In this last section, we aim to identify some areas of research and scientifi c reasoning that might connect the insights already reviewed to the phenomenon of collective emotions.
Th ese are the importance of self/other distinction in social interaction, and the fl exible
FROM THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY TO COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS 73
modulation of both social and non-social emotional experiences by automatic and con- trolled processes.
As outlined earlier, full-blown empathy requires the observer to track the “author” of the emotions felt in him- or herself. Whenever such tracking is lost, the observer might enter a state of emotional contagion, where he or she is not aware of the fact that the emo- tions he or she is experiencing have been instigated by others. Th is lack of self-awareness and self/other distinction is one putative mechanism of collective aff ective experiences such as the high synchrony between individuals that occurs during mass phenomena, such as at music concerts or at political demonstrations. Th ere, the individual becomes part of a larger crowd, and loses his or her ability for self-awareness and self/other dis- tinction. Fostering the ability of self-awareness might therefore be one mechanism to inhibit collective emotions in cases when they are detrimental to a society’s or a group’s welfare—such as when the collective emotion might result in acts of violence or motivate the infl iction of harm in other groups. Conversely, deliberately lowering self-awareness might help to promote collective experiences in cases when they are advantageous or desired (such as during peaceful political movements, or the mundane case of a joint festivity or celebration). Interestingly, neuroscientifi c fi ndings indicate that self/other distinction has both a perceptual and an action regulation component. More specifi cally, areas in the right temporo-parietal junction seem related to the sensory detection of a mismatch between self- and other-related perceptual, mental, aff ective and cognitive representations. In contrast, areas in the dorsal and anterior medial prefrontal cortex seem involved in regulating action tendencies that allow the observer to overcome being infl uenced too strongly by the other—in particular in cases when there is a mismatch between one’s own action intentions or aff ect and those of the other (e.g., Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff , & Decety, 2007; Lamm et al., 2010; Silani, Lamm, Ruff , & Singer, 2013).
Th e investigation of empathy by social neuroscience has documented the fl exibility of the human mind in responding to others and also showed that our emotional responses to others are not an all-or-none phenomenon. A key aspect for understanding collective emotions might therefore be the fl exible interplay between automatic and controlled pro- cesses, which is also one of the key concepts used to understand the cognitive, emotional, and social processes supporting social behavior in general (Lieberman, 2007). Th e ability to regulate our emotions and the ensuing behavioral responses also reminds us that all emotion theories in psychology and neuroscience stress that cognition plays a crucial role for all types of aff ective experiences (e.g., Rolls, 2007). In these theories, emotions are not only what they are according to many folk psychological concepts—a feeling state—but at the core of their concept also contain cognitive, behavioral, and bodily-physiological components. In the domain of cognition, so-called executive functions (such as response inhibition or executive control) as well as appraisal processes (which in a way “evaluate”
the occurring bodily and feeling responses taking into account situational and contex- tual variables) are important to understand the occurrence and persistence of emotional states.
In order to understand the phenomenon of collective emotions, it is therefore also important to understand how such mostly intentional and refl exive processes inter- act with feelings and physiological responses that are instigated mostly automatically, sensory-driven, and pre-refl exively. Th is is not to say however that the latter processes should be disregarded. Aft er all, the origin of the word emotion (from ex and motio ) reminds us that a crucial function of emotions is to induce behavioral tendencies and to prepare the organism to act upon them. It is interesting to note that some scholars have even argued that emotions are a type of “natural force” which is able to activate our reasoning, our body, and our behavior, and that this force is especially powerful and sus- tainable when activated in a collective fashion (Ciompi & Endert, 2011). In conclusion, taking into account both the cognitive, controlled, and the more automatic, aff ect-related components of collective emotions will likely enable a better understanding of the coor- dinated mass behaviors that are one of the most fascinating facets and eff ects of collective emotions.
Acknowledgments
Claus Lamm acknowledges funding from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF, P22813), the University of Vienna (research cluster “Multimodal neuroimaging in clinical neu- rosciences”), and the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF; projects CS11-005 and CS11-016), during the writing of this chapter. We thank Christoph Eisenegger for his critical comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
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Neurocognitive mechanisms of attentional prioritization in social interactions
Tobias Brosch
University of Geneva
Our environment constantly presents us with a rich fl ow of continuously changing infor- mation: each second, about 11 million bits of visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gusta- tory stimulus input enter our senses (Zimmermann, 1989). As the capacity of our brain is limited, not all information can be processed and evaluated in detail (Marois & Ivanoff , 2005). However, in order to successfully negotiate a complex world and adequately respond to its challenges, it is important that we rapidly detect important information and prepare adaptive responses. Th is feat is accomplished by multiple attention systems, which fi lter the stream of incoming information and select the most relevant subset of stimuli for more in-depth processing (Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011; Driver, 2001).
Attentional selection can be driven by several diff erent factors, such as low-level features of a stimulus (e.g., high-intensity, exogenous attention ) and factors related to the observer (e.g., current goals or expectations, endogenous attention ). Furthermore, the emotional relevance of a stimulus for the motivational concerns of an individual is an important factor for attentional selection ( emotional attention , see Vuilleumier & Brosch, 2009, for a review).
Humans are the “social animal,” essentially living and operating in complex, aff ectively charged social environments. Living in a large social group provides many benefi ts, such as protection from enemies and the opportunity to learn from others, but also some dangers, such as potential aggression and competition from group members (Emery, 2000). As a consequence, interactions with others are highly relevant for our well-being and survival.
Given the high relevance of social interactions, it is adaptive to prioritize social informa- tion that may help us to better negotiate such interactions. One of the most important sources of social information is the human face. Th e face conveys an impressive variety of socially relevant information, about relatively stable features such as ethnicity, age, or gender, but also about more malleable features such as the emotional state or the current intentions of a person (Calder, Rhodes, Johnson, & Haxby, 2011). For example, signals conveyed by changes in someone’s facial expression, such as a brief frown or a smile, can be predictive of hostile or friendly behavior, and thus are crucial in determining and