INTRODUCTION
F. Summing Up the ADB Experience with Environmental Policy
V. CONCLUSION
The evidence suggests that the process of environmental policy formation has been less ridden with conflicts in the ADB than in AfDB but it does not seem like any of the two multilateral institutions in question have developed the sort of generalized principles of conduct that are the hallmark of the institution of multilateralism (Caporaso 1993; Ruggie 1993). As we have seen, the question of what constitutes a legitimate level of political interference in recipient countries policies is still unsolved in both institutions. However, it looks like the deliberate, cautious approach adopted by the Board in the ADB has been more successful than the political controversies of the AfDB.
The difference with respect to leadership in the two institutions may be one important explanation. In the AfDB, the contextual framework for environmental policy formulation was exogenous shocks and missing leadership, while the ADB contextual framework was the lack of such specific external shocks and a double leadership. The different role played by Japan in the Banks may have had a significant impact on their differences. In the ADB, the Japanese position on conditionality acted as a constraint on the more aggressive position of the United States and hence contributed, through demands for moderation and caution, to prevent recipient countries from entering the trenches in this issues-area. In the AfDB, the low-profile position of Japan in the formative years excluded the possi- bility of a viable double leadership and left the U.S. executive directors more or less alone in the arena with positions that most often led to a closing of the debate and the shrugging of African shoulders.
In sum, it seems like multilateralism in Ruggie’s understanding is too de- manding to have a significant relevance in true multilateral contexts in which different cultures, perceptions, ideologies, and political systems are to interact to achieve some sort of cooperation. However, the argument is not that some sort of consensus or generalized principles of conduct are not possible to cultivate.
Young’s model of institutional bargaining is not by necessity contradictory to Ruggie’s brand of multilateralism. The evidence from both institutions suggests that this is not the case, but the experience from the AfDB and the ADB also clearly suggests that even if some sort of principles for conduct evolve, this does
not mean that the game of institutional bargaining is closed. On the contrary, the more successful case, the ADB, shows that bargaining within multilateral institutions is a Pandora’s box which is constantly reopened by different actors for different political reasons. The point, as Ruggie correctly argues, is that these institutions are what the actors make them. They are social constructs, depending on their members’ perception of the issues at stake for their behavior within any issue-area. Nevertheless, the evidence also underscores the importance of leadership, and in particular the presence of a regional leader that can act as a buffer and bridgehead between nonregional donor countries and regional recipi- ent countries. Japan played this role in the ADB, no actor seems to have been able or willing to take on such a role in the AfDB.
ENDNOTES
1. Of the MDBs, the World Bank has historically been the leader with respect to envi- ronmental questions. In 1970 under the presidency of Robert McNamara, it became the first MBD to appoint an environmental adviser, and McNamara’s successor have continued to upgrade the World Bank’s involvement in environmental issues, to the extent that in 1987 the environment office was upgraded to the status of department under the vice president for Sector Policy and Research.
2. This observation is drawn from fieldwork in Abidjan Coˆte d’Ivoire, September 1995 and September 1996, in Manila, Philippines, January and November 1996 and from participation in the 29th and 30th Annual Meetings of the ADB, held in Manila, May 1996, and Fukuoka, Japan, May 1997.
3. The minor comparisons presented are not built on a formal scheme of comparative methodology, because the ambition is not to present a comprehensive picture but to indicate areas for further research.
4. See Baldwin’s (1965) study of the World Bank. According to Mingst (1990) it was due to Baldwin’s observation that scholars began to systematically dispel the myth of political neutrality.
5. For instance, in the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank and the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, the following principle of political neutrality is stated: ‘‘The Bank, its Presidents, vice-presidents, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any members, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned.
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions’’ (AfDB 1964:
Art. 38; ADB 1966:Art. 36).
6. For functionalist approaches to IGOs, the classical piece is Mitrany (1943). For a more contemporary work see Selim (1983).
7. Or in Kratochwil’s (1993:467) words: ‘‘Thus the characterisation of certain agencies as merely ‘functional’ is misleading.’’.
8. An international regime is commonly defined as a set of implicit and explicit princi- ples, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expecta-
tions converge in a given issue-area (Krasner 1982). Even though the concept of international regime is widely acknowledged among students of international rela- tions, it is not universally accepted. For an excellent critical review see Strange (1982).
9. The AfDB was established by African countries in 1964. In 1982, the first non- regional members joined the institution. In the Bank, the regionals have 64.172%
of the votes and the non-regionals have 35.828%. In the Fund, the regionals have 50.00% and the non-regionals have 50.00%.
10. The ADB was established by both Asian and non-Asian countries in 1966.
11. While there may be disagreement, and even hard bargaining with respect to the identity of the parties that are or should be included in a specific case, efforts to devise international regimes generally involve a number of autonomous participants.
