Socioeconomic Indicators of Euroscepticism at the Regional Level in Slovakia (2020– 2022)
4. The Peculiarities of the Slovak Socioeconomic Determinants of Euroscepticism in the Regions
As the most recent parliamentary elections show (the National Council of the Slovak Republic elections in 2020), we observe considerable support for Eurosceptic parties, which is the joint result of Moderate Eurosceptics and Europessimists (see Table 1).
Table 1. The electoral support for Eurosceptics in the regions of the Slovak Republic (the 2020 Parliamentary Elections)
Region Europessimists Moderate
Eurosceptic Score
Bratislava region 9.11 % 18.68 % 27.79 %
Trnava region 10.98 % 12.72 % 23.7 %
Nitra region 12.64 % 13.23 % 25.87 %
Košice region 13.5 % 13.55 % 27.05 %
Prešov region 15.7 % 12.47 % 28.17 %
Banská Bystrica region 16.38 % 14.72 % 31.1 %
Žilina region 17.95 % 14.11 % 32.06 %
Trenčin region 16.7 % 15.46 % 32.16 %
Source: The authors’ calculations are based on the results of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (Voľby a referenda, n.d.)
Based on the electoral support level, we differentiate three groups of regions in Slovakia: (1) weak regions6— the Bratislava region, (2) moderate (“transitive”)
6 Only the capital belongs to this group, hence, it is an exception.
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regions (< 30 %)— Trnava, Nitra, Prešov and Košice regions, and (3) stable regions (> 30 %)— Trenčin, Žilina, and Banská- Bistrica regions (see Figure 1). Bratislava region- wise is where the most reactionary Europessimists have won less than 10 %, which is the lowest figure throughout the country. Given the socioeconomic dynamics in the Bratislava region, we have allocated it into a separate group.
Figure 1. Fragmentation of the Slovak Regions by the Support for Eurosceptic parties (According to the 2020 National Council Elections)
Source: The authors’ calculations are based on the results of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (Voľby a referenda, n.d.)
Among the Slovak regions, the pro- European Bratislava region has stood out for showing consistently high support for progressive political forces, for example,
“soft” populist OĽaNO or “presidential” Progressive Slovakia. Europessimists in the region have repeatedly lost from election to election. In 2020, they similarly failed to pass the 5 % barrier. Kotleba’s ĽSNS’s best result was 4.62 %, but even this was insufficient to obtain the necessary 5 %. Voting preferences in Bratislava often contradict those in the east of the country. Several decades of election campaigns in independent Slovakia have led to the formation of a sociopolitical cleavage of “West VS East” (Haydanka, 2021). Sociopolitical cleavages in the former transitory CEE countries7 deepen the electoral differentiation between the capital and peripheral regions.
7 We cannot but mention the seminal study on the nature of sociopolitical cleavages in the post- communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe by Stephen Whitefield (2002).
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Regarding its socioeconomic condition, the capital region stands out noticeably from the rest of the regions in Slovakia. Moreover, its GDP per capita approximates that of the highest indicators among the EU NUTS 2 (≥120) (Eurostat, n.d.) and the best economic indicators throughout the country. In the region, the minimum unemployment rate is slightly over 2 %, the average gross wages are 22 % higher than the national average, and the threat of poverty is in the marginal range of over 6 %. The capital is also the undisputed leader regarding the residents’ educational qualifications. Almost every third resident of the Bratislava region has a university degree. Since independence, it has also been peculiar for its “European” history and electoral support for pro- European politicians in opposition to reactionary conservatives. In this regard, worth mentioning are the fateful for Slovakia’s European future 1998 parliamentary elections (“collective democrat” Mikuláš Dzurinda8 vs. “people’s populist” Vladimír Mečiar9) or the recent 2019 presidential elections (the new face of Slovak politics Zuzana Čaputová10 vs. Robert Fico’s candidate Maroš Šefčovič11). Therefore, the Bratislava region is characterized by an advantageous socioeconomic situation and pro- European political traditions, which lay the foundations for tenacious Euro- optimism. At the same time, the status of Euro- pessimist parties, primarily right- wing ones, is still marginalized.
