INTRODUCTION
B. Holding Version of Corporate Organization
V. CORPORATISM: RESOLVING PROBLEMS OR IMPOSING UNION HEGEMONY?
also suggested—in apparent contradiction of many scholarly assertions that cor- poratism decreases the autonomy of trade unions—that corporatism, in conjunc- tion with modes of collective action, is a vehicle for enhancing union autonomy (Webster and Adler, 1997:3). The question that must follow is, What should the accompanying balance of power between the ‘‘social partners’’ be?
V. CORPORATISM: RESOLVING PROBLEMS OR
In contrast, Lehmbruch (1979:151, 154, 155) interpreted corporatism in terms of ‘‘increasing structural differentiation and functional specialization of the political system brought about by certain requirements of consensus-building specific to economic policy making.’’ When parties are incapable of providing appropriate policies, the function of consensus building may shift to the ‘‘subsys- tem of interest associations.’’ Interestingly, and perhaps contradictorily, the inca- pable parties nevertheless remain important for the successful pursuit of concerta- tion because, Lehmbruch (1979:167, 169) hypothesized, ‘‘consensus-building in liberal corporatism is . . . largely contingent on the degree to which the labor union movement is integrated into the process of policy-formation.’’ This, in turn, seems to depend on unions gaining power ‘‘by the channel of the party system.’’
Despite some ambiguity about the importance of political parties in corpo- ratism, Both Offe’s and Lehmbruch’s propositions direct attention to the associa- tion between party-union coherence and the prospects for corporatism. I want to look at the South African case at two ‘‘levels’’: first, and briefly, with regard to problems of governance, and then with regard to relations between the ANC and the unions.
In South Africa, corporatism and debates around it do focus strongly on structuring relations between social partners and, by implication, within the wider society. But if South African corporatism is a response to problems of gover- nance, then all the problems did not arise from the dynamics of a liberal pluralist society, nor from those of the very young postapartheid political and party sys- tems. Rather, pragmatists tend to justify corporatism in terms of the prediction that governance would be extremely difficult given the legacies of apartheid and the structural conditions mentioned before (section I of this paper). They also justify it with reference to the vulnerability of the economy and the state to cen- trifugal interests and ideologies and to the ‘‘demands’’ of a globalized economy (for example Adam et al. 1997:140–159).
However, I would argue that elements within the unions see the purpose of corporatism differently. For them corporatism is about gaining decisive control over policy agendas and policy formulations. This position was already visible in their insistence, during the interregnum of 1990 to 1994, that the decisions following from corporatist processes should be binding rather than merely advi- sory (Webster and Keet 1992:15). Furthermore, influential elements within the unions are not concerned about problems of governance as such, but about enforc- ing a particular programmatic direction in order to achieve, ultimately, a socialist transformation of society. In other words, and in contrast to a suggestion by Schmitter (1985:40) about the emergence of corporatism in advanced capitalist societies, corporatism in South Africa may well be connected to ‘‘the elevated goal of attaining hegemony and imposing a distinctive ‘class project’ upon the whole of society.’’
Business, on the other hand, seems to vacillate between the objectives of
advice and control, depending on perceptions of how well government’s policy declarations fit its own. During the interregnum, as during apartheid, the national- ist government was concerned about its sovereignty and preferred purely advisory processes. The ANC government from time to time threatens to govern alone, and did in fact do so when it took the BCEB to Parliament. However, it is ham- strung by divisions in its own ranks and that of the Tripartite Alliance.
As noted before, corporatism was formally conceived as a vehicle for re- solving conflict between capital and labor. But the fate of corporatism is likely to depend quite significantly on the ability of the ruling party to accommodate its own internal divisions and those between the parties to the Tripartite Alliance.
The ANC is itself a complex of formations. It rules as a member of the Tripartite Alliance comprising itself, the SACP, and the major trade union federa- tion, Cosatu. Furthermore, the ANC’s membership and support overlaps with that of its two allies. This overlap is especially significant at the level of the higher party organs and the national, provincial, and local levels of government.
For example, after the 1994 general elections the SACP claimed that four cabinet ministers and one deputy minister owe allegiance to it, and that it also had two of seven provincial premiers and between 50 and 80 MPs as members. Between 1994 and 1998 some 20 Cosatu officials were members of parliament, and many more sit in provincial and local legislatures (of which a significant number are likely to be the same individuals claimed by the SACP).
Differences of interest base and ideology between the constituent organiza- tions of the Alliance are, given the interlocking membership and directorates, presumably repeated within the ANC as well as within the other two components of the Alliance. Moreover, Cosatu includes unions which prize their autonomy, which are not equal in influence within the federation, and which possess their own, often divergent traditions of relating to (or diverging from) the ANC and which have their own ideological proclivities.
The Alliance and its unity of purpose has been partially dependent on the existence of common enemies: the nationalist government and apartheid. The extent to which opposition to capitalism and capital was uniform among members of the Alliance is less easy to say. The general tendency was to equate capitalism and apartheid with each other and to lean in a socialist, or at least a ‘‘mixed economy, state-welfarist,’’ direction. With the ANC in power, the issues have become more involved and this is showing its effects in intensifying disputes about economic strategy.
