2 Theory
Hugh T. Miller
CONTENTS
2.1 Theory as Hypothesis-Producing, Nomothetic Generalization... 13 2.1.1 A Coherent Account of the Facts ... 13 2.1.2 Theory=Data versus Data=Theory... 14 2.2 Theory as Narrative ... 16 2.2.1 The Quest of Reason ... 17 2.2.2 Metaphors ... 17 2.3 Theory and Practice ... 19 2.3.1 Theory as Something to Apply to Practice ... 19 2.3.2 The Theory–Practice Gap ... 20 2.4 Summary ... 21 2.5 Exercises ... 21 2.5.1 Intelligence and Reification ... 21 2.5.2 Precession of Simulacra... 22 2.5.3 Thought Experiments... 22 References ... 23 This chapter focuses not on fact-finding or truth-seeking (the functions of methods) but on question- raising and redescription (the functions of theory). To oversimplify for the sake of brevity, although the method-oriented researcher seeks to get the facts right andfind the truth, the theory-oriented scholar confronts established truths by reconciling incoherent elements of a theory into a more coherent narrative, by reinterpreting thefindings, or by deploying new and different categories to reframe the question.
This chapter considers theory in three ways: (1) as a source of hypotheses and generalizable deductions, (2) as a narrative of reason, andfinally (3) as one side of the infamous theory–practice gap. The now-standard understanding of theory (as a source of hypotheses) derives mostly from Karl Popper’s (1959) notion that theory is a logical-deductive set of statements from which testable propositions can be drawn and then subject to tests of evidence.
2.1 THEORY AS HYPOTHESIS-PRODUCING, NOMOTHETIC
synonymous with terms such as hunch or guess. Theory is often used synonymously with model, a term that emphasizes interrelations among observable phenomena. The formal dictionary definition of theory emphasizes the connecting of facts to one another through analysis. The idea behind theory in research is that generalizations declaring themselves to be descriptive of reality are phrased in a way that is testable.
Theory can be deployed to reinterpret the apparently obvious, common sense version of reality.
For example, it is readily observable that the sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening. But this patently observable fact was put to a severe challenge by a new narrative developed in the 1500s when Nicholas Copernicus theorized that the earth rotated around the sun and also rotated on an axis fixed in a particular direction—hence accounting for seasons as well as the apparent rising and setting of the sun. Observables such as seasons and apparent star movement became coherent in Copernicus’s theory. There had for centuries been speculation that the sun rather than the earth was at the center of things, but Copernicus’s system was among the most complete and coherent alternatives. Galileo, making observations using what was at the time a new-fangled telescope, provided some empirical evidence to support the Copernican system. His observations indicated that, like the moon, Venus went through phases of lightness and darkness (e.g., full moon, half moon). Although these observations of Venus were not proof of Copernicus’s theory, they strongly supported its plausibility. The understanding that Venus is a planet that rotates around the sun constitutes however a small portion of the physics or astronomy theory under consideration. But by peeling off testable hypotheses from the whole of the theoretical account, the scientific investigation of a theory’s veracity can be enhanced (or possibly undermined) with empirical data.
Peeling off a testable hypothesis is accomplished by developing a construct. A construct is a concept taken from theory that is then tailored for testing in the empirical world. A phase (as in a phase of the moon) is a construct that urges the observer to pay attention to the pattern of light reflecting off a celestial object in orbit. The construct is further translated into categories or variables that can be observed, measured, or counted (e.g., full moon, new moon) through the use of some instrument (e.g., eye or telescope) capable of affirming the presence or absence of the phenomenon under investigation.
Creating indicators capable of connecting a theoretical construct to an observable presence is one of the most challenging and uncertain tasks for the researcher. In the social sciences, the correspondence between conceptual constructs and empirical reality is virtually always suspect or debatable. For example, the measurement problems associated with unemployment rate are under constant challenge on the grounds of validity even though unemployment rate is one of the more stable and consensual economic indicators.* Potential social science categories such as ‘‘drunk driver,’’ ‘‘student,’’ or‘‘bureaucrat’’are useful in many contexts, but they contain value and role prescriptions and are not simply neutral descriptors. The indicators actually used by practicing researchers are often merely a matter of negotiation and habit among the community of scholars and researchers working on the problem of unemployment or some other social problem or phenomena.
Indicators and methods that tend to endure in the social sciences are the pragmatically useful ones.
Because of the intangible nature of social phenomena, there is an implicit question mark at the end of any sentence claiming a connection between an indicator and a fact. Does a response to a survey questionnaire represent a fact?
2.1.2 THEORY=DATA VERSUS DATA=THEORY
In the philosophy of science, there has been a long discussion about the precedence of theory over data or vice versa. Is knowledge generated inductively through experience or deductively from theory? The debate has historically set empiricists apart from rationalists. Rationalism holds out the
* In the United States, for example, those who have been unemployed for long periods are systematically excluded from the count.
possibility of a priori knowledge, a mental understanding independent of sensory inputs. Empiri- cism emphasizes the importance of sensory inputs. For example, one mustfirst observe the presence of tidal variation (high and low tide being empirical facts) before one can begin to theorize about it.
