Athens Center of Ekistics
Indonesia's Kampung Improvement Program: an evaluative case study Author(s): Nick Devas
Source: Ekistics, Vol. 48, No. 286, HOUSING POLICIES, PART I: POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS (JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1981), pp. 19-36
Published by: Athens Center of Ekistics
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Indonesia's Kampung Improvement Program:
an evaluative case study
Nick Devas
Nick Devas is with the Development Administration Group of the Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birming- ham, where he lectures in economics and urban planning. His
one month study of the Kampung Improvement Program was undertaken at the end of 1979 as part of a program for collecting teaching materials, financed by the UK Overseas Development Programme Administration.
Editor's foreword: It was announced in September, 1980, that 15 winning projects representing 12 Moslem coun- tries had been selected to share the $500,000 prize fund established as the Aga Khan Award for Architecture. We are happy to present a report on one of these winning projects, and we now quote briefly from the official press release:
In his address (when bestowing the Award) the Aga Khan commented ,
We have demonstrated the importance of architecture in influencing the quality of life in the Muslim world today. The Award is dedicated to the work of the common man of Islam, who creates for himself and his neighbors a setting for life and health, for preserving what nature has given him, and for developing ways to maintain his own identity among his neighbors rather than accepting the massive impersonal nature that exists in so much of the modern world.
The Award places great value on the underlying cul- tural, economic and environmental context of architec- ture. For example, a medical center in Mali was awarded for bringing vital health services to an entire region with- out imposing alien forms or values. The mud-straw struc- ture is so well integrated with the local community of Mopti that townspeople use its long, open-air entrance as a pedestrian walkway.
Similarly the Award was given to a project in Jakarta, Indonesia whose social benefits are far more dramatic
than its visual design. The Kampung Improvement Pro- gram measurably improved the lives of a half million urban squatters living in densely populated communities (kampungs/ Sponsored by Jakarta's municipal govern- ment, the KIP built much needed access roads, sewage and drainage systems around existing structures Though extensive, the program was at the extremely low cost of $60 per capita. The result was that the quality of kam- pung life was greatly enhanced, while the cultural fabric of these communities was undisturbed . Indeed, once
the access and social services were created, kampung residents began making improvements to their own homes, as well as contributing to the economic life of Jakarta at large .
Introduction
The Kampung Improvement Program in Indonesia is often quoted as an example of a successful approach to the housing needs of the urban poor. It certainly has been impressive in its scale - improving living con- ditions for something like half the population of the city of Jakarta. It is also important as being one of the earliest attempts at substantial upgrading, having been started some 11 years ago, in response to local political needs, rather than pressure from international agencies or "de- velopment experts."
Kampungs are the informal, unplanned and, until re- cently, unserviced housing areas, which form a large part of most Indonesian cities. Some 1 1 years ago a start was made on the huge task of improving the kampungs in Jakarta, by providing a basic level of services and infra- structure. Since then, with help from the World Bank, the program has had a major impact on the city's housing conditions, having upgraded some 7,700 hectares of kampung and improved conditions for some three million people (fig. 1). Since 1976, a similar program has been operating in Surabaya.
These programs are concerned with upgrading the physical infrastructure: roads, footpaths, drainage canals, water supply, sanitation, solid waste disposal, schools and clinics (fig. 2). For the first five years the program in Jakarta operated through a committee which coordinated the functions of various departments con- cerned. With the World Bank's support, a separate pro- ject unit was established with staff seconded from the various departments involved. This unit is responsible for planning, design and supervision of the construction work, which is carried out by contractors. Relations with the community are conducted through the Camat, who is the officer of the city government at Sub-District level, and who is made site manager for the execution of pro- jects in his area. He is assisted in this job by technical staff from the KIP Unit.
The program is financed entirely by the city govern- ment (with loans from the World Bank since 1974). No charge is made to the residents for the infrastructure provided, although they are required to contribute (without compensation) the land required for access
routes.
In financial terms the programs do not represent a burden to the residents, since capital costs are not re- couped directly; the only costs to the residents are in- creased property taxes (which are low anyway) and
certain contributions for operation and maintenance of
Fig. 1: Kampung Improvement Program, Jakarta. After a World Bank appraisal of the Second Urban Development Project.
Fig. 2: Before the municipal improvement program began, the street was virtually an open sewer, unfit for use. Today sewage is con- trolled and streets filled with children connect squatter communities with the rest of the city.
the infrastructure. The size of the programs implies a substantial charge on the budgets of the cities con- cerned, but, given the low per capita costs of upgrading as compared to alternative housing solutions, such a burden does not seem excessive; it is estimated that to upgrade all the kampungs in a typical city would absorb only about 5-15 percent of the city's Development Budget over a 10 to 12 year period.
The size of the Kampung Improvement Program in Indonesia makes it one of the largest in the world. The speed and efficiency with which it has been carried out is impressive by the standards of any government. It has benefited a large number of people whose needs for urban services were acute, and, by and large, it has been very popular. It has certainly had a considerable impact on the government's thinking (and the thinking of govern- ments outside Indonesia, as well as of international agen- cies) about how to provide urban services to the poor.
