86 Flentje
the Progressive era, for example, state lawmakers authorized superintendents and wardens of state hospitals and prisons to initiate sterilization if he or she
believes that the mental or physical condition of any inmate would be im- proved thereby or that procreation by such inmate would be likely to result in defective or feeble-minded children with criminal tendencies, and that the condition of such inmate is not likely to improve so as to make procreation by such persons desirable or beneficial to the state (my emphasis) (Kansas,
1913, 1917)
Once the administrator's recommendation was reviewed and sanctioned by supe- rior state officials and medical officers, the treatment could be executed Presum- ably, the state would then benefit
State Administration in Cultural Context 87 with public funds shifted to the school of choice School choice in Minnesota is based on the belief that
the key to transforming schools was changing the system of incentives, ac- countabilities, and control within which they operated By giving customers choices, making districts compete for their students and dollars, and encour- aging teachers, parents, and others to create new schools tree ot the red tape that constrained most principals and teachers, they believed they could create a system that would produce not just a tew excellent schools, but thousands of excellent schools (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997 160)
One early study of open enrollment under school choice in Minnesota con- cluded
Open enrollment has stimulated an increase in parent decision-making power, which is characterized initially by administrators involving parents more in school planning eftorts and day-to-day operations School adminis- trators were seen to become more responsive to parent wishes and demands in an eftort to keep them satisfied (quoted in Osborne and Plastnk, 1997 166)
A more recent study similarly found
Open enrollment impacts the parent-educator dynamic by subtly changing the degree of power held by each player in the system Parents are flexing their political muscles by demanding desired programs and services If the requests are not honored, many threaten to leave the distnct Findings suggest it doesn't take a large number of families threatening transfer for administra- tors to take seriously the requests (quoted in Osborne and Plastrik, 1997 172)
School choice had an immediate impact as schools made adjustments to compete for students These changes included ' 'lengthening their hours, adding more counseling, and developing new educational programs, new after-school programs, new career programs, and new programs for gifted and talented stu- dents" (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997 172) Smaller schools expanded offerings, cutting administrative costs rather than programs, in order to stay competitive
The value of customer choice was also used to transform the Minnesota Department of Administration, a traditional control-oriented state agency into a customer-oriented service provider In this case, the preference for customer choice was defined as follows
A customer relationship is a mutually adjustive working relationship in which a provider's mam purpose is to meet user's needs In a typical customer relationship, users believe that providers should be accountable to them tor tulfillmg this purpose, and providers recognize that they ought to be ac- countable Built into the definition of a customer relationship is an additional
88 Flentje key presumption as a rule, customers' informed and reflective judgements about how well a service meets their needs are accurate Therefore the most relevant information and evidence for judging how well a provider fulfills the mam purpose of providing a service are users' evaluation of service qual- ity and value, however expressed (Barzelay, 1992 110)
This customer focus resulted in enhanced information sharing with customers, more face-to-face contacts, and more two-way communication with customers, empowering customers in decision making, assessing customer satisfaction, and market research on customer needs Further, Minnesota adopted the basic market philosophy that customers should pay for service In other words, centralized service agencies should be financed through revenues earned by selling services to line agency customers, which further heightened customer service and account- ability (Barzelay, 199258-78, 102-114)
Diffusion of authority in the delivery of public service—which takes many forms—represents another key element of state administration m individualism Customer choice obviously individualizes authority Other means of diffusing authority include the familiar, tor example, local control and home rule, and more novel strategies, such as competition, privatization, and empowerment
A deep-seated belief in local self-government has shaped institution build- ing and state administration throughout U S history Tocqueville observed that self-government was a widely held principle tor organizing U S governments in the early part of the 19th century Americans believe, he observed, that each individual
is the best and sole judge of his own private interest and that society has no nght to control a man's actions unless they are prejudicial to the common- weal or unless the commonweal demands his help Municipal indepen- dence, in the United States, is therefore a natural consequence of this very principle of the sovereignty of the people (De Tocqueville, 1945 64-65) In Kansas, for example, the ideal of local self-government spawned over 11,000 counties, cities, schools, and townships from statehood in 1861 to the mid-1890s Nationally, over 80,000 locally governed instrumentalities of the state deliver a broad array of public services (see Krane et al , forthcoming)
In his study of political culture with respect to public schools, Frederick Wirt states that local control
is one expression of the fundamental value of individualism, which is charac- terized by a belief that the individual can best be protected if one can see what government is doing to one's interests [T]he individualistic culture might fear the use of centralized power, and hence its institutions would be more localist in school power, centralism is always a threat to the expression of individual preferences (Wirt, 1982 82, 95)
State Administration in Cultural Context 89
One study of state and local expenditures found, for example, that in "individual- istic states, expenditures are higher for local governments and lower for state government" (Miller, 1991:100).
