Activating Approach-Avoidance Motivation
Given our assumption that a fundamental need exists to connect with others and that this need translates into intimate exchange and tenderness in some degree in personal relationships, it makes sense that the desire to be emotionally close should be relevant to signifi cant-other representations and thus that approach-avoidance motivation should emerge in transference. At the most straightforward level, transference involving a positive signifi cant other should evoke the motivation to approach (be emotionally close to) the new person and not avoidance motivation (to withdraw and be emotionally distant). When a signifi cant-other representation is activated in transference, the motivation associated with this other should also be activated and experienced in relation to the new person. Any motivation to approach or avoid this person should be at its peak when expecting to meet a new person. Participants rate their desire to reveal their fears, insecurities, and hopes to the new person, and also their desire to avoid being emotionally intimate with this person, presumed to capture approach/avoidance motivation. The fi ndings indicate that participants are more motivated to approach a new person when he or she resembles a positive (versus a negative) signifi cant other, and this does not occur in the control condition (Andersen et al., 1996; Berk & Andersen, 2000).
This evidence builds on other research showing that goal states are automati- cally activated (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Goll- witzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; see also Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) and extends it into the realm of signifi cant-other representations. Although closeness motivation was assessed through self-report, the relatively implicit acti- vation of the signifi cant-other representation based on signifi cant-other resem- blance suggests that automatic goal activation may well occur based on activating a signifi cant-other representation in transference. Indeed, recent research has also shown that subliminally priming a signifi cant-other representation has automatic effects on goal activation, goal commitment (i.e., the value placed on goals), and actual goal-related task performance and persistence, and even on the perceived likelihood of attaining goals (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003a, 2003b; see
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Fitzsimons, Shah, Chartrand, & Bargh, 2005, for a review). Clearly, this shows that interpersonal goals with a signifi cant other can be activated when a signifi cant- other representation is activated (Chen et al., 2007).
Returning to approach motivation in transference, it also seemed relevant to ask when such effects might be disrupted. Hence, we questioned whether the effect would hold when the signifi cant other was a loved parent with whom one held a self-discrepancy. Results in fact show that approach motivation is still evoked in such a case (Reznik & Andersen, 2007), suggesting that the other’s problematic expectancies do not interfere with approach motivation. However, when one’s need for connection with a signifi cant other is chronically unsatisfi ed—that is, when the goal to be loved and accepted by the other has long gone unmet—this interferes with emotional approach motivation in transference (Berk & Andersen, 2004).
This work has a unique relevance for understanding the self and personal- ity because it clearly links the transference process with motivation. Motivational dynamics with the signifi cant other (e.g., his or her typical responses to one’s needs and motives) are applied to a new person in transference. Differing motives and goals thus appear to arise as a function of interpersonal context, refl ecting yet another form of variability in the self and personality.
Activating Self-Regulation
Beyond the simple activation and pursuit of a particular need or goal in trans- ference, we suggest that there are three ways of conceptualizing self-regulation in transference. One is that transference processes may activate a particular self- regulatory focus, i.e., a focus geared toward obtaining positive outcomes or one geared toward avoiding negative outcomes. The other two are linked to threat and protection experienced in transference—that is, protection of the self or protec- tion of the other.
Activating Self-Regulatory Focus. Regulatory focus in transference has been examined as a way of predicting approach and avoidance in transference (Reznik & Andersen, 2007; see Andersen & Chen, 2002) and involves either ideal standards, seeking to attain positive outcomes, and engaging in a promotion focus, or ought standards, trying to avoid negative outcomes, and prevention focus (Hig- gins, 1996b, 1996c). Each form of regulatory focus should be stored with the rel- evant signifi cant-other representation if one regulates in the relationship in a way consistent with this regulatory focus. For example, if a discrepancy exists between the other’s standards and one’s actual self, the relevant discrepancy and regula- tory focus should be evoked when the signifi cant-other representation is triggered.
Hence, individuals with an ought (versus an ideal) discrepancy should show more avoidance motivation in an imminent encounter with a new person. Indeed, ought- discrepant participants are more motivated to avoid the new person in transfer- ence while expecting to meet this new person relative to not expecting to meet him or her, whereas ideal-discrepant participants show a motivation to avoid the new person that is less pronounced while anticipating the meeting than when no longer
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anticipating it (Reznik & Andersen, 2007). Motivation toward the new person does not shift in the no-transference control condition.
