Signifi cant-Other Representations
We defi ne signifi cant others as individuals who have had a substantial impact on the self, whom one knows well and cares (or has cared) deeply about. These individuals can be from one’s family of origin (i.e., parents, siblings, relatives), or they can be close friends, romantic partners, mentors, and so on. Prior knowledge allows one to subjectively interpret reality (Higgins & King, 1981; Smith, 1998) and signifi cant-other representations are one form of such knowledge.
Representations of signifi cant others are n-of-one representations in memory (exemplars; Linville & Fischer, 1993; Smith & Zarate, 1992), each designating a unique individual. Although distinct from social categories (generic knowledge about members of a social group) in terms of what and whom they refer to, sig- nifi cant-other representations also contain generalized knowledge, including social roles and social category memberships (e.g., Baum & Andersen, 1999; Karylowski, Konarzewski, & Motes, 2000). Individualized signifi cant-other knowledge involves information such as the other’s physical characteristics, personality attributes, ways of thinking, styles of interaction, interests, habits, and a variety of internal states that the individual is assumed to have (e.g., Andersen & Cole, 1990; Ander- sen, Glassman, & Gold, 1998; Chen, 2001, 2003; Johnson & Boyd, 1995; Prentice, 1990). The high level of specifi city in signifi cant-other representations differenti- ates these from knowledge held about generic categories such as stereotypes and even nonsignifi cant exemplars. Signifi cant-other representations are also heavily laden with affect, and with expectancies and motives to a greater extent—giving them a unique status in social cognition. They also fi gure prominently in the self and are linked to the self in memory, as noted, which is perhaps less commonly true of generic representations or representations of nonsignifi cant others.
We assume that a basic need for human connection commonly fuels signifi - cant-other relationships, infusing affective and motivational responses based on such prior knowledge—when it is used in relation to new people. For our pur- poses, signifi cant others have three important features: familiarity (e.g., Andersen, Reznik, & Glassman, 2005; Prentice, 1990), emotional and motivational relevance for the self (Higgins, 1989b), and exigencies of interdependence. These features are naturally confounded with each other, along with the unusual level of richness and distinctiveness of signifi cant-other knowledge, which has been shown (Ander- sen & Cole, 1990). Beyond this, signifi cant-other representations can and do vary on many dimensions, such as how positively or negatively evaluated the signifi cant other is, and what kinds of standards this other has for the individual. Individual differences are likely, both in the number and quality of signifi cant-other relation- ships that one has, as well as in the level of “signifi cance” or intimacy in these rela- tionships (Andersen & Chen, 2002). People are unlikely to have limitless signifi cant others, however; the numbers should rarely be huge (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995). There may also be profound differences between various signifi cant others for any given person as well as across individuals in the specifi c content of their
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signifi cant-other representations and relationships. Considerable variability in how one experiences the self across different relationships may also exist, a key point we revisit throughout this review. For now, we note that signifi cant-other repre- sentations are intertwined with the self via representations of the self-with-other, holding implications for self-experience. Although we have yet to systematically examine all of our assumptions about variability in signifi cant-other representa- tions, research has verifi ed that people not only experience little diffi culty when asked to name various kinds of signifi cant others, but they also exhibit considerable variability in describing them (e.g., Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, 1996; Baum &
Andersen, 1999; see also Ashmore & Ogilvie, 1992; Bacon & Ashmore, 1985; Bald- win, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, & Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996). Yet this appears not to matter in the basic process of transference, which seems to generalize across numerous representations.
Historical Roots of Transference in Terms of Our Social-Cognitive Model
Transference has been a central concept in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic theory, as originated by Sigmund Freud (e.g., Ehrenreich, 1989; Greenson, 1965;
Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990). Although Freud (1912/1958) viewed transfer- ence in terms of the patient-analyst relationship in which the patient experiences childhood fantasies and confl icts with the analyst (see also Andersen & Glassman, 1996), he acknowledged it occurs beyond analysis as well. He also proposed the concept of an “imagoe”—similar to the modern notion of a signifi cant-other rep- resentation (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990; Schimek, 1983; Singer, 1988; Wachtel, 1981; Westen, 1988), but never fully integrated it into his theory, i.e., the classic drive-structure model (J. R. Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). For Freud, transference was unconscious, psychosexual, and confl ictual.
Our model employs only one related assumption, i.e., that the process of transfer- ence is unconscious. We also assume it occurs in daily life through “normal” cogni- tive processes (including a lack of awareness).
Our work has been infl uenced more directly by Harry Stack Sullivan (1953), a neo-Freudian who abandoned Freud’s psychosexual drive (see J. R. Greenberg &
Mitchell, 1983). He proposed the existence of “personifi cations” of the self and sig- nifi cant others, akin to mental representations in contemporary social cognition, and of “dynamisms” or relational dynamics enacted by the self and other. These are central in his theory, not subordinate to other structures. Sullivan termed the transference process parataxic distortion and argued that through it, past rela- tional patterns could be re-experienced in illusory ways with new people. This, he argued, should infl uence interactions in psychotherapy and beyond. He also focused on basic needs, such as that for human connection and integration with others, which he argued is basic to fulfi lling needs for satisfaction. The need for satisfaction consists of the urge to express perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, and also the urge to develop talents or capacities and to grow as a person, without having to sacrifi ce tenderness and connection (i.e., “integrative” experiences) with
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others. In addition, he posited a need for security—a need to feel safe and pro- tected from literal and symbolic harm. For Sullivan, transference is colored heavily by motivation because it depends on personifi cations and dynamisms that develop based on these needs. The content of signifi cant-other representations should be learned through experience with these others, driven by these basic needs.