Research on state educational elites and statutory provisions suggests that the extent of local autonomy varies from state to state in response to political cultures. For example, in Illinois, a state with an individualistic political culture, researchers found ' 'considerable localism, a preference for local control paired with a suspicion of state control" and "pervasive distrust of political authority."
Education elites "seem to adopt consistently one view . . . let locals handle it."
Specifically, elites opposed long-range capital planning by the state and favored incremental approaches in building maintenance. Statutory provisions were de- signed to protect against the abuse of authority and left issues of curriculum up to local authorities mandating few requirements (Marshall et al., 1989:127, 141, 144-145).
Osborne and his associates take this long-standing ideal of local control at least one step further to "community empowerment," suggesting that local authorities diffuse authority further by empowering neighborhoods and others within local jurisdictions. According to the authors, compared to bureaucratic service delivery, empowered communities have more commitment to their mem- bers, understand problems better, solve problems rather than deliver services, are more flexible and creative, and are cheaper (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992:25- 48; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997:203-240). Citizen empowerment in which citi- zens deliver services through volunteerism and coprovision would take diffusion of authority a step further (Percy and Baker, 1980; Powers and Thompson, 1994).
Most states, for example, make provision for fire protection in rural or sparsely populated areas through volunteer fire departments.
Another means of diffusing authority in the delivery of service is competi- tion through privatization of services. Privatization takes many forms, some of which are readily familiar in the administration of state government. Almost all major state agencies procure services through competitive bidding among private vendors, both profit and not-for-profit organizations (Kettl, 1993:155-177). Most state transportation agencies, for example, have for years contracted for road construction and maintenance, as well as professional services for design and engineering of roads. Many state social service agencies have procured a broad array of social services through contracts with a multitude of private providers.
Since the early 1980s, a new level of competition has been injected into service delivery, extending and deepening privatization in the administration of most state governments. In a recent 50-state survey of state agency heads in 15 substantive areas, 60% of the state officials reported an expansion of privatization in their jurisdiction over the past five years, and 55% indicated that the level of privatization would increase over the next five years. Fewer than one in eight officials responded that no privatization was taking place (Chi and Jasper, 1998:
90 Flentje
7) Officials indicated that over 3000 specific programs had been privatized reach- ing into every area ot state activity surveyed with privatization reported most frequently in transportation, administration and general services, corrections, higher education, social services, natural resources and environment, mental health and retardation, juvenile rehabilitation, and health
According to the Council of State Governments survey
Many states are turning to privatization to achieve cost control, efficiency and administrative expediency [T]here are few comprehensive privatization initiatives Instead, individual agencies privatize their activities as necessary and manage the projects on a case-by-case basis (Chi and Jasper, 1998 4) Over 80% of the privatization is executed through contracts with private provid- ers Less widely used forms of privatization, no one of which was used in more that 5% of the cases according to the survey, include public-private partnerships, service shedding, franchises, vouchers, deregulation, and asset sale
Michigan has used privatization as strategic tool through a review process labeled PERM for privatize, eliminate, retain in current form, or modify Priva- tization was defined as ' 'the act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets" (Kost, 1996 17) John Kost concludes from his experience with privatization in Michi- gan that the process requires "a sound analytical process" and assurance of ' 'quality and value rather than simply the lowest price '' Assuring perfor- mance from private vendors requires "precise specification of outcomes in ad- vance," "complete and binding contractual language" including accountability, and "comprehensive after-the-tact evaluation" (Kost, 1996 18, 21)
State administration in individualism—whether through customer choice, diffusion of authority, or competition—suggests decision making through negoti- ation, bargaining, and incremental adaption, rather than top-down orders For example, in the case of the Minnesota Department of Administration, in which a control-oriented department was transformed into a customer-oriented service agency, mutual adjustment, not unilateral direction, characterized decision mak- ing According to Barzelay
mutual adjustment becomes valued Once employees are conscious that they and the users are engaged in coproduction, attention can focus on optimizing their interactive working relationship As a turther conse- quence, improving working relationships and optimizing mutual adjustment processes can come to be valued by staft agency employees, substituting for the value conventionally placed on delineating roles and responsibilities and on the unilateral adjustment of line agencies to staff agencies (Barzelay, 1992 106-107)
State Administration in Cultural Context 91 State regulatory agencies may opt for negotiation between regulator and regulated over command and control enforcement due to the nature of regulation, as indicated by one study of water pollution control