The study seeks to evaluate the performance of these programs not only in quantitative terms but also in quali- tative terms (the effects of the programs) and in distri- butive terms (who has gained and who has lost). In this latter context I should like to refer to the specific distri- butive effects of public programs such as upgrading referred to by Batley in his study of Lima and Caracas, about which he comments:
.... even where public services specifically set out to focus benefits on the poor, they frequently finish by benefiting at least as much the rich or middle income groups, sometimes exacerbating existing inequalities and sometimes creating new ones. (BATLEY, 1978, p. 7)
The study also examines a number of specific imple- mentation issues: the institutional framework, project organization and management, relationship between the projects and the community, financial aspects and the effects on the wider urban system.
In considering these implementation aspects, I would like to refer to the two broad themes identified by Pasteur in his study of squatter upgrading in Lusaka (PASTEUR, 1979, p. 4):
- identification of the distinctive management impli- cations of squatter upgrading strategies, and
- the institution-building necessary for such a program.
The Kampung Improvement Program
The first really substantial program in the country was established in Jakarta in 1969, by the then Governor, Ali Sadikin. This program aimed to upgrade around 2,400 ha of the city's kampungs in the five years of the First National Development Plan, Repelita I (1969-74) - quite an ambitious target for such a new program. The scheme was a response to considerable political pressure from the very wide cross-section of the population who in- habited kampungs which lacked any basic services.
During these first five years, the program was funded entirely from the city's own resources; the standards for infrastructure provision were set low in order to stretch these resources as far as possible.
In 1974, the World Bank provided a loan (Urban I) which permitted the city to expand the scale of program considerably, as well as to increase somewhat the stan- dards of provision. To implement this new program, a
separate project unit was established, the Muhammad Husni Thamrin Project (MHT), named after a national hero. A second loan (Urban II) was provided in 1977, and a third (Urban III) from 1979.
Physical and social background
Indonesia, with the world's fifth largest population, is experiencing the sort of urban growth pattern of most Third World countries. Population pressures are parti- cularly great in Java, where about two-thirds of the coun- try's population live on just 7 percent of the land area.
The populations of Jakarta and Surabaya - the two largest cities - grew by about 50 percent each during the 1960s. The city of Jakarta currently has a population of somewhat over six million, with anything up to 10 mil- lion in the Greater Jakarta conurbation, and an estimated growth rate of 4.5 percent per year. Surabaya's current population is about 2.2 million and its growth rate is estimated at 3.5 percent per year. Of these population figures, around 20 percent is normally reckoned to be accounted for by the annual cycle of "circular migration"
from the rural areas.
Unemployment and underemployment are obvious problems in the cities (unemployment is generally con- sidered to be about 10-15 percent of the workforce), and poverty is very apparent. Between a third and a half of the urban workforce is employed in the informal sector (PARMAN, 19 77). The 1976 survey of consumption ex- penditures (SUSENAS, 1976) showed a mean per capita consumption in the urban areas of Rp 83,000 per year ($200 at the then rate of exchange); however, this masks substantial income differences and, based on this data, it is clear that at least 65 percent of the urban population had a per capita income below the estimated absolute poverty line of Rp 54,000/year ($130). In Surabaya, while the average household income (1978) was Rp 451,000/
year, consultants (JURURANCANG BERSEKUTU, 1978) esti- mated that 11 percent had an annual household income of less than one-third of that figure. A survey (SILAS, p. 2) of Kampung Kedungdoro in Surabaya found that 45 percent of the population had an income below the sub- sistence level (Rp 180,000/household/year).
Although both cities, and the capital in particular, ex- hibit plenty of the symbols of "modern development" - large hotels, offices, banks, smart suburbs, etc - the majority of housing is in the kampung areas. The term kampung literally means a compound, but came to.be applied to the semiurban villages which grew up around the cities, built on former rice fields. They are now fully absorbed into the cities: densely populated areas of small houses (rarely more than single story), built in a mixture of traditional and modern materials. The kam- - pungs close to the city centers are generally (but not al- ways) of a very high density - typically 400 to 500 per- sons per hectare, with up to 1,000 ppha having been observed (RMl, June 1979, p. 18; PARMAN, 19 77, p. 9;
KRAUSSE, 1978, p. 17), while those on the outskirts retain much of the atmosphere of a traditional village. House plots in the denser kampungs are mostly 40-50 m2, rising to 160 m2 in the more peripheral kampungs (JURURAN- CANG BERSEKUTU, 1978).
The kampungs are by no means all slums, although,
prior to KIP, they certainly lacked infrastructure and ser- vices. Although around 40 percent of urban housing is categorized as being built of nonpermanent materials, there is a constant process of renewing and upgrading of houses. Nor are they ghettos of poverty: most kam- pungs contain a remarkable diversity of income groups (BAROSS, 1979) with substantial modern houses adjacent to dilapidated shacks. This is at least partly accounted for by the stability of such areas: families whose eco- nomic situation improves seem to prefer to stay and gradually improve or expand their present houses, rather than to move to a more affluent area.