Other conceptions of transference exist, including what is assumed to occur within self-object transferences (Kohut, 1971), in neurotic trends (Horney, 1939), within borderline transferences (Kernberg, 1976), or based on role-relationship confi gurations (Horowitz, 1989, 1991) or core-confl ictual relationship themes (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990). These tend to differ on which exact factors are to be assumed essential, such as the content that is being transferred, how and when this content is acquired, and the exact mechanism of transference (Ehren- reich, 1989). One statement thought to defi ne transference in this respect—that captures common themes in the psychodynamic literature—suggests that trans- ference is “the experiencing of feelings, drives, attitudes, fantasies, and defenses toward a person in the present which are inappropriate to the person and are a repetition, a displacement of reaction originating in regard to signifi cant persons of early childhood” (Greenson, 1965, p. 156; see also Andersen & Baum, 1994).
Our model fi ts this general defi nition and also remains distinctive from earlier frameworks by focusing on what is stored in memory and how it is used. While our model shares much with Sullivan’s (1953) interpersonal theory in terms of assump- tions about fundamental human motivations, our research also explicitly highlights mental representations (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990; see also Singer, 1988; Wachtel, 1981; Westen, 1988) whereas Sullivan presumed the more amorphous concept of “energy transformations.” Furthermore, we frame the model such that it can be studied empirically by focusing on mental representa- tions of the signifi cant other, the self, and the self-other relation, which are parallel to personifi cations and dynamisms. We also examine motivation in transference—
again linking this perspective to personality and social behavior.
Our own research suggests that the transference process has broad-based impli- cations for social life and its vicissitudes. The fact that this process can be studied without reference to the drive-based origins of Freudian theory is of theoreti- cal signifi cance, as is the deeply held clinical assumption that transference occurs unconsciously (e.g., Ehrenreich, 1989; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990), which our evidence validates (Glassman & Andersen, 1999a) bringing this line of empiri- cal work squarely into contact with longstanding clinical theory. The deep-rooted assumption that human suffering may result from experiencing prior relationships in the present (when the signifi cant other is not present) is of obvious relevance to personality and social behavior as well, especially if it is assumed to transpire broadly in everyday social relations.
Cognitive Bases of Transference
The theoretical lineage of our model is also relevant to historical tensions between psychoanalysis and behaviorism and to tensions with cognitive-behavioral and simply cognitive theories (all of which are rooted in learning theory). Behavioral
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theories have focused on the basic mechanisms by which response patterns are learned, and cognitive theories have examined mental representations and how they function. Neither approach has been infl uenced by psychoanalytic thought, which developed as an independent fi eld grounded in motivation (whether drive- based and instinctual or more ego-based and/or interpersonal), and in interper- sonal suffering and its remediation. In this sense, our model has the advantage of being integrative (see Andersen & Saribay, 2006). It is fundamentally cognitive and comparable with basic processes of learning, and yet is also infused with moti- vation and emotion in a way that is focused on interpersonal patterns and notions of self.
Most importantly, our approach to transference is social-cognitive and relies heavily on social construct theory (Higgins, 1996a), antecedents for which can be found in Kelly’s (1955) personal construct theory. Social construct theory focuses on transient and chronic sources of accessibility of mental constructs and how these bias interpretation, based in part on their applicability to the stimulus at hand. The cognitive bases of transference show that signifi cant-other represen- tations function much as other exemplars and social categories do, except that they are more robust in interpersonal perception (e.g., Andersen & Cole, 1990;
Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995). Transference occurs as an essentially
“normal” process not especially associated with pathology (i.e., it refl ects a basic aspect of social information processing), and yet also involves “going beyond the information given” (Bruner, 1957) about the new person. To the extent that trans- ference evokes the motivation to be connected, which is relevant to the signifi cant other, the individual may wish to be connected with a new person in transference.
Indeed, this may oil the wheels of interpersonal interaction. In psychotherapy, a positive transference may help enable an authentic therapeutic alliance by pro- moting motives for connection (Miranda & Andersen, 2007). We assume that the outcome of transference will depend on the content and valence of the signifi cant- other representation and of the relational patterns involved.
The Relational Self: Our Theoretical Framework for Understanding Personality and Social Behavior
The model of the relational self (see Andersen & Chen, 2002) is an extension of our research on transference, which proposes that individuals possess separate (though potentially related) relational selves with each signifi cant other in their lives. Each relational self captures ways of relating to a particular other and of expressing and experiencing the self in this other’s presence. Through repeated interactions, aspects of the self experienced with the signifi cant other become “entangled” in memory with signifi cant-other knowledge (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Andersen et al., 1997). These representations contain not only idiosyncratic relationship information but also shared realities, such as the respective roles occupied in the relationship (e.g., Andersen & Chen, 2002; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991;
Baldwin, 1992; Baum & Andersen, 1999; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Ogilvie & Ash- more, 1991). The relational self is indirectly activated when a signifi cant-other rep-
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resentation is activated, i.e., transference occurs, leading to changes in how the self is experienced and expressed in the immediate context (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). The notion of relational selves allows us to offer an interpersonal view of personality that simultaneously addresses the regularities of a person and variabil- ity in behavior across situations (see also Higgins, 1990).