B. Explaining the Governor's Influence
VI. INDEPENDENT STATE POLITICAL EXECUTIVES ARE DIFFERENT FROM POLITICAL EXECUTIVES IN THE
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office (Moe, 1990) Moe argues that state government can best be understood as a two-tier system in which politicians and interest groups interact, on one tier deciding the manner in which political authority will be exercised Governmental managers operate in another tier carrying out the everyday activities of the bu- reaucracy In this two-tier model, understanding the role of the state political executives in the governance process is essential to understanding political strug- gles Deborah Roberts (1993) captures this dispersion of authority when she writes ' 'The executive leadership system (of states) sits atop the operating levels of state government and cuts across the institutional boundaries of agencies that focus more narrowly on their function and policy areas" (p 63)
Once state governance is understood as a complex web in which public authority is shared, analysis of political executives shifts from focusing on inter- nal management of organizations to junctures where the public authority of vari- ous players meets or overlaps These junctures occur at the boundaries of agen- cies, the areas where public authority leads to complex interrelationships and shared responsibility (Kettl, 1994)
Kettl argues that the boundaries between government organizations are where the balance of power is set and mutual influence is exerted He sees that a key role of a political executive is maintaining and reaching across boundaries He contends that' 'coping at the boundaries of government thus imposes substan- tial and novel burdens on top officials" (Kettl, 1994 194) Kettl writes that politi- cal executives act as "gatekeepers" stationed at organizational boundaries The skill of the political executive influences the balance of power between organiza- tions As Kirlm (1994) notes
Governments with all their attendant constitutions, institutions, policies, pro- grams, regulations and more are social constructions They were created by human action and can be recreated in endless variety by human action Gov- ernments are not static, nor immutable, but rather changing and changeable As a consequence, "design" of government and all their parts is a critical, on-going activity (pp 5-6)
Through participation in the ongoing political dynamics of the state, each inde- pendent political executive plays a unique role in the design of their state govern- mental process
VI. INDEPENDENT STATE POLITICAL EXECUTIVES ARE
Independent Political Executive 137 When analyzing the federal bureaucracy, James Wilson argues that federal political executives have weakly defined roles "They are less bound by daily routines and peer expectations and are less dominated by situational and techno- logical imperatives" (Wilson, 1989 209) Independent political state executives also have weakly defined roles State executives, however, vary from federal executives m their expectation for longevity in their positions Federal political executives anticipate staying two years or less while state political executives can expect to be in positions in state government an average of 13 years The longevity of independent political state executives allows these executives to op- erate in a context very different from their federal counterparts A comparison of the different characteristics between federal and independent political state executives is presented in Table 1
In 1977, Hugh Heclo published his now classic study about characteristics, roles, and relationships of federal political executives in Washington, DC The title of his work, A Government of Strangers, captures a major characteristic of federal political executives These executives arrive in Washington, DC, with little knowledge of governmental processes or the necessary political networks to help them learn how to make government work for them Heclo (1977) de- scribes the relations between executives and bureaucrats as "an accidental collec- tion of individuals with little past commitment to political leadership and few enduring stakes in government's own capabilities and performance" (p 154) Thus, the short-term nature of federal political appointees, from diverse back- grounds and geographic locations, makes them virtual strangers attempting to provide national political leadership through the federal government Appointees come and go in such rapid succession that Heclo termed them ' 'birds of passage '' Heclo argues that good management requires open communication, trust, and confidence in order for organizations to achieve long-term goals The short- term tenure of the federal political executives, however, limits even the most skilled executive's efforts to make a significant difference and alter core govern- ment functions
[Federal] political executives have to learn, however, that it is not enough to help themselves Those few important characteristics that appointees share- impatience, short-term tenures, and inexperience as a group—are at war with what they most need—a patient fashioning of relationships of trust and con- fidence The latter require time and experience, both ot which are in short supply in the political layers (Heclo, 1977 170-171)