Recent research complements these results by showing that when people are subliminally primed with father-related words and later engage in a problem-solv- ing task, they come to adopt the regulatory focus consistent with their father’s stan- dards (Shah, 2003b, Study 3). Beyond the transference paradigm, then, subliminal activation of a signifi cant-other representation can also trigger regulatory focus.
Activating Self-Protective Self-Regulation. Self-regulation should also arise when a threat to the self is experienced. Compensatory self-enhancement or self-infl ation protecting the self has been widely documented in other research literatures (e.g., Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Show- ers, 1992; Steele, 1988; Taylor & Brown, 1988). One way to operationalize this kind of a threat to the self is an insult to how positively one views one’s self. When the signifi cant other in question is perceived negatively, for example, activation of this signifi cant-other representation should result in an infl ux of negative elements into the self-concept, as the research shows (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). This negativ- ity should in turn pose a threat, thus evoking self-protective responses. Indeed, evidence shows that compensatory self-enhancement does occur in a negative transference: Along with the infl ux of negative self-features into the self-concept comes a fl ood of especially positive self-views. The self becomes, in fact, markedly positive overall in what appears to be a self-protective process.
In other research, participants learned about a new person resembling a posi- tive signifi cant other (or not) who, participants had previously indicated, was asso- ciated with a dreaded or desired self. Even though the positivity of the signifi cant other is held constant, dreaded self-views should fl ood into the self-concept (in the dreaded-self condition), posing a serious threat to the self and evoking self-regula- tory responses. The evidence once again shows an infl ux of positive aspects of the self—those unrelated to the dreaded self—into the self-concept in the transference involving a dreaded self, and these were especially positive, indicating compensa- tory self-enhancement (Reznik & Andersen, 2005). Hence, such compensatory self-infl ation appears to function as a kind of self-protective self-regulation as a result of a negative or positive transference involving a dreaded self.
Activating Other-Protective Self-Regulation. Signifi cant others are often impossible to replace, and exiting close relationships is not always feasible even when desired. Such relationships are characterized by interdependence and emo- tional investment, two factors that motivate people to maintain relationships and thus to maintain positive images of positive signifi cant others. People construe signifi cant-other fl aws in ways that minimize how threatening these fl aws are and maximize the signifi cant other’s benevolence. The clumsiness or scatteredness of a spouse, for example, may also be seen as cute (e.g., Murray & Holmes, 1993).
Negative aspects of the signifi cant other thus provoke other-protective responses.
Hence, in a positive transference, any negative signifi cant-other feature encoun- tered in a new person should activate other-protective self-regulation—refl ected in participants’ facial affect while learning about the new person. Indeed, partici-
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pants show especially positive facial affect in response to reading a new person’s features in transference when these features refl ect negative aspects of their posi- tive signifi cant other (versus positive aspects; Andersen et al., 1996), and no such pattern occurs among control participants. Participants respond affectively to transform the valence of each feature to match the overall valence of the represen- tation, and this occurs relatively immediately and implicitly. Yet, it also appears to be a self-regulatory response—perhaps a relatively automatic one—that protects the view of the other as positive and good.
When one is reminded (consciously or unconsciously) of a positive signifi cant other’s negative attributes in transference, this may pose a challenge to needs for connection. Finding a way to positively respond to the other’s negative qualities may be essential to maintaining relationships, and a person may be especially likely to regard a loved one positively when reminded of the other’s faults (Holmes &
Rempel, 1989). If this process is well practiced, it ought to take place relatively automatically, as this evidence suggests.
This kind of automatic response may not always be benign, however—for example, if it occurs in maladaptive relationships. In transference research involv- ing an abusive parent (Berenson & Andersen, 2006), the effects of contextual cues about the new person’s frame of mind were also assessed. Based on the idea that anger or frustration in an abusive parent may signal danger to one’s well-being, the new person’s alleged mood was manipulated. Participants learned about a new person who resembled their abusive parent (or did not), and later that this person was in an increasingly angry mood (or not). More positive facial affect occurs in response to this negative cue in transference than in the control condition, regard- less of abuse history. An attempt to protect the image of the other as good may thus be indirectly refl ected in affect protecting the other (and the relationship with him or her).