It would also be quite wrong to refer to most kampungs as "squatter" areas. The land tenure system in Indonesia is complicated, with some nine types of tenure; while it may be the case that certain kampungs are built illegally on state-owned land, the vast majority of kampung dwell- ers have some form of legitimate tenure. There are, in addition, a number of areas where there are genuine "squatters," who have taken over publicly-owned land, eg along railway lines and river banks.
Infrastructure and services are an acute problem in all Indonesian cities. At no stage has the infrastructure of Jakarta been adequate for its population. In particular, the municipal water undertaking is able to provide less than one-third of the citizens with piped water - the rest rely on private wells, canals or rivers and water vendors.
The situation is similar in Surabaya, with less than half
of the population being served with piped water. There is no sewerage at all in*either city; those who do not have access to private or communal lavatories with septic tanks, or to pit privies, continue to use the canals and rivers for defecation. The refuse disposal system is total- ly inadequate, in both Jakarta and Surabaya, handling only about 50-60 percent of the refuse generated. As far as accessibility is concerned, the last decade has seen
the development of several large new roads (up to ten lanes wide in the case of Jakarta), but it is probably the Kampung Improvement Program, with its provision of footpaths and access roads which has had the greatest impact on accessibility for kampung residents.
One of the most serious problems in both cities is flooding. Because of the generally low level of the land, plus the fact that many of the kampungs were con- structed on swampy areas, serious flooding is a regular occurrence in many of the kampungs. The present net- work of canals and drains is quite inadequate to cope with such occurrences, a situation exacerbated by the fact that many of the canals and drains become clogged with refuse. Given the lack of sanitation in the cities, the health hazards from such flooding are enormous;
it is not, therefore, surprising that Indonesia has one of the highest incidences of cholera of anywhere in the
world.
Finally, the inadequacy of social infrastructure pro- vision in the cities, combined with manifest poverty, has
Fig. 3: The location of the UNEP project in Surabaya (Kampung Kegungdoro)
many serious social implications: an infant mortality rate of 1 16 per 1000 live births (rising to 200 per thousand in some kampungs); 37 percent of all children under seven are malnourished, 17 percent severely so, while 80 percent of families consume grossly inadequate diets (data from the Applied Nutrition Programme, quoted in RMI, May 1978); a primary school enrollment averaging 70 percent of all primary school age children, but as low as 40 percent in some kampungs.
Administrative and government framework
In order to understand the organization of KIP, it is neces- sary to have some background on the country's adminis-
trative system (see DAVEY, 1979). The present system is a direct descendant of the Dutch Colonial system of ad- ministration, with its powerful vertical structure, reaching right down to the neighborhood level (see figure 4), each level being answerable to the one above it. The appoint-
ment of the head at each level is a mixture of local nomi-
nation and selection by the superior level - the mixture varying from area to area. It is essentially a vertical sys- tem, and its strength lies in its vertical communications and control. It provides a mechanism for negotiating with people, and for delivering a program like KIP at the most local level. This applies even in the most deprived areas which otherwise lack any government recognition and services. Its weakness, though, is in its horizontal
Fig. 4: Government hierarchy in Indonesia
management. Ministries and local authority departments all tend to operate vertically: there is very little sense of corporate management or even of interagency or inter- departmental coordination. It is this that makes the Kampung Improvement Program particularly interesting, since it has necessitated a considerable degree of hor- izontal integration.
The objective of KIP has been stated as: "To improve the well-being of the poorer citizens of Jakarta by up- grading their physical environment and increasing their access to modern municipal services." (parman, p. 23).
This was stated more fully in the Ministry of Public Works/UNDP document "Towards a National Policy for a Kampung Improvement Program" (May, 1976):
The overall objective of the Kampung Improvement Program is to immediately increase the standard of living of kampung households through implementation of an integrated physi- cal, social and economic program package which will:
(a) Reduce deficits in household needs of essential public services;
(b) Increase human capacity, incomes and productivity;
(c) Increase households' and enterprises' control of capital asséts;
(d) Promote social and economic stability and reduce vul- nerability within kampungs; and
(e) Promote self-help and self-reliance among kampung people.
The approach adopted has been essentially a "public works" one, and the model adopted a "sanitization" one:
in other words, the installation of basic infrastructure and services, in those kampungs which lacked them, by the use of public works contractors.
Institutional framework: Between 1969 and 1974, the program was carried out by the individual departments of DKl (metropolitan government of Jakarta), notably Public Works, under the general coordination of a Steer- ing Committee drawn from all the relevant departments and chaired by the Deputy Governor for coordination.
This arrangement proved to be unsatisfactory, with poor coordination between project components, conflicts between different contractors trying to work in the same area at the same time, and widespread confusion on the part of the kampung residents.
One of the conditions of the World Bank loan in 1974 was the establishment of a separate project unit, which was named the Muhammad Husni Thamrin Proyek (MHT).
This unit is directly answerable to the Governor (see figure 5), and its staff is seconded from the various departments of DKl. There is a Steering Committee whose task it is to oversee the work program of the kip unit and to consider the annual selection of kampungs for improvement, before this is submitted to the Governor for his approval. The Steering Committee is made up of the five District Mayors and the Heads of the relevant Departments and Directorates of DKl.