See Young (1989:360–361).
12. For a more detailed discussion of such processes, see Brennan and Buchanan (1985).
13. In this respect, the model of institutional bargaining has some significant similarities with the two-levels game approach of Evans et al. (1993).
14. See also Wæver (1997).
15. Ruggie (1993) mentions MFN treatment as an example of such generalised princi- ples. Adherence to the MFN norm makes the system of world trade an indivisible whole, not some inherent attribute of trade itself.
16. Whereas the structural leader relies on its ability to translate material resources into bargaining power, the entrepreneurial leader relies on its negotiating skills and the intellectual leader on its ability to shape the intellectual capital available to those involved in the bargaining process. We are in this paper mainly concerned about the possibility of structural leadership of Japan and the United States.
17. With one exception. South Africa was not eligible for membership until apartheid was terminated. South Africa joined in August 1995 with 1% of the Bank’s share capital and the option to increase this holding at a later stage.
18. The initial capitalisation of the AfDB was $300 million, of which 50% was paid- in convertible currency, the rest callable. The present capitalisation is $22.25 billion of which $2.56 billion is paid-in capital.
19. The decision to admit nonregional countries to join the AfDB was highly controver- sial and it led to the fall of Kwame Donkoh Fordwar, the president who initiated the process. See Fordwar (1981) and Mingst (1990).
20. It was this declaration that established the Committee of International Development Institutions on the Environment (CIDIE).
21. See Wettestad 1987. This observation was confirmed in interviews with informants who worked in the AfDB during this period.
22. Prior to the current reorganisation of the AfDB this department was responsible for issue-areas such as infrastructure development polices, procurement policy, agrarian development polices, social and environmental policies and the issue-area of women in development. In other words, it was a policy department, not an implementing agency.
23. The following six principles constitute the core of the AfDB’s policy on the environ- ment: (1) Promotion of strategies and practices that foster sustainability of develop-
ment, by emphasising rational utilisation of natural resources for the long-term needs of regional member countries. (2) Support of regional member countries’ efforts in making environment an integral part of their national strategic framework for sus- tainable development. (3) Empowerment of the poor and other vulnerable groups, such as women and youth, to enable them to participate in the management of natural resources. (4) Strengthening institutions and human resource capabilities in the re- gional member countries to enable them to undertake environmentally sound man- agement and development activities. (5) Adoption of an integrated approach to natu- ral resource management, given the holistic nature of environmental issues in Africa.
(6) Harmonization of environmental policies, procedures, and practices among the various international institutions and donor agencies, for the ultimate benefit of re- gional member countries.
24. Letter from George Folsom to Babacar N’Diaye, August 28, 1990. Quoted in Mike- sell and Williams (1992:25).
25. According to informants who worked in the AfDB during this period, the drought in Africa from 1983–85 did increase the staff ’s preoccupation with environmental issues. In addition, the international trend in general, and in particular the Brundtland Commission and its report ‘‘Our Common Future’’ is mentioned as important.
26. The African Development Fund is the soft window of the Bank with repayment periods of 50 years and a service charge of 0.75% per annum.
27. In the Bank, the regional countries hold 64.172% of the votes and the nonregionals 35.828% of the votes.
28. In 1995, Algeria held 4.007%, Coˆte d’Ivoire 4.101%, Egypt 5.861%, and Nigeria 10.143% of the votes.
29. In 1995, Japan held 4.701% of the votes. Recently, the Japanese have signaled that they are eager to cash in greater political influence on their financial contributions.
30. In 1995, Canada held 3.227% of the votes. Canada has played an important role in the AfDB, for instance, it played an instrumental role in the establishment of the Fund and convinced France to participate in the undertaking.
31. Some of the nonregionals only take an active interest in the AfDB when procurement contracts are on the agenda. See Mingst (1990). This information has been confirmed by informants who have worked in the AfDB.
32. For instance, U.S. law requires that copies of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are available to board members at least 120 days in advance of loan consider- ation, and that copies of EIAs or a comprehensive summary are made available to the public. U.S. directors cannot support loans unless these procedures are followed.
33. ‘‘The strategy of ‘‘tying hands’’—deliberately shrinking the win-set in pursuit of an agreement closer to the COG’s preferred outcome—is infrequently attempted and usually not effective. The tying-hands strategy, suggested by Thomas Schel- lings’s work, is logically plausible but lacks efficacy in practice’’ (Evans 1993:399).
See also Schelling (1960).