The critique of empiricism is that the logic of knowledge eventually devolves into an endless stream of sensory inputs, and they would not cohere in an intellectual sense. It is one thing when the sun shines, another thing when the wind blows, another thing when the cat crosses the street, and then an insectflew by—one danged thing after another. A world without theory is but a stream of sensory images—mindless empiricism to put it harshly. Moreover, rationalists would point out that we sometimes need a category to exist before we can see instances of it in the world.‘‘Legislature,’’
‘‘prison,’’and‘‘health insurance’’might be examples of abstract concepts existing in the imagin- ation before they eventually help to create empirical reality. Until we develop the vocabulary and categories, the realities cannot be described.
The critique of rationalism (as well as a priori reasoning, intuition, or revelation) is that there is no necessary contact with the observable world. This is a problem because knowledge of nature is not derived from scripture, or ideology, or from any official authoritative narrative, but from the experience of particular cases. Hence the particularity of the circumstances matter more than conformity to general rules, however logical they may be. Moreover, there is tremendous power in the use of empirical data. Empirical evidence can debunk one theory while affirming another.
Debunking a false theory with empirical data would bring a wonderful clarity to the knowledge- building project, but social questions are rarely resolved in so clear a manner. Nor is the distinction between empiricism and rationalism so clear-cut; the philosophical and scientific mainstreams adopt aspects of both. Following Popper (1959), theory is regarded as a coherent set of logical-deductive statements from which hypotheses are derived. Empirical tests that subject these statements to falsification protocols are then fashioned by researchers. A scientific test, then, is one that can show a statement to be false if indeed it is. Whether theory precedes data or data precedes theory depends on the circumstances of the investigation.
The excitement in knowledge building takes place at the point of collision between and among data and theories. Because the sun rises each day and sets each night, any intelligent observer might hypothesize that the sun revolves around the earth. How shocking it must have been to have one’s perception of reality upended so thoroughly! The new theory advanced by Copernicus and Galileo changed the facts that were once self-evident. The facts of sunrise and sunset became nonfacts. Even so, new theory has a difficult time changing the language of the past even when the old theory has been displaced. We still speak of sunrise and sunset even though it would be hard to imagine an educated person who now believes that the sun is revolving around the earth.
The recent political conflict swirling around the theory of evolution is testimony to the difficulties faced by a theory that challenges widely held beliefs about reality. Religious believers in parts of the United States have attempted to force teachers of biology to offer a theory of creationism alongside the theory of evolution. The idea that random variation and natural selection of genetic mutations are what led to human differentiation from other primates runs profoundly contrary to many religious accounts of the origin of humans. Perhaps even more instructive than the conflicts between religion and science is that evolutionary theory itself has evolved over time.
A short theory-building example is illustrative of how the norms of science generate knowledge—a surprisingly malleable product.
Isbell (2006) tracked the changes in those evolutionary theories that attempted to explain why primates have better vision than other mammals. Arboreal theory had it that our ancestral primates lived in trees, and those without excellent vision would fall out of trees and die at a higher rate.
When challengers pointed out that other mammals such as tree squirrels without excellent vision lived in trees, the arboreal hypothesis retreated and a visual predation hypothesis emerged. In this account, primates need excellent vision because successfully stalking and grabbing their small prey requires it. But subsequent evidence showed that some primatesfind their prey using their ears or noses and not their eyes.
Recently, researchers have noticed that in primate brains the part of the visual system that has expanded the most is the region identified with the ability to distinguish nearby objects from their backgrounds and with the ability to see camouflaged objects. This is interesting. It means that the ability to see snakes, for example, might have proved functional to species survival.
Indeed, Isbell (2006) reports the species of monkeys with the sharpest eyesight tend to be those who live in closest proximity to venomous snakes. For example, the Malagasy lemurs, the primates with the least complex visual systems, live in Madagascar, a place where venomous snakes have never lived. Primates in Africa and Asia, where venomous snakes have been around for about 100 million years, have the best vision. Humans are descendants of that group. Could it be that African=Asian primates that failed to develop excellent vision were disproportionately killed by snakes? Isbell notes the observation made a century ago by P. Chalmers Mitchell and R.I. Pocock when they carried writhing snakes into a roomful of caged chimpanzees, baboons, and lemurs. The African=Asian chimpanzees and baboons were panic-stricken, chattering loudly, and retreating as high up and far away in their cages as possible. In contrast, the Malagasy lemurs, lacking sophisticated vision, were unperturbed. Hence, the snake theory of excellent human eyesight gains credibility.
This short example of theory building shows how an interaction of data and theory and a strong norm of openness to revision have contributed to the formidable power of evolutionary theory.
Despite its prestige in the scientific community, evolutionary theory continues to call itself a theory—a testimony to the hesitancy, tentativity, and open-mindedness that exemplifies scientific inquiry. Whether the snake-detection hypothesis withstands future tests of theoretical coherence and empirical observation is, consistent with the spirit of inquiry, an open question.
Though it is important to distinguish between them, empirical data and theories may not be such completely distinct categories as philosophers once portrayed them to be. Instead of insisting that theory precedes facts, or that facts precede theory, it might be better to see the two as intimately related. Facts are described differently from different theoretical perspectives. One theory can detect facts that are invisible to another theory. Arboreal theory shed light on different empirical data than visual predation theory did. Some facts—that primates lived in trees—are important in arboreal theory but not in visual predation theory. Meanwhile, the snake-vision theory makes use of correlations between the presence of snakes and complexity of vision in primates, and the conver- sation shifts. Evolution is talked about less in terms of hunting and eating, as in visual predation theory, and more in terms of avoiding being killed. In all these cases, different facts were emphasized in different theories. Because of this interdependence between theory and fact, a theory and its facts may be thought of as a paradigm or as complementary elements of a narrative.