INTRODUCTION
B. Holding Version of Corporate Organization
III. WHAT IS CORPORATISM FOR?
cepts and the accompanying propositions tell us about the likelihood of successful negotiation politics.
If theorizations of corporatism (and of similar configurations such as conso- ciationalism) in Europe are taken as benchmarks, there could be little doubt that, in South Africa, the relevant structural conditions are not conducive to negotiated agreements between ‘‘class enemies.’’ However, the depth and intractability of social divisions which some observers have noted as obstacles to corporatism in South Africa have been identified by others as the main reasons for instituting it. Also, it was for long predicted that apartheid could not be ended by negotiation.
It was ended by negotiation. So perhaps corporatism or, more generally, the cre- ation of political order through negotiation is possible.
so as to make them satisfiable’’ (Offe 1985:225). It is, according to Offe, a form of policy management which leans towards structural policies, as distinguished from conjunctural policies. Structural policies are designed for the ‘‘shaping of political input and economic supply,’’ whereas conjunctural policies are aimed at maximizing the responses to ‘‘as many of the specific demand inputs as possi- ble.’’ Conjunctural policies are associated with liberal-pluralist politics. The role of the state here is, if not neutral, that of intervention. Structural policies are associated with conditions of relatively deep social, economic, and political divi- sion. Here the search is not for satisfying as many demands as possible, but for structuring demands in order to achieve social harmony (Offe 1985:223–226).
The role of the state becomes that of matchmaker for a me´nage a` trois in which it is itself a partner.
According to Offe (1985:224–226), the type of political rationality which is associated with structural politics follows the imperative of keeping output constant, that is, at levels that are considered reasonable or affordable, while channelling demand inputs in a way that appears compatible with available re- sources.
I am not sure how strictly one should read this proposition. It seems that it would not make much empirical sense to think of it as an accurate representa- tion of particular realities. A regime that emphasizes structural policies is unlikely to persist if the management of demands does not, within some reasonable period of time and to some materially adequate extent, meet some of the demands of
‘‘strategic actors’’ (Magagna 1988:421) and if the outputs do not respect the underlying interests. Furthermore, if the notion that output must be kept constant is to be taken literally, Offe was here swimming against a stream of analyses which indicated economic growth as a major objective of corporatism. So it must be a matter of analytic approach—or, as Offe (1985:226) says, ‘‘conceptual dis- tinction’’—rather than empirical assertion, to claim predominant regime and in- stitutional tendencies in one direction or another.
Proponents of corporatism for South Africa hold that the structure of SA society renders politics of the liberal-pluralist type very hard to achieve. It is depicted as a social structure marked by a large measure of coincidence between deep class and race divisions and an economic structure which is characterized by extreme inequalities of opportunity and reward. Major political and economic formations tend to mobilize around the divisions, and so reinforce them. The structure and performance of the South African economy are, furthermore, such that responses to the conflicting demands of class and race-based interest groups cannot be maximized. If the economy performed better, the divisions would pre- sumably be easier to bridge. The problem for democracy is both to survive these unfavorable conditions and to reshape them (see, for example, Nedlac 1995:1, 3). Hence the designers of the pact which cleared the way for both the interim and the 1996 constitutions leaned in the direction of consensual political mechanisms.
Nedlac embodies an attempt to replicate in the socioeconomic field the achievements of negotiation in the political field. The experience of successful negotiation is reinforced through an interpretation of the history of Nedlac’s im- mediate predecessors, the National Manpower Commission (NMC) and the Na- tional Economic Forum (NEF) (see, for example, LMC 1996:189). At least in terms of the publicly announced intentions, Nedlac was thus designed as a place and a process where conflicting class and other group interests can be accommo- dated, if not reconciled. In this sense, Nedlac is intended for demand manage- ment. But the ruling party’s, and its allies’, conceptions of the goals of corporat- ism go beyond a mere accommodation of interests. From the ANC’s point of view, corporatism has the purpose of effecting quite thoroughgoing social and economic transformation:
The democratic state must . . . seek to forge a democratic and equitable partnership as well as a working relationship between labour and capital in the interest of social stability, economic progress, reconstruction and devel- opment (ANC 1996:7).
In South Africa, terms such as reconstruction and development frequently indicate the goals of radically reducing inequalities and redressing inequities which are seen as the results of apartheid and the associated ‘‘racial capitalism.’’
As expressed in a document prepared for the party’s 1997 Congress, the ANC’s
‘‘programme of social transformation’’ specifies the
strategic objective of the National Democratic Revolution . . . [as] the cre- ation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. This in es- sence means the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in gen- eral from political and economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life of all South Africans, especially the poor (ANC 1997:5).
Traditional ANC policy incorporated measures such as the nationalization, or some other form of socialization, of banks, mines and industrial monopolies.
Current ANC policy accepts (some would say in deference to global economic forces) neoliberal claims regarding the indispensability of private capital and the close integration of national economies into global capitalism. This is reflected in the claim that a ‘‘dialectical relationship with private capital as a social partner for development and social progress’’ is of particular importance, given the cen- trality of ‘‘capital . . . to the creation of the material conditions which make it possible continuously to improve the conditions of life of the people,’’ as well as the mobility of capital that comes with globalization (ANC 1996:10). How- ever, such purposes, like those formulated for Nedlac, cannot be served by poli- cies that ‘‘keep output constant.’’ They require firm efforts to achieve and sustain substantial rates of economic growth. The main social partners share this view.
But that is as far as agreement goes.