The second group includes four “moderate” regions: two from the West and two from the East. Paradoxically, the group combines regions that not only come from the most polar parts of the country but stereotypically consolidate the most opposite, for example, liberally oriented West and conservative East. Let’s analyze the history of elections in post- socialist Slovakia. Notably, ideologically- liberal pro- European politicians get more support in the West of the country.
8 Mikuláš Dzurinda headed the anti- Mečiar coalition SDK (slov.— Slovenská demokratická koalícia) to change the foreign policy course and deepen the Euro- Atlantic integration of the post- communist Slovak Republic.
9 Vladimír Mečiar is the most outstanding Slovak politician of the 1990s, having implemented conservative politics through populist methods. He positioned himself as a “people’s populist” because of his never- ending concern for the Slovak people (Kevin Deegan- Krause 2012).
10 Zuzana Čaputová’s political image strongly resonates with mainstream Slovak politicians, frequently accused of corruption (Haydanka & Haydanka, 2022, p. 213).
She is a well- known public activist who managed to become the first female President of the Slovak Republic.
11 After the deep 2018 political crisis, the notorious Robert Fico sought to maintain his political influence in Slovakia. In the presidential elections, Fico supported the diplomat Maroš Šefčovič (Haydanka & Haydanka, 2022, p. 213).
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On the other hand, in the eastern regions, conservatives or populists more often get elected to the Parliament and win in the presidential elections (Haydanka, 2021). As we can see, the sociopolitical cleavage “West VS East” is not relatable when dividing the electoral sympathies between “Moderate Eurosceptics and Europessimism.” Eurosceptic parties have a pronounced electoral advantage in the eastern Prešov and Košice regions (fluctuating at 27– 28 %). In the Trnava and Nitra regions, Eurosceptics get somewhat less— 23 % and 25 %, respectively. The level of support for Europessimists is yet another distinctive feature within this group. In the Trnava region, they got a cumulative result of 10 % of the votes,12 whereas, in the Prešov region, the right- wing radicals- Eurosceptics appeared quite competitive.13 Despite the comparable level of support for Eurosceptics, this group of four Slovak regions is quite fragmented and transitive.
Regarding socioeconomic indicators, regions differ considerably. According to the Regional Development Strategy of the Slovak Republic, the Trnava Region is the second most competitive region in terms of its potential (Metodika tvorby PHRSR, 2020). The promising regions also include Nitra and Košice, with high indicators of gross wages, approaching the national level of 1,211 euros.
The Nitra region is the second best after Bratislava, with unemployment of only 4.5 %. The neighboring Trnava region has a similarly low unemployment rate (6 %). Worse is the situation in the Košice region, with unemployment exceeding 10 % and one of the highest in the country numbers of people at risk of poverty (every fifth resident). However, the worst indicators are in the Prešov region, not only in this group but throughout the country, with gross wages lower than a thousand euros, the highest unemployment rate (11.4 %) in the country, and over 20 % of people at risk of poverty. The West Slovak regions are characterized by their proximity to the capital, which fully meets European socioeconomic standards. Also, closeness to the borders with Austria and the Czech Republic increase employment opportunities. Based on the statistics, the level of foreign investments in the Trnava and Nitra regions has significantly grown in recent years (Priame zahraničné investície, n.d.). In the Košice region, there is a disparity in the socioeconomic development of the regional center of Košice and the periphery. With a population of 250,000, Košice is the second most populated city in Slovakia, concentrating the country’s multiple industrial facilities. In the Prešov region, socioeconomic prospects are associated with the
12 The most influential ĽSNS was only fifth.
13 ĽSNS was third, receiving 8.5 % of the votes.
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“green economy” and the development of the agricultural sector. However, it is characterized by a significant outflow of labor (economically active persons).