In short, both self-protective and other-protective self-regulatory processes arise in transference in response to threat (Andersen & Chen, 2002). They are experienced in new situations based on activation of a relevant signifi cant-other representation, such that people self-regulate with respect to the signifi cant other.
Such self-regulation is dynamic and fl exible: While being driven by qualities of the triggered representation, it is also responsive to cues in the present context.
Self-regulation, as defi ned by threats, is comparable to a type of psychological defense—a matter closely relevant to theories of personality.
Emotions. Consistent with recent theorizing in the literature on emotions (Russell, 2003), which suggests that core affect is largely defi ned on a basic positive versus negative dimension, we have shown, as noted, that generic positive or nega- tive affect arises in transference. Because people are emotionally invested in their signifi cant others, it stands to reason that these others would hold considerable sway in emotions. It is thus curious that research on interpersonal aspects of the self has focused relatively little attention on emotions—although there are some major exceptions, such as self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) and attachment theory (e.g., Collins, 1996; see also Bersheid, 1994), which we address below.
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First, we consider generic positive affect. Although both evaluation and facial affect in transference refl ect global regard for the signifi cant other, self-reported mood effects have only occasionally been found (e.g., Andersen & Baum, 1994).
There are several reasons why this may be the case. Mood states are diffuse and are infl uenced by numerous seemingly irrelevant contextual factors, including even the weather (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and also by various individual differences (e.g., neuroticism; Rusting & Larsen, 1997; negative affectivity; Watson & Clark, 1984).
In the following pages, we consider a number of conditions under which the positive affect otherwise associated with a positive signifi cant other might be dis- coupled in transference. We then turn to the specifi c negative emotions that arise in transference, deriving from various individual differences.
Disrupting Positive Affect
One factor that may prevent global positive affect from arising in a positive trans- ference is expectancy violation. There are at least three ways in which the expec- tancies one has with a positive signifi cant other (that are indirectly activated in transference) may ultimately be violated in transference. We describe each of these effects in turn.
Chronic Need Violation and Chronically Unsatisfi ed Goals. As noted, a loved or liked other will not necessarily evoke positive mood states when the rep- resentation of this person is activated. When a signifi cant-other representation is activated in transference, the goal for love and acceptance should also be activated, along with information about whether or not it has been satisfi ed. Diminished pos- itive affect or increased frustration and hostility may thus result when such needs go unmet, and this is what the data show. Positive affect is indeed disrupted in a positive transference when one has chronically unsatisfi ed acceptance goals with this signifi cant other, resulting in heightened hostility. However, when the signifi - cant other is from one’s family of origin, a paradoxical effect may arise. The more such hostility is evoked in the transference, the more one also engages in overt behaviors designed to solicit acceptance and liking from the new person, pursuing an obsequious strategy that might evoke acceptance, presumably one that did not work in the past (Berk & Andersen, 2004). This is of interest in part because it is the fi rst evidence to examine chronically interrupted goals with a signifi cant other in transference and to show that the same goals may be pursued behaviorally in transference. This evidence is also important because it involves needs for connec- tion with others, which if long unsatisfi ed, may well have still broader implications for personality (e.g., Downey & Feldman, 1996).
Chronic Self-Induced Violation of Own Standards. If one tends to expe- rience a dreaded self with a liked or loved other (i.e., one responds in ways that one deems unacceptable when around this other), this experience clearly goes against one’s own preferred responses. Moreover, this knowledge about the relationship
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should be stored with the signifi cant-other representation and should thus be acti- vated in transference, disrupting any positive mood that might otherwise result from this positive transference. In fact, when a positive signifi cant other associated with a dreaded self is activated in transference, this diminishes positive mood and increases negative mood, relative to a comparable desired-self-transference condi- tion, which does not occur in the control condition (Reznik & Andersen, 2005).
Contextually-Based Expectancy Violation Through Interpersonal Roles. Even when a relationship becomes quite close and individuating infor- mation about the other is at the forefront, norms derived from interpersonal roles continue to guide interactions by prescribing behaviors and expectations. Informa- tion about a signifi cant other’s role in the relationship should thus be stored in the relational knowledge linked to the signifi cant-other representation and should thus be activated in transference when the representation is activated, leading the indi- vidual to hold the same role expectancies in relation to the new person. When con- textual cues about the new person indicate that he or she will be in an incongruent role relative to the signifi cant other—a role and expectancy violation that should disrupt positive mood—this indeed results in increased negative mood relative to when the role is congruent. Specifi cally, when the new person resembles a signifi - cant other who is also an authority fi gure to the participant, and the new person is placed in the position of a novice in the experimental interaction, this leads to depressed affect (Baum & Andersen, 1999).