KIP in Jakarta is essentially concerned with the pro- vision of physical infrastructure:
Fig. 5: Relationship of the KIP unit to the administration of DKl Jakarta
Governor - - - Peoples' Assembly (DPRU)
l. I I «
- Municipal Water Secretary ~ «... _ _
Corporation (PAM)ļ
""*■ - -
, Other Municipal Dept. of Public J I
Corporations i~j Works (TO) , IKlPUnit J
' Corporations i i~j j -1
-1 Dept. of Education I - -| , _ Administration Ceuats "V
- p Dept. of Health - "Ï , , ^ »_j- - i
p_ Dept. of Town I Li- roh
Planning - 4 •-
I ' I
- Other Departments - Dir. of Physical •- _J l_
"J j , Dir. of Finance
Note: SoliH. lines indicate
formal lines of authority/ '
responsibility} dotted lines tther Directorates "t BT Heads K
indicate lines of communication I ' - * J I ^ ' |
related to the Kampung I - I
Improvement Progr arane. L| Bureaux (?) ļ-^ fno.eehLs h
n
- local roads: the construction of new access roads,
and/or the upgrading of existing ones, to provide access to neighborhoods, particularly for emergency
vehicles.
- footpaths: new or improved footpaths to provide ac- cess to all properties.
- drainage: new or improved drainage channels to dis- pose of surface water from roads and footpaths into
the main collector canals.
- water: to provide improved access to adequate sup- plies of clean water.
- sanitation: to construct family pit privies where pos- sible, and to construct group toilet, washing and bath- ing facilities, connected to a septic tank.
- solid waste: to construct household garbage boxes, and to provide equipment (hand carts and trailers) to enable the community to improve the collection of solid waste and its removal to central collection points.
- schools: the construction of primary schools ( Sekolar Dasar) where school facilities are lacking in an area.
- clinics: the construction of health clinics (Puskesmas and Poskesehatan) where needed in kampungs.
The KIP Unit is headed by a Project Manager, who is an engineer, and a Project Secretary (effectively a deputy manager) who is a planner and an architect. The total staff of the project is about 280, plus a number of part-time staff (ie staff who are only seconded on a part- time basis from their departments: this applies parti- cularly to the Departments of Town Planning and Public Works). The Organization has four divisions: Adminis- tration, Finance, Planning and Supervision. The way in which the program operates is that the Camat (District Head) in whose area the kampung is located is appointed
as the Site Manager. In order to enable him to perform this role, he is provided with technical staff from the kip Unit; during 1979/80, the program was working in 13
Kecamatan.
Each Camat in whose area there are kampungs being improved is assisted in his role as Site Manager by
technical staff from the Unit, comprising one junior en- gineer plus supporting technicians (an average team of about nine per Kecamatan). These are located in the Camat's Office, and their responsibility is the daily super- vision of the contractors. The Camat has ultimate re-
sponsibility for the projects in his area, though, since he is not a technician his role is essentially an adminis- trative and political one of negotiating public support and sorting out disputes. Those technical staff assigned to the site office are under the authority of the Camat, although on all technical matters they refer to the kip
office.
Staff of the project are all seconded from other dki departments, including the municipal water undertaking (PAM). The staffing levels were established when the project unit was first set up and have changed little since then. The project appears to have had no difficulty in obtaining the staff it required from the other departments - presumably because of the status accorded to the
unit by DKI, and because of the extra incentive payments offered. The professional staff are generally graduates of the big technical institutes, while the technical assis- tants are graduates of technical high schools. No special training has been given to staff apart from what they learn on-the-job (although the consultants monitoring the project have provided a certain amount of on-the-job training for supervisors and accountants). Some of the administrative and finance staff are given day release courses at DKl's own training center, in such subjects as bookkeeping, etc.
Fig. 6: Roadway under construction: the surface will be raised to the level of the side walls.
Fig. 7: Provision of land for access routes, by cutting back or removing properties, is regarded as a community contribution:
this photo shows a property which has been cut back.
Project organization and procedures: The following are the main stages in the kip Procedure:
a) Preliminary survey: starting in about May /June, data is collected from Camats and Lurahs about the social, economic and physical conditions in the kampungs in their areas, and the Camats are invited to make sugges- tions of kampungs for improvement.
b) Selection of kampungs : in a joint exercise between the DKI City Planning Department and KIP Unit staff, an inventory of the social and economic conditions in the kampungs is compiled from the data provided by the Camats and Lurahs. These are then analyzed against the criteria established by the KIP unit for kampung
selection.
There are a number of kampungs which are not con- sidered for improvement, for a variety of planning reasons. These "never-to-be-improved" kampungs in- clude a) settlements on land zoned for other purposes, eg "green belt" or industrial use, and b) settlements whose presence in that location is considered to be a
health or safety hazard, eg on the canal banks or along railway lines.
The criteria for selection relate to social and economic
conditions, locational and zoning factors, but with part- cular emphasis on the deficiencies in physical infrastruc- ture. The purpose of the criteria is to give priority to the worst kampungs. This is qualified by a requirement that the kampungs selected should be roughly evenly distri- buted between the five Mayoral Districts.
