Of course, motivation is central to psychodynamic theories that have infl uenced our model and must be addressed in any adequate model of personality. Many the- ories have advocated, for example, a fundamental need for human connection—for relatedness, tenderness, attachment, or belonging (see Adler, 1927/1957; Bakan, 1966; Bowlby, 1969; Fairbairn, 1952; J. R. Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Guisinger
& Blatt, 1994; Helgeson, 1994; Horney, 1939, 1945; McAdams, 1985, 1989; Rog- ers, 1951; Safran, 1990; Sullivan, 1953). Recent social psychology has also begun to address basic human needs (e.g., Batson, 1990; Deci, 1995; S. T. Fiske, 2003).
The need for connection and belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) in particular is refl ected in a growing body of work on the cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences of social bonds. Some of these consequences are known to arise as a function of contingencies for acceptance or rejection that one experiences
RT4509X_C004.indd 86
RT4509X_C004.indd 86 1/3/2008 11:59:07 AM1/3/2008 11:59:07 AM
with signifi cant others as well as with other individuals, such as those representing a group (e.g., Ayduk, Mendoza-Denton, Mischel, Downey, Peake, & Rodriguez, 2000; Bandura, 1986; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Downey
& Feldman, 1996; Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995;
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Smith, Murphy, & Coats, 1999).
We also give the need for human connection a central place in our theory.
Without such a need, it is diffi cult to imagine why an individual would have any signifi cant relationships at all. Without some degree of connection, or when all connection is hampered, it would seem the problematic consequences can be pro- found. Our model assumes other needs beyond this, such as needs for autonomy or freedom (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985); for mastery, competence, or control (e.g., Selig- man, 1975); for meaning (e.g., Becker, 1971); and for felt security (e.g., Epstein, 1973). Of course, these needs are also prominent in a wide array of psychological theories (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Andersen et al., 1997; Bakan, 1966; Bandura, 1977, 1989; Baumeister, 1991; Becker, 1973; Bruner, 1990; Deci &
Ryan, 1991; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Frankl, 1959; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Klinger, 1977; Park & Folkman, 1997; Pennebaker, 1997; Silver & Wortman, 1980; Sullivan, 1953; White, 1959).
In conceptualizing the workings of the motivational system in transference, and in empirically investigating it, we adopt the social-cognitive view that motives and goals are stored in memory as mental constructs. This view assumes that goals can be triggered like any other mental construct, shaping cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses (e.g., Bargh, 1990, 1997; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). Goal states and motives, however, are assumed to uniquely energize behavior through the tension between desired end states and also one’s proximity to that end state (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Kruglanski, 1996), sug- gesting the importance of examining the unique properties of goals and motives separately from other types of representations.
We argue that signifi cant-other representations are linked in memory with goals one typically pursues in relation to the other (Andersen et al., 1996; Berk &
Andersen, 2000), as much research now shows (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003a, 2003b). Motivations toward the signifi cant other, and goals fostered by them (or made salient by their real or imagined presence) should all be key parts of the relational self. Self-regulation should also fi gure as an essential part of the relational self, due to the emotional-motivational relevance of signifi cant others for the self. Understanding how the motivational system functions in transference and in the relational self may thus provide a key avenue for conceptualizing the link to personality.
Transference: Methodology and Basic Evidence
We turn now to some basic fi ndings that empirically demonstrate the transference process. We begin with a brief characterization of our research paradigm, and then focus on cognitive and evaluative-affective indices of transference, which provide evidence for the idea that when a new person resembles one’s signifi cant other, one’s representation of this other will be activated and applied to that new person.
RT4509X_C004.indd 87
RT4509X_C004.indd 87 1/3/2008 11:59:07 AM1/3/2008 11:59:07 AM
Throughout, we indicate how this is relevant to personality and social behavior, about which we say more in the evidence concerned with the relational self.
METHODOLOGY IN BRIEF
In our research on the social-cognitive process of transference, a signifi cant-other representation is typically activated based on triggering cues operationalized as descriptive features about a new person whom participants expect to meet. These features are actually characteristics of the signifi cant other such as attitudes, hab- its, styles of relating, physical characteristics, and dispositions that are derived from the participant’s own descriptions of their signifi cant other. These features are then used to trigger the signifi cant-other representation based on their appar- ent applicability (see Higgins, 1996a) to the new person. We assume that cues emanating from (or read about) a new person will activate the representation to the extent that they “map onto” the participant’s view of the signifi cant other. This activated representation is in turn used to perceive the new person, leading to a number of cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses revealing the occurrence of transference.
More specifi cally, in a preliminary session participants are led to think of a signifi cant other and are asked to write open-ended descriptions of this individ- ual (or a few, depending on the study). Each sentence is to describe the signifi - cant other distinctively, rather than in a way that is descriptive of just anyone. At least two weeks later, participants take part in a supposedly unrelated experiment and are led to believe that another person whom they will meet later on is being interviewed next door. Participants in the signifi cant-other resemblance condition are presented with an equal number of positive and negative descriptions of this
“interaction partner,” some of which are derived from sentences they generated in the fi rst session to describe their signifi cant other. Following exposure to these fea- tures about the new person, participants’ memory of the features, their evaluation, affect, motives, and expectancies regarding the new person, and their self-ratings and behavior may be assessed, depending on the particular study. Importantly, for each experimental participant, another participant in the control condition is exposed to the exact same features about the new person. This one-to-one yoking of participants allows stimulus content to be perfectly controlled across conditions, showing that the effects arise not just as a function of the features presented, but based on activation of the signifi cant-other representation.
This combined idiographic-nomothetic design permits us to tap the specifi c, idiosyncratic aspects of an individual’s actual life experience—assuring the mean- ingfulness of the stimuli—while still allowing for the examination of generaliz- able mental processes across a range of people. Indeed, although the transference process itself is not idiographic, it is based on idiographic content. Even though we believe that relevant individual differences might facilitate or inhibit transference, we have repeatedly demonstrated its occurrence in fairly diverse samples (in terms of gender and cultural background). Such a method, capturing both idiographic and normative aspects of the self and behavior, is of value in conceptualizing trans-
RT4509X_C004.indd 88
RT4509X_C004.indd 88 1/3/2008 11:59:08 AM1/3/2008 11:59:08 AM
ference as a phenomenon that underlies both variability and stability in the expres- sion and experience of the self. We turn now to the basic evidence.