Heclo (1977) portrays federal political executives who are unable to master the short learning curves necessary just to survive in their positions as unable to
"find their way around" (p 156)
This phenomenon of short tenure in top political positions in the federal government has not changed substantially since the 1970s Michaels (1995) notes
Table 1 Comparison of Characteristics of Federal and Independent Political State ExecutivesCo Characteristics of political executivesFederal political executives"Independent political state executives11 Longevity in position Experience with government Policy objectives Knowledge of internal operations and agency staff External networks and contacts Authority structure Descnptive terms Short tenure—average 2 years Extremely limited—short, fast learning curve needed to succeed Few or none—emphasis on self-promotion "maintenance of the executive" and controlling agency autonomy Limited—(1) Immediate staff may be hired for political or stakeholder pay- offs (2) Bureaucrats are long-term ca- reer employees with limited reason to trust or assist Few in Washington, need to be developed quickly to succeed The executive is easily expendable, must constantly tend connections with those with more power and authority, i e , cabinet secretary, White House ' 'Birds of passage'' "Government of strangers"
Average years in state government—13 Highly developed expertise about state govern- ment technical processes and state politics Clear goals to be achieved Agency autonomy taken as a given Successful movement towards goals results in increased personal power and public authority Extensive—(1) Deputy is likely to have exten- sive experience in state government and long work history with executive (2) Because of longevity, executive may eventually be able to hire a majority of career positions (3) Poten- tial long tenure of executive affords protection of career employees and the development of lasting loyalty Already in place through years of careful man- agement Independent—may choose to cultivate relation- ship with governor, but not required to be- cause of independent status, in fact, may choose to actively oppose the governor "In and arounders" "Government of acquaintances" a Composite developed from Heclo, 1977, Wilson, 1989 b Composite developed from Wnght et al, 1991 31-37, Thompson 1993a, Roberts, 1993 Sowce Robinson (1998)
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Independent Political Executive 139 that presidential appointments (PAs) in the Reagan years were understood to be 18-24 months, but those who stayed longer than 8 months were considered ' 'old- timers" (p. 279). A Government Accounting Office study of tenure during the Reagan/Bush years found that cabinet, department, and agency heads served 2.1 years (Michaels, 1995:282). Michaels argues that the advent of President Clin- ton's Democratic Administration, after 12 years of Republican rule, brought back a government of strangers. The figures presented above suggest at least at the top of the federal government Heclo's findings of short tenure of political ap- pointees has applied into the late 20th century.
State political executives do not, however, reflect this short-term phenom- ena. Research shows a great deal of stability in the people involved in leadership positions in state government (Wright et al., 1991:31-37). State executives have spent an average of 13 years in state government, a figure virtually unchanged over two decades (Thompson, 1993a:21). This longevity of people (the positions that an individual holds may change) has led Roberts (1993) to describe govern- ment executives as "in and arounders" (p. 61). Governance at the state level moves from policy development by strangers to a "stable government of acquain- tances" (Roberts, 1993:61).
The prospects for longevity of these executives and their staffs at the state level changes the dynamics of the potential role these executives may play in the state governance process. Wilson argues that federal political executives' short tenure and constant federal turf wars necessitate that the federal political executives work on issue of agency maintenance using strategies that enhance the executives' personal, external reputations. Wilson describes federal political executives as in an ongoing state of siege, both internally and externally.
Thirteen years in a position is a long time in the rapidly changing world of politics. State political executives, unlike their federal counterparts, have the luxury of time on their side and are not in constant battles over the very existence of the agencies which they head. Independent political state executives have a detailed knowledge of internal agency operations as well as extensive under- standings of technical processes that make state government work. They have over time surrounded themselves with staff who are loyal to them. Most of these individuals have a deputy who has worked with them for years and can handle the internal operations of their agency with little oversight from the execu- tive.