From these criteria, a preliminary list of kampungs is prepared for the following year, which is discussed at a meeting to which all the Camats are invited. On the basis of this discussion a list of kampungs is submitted to the Steering Committee for its approval, before being
submitted to the Governor for his ratification in Novem- ber of each year. At any of these stages, the original selection may be modified for any of a number of political or administrative reasons, although such changes do not generally appear to be too substantial.
c) Planning: following the Governor's publication of the selection of kampungs, the Planning Division carries out further survey work in the field. Further meetings are then held with the Lurahs and Camats involved, on an area basis; at these meetings, the policies for the coming year are explained and proposals for specific work in each area are exchanged between the KIP Unit staff and Lurahs/Camats. These are followed up by site meetings with the Lurahs and Camats at which specific proposals are identified on the ground. In these meetings, it is considered that the Camat and the Lurah "represent the community"; the extent to which they consult the resi- dents, before or afterwards, is up to them. An agreed plan is then prepared and signed by the Camat.
d) Land clearance: in many cases, in order to construct a road or footpath of the standard width, it is necessary for certain buildings to be cut back. The buildings so affected are marked with paint at the point where they must be cut, and it is up to the owner to make the neces- sary alterations before work on the infrastructure com- mences. No compensation is payable, on the grounds that what the owner loses thereby will be compensated at least by the improved access gained. Camats do, however, have the power to find alternative sites and to collect money from neighboring residents in cases where a property has to be removed entirely (a relatively small number of cases) or in the case of real hardship. Where land is required for a school or a clinic, compensation is paid by DKI. In these cases, DKl's Directorate of Devel- opment is responsible for acquiring the properties af- fected, as part of its city-wide responsibilities for land acquisition.
It is the job of the Camat (and through him the Lurah) to ensure that the access routes are cleared in time.
Although he is not obliged to consult anyone in the selec- tion of these routes, if he is to avoid problems at a later stage it is obviously desirable for him to negotiate 'the most satisfactory route directly with the community.
The project's policy throughout is to keep destruction to a minimum, and standard specifications for routes are adjusted to meet the local situation.
e) Detailed design: after detailed measurement of the area, engineering drawings are prepared and costed, and a bill of quantities produced. Costings are based on
standard DKI Public Works unit prices. In March, tender documents are prepared.
f) Contracting: as soon as the City's annual budget is approved (beginning of April), tenders are invited from a list of contractors prequalified by the DKI Public Works Department. Tendering is in accordance with standard World Bank procedures. Contracts are awarded on a
kampung by kampung basis (except for schools, clinics and pit privies) to avoid difficulties between contractors.
Contracts are awarded as early as possible in the finan- cial year so as to enable most of the work to be com- pleted before the wet season starts (December).
g) Supervision and monitoring: daily supervision of the contractor is the responsibility of the technical staff at the Camat's Office, with weekly and monthly inspections from the supervision division. These daily, weekly and monthly reports provide the basis for monitoring the project. In addition, the consultants employed by the Ministry of Public Works check all completed work on site before filing the reimbursement applications to the World Bank. Any technical problems emerging from the monitoring reports are investigated by a "Special Policy
Taskforce" of senior officers of the kip Unit. If the con-
tractor is failing in his job, there is a formal system of warnings and penalties. Payment of contractors is on the standard staged-payment system, with 5 percent being retained for three months after completion to cover defects. If any problem arises with the community (eg routes not cleared) it is the Camat's responsibility to resolve the matter. If he is unable to do so, he can refer it up to the District Mayor and thence to the Governor, but the need for recourse to such measures seems to be rare.
Relationship with the community: As indicated above, the administrative philosophy of the program is that the Camat and Lurah "represent the people." Thus all nego- tiations between the project and the community are con- ducted through them. The degree to which they involve the public in decisions about kampung improvement is highly variable. They will almost certainly consult the RW heads in their area, and perhaps also the RT heads;
these in turn may organize meetings in their neighbor- hoods to discuss the program. Where it exists, the of- ficial village forum, the lkpmdk, may be invited to
discuss the matter. However, in the end, the community's role is essentially a passive one. Since the program is executed through contractors, there is no scope for
self-help. The community's role is thus really limited to:
• removing or cutting back buildings which obstruct the proposed access routes;
• maintaining the infrastructure, once provided;
• organizing the collection of refuse from households.
Financing: For the first five years of the program, the capital cost was met entirely from the dki budget. This ran at an average cost of Rp 1.3 billion per year. Since then, the cost has been shared equally between dki and the World Bank loan (which will have to be repaid by DKI after the five year grace period). Over the three years of the Urban II project (1976/7 to 78/9) the average an- nual cost of the program has been Rp 9.8b, of which half has been met from the World Bank loan. The total World Bank Loan to DKI for KIP so far amounts to US $61 million (Urban I: $18m, Urban II: $43m) with a further $28m for KIP in Urban III. The policy of the City of Jakarta has been, from the beginning of the program, that no charge should be made to the kampung residents for the ser- vices and infrastructure provided, on the grounds that these forms of infrastructure are provided free of charge elsewhere in the city. The only exception is the provision of standpipes, which are allocated to standpipe holders for an initial charge (currently Rp 55,000) which they then recoup by selling the water from the standpipe.
