B. Explaining the Governor's Influence
I. DISPERSED AUTHORITY IN THE STATES
6
The Independent Political
Executive in State Governance
Julia E. Robinson
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs, Colorado
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The resurgence of state governments has paralleled an increasing emphasis on gubernatorial power. For example, between 1955 and 1982, 11 states ratified new Constitutions strengthening executive powers of the governor and eliminat- ing some elected officials. Numerous reorganizations took place across the coun- try consolidating agencies and developing cabinets with the intention of giving governors more control over state bureaucracies (Reeves, 1989:21-24).
The goal of strengthening gubernatorial powers has been to reduce frag- mentation and thus improve accountability and responsiveness (Thompson, 1993a). In this model of public administration, a centralized governmental struc- ture presided over by the governor as chief executive is seen as desirable. Dis- persed authority with a number of independently elected officials or appointed officials is viewed as an obstacle to good governance. In Thompson's (1993b) conclusion on how to revitalize state government, Thompson characterizes the current dispersion of authority at the state level as a "sloppy governmental sys- tem" and a "barroom brawl" (p. 310).
This belief in the effectiveness of the powerful chief executive is so funda- mental to theory in public administration that the Winter commission (1993) recommendations on state and local reform advocate "strengthening executive authority to act by reducing the number of independently elected cabinet-level officials" (p. 10). Chester Newland, long-term editor of the Public Administration Review, describes this orientation as ' 'the orthodoxy of public administration since the short-ballot movement—glorifying the chief executive at the expense of dispersed authority systems and legislatures" (personal communication, Feb.
3, 1995).
The fact remains that in the face of continuing theoretical emphasis and ongoing reform efforts to centralize gubernatorial power, a large number of inde- pendently elected and appointed officials maintain extensive authority in state governments throughout the country. For example, most governors share their elected powers with other elected state officials. Massachusetts and New Jersey are the only two states where the governor is the sole elected state official.
American public administration theory and research have traditionally failed to deal much with the normative political dimensions of appointed and elected executive governmental positions below the chief executive (Fisher, 1980).1 Public administration, with the exception of presidents and local govern- ment managers, tends to deemphasize the role of individuals (Doig and Hargrove, 1987). The omission of political actors apparently stems from a continuing theo- retical emphasis on technical rationality, persistent positivist research approaches, and the widely shared belief that leaders in government make little difference (Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Fischer, 1980, 1986; Moe, 1990).
While there have been some studies of the roles, actions, and impacts of federal executives, mayors, governors and gubernatorial appointees, there has been very little research on state political executives who are elected in their own
Independent Political Executive 129 right or who are gubernatorial appointees but serve on boards and commissions independent from the governor and his/her cabinet1 This omission occurs even though the orientation of appointees and elected officials is different from other public managers Thus, the presence of political officials in the governmental process alters the dynamics of the process (Lorentzen, 1985)
In 1993, the Winter commission report Hard Truths/Tough Choices- An Agenda for State and Local Reform recommended that efforts be made to stream- line state government by eliminating these independently elected officials and political executives appointed to oversee boards and authorities independent of the governor Until such action occurs in states across the country, however, the public authority of independent political executives makes them distinct players in developing state policy and brokering public values on a tier which is quasi- independent of the state bureaucracy (Moe, 1990). Their actions contribute to- ward establishing what Kirlin (1994) has termed "place value," or the effective- ness of political structures, civic institutions, and individual property rights that influence the quality of life in the state
This chapter addresses the question, "What is the role of the independent state executive in the state governance process9'' Five themes emerge from exam- ining this question
The first theme is that the existence of and persistence of these positions in state government is a reflection of embedded public values woven into state constitutions and statues (Beyle, 1993). Independent state government executives ongmated to capture the deeply held public values of democratic responsiveness and bureaucratic neutrality in governmental design In the public administration literature, these values are presented as being inherently at odds The creation of independent state political executive positions, however, is a direct result of ef- forts to achieve both of these ends at differing points in American history.
The second theme that emerges is that the dispersion of authority at the state level means that state government processes must be understood as a web of interconnecting relationships (Kettl, 1994, Robinson, 1998) In a political sys- tem in which power is shared, a hierarchical model of government does not cap- ture much of the political action and efforts to define the public good
The third theme is that political executives in state government are different than political executives in the federal bureaucracy and serve a different function in the governance process than executives at the national level (Heclo, 1977, Wilson, 1989, Thompson, 1993a,b, Roberts, 1993). The difference between fed- eral political executives and state executives results from two structural factors
1 Examples of this research include Ammons and Newell, 1989, Banfield and Wilson, 1963, Doig and Hargrove, 1987, Garvey, 1993, Golembiewski and Gabris, 1995, Ingraham, 1987, Kravchuk, 1993, Montjoy and Watson, 1995, Rosenbloom, 1995, Svara, 1985, 1988, 1989, Wilson, 1989
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in states: the dispersion of authority at the state level among a number of political executives who are independent of the governor and the relative longevity of these executives in their positions (Roberts, 1993; Robinson, 1998; Thompson, 1993a; Winter, 1993).
The fourth theme of this chapter assumes that independent political execu- tives play a key role in the development of a state's unique political and social institutions. This role means that these executives help establish the distinctive character of each state and are prominent actors in brokering and determining a state's unique "place value" (Kirlin, 1994; Robinson, 1998).
The fifth and final theme is that dispersion of authority at the state level among a number of long-term independent political executives has positive con- sequences for states (Robinson, 1998). This theme is in contrast to arguments by the centrist school that gubernatorial power should be strengthened through reducing the number of or eliminating state political executives who function independently of the governor (Thompson, 1993a,b; Winter, 1993).
II. WHO ARE THE INDEPENDENT POLITICAL