34. For example, in the World Bank an American and in the ADB a Japanese.
35. With respect to the concept ‘‘the shadow of the future,’’ see Oye (1986:12–14).
36. This information has been confirmed by informants in the AfDB. An interesting question is why the U.S. is pursuing this kind of a strategy. One reason may be a lack of knowledge in Washington with respect to the specific nature of the AfDB,
another is that NGOs are paid off with an aggressive environmental policy in cases where no American interests are at stake.
37. The information concerning this case was obtained through interviews with former AfDB staff, and from Shaw (1991) and internal memorandums from the Bank.
38. The film in question was made by a South African, and it was latter rumoured in Botswana that the film was sponsored by the South African meat industry.
39. The environmental coordinator during this period was Ingrid Bertilsson. As in the case of the Norwegian environmental specialists in the early stages, she was formally employed by the AfDB, but her salary was paid by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
40. At least this is how his position was understood by Southern African constituencies and the staff of the environmental unit.
41. This report was quickly known as the Knox-report after the chairman of the task force, David Knox, a former vice president of the World Bank. The report described the Bank as a top-heavy bureaucracy, weakened by the impoverishment of the conti- nent it was meant to help, and full of political intrigue and suspicion. The argument was that if the Bank was not significantly reformed it might end up by destroying itself. See AfDB (1994b).
42. For a more general review of the reorganisation process in the AfDB see Bøa˚s (1997).
43. For an excellent review of the relationship between Japan and the ADB see Yasu- tomo (1983).
44. Contrary to the AfDB, it is not as easy in the ADB to divide the members into regionals and nonregionals, because among the regionals we find donor countries such as Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. All nonregionals are donor countries.
45. The ones that graduated were Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
46. According to Young (1989), blurred cleavages facilitate the prospects for success in institutional bargaining.
47. Japan holds 15.601%, the United States 7.979%, China 6.651%, India 6.541%, and Australia 6.009% of the votes.
48. From 1981 to 1985 Japan’s foreign aid budget expanded faster than any other item.
In this period the average increase was 10% per annum. See Yasutomo (1986).
49. Japan is the largest contributor to the ADB. It joined the African Development Fund in 1973 and became a full member of the AfDB in 1983 and it has been active in the Inter-American Development Bank since it gained membership in 1976. Since 1984, Japan and the United States have been the largest suppliers of funds to the World Bank. For a study of the new multilateral activism in Japan’s foreign policy see Yasutomo (1995).
50. At establishment, Japan and the United States contributed $200 million each, the first time any country matched an American contribution to an international organi- zation. From the beginning Japan sought to maintain funding parity with the United States. Since the early 1970s, Japan has pledged to provide at least one-third of the ADF. In addition, it created a Japan special Fund within the Bank in 1988 and in 1990 offered to set aside $4 million out of a planned $59 million allocation to the Japan Special Fund for a new environmental preservation fund.
51. Under Fujioka’s leadership, a quota for loan commitments of 15% and then 21% a year was instituted. This issue became especially acute in the mid-1980s, when the ADB was awash with liquidity because of a drop in loan requests from recipient countries.
52. The American executive director in the ADB is in the same positions as the U.S.
executive director in the AfDB. All loans proposed by the ADB are sent to Washing- ton to be evaluated by the Working Group on Multilateral Assistance.
53. Japan has envisioned its role as co-ordinator and balancer because of its status as both an Asian country and a donor, and its preferences are pivotal, for its vote may tilt the balance toward either the recipient or the donor countries.
54. In particular, the paper recommended that the ADB should concentrate on (1) re- viewing the Bank’s projects to ensure that all potentially significant environmental impacts are identified, and that appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse im- pacts; (2) promoting environmental awareness among Bank staff; (3) acting as a regional resource center; (4) supporting projects with direct environmental benefits as well as initiating and processing environmentally oriented projects per se, and (5) strengthening the institutions dealing with the planning and management of envi- ronmental and natural resources, together with the line agencies concerned with the monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.
55. Unfortunately, no comparable figures exist for the AfDB.
56. Source: ADB (1994). Environmental lending includes environmental-oriented proj- ects such as forestry, and use planning, urban environmental improvement, and envi- ronment projects per se such as biodiversity conservation, institution building, and pollution control and projects with environmental components—i.e., those which include a component to mitigate the environmental impact.
57. In this paper, the need for such a strategy is legitimized by pointing at the Stockholm principles and the guidelines already prepared by the World Bank and USAID.
58. The following information was obtained from Bank documents and interviews with former members of the ADB staff.
59. The conference, which was cosponsored by the ADB and the IUCN, was the first concerted action for the region since the signing of the Convention on Biological Diversity by over 150 governments at the Rio Summit. According to Tahir Qadri, an ADB forestry specialist, the conference was a success in the sense that it brought home the message that the Bank would support efforts in gearing members policies to biodiversity conservation.
60. See the Financial Times 5/5/94.
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