However, there are certain charges made for operating costs:
Water: as well as recouping the installation cost, the standpipe holder has to pay for water consumed (at the present rate of Rp 0.06/liter), which cost he then passes on - generally with a massive profit - to consumers (or vendors). Where individual house connections are made, households must pay both the connection charge and
the metered tariff.
Fig. 8: Self-help improvement work: a footpath provided by self-help labor under the UNEP project in Bandung
Table 1
Quantitative achievements of the KIP
Jakarta Surabaya
Repel i ta I Urban I Urban II Urban II WR Supratman (1969-74) (1974-6) (1976-9) 1976-9 (1974-79)
0) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Area (Ha) 2,385 1,975 3,316 287 (309 locations) Total Population 1,173,000 765,000 1,097,000 171,000
Average Pop- ulation Density
(persons/ha) 494 387 331 597
Total Cost
(Rpm.) 6,484 15,963 29,360 1 ,627 664
Total Cost
per capita (Rp) 5,500 20,900 26,800 9,500
Total Cost
per Hectare 2,719 8,083 8,854 5,668 (Rp X 'ooo)
Quantities
Roads (km) 179 179 567 25 84 Footpaths (km) 270 330 350 50 2 Drainage Channels
(km) 145 79 186 23 2 Public Taps/Wells 78 839 588 269
MCK's 71 135 71 141 Pit Privies - - 14,045
Garbage Carts 207 265 516 67 Health posts and
centres 21 25 43 7 Schools 54 96 9
Sources: Column 1: "Jakarta's Kampung Improvement Programme", DKI , 1976.
Column 2: Parman, 1977
Columns 3 & 4: RMI June 1978 and September 1979 Column 5: KIP Steering Committee, Surabaya, 1979
Communal lavatories /washrooms (MCK's): no contri- bution is made by kampung residents towards the capital cost, but the community (usually through the RW head) usually levies a charge in order to pay someone to clean and maintain the facility.
Solid waste collection: this is the responsibility of the local community, and it is financed through a monthly charge, usually, again, collected by the rw head, of usually around Rp 100-300 per household per month, which is used to pay the refuse collectors.
In addition, various amounts may be collected by the Lurah or RW head for various communal, social or chari- table purposes, as well as for the cost of any main- tenance work needed in the kampung.
The only form of taxation which relates in any way to the improvement of the kampung is the property tax Ipeda. This tax is levied on all properties, urban and
rural, on the basis of property values (urban) or estimated agricultural yield (rural). However, the levels of this tax are very low - averaging Rp 750 per head in Jakarta (including commercial and industrial properties), nor is it clear how far increased property values resulting from kampung improvement are really reflected in increased Ipeda assessments.
Evaluation of
the Kampung Improvement Programs
Quantitative evaluationTable 1 sets out the quantitative achievements of kip (Repelita I and Urban I and II).
A number of observations can be made about this in- formation:
1 . The scale of the program in Jakarta is very substantial, covering over 760 hectares and over three million people in the ten years 1969-79, building 925 km of roads, 950 km of footpaths, 410 km of drainage.
2. Density: The density of kampungs improved has de- clined significantly over the program in Jakarta, re- flecting principally the density criterion in selection;
the density of kampungs in Surabaya would appear to be higher than in Jakarta.
3. Costs : The per capita and per hectare costs of the Repelita I program are very low, while those for the World Bank project are substantially higher, even allowing for the rapid inflation at the time. However, even the Urban II costs only worked out at US$65 per capita, $21,300 per hectare in Jakarta (using the pre- devaluation rate of exchange of $US 1 = Rp 415).
The costs for Urban II kip Surabaya are substantially lower than those for Jakarta. This does not seem to be accounted for only by unit cost differences, which are not significant (except for public taps and MCKs) but by a) the lower density of kampungs in Jakarta in Urban II, leading to higher per capita cost (eg twice Surabaya's per capita cost on drainage) and b) the much higher proportion of roads (the most costly item) in the Urban II projects in Jakarta; the combination of these two factors results in a per capita expenditure on roads in Jakarta of over five times that in Surabaya.
4. Implementation : It should be noted that, for a large part of the program in Jakarta (excluding schools and clinics), work was proceeding ahead of schedule and at below estimated costs (PARMAN, 1977, p. 26). In the Urban II program for Jakarta, over 3,300 ha were improved, compared to 3,000 originally scheduled for the three years.
The main beneficiaries: In Jakarta,' the program up to the end of 1979 is estimated to have benefited around half
of the city's population; in Surabaya, the figure to date would be about one in ten of the city's population.
Inasmuch as the kampungs selected under the World Bank programs have generally been those with least
facilities, it is reasonable to assume that those with the greatest need for infrastructure and services have bene- fited. It is also reasonable to assume that, except for those actually excluded, all within an improved kampung benefit. However, some clearly benefit more than others:
- those who gain access to a road, and, to a lesser ex- tent, those who gain access to a footpath;
- those who obtain pit privies;
- those who become stand-pipe holders;
- those with vehicles probably gain more than non- vehicle owners;
- property owners who gain from the increased value of the property.
