Empathy’s linguistic roots lie in the Old Greek “empatheia” (passion), which is composed of “en” (in) and “pathos” (feeling). At a basic phenomenological level, empathy denotes an aff ective response to the directly perceived, imagined, or inferred emotional state of another being (for an excellent overview of how “empathy” has been defi ned and concep- tualized, see Batson, 2008). In our own understanding, empathy requires the engagement of two key components. Th e fi rst component is sharing the other person’s aff ect. More precisely, an empathic response requires that an individual’s (referred to as the observer ) perception or imagination of someone else’s (the target ) aff ective state triggers a feeling in the observer that is partially isomorphic to what the target is feeling. Second, and equally important, the observer has to be aware at any point in time that the source of his or her feelings is the target. Th is stresses the central importance of the capacity for self/other distinction, which is the ability to distinguish between mental and bodily representations related to the self or to the other (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2006;
Singer & Lamm, 2009). In a computational sense, therefore, empathy could be regarded as enabling a (usually impartial) “copy” (“feeling with/as”) of the target’s emotional state by the observer, with full awareness of which are the “copied” parts and which parts originate in the observer him- or herself.
In order to avoid confusion with other terms, some conceptual clarifi cations are needed.
Fig. 5.1 illustrates fi ve key concepts related to empathy, which can occur in a chain of events originating from motor mimicry and ultimately result in prosocial behavior.
Although these variables and terms each refer to a diff erent phenomenon, they usually occur in concert and are connected to each other in a sequential and probabilistic man- ner. In many cases, in particular if directly confronted with emotional expressions of a target person, mimicry and emotional contagion precede empathy, which likely results in empathic concern and compassion, and in turn might result in prosocial behavior (see Hess, Houde, & Fischer, Chapter 7, this volume, for a discussion). For example, witness- ing another person expressing pain on their face has been shown to result in mimicking of this expression and a contagious and partial sharing of the painful state (e.g., Lamm,
WHAT “IS” EMPATHY? 65
Porges, Cacioppo, & Decety, 2008; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002). If the observer becomes aware of his or her emotional response and that its source is located in the other per- son, this initial emotional response results in a full-blown empathic response. Depending upon the context and the observer’s emotion-regulation capacities, this empathic sharing might motivate other-related motivational states such as empathic concern or compas- sion, which are known to be conducive to prosocial behavior (e.g., Batson, 1991; Lamm, Meltzoff , & Decety, 2007).
Motor mimicry describes our tendency to automatically synchronize our move- ments with those of another person, and there is considerable evidence that perceiving a target’s aff ective facial expressions activates the corresponding facial muscles in the observer (see Dimberg & Oehman, 1996, for review). A weak correlation between the strength of such mimicry responses and trait measures of empathy has also been found (Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2002). While this has been taken as evidence that motor resonance may increase empathy in an automatic and sensory-driven fashion, more critical accounts have contested this conclusion and stress the role of mimicry as a social signal which increases rapport and fondness between self and other (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren, Horgan, Chartrand, & Dijkmans, 2004). We propose that motor mimicry might subserve both functions and support a virtuous circle sustaining smooth social interac- tions (Heyes, in press), where overt signals of sharing another person’s emotional states will in turn result in increased resonance and rapport of that other person.
What is empathy?
“Feeling what someone else is feeling”
mimicry
emotional contagion
empathy
prosocial behaviour empathic
concern/
compassion
Fig. 5.1 Illustration of fi ve key terms related to empathy, ranging from mimicry to prosocial behavior. Left to right: © Image Source/SuperStock; © Istockphoto.com; © PhotoAlto/Alamy;
© ispstock/Fotolia; © LOOK Die Bildagentur der Fotografen GmbH/Alamy.
Emotional contagion is another concept which is strongly relevant yet clearly distinct from empathy (see Hess et al., Chapter 7, this volume; Hatfi eld, Carpenter, & Rapson, Chapter 8, this volume). It denotes the tendency to “catch” other people’s emotions and has also been labeled as “primitive empathy” (Hatfi eld, Rapson, & Le, 2008; Hatfi eld et al., Chapter 8, this volume) or as “aff ective empathy” (de Waal, 2008). Th e latter term has been used particularly oft en in comparative research where the quest for vicarious emotional responses in non-human animals, including rodents, canines, or apes, has so far gener- ated evidence that our ancestors show vicarious responses similar to those of humans.
However, given that self-awareness might not be as highly developed in non-human ani- mals these responses should rather be labeled as emotional contagion than as full-blown empathic responses (e.g., Ben-Ami Bartal, Decety, & Mason, 2011; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Notably, even in humans, babies start crying in response to distress calls of other babies long before they develop a sense of a self that is separate from others. Th is sense only emerges around the age of about 12 months, when children also start to show fi rst signs of other- rather than self-related vicarious responses and behaviors (Hoff man, 2000). Taken together, motor mimicry and emotional contagion might in many instances be important antecedents of empathy, but in general should neither be regarded as neces- sary nor as suffi cient processes for the experience of empathy.
With respect to the consequences of vicarious emotional responses, we need to separate empathy from sympathy, empathic concern, and compassion. In all four cases, aff ective changes are induced in the observer in response to the perceived or imagined aff ective state of another person. However, only during the experience of empathy do we see vicari- ous responses that are unaff ected by the observer (in the sense of the “copied state” or “feeling with/as” referred to earlier), while sympathy, empathic concern, and compassion carry additional “feeling for” processes originating in the observer. For example, interact- ing with a sad person in the case of empathy will be associated with a state of sadness in the observer that is similar to the one of the target. Sympathy, empathic concern, and compassion, however, will be characterized by additional feelings, such as concern about the target’s welfare or the strong wish for alleviating his or her suff ering. Th ese processes are the outcome of the interaction between observer and target, but go beyond what the target is actually feeling. Th e main distinction between empathy and terms such as sym- pathy, empathic concern, and compassion is therefore whether the observer’s emotions are inherently other-oriented (“feeling for”; compassion, sympathy, empathic concern) or whether they refl ect aff ective sharing in the sense of “feeling with/as” (empathy) the other person.
Finally, many accounts of empathy (Batson, 1991; de Waal, 2008) relate its occurrence to prosocial, other-oriented motivations (i.e., a motivation with the goal to increase the other person’s well-being or welfare or to forego egoistic, self-related benefi ts for the ben- efi ts of others). In our understanding of empathy as “feeling with” another person, this is not necessarily and always the case as empathy in its purest form simply enables us to feel as accurately as possible what others are feeling, without any sort of valuation attached to these feelings. Whether this then has prosocial, antisocial, or neutral consequences
THE NEURAL BASES OF EMPATHY—A CORE NETWORK OF SHARED AFFECT 67
is the result of other variables, including other social emotions (such as envy or guilt), as well as acquired behavioral tendencies, moral values, or the personal relationship between observer and target (which if competitive can even result in counter-empathy;
e.g., Lanzetta & Englis, 1989; Yamada, Lamm, & Decety, 2011). Notably, while consistent evidence for the link between “feeling for” (empathic concern, compassion) and prosocial behavior exists (e.g., Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg et al., 1989), a clear-cut empirical demonstration of a link between empathy as “feeling-with” and prosocial behavior is still missing.
Finally, it is important to note that other scholars in social neuroscience as well as in social psychology have focused on cognitive or inferential aspects of empathy that do not include aff ective sharing as a core component, but rather focus on the mechanisms involved in what is called empathic accuracy—which is the ability to correctly label and quantify the emotions felt by a target (e.g., Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Th ese aspects of empa- thy are not within the scope of the present review.