The internal loyalty and trust of their staff combined with their expertise in government and state politics allows the executive to stay externally focused, developing long-term goals and mapping out successful strategies for achieving desired outcomes. Freed from internal threats to his/her administration, the politi- cal executive can focus on issues of public authority, negotiate boundaries be- tween other agencies and other governmental sectors and become a prime actor in debates on normative issues of state governance.
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Over time, independent political state executives can develop extensive networks of colleagues, loyal supporters, and friends throughout government and throughout the state. The longevity and thus the success of the independent politi- cal state executive builds on itself. The longer the executive stays in his/her position, the more goals he/she achieves, and the more influence and power within the state the executive acquires (Pfeffer, 1992).
Independent political state executives' public authority initially emanates from state constitutions and statues. This formal authority provides political exec- utives with a base from which to acquire power (Pfeffer, 1992). As Pfeffer (1994) notes, a good position for acquiring power provides an executive with control over budgets and positions, control over and access to information and formal authority (p. 69). This power affords the independent political executive a promi- nent role in the state governance process. Powerful independent political execu- tives are in the position to influence, shape and reshape public authority and policy to be consistent with their values and visions. These executives have years to carefully expand their sphere of influence.
For political executives who choose to broaden their scope of influence, their initial public authority emanating from their political position provides some protection for their activities. Since the executive is elected in their own right or appointed for a set term, the executive can determine in advance how much controversy they are personally willing to sustain. Their staff may have more protection than staff in a typical bureaucracy if their activities generate what the politician feels is defensible controversy (K. Karpan, personal communication, April 15, 1994).
The weakly defined roles of the state political executives combined with their prospects of longevity for themselves and their immediate staff, allows the executives to create distinct spheres of influence by building on their particular areas of expertise and personal talents. These individuals are able carve out niches which become their personal spheres of influence in the state governance process.
For independent state political executives, public authority and institutional boundaries are not rigid but fluid. Both evolve based on the individuals involved in the political straggles. Some independent political executives are willing to seize opportunities as they become available. These individuals are willing to exert their political power and expertise "to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do" (Pfeffer, 1994:30). When they successfully exert their power, independent political executives also augment their authority. This is es- pecially the case in political arenas in which legal authority among various actors is ambiguous.
This shaping process is possible because all public authority is not absolute but, rather, is a social construction. As such, it is a value-laden linguistic category implying shared societal understandings of both moral and political good that
Independent Political Executive 141 evolve over time (Ryan, 1990) Understanding the value-laden nature of the pub- lic is fundamental to analyzing the impact of independent political executives on the state governance process Since this process is fluid, the authority, power, and boundaries established by one person filling a particular position do not nee essanly transfer to the next person who inhabits that position
Independent political state executives have broad latitude m developing their concepts of public authority and in delineating their personal spheres of influence within a state's governmental process The techniques by which the executives build their sphere of influence varies by personal style and skill This process can be understood as an artisan carving a niche m the political terrain The successful state executive meets Goodsell's definition (1992 247) of an arti san who performs each individual task well with a sure sense of execution and mastery The state political executive masters the political terrain by learning to harness personal creativity and distinctive style The independent political state executive daily engages m an artistic performance responding to complexity and proceeding with only partial information (Etziom, 1989) Like any true artisan, the independent political state executive takes pride in what he/she does Schon (1983) captures the artistry of the state political executive when he writes
His artistry is evident m his selective management of large amounts of mfor ination, his ability to spin out long lines of invention and inference, and his capacity to hold several ways of looking at things at once without disrupting the flow of inquiry (p 130)
The choice and skill to pursue power from these positions is, of course, an individual one Obviously, not every executive is interested m expanding their sphere of influence, authority, and political power Some political executives are satisfied with the status quo and narrowly define their public authority These individuals take little action outside prescribed boundaries But the potential for these individuals to move into their state's larger political terrain outside of the executive clearly defined junsdictional boundaries remains
VII. THE INDEPENDENT POLITICAL STATE EXECUTIVE'S