Some will clearly gain less, and may even end up
worse off:
- those who have to cut back their properties (this may be a costly business and lead to serious diminution of site, which is only likely to be compensated at all in the case of severe hardship, and then only by a
collection from neighbors; on the other hand, this may be more than offset by the improved access to their site);
- those who find themselves next to an MCK;
- water vendors who are'driven out of business by in- creased availability of water (although there is no evidence that this has yet happened on any signifi- cant scale);
- tenants who find their rents increased, or who are evicted as a result of the upgrading.
Excluded categories: It is possible to identify a number of categories of people who are excluded from the bene- fits of improvement:
1 . Those living in "never-to-be-improved" areas, such as those whose homes are on land which is zoned for other
uses, like industry or open space, or those squatting on railway land. At the very beginning of the program, it seems there was even resistance to the inclusion of any kampung developed since 1954, since these were tech- nically "illegal." There is no doubt though, that, in both cities, the political popularity of KIP has forced the city planners to modify their former rather rigid land use zoning and to bring an increasing proportion of kam- pungs into the program (HARDJAKUSUMAH, 1978). The squatter areas along the railways and canals, and under high-tension lines, present more of a problem, since there clearly are safety and health hazards, and to up- grade such areas would generally be quite unrealistic;
however, the wide margins which the planners have sought to sterilize alongside such corridors are perhaps unreasonable. In these areas live the poorest (RMI, June 1979, p. 24) - often the newly arrived or temporary migrant - and here the conditions are by far the most squalid of anywhere in the city; yet it is the residents of these areas who receive no benefits at all from these
upgrading programs.
It has not been possible to get an accurate estimate of the proportion of kampungs which are "never-to-be- improved"; figures mentioned by planners are 1 to 2 percent only; casual observation would suggest a rather higher figure, although probably not more than 5 to 10 percent.
2. Those whose houses are completely removed to make way for roads, MCKs, clinics, schools. The official policy is one of keeping destruction to a minimum, and certainly for road access, for which no official compensation is available, relatively few properties are totally removed;
it is estimated by the World Bank that, on average, only about 1 to 3 percent of properties have to be totally re- moved; in the first two years of the program in Surabaya, only eight properties were completely removed for roads or footpaths.
There has been considerable resistance from those
whose properties are required for communal facilities, and this, combined with the generally cumbersome land acquisition procedures, has caused considerable delays to these components of the programs in both Jakarta and Surabaya.
3. Tenants who are evicted, or whose rents are in-
creased, as a result of the upgrading and increased value of the property; the limited evidence so far available does
not suggest a significant out-migration from improved kampungs, however.
Displacement of the poor by the better off: One of the most undesirable side effects of upgrading schemes in many countries is the displacement of the poor by the better off, once an area has been improved (a process often referred to in the UK as "gentrification"). One of the reasons for adopting low standards for upgrading in the Indonesian KIP projects was to avoid making the im- proved areas too attractive to the higher income groups.
In order to be able to establish whether or not such a
process has actually taken place, we require longitudinal data which does not yet exist. The cross-sectional data collected in 1976, which compared a selection of un-
improved, improved and never-to-be-improved kam- pungs, showed no evidence that mobility was any higher in the improved kampungs than the unimproved kam- pungs (indeed, it was, in fact, lower) (rmi, June 1979).
While this data is of limited value, since the kampungs in the different categories were not strictly comparable, it does not suggest evidence for a significant process of "gentrification."
In another survey, Surbakti (1978) interviewed 108 households in two kampungs: 58 old households and 50 new ones (ie those who had moved in since improve- ment); this survey showed no significant differences in income levels or in housing conditions between these two groups. The conclusion drawn was that improve- ment of the kampungs had not significantly affected the normal pattern of household movements.
It should also be noted that the proportion of residents who own their own house, and own the land on which it is situated, is quite high. The 1976 survey (RMI, June 1978, p. 41) of 146 kampungs found that nearly two-thirds of residents owned their own houses and 43 percent had freehold or its equivalent right to the land, while a further 34 percent had a "right to build" or "assigned" tenure.
Similar proportions pertain in Surabaya (JURURANCANG BERSEKUTU, 1978). Thus, compared to the situation in many other countries, kampung dwellers in Indonesia have a relatively high degree of security of occupation.
The scale and pace of the improvement program in Jakarta have also helped to minimize the pressure on those kampungs which have been improved. However, it does seem likely that those kampungs which are favor- ably located (good access to the city center, proximity to higher income areas, etc) have experienced pressure from the better off trying to move in. Only detailed longi- tudinal data, though, can really answer this question of succession satisfactorily.
Distribution of the program resources between areas:
the selection of areas: The final decision about the selec-
tion of kampungs in Jakarta rests with the Governor (the Mayor in Surabaya), based on advice from the Steering Committee. Effectively, though, kampungs are selected by the kip unit staff, on the basis of information supplied by the Camats and Lurahs.
