potential to coordinate attacks so that greater numbers of

ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR TMD 73 attacking missiles arrive in shorter periods of time combine to make reaction time and firepower the principal challenges in shipboard weapon control.

The Navy’s answer to the reaction time and firepower challenges is to rely on automation and to provide doctrine allowing the commander to depend on an automated response in high-threat conditions. To provide the capability, the Navy has also had to meet stringent launch control, launcher design, and illumi- nator requirements to fire and guide semiactive air defense missiles. The first implementation of this was in Aegis. For decades an Aegis ship has been able to have multiple missiles in the air against an incoming threat just a few seconds after establishing a firm track on it.

In recent years, the Navy has implemented an ad hoc capability for automat- ed fast reaction in its other combatant classes. The SWY-1, -2, and -3 weapon control systems in these ships have a reaction time with a RAM that can rival Aegis’s with a standard missile. The Navy now plans to replace this ad hoc weapon control capability with the SSDS—a modern, open, distributed architec- ture founded on a local area network (LAN). SSDS treats sensors and weapons as LAN access units, permitting easier replacement.

The Navy also plans to evolve Aegis toward an open architecture. When this has been done, the Navy will have the opportunity to standardize the com- mand and decision (C&D) element of air defense systems on its various ship classes.

The Navy will soon have three levels of BMC3 systems applicable to area AAW, providing for three levels of operations:

• An individual ship providing air defense to other forces,

• A battle force, and

• Joint forces in a regional theater.

The command and decision systems on Aegis cruisers and destroyers pro- vide the first level; the CEC will enable BMC3 for a battle force; and the system being developed to support the area air defense commander will provide BMC3 for air defense within a theater. These systems are as applicable for TBMD as they are for area AAW and CMD.

The Navy and Marine Corps BMC3 for theater missile defense is discussed in more detail in the next section.

Area Antiair Warfare

SM-2 Blocks III and IV today provide Aegis’s area AAW engagement capa- bility. SM-2 Block III is a medium-range weapon with a semiactive RF guid- ance augmented by a nonimaging IR seeker for countermeasure robustness. SM- 2 Block IV is a long-range weapon designed to handle fast, high-flying threats.

SM-2 Block IVA, now under development for TBMD, has the same propulsion

system as (but greater maneuverability than) Block IV. Block IVA’s imaging IR seeker will not be used against cruise missile or aircraft threats.

3.3 BATTLE MANAGEMENT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND