I was very fortunate to have Professor Joni Hersch as both chairman of my thesis committee and as a mentor throughout my time at the Law and Economics degree. My first chapter focuses on the labor market impacts of the modern official English movement on the limited English proficient (LEP) population in the United States.
Introduction
CHAPTER ONE: THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH MOVEMENT AND MECHANISMS UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS ON THE WAGES OF LEP WORKERS. The Official English Movement supports the declaration of English as the official language of government in the United States and each state.
Official English Movements: Past and Present
Official English laws were unconstitutional because they prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in schools. These laws differ from the Official English laws of the 1920s as they require the use of English only when the state government is acting in its official capacity.
Conceptual Framework
Any remaining unexplained differences in wages for LEP workers in official English countries can be attributed to employment discrimination (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973). If official English laws reflect discrimination by employers against LEP workers, I expect the number of workers to decline over time.
Data and Methodology
The anti-immigrant rhetoric that often surrounds the Official English movement can encourage ethnic minorities to become more ethnocentric and resist the acquisition of English skills (Pérez 2014; Fouka 2015). These laws may also allow for feedback such that LEP workers choose lower-paying jobs with less emphasis on the English language in anticipation of employer discrimination, migrate from states that adopt official English laws, or leave the workforce altogether.
Data
Since my sample excludes those in the military, there are 22 different indicator variables for occupation in my analysis. Those in states without an official English law earn on average just 38 cents less an hour than
Methodology
Most of my sample is native-born, but my sample also contains 67,324 LEP workers and 240,746 English-proficient foreign-born. Triple difference estimates do not suffer from the same bias if unobservable abilities or other characteristics of LEP workers in states with or without official English laws did not change over the period studied.
Results
The smaller wage penalty for male LEP workers in official English states can be explained by the productivity or quality of LEP workers in official English states improving over time. I also find evidence that LEP men in official English states are less likely to be employed.
Placebo Tests
Although my analysis focuses only on wages as an outcome for LEP workers, in the appendix I also examine the effects of these laws on other employment outcomes, such as job probability. I find evidence that LEP women and men in official English states work fewer weeks and hours than their counterparts in official English states, which could be due to the shift of LEP workers in official English states to part-time work.
Shifts in the LEP Worker Population
Further, the coefficient of interest, δ1, will allow me to determine whether there is an effect of the increasing LEP population share on LEP status. My primary coefficient of interest, δ1, is not significant for either males or females, providing evidence that there is no confounding effect of LEP population shifts in my main specification.
Selective Migration
Occupational Representation in Official English States
The mean score for the importance of speaking English for LEP workers is 3.12 on a scale of 1 to 5, with a standard deviation of 0.44. Ratings of the importance of communicating with the public tell a similar story: the mean for LEP employees is 2.76 with a standard deviation of 0.64, while the mean for English-proficient workers is 3.28 with a standard deviation of 0.69.
Are LEP Workers Less Represented in Occupations that Require English Skills in
LEP Worker Productivity in Official English States
States without official English laws allowing driver's license examinations in other languages serve as the control group for this specification. There are also more LEP individuals in states that offer these driver's license exams in other languages.
Employment Discrimination
Like LEP Hispanic women, LEP Asian women in official English states are neither better nor worse off than their ethnic counterparts. LEP workers do not translate into a wage penalty relative to other white workers in official English states.
Conclusion
The 'Official English' Movement and Symbolic Language Politics in the United States," The Western Political Quarterly. Official English and the States: Influences on Declaring English the Official Language of the United States." Quarterly magazine for political research. The Effects of Official English Laws on Limited-English Skilled Workers,” Journal of Labor Economics.
Individuals are considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they report speaking English “not well” or “not at all.” “OE law” indicates the presence of an official English law in state k at time t. Individuals are considered limited English proficient (LEP) if they report speaking English “not well” or “not at all.” “Statute” indicates the presence of an official English law in the form of a statute in state k at time t.
Background
In the following two years, 287(g) officers identified more than 100,000 identified noncitizens for possible removal (Parrado 2012). Each year, the ACS samples nearly three million household unit addresses in the United States. Variation in the timing of 287(g) agreements provides a quasi-experiment to analyze the impact of these agreements on immigrant labor markets.