The dissatisfaction of influential factions within Cosatu with the govern- ment has found strong expression in a November 1996 discussion paper presented to the Cosatu executive. The document alleges the absence of a ‘‘systematic Alliance approach to the development of policy’’ and the existence of a generally reactive approach to policy on Cosatu’s side (Cosatu, 1996:2, 3). In fact, members of the Cosatu leadership have often threatened to make the federations’ support
for the ANC’s 1999 election campaign conditional on such agreements (Cosatu 1997:Chapter 3).
In the 1996 Cosatu discussion paper it was claimed that the lack of joint planning within the Alliance resulted in ‘‘conflicting perspectives emerging be- tween the democratic forces’’ in various state institutions and in Nedlac. The document then proposed, not a social pact between the social partners as per corporatism, but an intra-Alliance
Accord or National Agreement on strategic issues, as well as a programme to implement these at different levels of government. This would clearly bind the Alliance forces to actively pursue this agenda in all areas. It would guide, for example, Cosatu and the Government as to how to approach the various issues in Nedlac, rather than the two parties going there with separate and often competing agendas. It would remove the impression that the govern- ment is acting as a neutral referee sitting above the other players in society.
Rather the mass bias of government and its commitment to the implementa- tion of a particular programme, would be the lodestar which would clearly reflect the mandate of the majority party. The Alliance would therefore openly mobilise the people for the implementation and defence of agreed programmes at the level of Parliament, Nedlac and other areas of governance (Cosatu 1996:13).
The clear intent of the authors is to ensure the elveation of an intra-Alliance agreement above any possible agreement between state, capital and labor, and to subject forums such as Nedlac to the purpose for which ‘‘they were historically conceived—as fora for transformation’’ (Cosatu 1996:21). Capital must itself be subjected to the Tripartite Alliance and its pruposes:
While there is a common perception that accords have to be between unions, government and business, there is no law which says that Accords have to be negotiated with capital. Obviously an Alliance agreement will for its im- plementation need certain elements to be negotiated with capital . . . but this is different from deciding that you want the agreement itself to be tripartite in character (Cosatu 1996:15).
The discussion document did foresee a need for agreement with business on what it calls ‘‘state regulated activity’’ such as incomes and wages policy, investment policy and supply side measures (Cosatu 1996:18–19). However, those are mostly areas in which South African business has—consistent with a quite purist free market ideology—traditionally opposed government interven- tion. Moreover, the authors of the document makes the intention to subordinate business to labor quite clear by presenting the union vision of labor-business agreements as
an opportunity for business to make reparations for the devastation they have created in this country over the apartheid years; to create social stability;
to allow people to benefit from economic participation; and to themselves ultimately share in the huge economic expansion which they have been too short sighted to invest in (Cosatu 1996:21).
In the South African case a union way of looking at corporatism is thus to see it as a vehicle for radical transformation strategies. Pushed to its logical conclusion, the view is, however, one which rejects corporatism. It projects state intervention to force socialist transformation under union leadership. Neither Of- fe’s nor Lehmbruch’s propositions have much bearing, then, on the way in which the Cosatu discussion document perceives the relationship between the unions, the governing party and business. If corporatism is engineered consistently with the discussion document, the task of Nedlac will be limited to mediating conces- sions to business as a political subject, rather than that of brokering agreements with business as a social partner.
The fact that government has tended to ignore business demands on core aspects of labor legislation could indicate that reality approximates the union ideal of subjecting business. And Cosatu is, after all, a member of the governing Alliance—even if the Alliance does not operate to it’s satisfaction. On the other hand, Cosatu did not achieve all it wanted from, for example, the BCEB. More- over, ANC leaders have claimed—despite subsequent denials by Cosatu lead- ers—that the ANC’s December 1997 congress endorsed Gear. This came shortly after President Mandela apologized to the 1997 Cosatu conference for the govern- ment’s unilateral adoption of Gear, but also made it clear that, in ‘‘situations, where no agreement [between the partners of an alliance] is possible . . . the ANC government’s view will hold sway’’ (Sunday Independent 1997; Mail &
Guardian January 1998). ANC President Thabo Mbeki’s mid-1998 addresses to Cosatu and SACP structures clearly implied the ANC’s impatience with criticism from its partners, as well as the warning that the ANC is the senior partner. But—
as Mbeki’s statements also implied—the partners are interdependent (Mbeki 1998, 1998a). Awareness of this interdependency is likely to suppress intra-alli- ance conflicts until after the general elections scheduled for 1999.
An October 1998 meeting between ANC, Cosatu and SACP leaders an- nounced that budget deficit targets set by Gear would be eased. However this, and the Jobs Summit, left Gear’s neoliberal thrust largely intact. But Gear remains in place alongside government policies which protect an inflexible labor market.
The seeming anomaly may reflect a fragile balance of power and preferences between the relevant interest groups. But it may also reflect the ANC govern- ment’s compromise between global economic interests and national union de- mands.
In short, it is not clear whether or not current policy processes and direc- tions indicate the ascendancy, or otherwise, of Cosatu’s hegemonic ideals. Nor do they unambiguously indicate the balance of interests within a putative corporatist system. What is clear is that there are strong ideological disagreements between
the unions and organized business and within the governing Tripartite Alliance.
It is also clear that influential elements within the major union federation see corporatism as an instrument for working class hegemony.
VI. FROM CONFLICT TO ORDER OR FROM ORDER TO