In each of the four regions, the number of people with university degrees ranges from 15 % to 16 %. Four large university centers,14 which can compete with Bratislava universities, successfully operate in the west and provide training for students from non- European countries in the east. According to the number of university graduates, the regions of the “transitive” group are stable and correspond to national indicators.
The last group, or stable regions, is the geographical core of Slovakia. The Žilina, Trenčin, and Banská Bystrica regions are located at the intersection of the country’s pro- European West and the conservative East. The parliamentary and regional elections confirm the high level of conservatism of Slovak voters in these regions. Conservatives and populists traditionally stand firm there. In particular, in the last elections to the National Council in 2020, Robert Fico’s SMER- SD arrived second in all three regions. Slovak social populists conceded only to their biggest competitor, Igor Matovic’s OĽANO. At the same time, the elections occurred during a deep political crisis and Robert Fico’s delegitimization as a politician. Moreover, one of the most notorious Slovak politicians, Marian Kotleba, was elected the president (slov.— Župan) of the Banská Bystrica region in 2013.
The 2020 parliamentary elections confirmed that every third voter is Eurosceptically- minded. Notably, well known for their radical political position, Europessimists obtained significant electoral support. Eventually, having received 9 %– 10 % of the votes, ĽSNS lost only to the two leaders, OĽANO and SMER- SD.
In the Žilina region, the right- wing radical SNS was only a few hundred votes short of passing the voting barrier (4.73 %), whereas Moderate Eurosceptics of SME RODINA and SaS have successfully overcome it. The results of the 2020 parliamentary elections only confirmed persistent Eurosceptic sentiments in the three central Slovak regions.
In general, socioeconomic determinants in the Žilina, Trenčin, and Banská Bystrica regions create a heterogeneous environment for Eurosceptic parties.
Foremost, the Banská Bystrica region demonstrates the worst economic indicators throughout the country, for example, the risk of poverty, according to which every fourth of its residents is in this group. Over 10 % of the unemployed and a gross monthly salary of slightly over a thousand Euros led to a stable social
14 Trnava University in Trnava, Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice and University of Prešov.
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stratum dissatisfied with the actions of the pro- European authorities and the European Union in general. On the other hand, the level of electoral support for right- wing populists is growing. Compared to Banská Bystrica, the economic indicators in Žilina and Trenčin regions make them stand out. Both are in a good position regarding unemployment, gross wages, and the number of people at risk of poverty. According to these, the Žilina and Trenčin regions correlate with the “transitive” group and run after the capital. Therefore, based on economic indicators, these Central Slovak regions can hardly be considered “persistently Eurosceptic.” Regarding the number of university graduates, all three in the stable group show fair indicators, the situation being slightly worse in the Banská Bystrica region.15 In each region, large state universities operate, with Banská Bystrica university having over 10.000 students (slov.— Univerzita Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici), which is a high indicator for Slovakia.
5. Conclusion
We argue that the relationship between the principal socioeconomic indicators and the level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties touches on specific elections and regional development features and requires more in- depth insight.
To conclude, we argue that the relationship between the principal socioeconomic indicators and the level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties touches on specific elections and regional development features and requires more in- depth insight. As the most recent parliamentary elections in the Slovak Republic show, we can outline three groups of regions based on the level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties: the Bratislava region, the group “West- East,” and the Central Slovak group. Only the Prešov and partly Banská Bystrica regions show low (insignificant) indicators of socioeconomic development as a prerequisite for growing electoral support for Eurosceptics. In the Bratislava region, high socioeconomic indicators sustain the pro- European orientations of residents.
The “West- East” group, which united as many as four areas, looks contradictory.
Thus, we can call into question the long- standing Slovak sociopolitical cleavage of
“West VS East.” Despite the high socioeconomic level, the central Slovak regions of Žilina and Trenčin, with considerable support for Eurosceptics, remain a mystery. This way or another, we should redirect research into socioeconomic determinants of Euroscepticism from the national to the regional level.
15 Žilina region— 17.6 %, Trenčin region— 16.7 %, Banská- Bystrica region— 15.8 % of people with university degrees.
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