Results
The identifying assumption in my model is that, in the absence of the reform, wages for immigrant workers in jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements would have evolved similarly to wages for immigrant workers in jurisdictions without such agreements.
All Immigrant Workers
My findings that 287(g) agreements affect women's hourly wages almost equally as men's hourly wages contradict research showing that legal interventions have little effect on immigrant women's wages (Zavodny 2000; Orrenius and Zavodny 2014). These results show the impact of 287(g) agreements on all foreign-born individuals and reflect the effects on both legal immigrants and undocumented immigrants. However, to the extent that these agreements have a more direct impact on undocumented workers, I would expect the effects on undocumented workers to be greater.
Undocumented Workers
Asking undocumented workers to report their status for a government survey would result in massive underreporting for fear that governments would have information about it. This strategy confirms the Pew Research Center's results and provides a meaningful way to indicate undocumented status in large, publicly available data sets. 2017) confirms that the earnings of undocumented workers are much lower than those of legal immigrants and domestic workers. I find that male and female potentially undocumented workers in jurisdictions with 287(g) contracts experience a greater wage penalty than those living in jurisdictions without 287(g) contracts.
Other Employment Effects
Male immigrants in jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements work 1.3 percent fewer hours than their counterparts in jurisdictions without these agreements. Using this model, the coefficient on the interaction between immigrant status and the presence of a 287(g) agreement is positive and statistically significant. This result provides evidence that individuals do not opt out of the labor force in response to 287(g) agreements.
Placebo Test
Migration Response
Heterogeneity of 287(g) Agreements
Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data research organization, and was obtained from ICE using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).25 The data contains individual records on each registered I-247 detainee or notification request issued by ICE,26 including the month and year in which ICE issued the I-247 form, which detainee was sent from the state, county facility, whether the detention facility was federal, state, or county, and whether ICE took custody after the detainee was released. For each detainee, the data includes information about the agency that sent the request as well as demographic information, such as the country of citizenship for each individual. The data also includes the individual's criminal history, categorized by the most serious criminal conviction and whether that conviction falls under Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 of the 287(g) enforcement prioritization.
Type of Program
Examining the effects of program heterogeneity, I find large and significant negative effects of task forces and enforcement models on immigrant wages. The magnitude of the coefficient for the task force models is larger than for the law enforcement models. Overall, my results are consistent with criticisms of the broad nature of working group agreements.
Strength of Program
To assess the strength of the effects of each 287(g) agreement, I use a variable within the TRAC data that indicates whether ICE actually took custody of the individual. These results show that the effects of these agreements differ based on the actual strength of the agreement when the individual is male and undocumented. This provides evidence that the inherent nature of the agreement, rather than the strength of the agreement, determines the effects of these agreements on immigrant workers' wages.
Targeting
Conclusion
CHAPTER THREE: DISADVANTAGES AND BORROWED TIME: THE IMPACT OF BUSINESS DISADVANTAGES ON THE IMMIGRATION JUSTICE SYSTEM. The impact of the case backlog on immigration court output remains ambiguous both theoretically and empirically. In the context of immigration courts, if judges respond to an incentive effect, they will expedite their proceedings.
Data
These outcomes include actual grants of relief, in which the immigration judge finds that the individual is entitled to relief from removal and may remain in the United States. I create an indicator variable, in absentia, that indicates whether the individual was present at the hearing in which the decision was rendered. The TRAC data also includes whether the individual has been charged with a crime other than being illegally present in the United States.
Examining the Effects of Case Backlog on Case Duration
From 2003 to 2006, a one percent increase in the number of pending cases is associated with a 7 percent decrease in case duration. But between 2007 and 2010, this effect turns positive, with a one percent increase in the number of pending cases associated with a 1.6 percent increase in case duration. In 2011 through 2013, a one percent increase in the number of pending cases is associated with an 11.06 percent increase in case duration.
Examining Case Outcomes
I find that from a one percent increase in the percentage change of adult cases pending is associated with a decrease in the probability of success for a given individual's case. Ultimately, these results provide a consistent story of the consequences of backlogs in the immigration court system. Data shown consists of the DHS records of all juvenile immigration court cases.