The complex dynamics of regarding the new person positively but feeling bad personally surely speaks to personality and behavior by tracing the emotional dis- continuities that may characterize people’s day-to-day experiences and pointing to subtle shifts in perception and emotional responses. As indicated, when one’s needs are chronically unsatisfi ed in relation to a signifi cant other, this is associated with suffering in the relationship that is then evoked in transference. When one chronically violates one’s own preferences in the relationship, this too is associated with emotional suffering evoked in transference. Finally, when the violation stems from the immediate context, suggesting that the original role relationship with the signifi cant other (typically satisfi ed in that relationship) will be reversed, this also disrupts positive affect. A more static approach to personality dispositions or emotional tendencies would neither predict nor be likely to capture this range of contextually provoked responses linked to signifi cant-other representations.
We turn now to work that moves beyond the core positive-negative dimension of affect to make predictions about discrete emotions in transference. One approach to the question of how a positive transference may lead to painful emotions is to examine individual differences that are linked to the self and thus thought to be associated with specifi c negative emotions. Based on the individual differences that impinge upon signifi cant-other relationships, it should be possible to predict specifi c negative emotions that will arise in a given transference, even if the other is positive. Independent lines of work examined this by focusing on self-discrepan- cies from the signifi cant other’s perspective and also on attachment style with the signifi cant other. We describe each in turn.
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Self-Discrepancies From a Parent’s Perspective and Specifi c Emotional Vulnerabilities
According to self-discrepancy theory, when a discrepancy exists between how one perceives the actual self and how one perceives the ideal self, this results in dejec- tion-related affect, whereas a discrepancy between one’s actual and ought selves (e.g., perceived obligations) results in agitation-related affect (Higgins, 1987).
Ought and ideal selves can also be held from a signifi cant other’s perspective, and either way should lead to these distinct emotional outcomes. The model implies that representations of self and other are intertwined in memory, as we assume in conceptualizing the relational self. The integration of these frameworks suggests that self-discrepancies associated with a signifi cant other should be activated in transference when a signifi cant-other representation is activated, thus evoking the specifi c emotional reactions associated with these self-discrepancies. In research assessing this, participants classifi ed as having an ideal or ought self-discrepancy (but not both) from a loved parent’s perspective took part in a transference experi- ment (Andersen & Chen, 2002; see Reznik & Andersen, 2007).
Depressed Mood. When a new person resembles a parent who holds an ideal (but not an ought) self-discrepancy, this results in more depressed mood in trans- ference (relative to a control condition; Reznik & Andersen, 2007). That is, the relatively implicit activation of this signifi cant-other representation (based on sig- nifi cant-other resemblance in the new person) is suffi cient to evoke the self-dis- crepancy and the associated affect in transference. Thus, even in this relatively positive transference experience, which includes positive expectancies about the new person, participants’ mood is negative, and consistent with the model, they are more depressed.
Hostile Mood (a Lack of Calm). Also consistent with the model, partici- pants with an ought discrepancy from their parent’s perspective tend to experi- ence more resentful and hostile mood when a new person resembles this parent relative to a control condition. Hostility is known to be associated with ought dis- crepancies as part of an agitated response. Again, the implicit activation of the signifi cant-other representation in transference is suffi cient to activate the self- discrepancy. That ought-discrepant individuals in transference also report feeling markedly less calm than in the control condition when they no longer expected to interact with the new person—that is, when most other participants are relieved and relatively calm—supports the notion that an agitation-related constellation of affects is associated with the ought self-discrepancy, which is indirectly activated in transference.
These fi ndings are also supported by research in which participants are sub- liminally primed with father-related words (or not) and later engage in a problem- solving task and then receive positive or negative performance feedback (or none;
Shah, 2003b). When the father is primed, this activates the father’s standards and thus infl uences emotional responses to the performance feedback. We argue that to understand affect in transference in precise terms, i.e., in terms of discrete affects,
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