Negotiation is carried on in various ways reflecting the officer s own style and his personal judgement as to the most fruitful approach to employ with a particular discharger Enforcement activity in pollution control is cen tered upon the handling ot individual cases [which] has the potential for fragmented and particularistic enforcement work since each case tends to be treated on its ments according to its own special problems Practical policy is expressed in the accumulation of individualized decisions (Hawkins, 1984 141 153)
According to Joel Handler, the decision making process is characterized by infor mality, consultation, and persuasion, a style of regulation "rooted in reciproc- ity—the agency bargains on the less serious offenses, treats the regulated with respect, exchanges information, is responsive to the problems of compliance, and is considerate of good faith Forbearance is exchanged for access, information, and compliance" (1996 60) In a comprehensive 50 state study of water quality regulation Hunter and Waterman similarly find that bargaining is "rampant" and conclude that state officials will "continue to rely quite heavily on bargaining, compromise, and negotiation with permittees tor pragmatic reasons" (1996 226)
A recent four state study of child care regulation identified different roles chosen by state inspectors of child care facilities, including the roles of persuader, bargainer, and enforcer Inspectors in Pennsylvania, a state with an individualistic political culture, more often selected the roles ot persuader and bargainer, com pared to inspectors in North Carolina, a state with a hierarchial culture, who were more likely to choose the enforcer role indicating vigorous and punitive enforcement (Gormley, 1997 290-293)
States also opt for regulatory strategies other than strict law enforcement to secure compliance Regulatory administration is being accomplished through self regulation, voluntary compliance, private regulation, public disclosure, and liability requirements, among other mechanisms (see Bardach and Kagan, 1982 217-299, Handler, 1996 133-168) Enforcement officials in motor carrier safety for the California State Highway Patrol, tor example, are encouraged to achieve ' 'voluntary compliance'' and regard formal prosecution under the law as a failure Some state environmental protection agencies prefer "telephone calls, site visits, warning letters, and conferences" over court action (Bardach and Kagan, 1982 38-39) Keith Hawkins concludes
The voluntary compliance ot the regulated is regarded by the agencies as the most desirable means of meeting water quality standards [and] a
92 Flentje relatively cheap method of achieving conformity Compliance takes on the appearance of voluntarmess by the use of bargaining Bargaining implies the acquiescence of the regulated [and] suggests some compro- mise from the rigours of penal enforcement (1984 122)
Terms such as entrepreneurial and innovative are often used to describe leadership in state administration committed to customer choice, diffusion of au- thority, and competition in service delivery Risk and failure are also associated with such leadership Research on innovation relevant to state and local govern- ments suggests, according to Laurence Lynn, that such leadership is individual- ized
Innovation is fueled by creativity Creativity is individual, a product of passion and intellect, and the natural inclination of iconoclasts who thrive on taking risks and challenging the status quo Committees organized to rep- resent affected interests and to produce innovations through teamwork are extremely unlikely to be creative or the wellspnngs of innovation, though they will congratulate themselves on having been just that An innovative organization is flexible to the point of being a bit chaotic Turf is up for grabs The ambitious, clever entrepreneur thrives The intellectual tone is active, contentious, and exciting Young turks challenge "the bureaucrats "
Contempt is evident for seniority, expertise, and hierarchy It is not who is right, but what is right, that counts (Lynn, 1997 97)
Lynn also observes that political skills—bargaining, negotiating, and collaborat- ing—will likely be required to carry innovation into full implementation (1997 91)
"Entrepreneurial" is often used to descnbe recent state leadership in eco- nomic development Activist governors and economic officials have crafted ini- tiatives to enter into partnership with private companies, underwrite product de- velopment, stimulate technology-based industry, target industries with venture capital, reinvent production processes, subsidize business incubators, and seed the development of value-added companies, among many other interventions in the state economy These state leaders believe they can influence ' 'which busi- nesses start, grow, innovate, develop and market new products, improve their productivity, develop export markets, contract, decline, relocate, and fold"
(Fosler, 1988 319) In such cases the state becomes, according to Peter Eismger,
"a risk-taker, a path-finder to new markets" (1988 9) State officials become entrepreneurs, often investing public funds in high-risk projects in order to gener- ate long-term results This focus on "discovering, developing, expanding, and creating new markets tor indigenous industries" distinguishes this new brand of state leadership from earlier expenence, according to Paul Brace (1993 29)
Such high-risk ventures are obviously subject to failure In some cases gov- ernors who have led entrepreneurial ventures to stimulate the economy have been
State Administration in Cultural Context 93 replaced with governors much less inclined to such endeavors, which, according to Brace, ' 'underscores the fragility of state economic development efforts Like a house of cards, they may be assembled with great care, yet, with a single jolt, come tumbling down" (1993 121) In Kansas, during an economic downturn in the mid-1980s, the chair of the state public employees retirement fund convinced the governor and other state officials to divert a significant portion of state retire- ment funds from secure low interest secunties into higher nsk investments with potential for big payoffs Initial results were exceedingly favorable, but then a number of investments failed The chair resigned amid allegations of conflicts of interest Suits were filed challenging poor investment practices High-risk ven- tures were sharply curtailed Leadership here could be described as meteonc—
rising in spectacular brilliance then plummeting into the depths of darkness