It is possible to criticize this selection process from a number of points of view:
1. the fact that initial selection of kampungs is based on data provided by Lurah and Camat, rather than
on specific surveys (although surveys may be con- ducted to supplement this information); this means that the information may be both incomplete and rather subjective;
2. the selection criteria give overwhelming weight to physical infrastructure deficiencies, and only limited weight to factors like income and density;
while one might expect physical deficiencies to be correlated with income, density and other socio- economic characteristics, this may not always be true (for example, a new high income, low density area not yet provided with infrastructure would score highly on the selection criteria used);
3. the weighting system used is illogical, since on some items a score of 3 can be obtained for not
having a problem while on other items a score of 3 represents a serious problem; thus an area with a
good drinking water supply, or one with little flood- ing, will earn the same number of points as one with a high density or one with a very low per capita income;
4. some of the criteria seem questionable (eg age of kampung, proximity to main road), while others depend almost entirely on the opinion of the Lurah/
Camat (eg attitudes of the people, potential bene- fits from improvement and response by the resi- dents to improvements, etc);
5. the requirement (in Jakarta) that the program should be distributed evenly between the five Mayoral areas introduces a distortion, since the needs for upgrading are not uniform between the five Mayoral Districts;
6. the list of selected kampungs has to pass through various levels of approval - the meeting of Camats, the Steering Committee and the Governor; at any of these stages the prioritization may be altered for any of a number of administrative or political
reasons;
7. finally there are the absolute criteria, discussed above, which relegate certain areas to "never-to- be-improved" status.
There is no doubt that the way that the selection pro- cess has operated in both Jakarta and Surabaya has
meant that, in quite a few cases, areas of less pressing need (ie higher income, lower density, better served kampungs etc) have benefited before areas of higher priority. However, it is also clear (evidence in RMI, June 1979) that, on the whole, the stated policy of "improving the worst first" has been adhered to. It seems churlish
to criticize the prioritization policy too much now since, in Jakarta at least, virtually all the kampungs eligible have been improved; thus at worst, any deviation from the worst-first policy only meant a delay in obtaining the program's benefits. There remains, of course, the ques- tion of the "never-to-be-improved areas."
One particular distributional problem which has arisen from the "worst-first" policy in Jakarta is that, since the kampungs improved with World Bank finance (1974 on- wards) were improved to a higher standard than the earlier ones, it has meant that the worst areas generally received a lower standard of improvement. This is being partly rectified by a "re-upgrading" program for the
1969-1974 kampungs which will generally bring infra- structure up to the standard of the later areas.
Distribution of program resources between areas: ex- penditure levels: The other aspect of the distribution of resources between areas is the question of how much is expended in each area. Under the original (Repelita I) program in Jakarta, the resources spent in any one kam- pung were at least partly a reflection of the negotiating strengths of the community representatives (Lurah and Camat) concerned - including their ability to secure set-backs for roads and footpaths within their areas.
With the World Bank project, standard levels of pro- vision per hectare or per capita were introduced, along with standard unit costs. While this was more equitable, it lacked the flexibility to allow for such factors as vari- ations in cost due to local conditions (degree of flooding, density, etc), and initial levels of provision within areas.
As a result, these standards have had to be modified to suit particular situations, and this has sometimes meant that, for example, some of the lower density kam- pungs have been able to achieve a much higher pro- vision of road access than was intended (thereby in- creasing the budget allocation for roads in the Jakarta
kip to twice the level originally intended). Therefore, for the Urban III program, an attempt is being made to design a budgeting system which is equitable between kam- pungs, but which is responsive to the specific needs of each kampung. This it will do by defining both maximum and minimum standards for improvement, requiring account to be taken of existing levels of infrastructure, and by permitting cost variations for particular local
conditions.
Distribution of benefits within areas: The decisions about the location of roads and footpaths are the responsibility of the Camat, in collaboration with the project unit's Planning Division. On land for schools and clinics, re- sponsibility in Jakarta lies with the Development Direc- torate (Dir. 4) of DKl to acquire the land, although they will conduct their negotiations through the Camat. How- ever, it seems clear that, apart from any obvious physical factors, like existing routes, Camats and Lurahs are most likely to be guided in their selection by the desire to minimize opposition to their proposals. It is easy to see that, in this situation, the poor are likely to offer less resistance to being disturbed than the better off, although
Fig. 9: Self-help improvement work: an access route improved under the W.R. Supratman program in Surabaya
there may be patrimonial rights which may be as im- portant as wealth in according security over land.
As far as roads and footways are concerned, there will often exist recognized routes, and thus these decisions are relatively straightforward. When it comes to select- ing land for schools, clinics, MCKs, unless there are sub- stantial tracts of open space, which is rare in central kampungs, the choice can be very difficult. Although there is no evidence on the matter, it is reasonable to suppose that the poorer housing (ie housing constructed of temporary materials) will be more vulnerable than the permanent housing. This will apply also to decisions about where to cut back properties to widen roads or footpaths. In this situation it will generally be the poor
who suffer most.
Maintenance: It is one thing for a program to provide facilities or infrastructure, but another to ensure that they are still there and serviceable 20 or 50 years later.
Any evaluation of a program must look also, therefore, at the longer term maintenance and upkeep of the facili- ties provided. Maintenance has probably been one of the
most serious failures of the program, at least as far as the World Bank-financed projects are concerned. Roads and footpaths break up, drainage channels collapse or get filled in. Even the elementary task of clearing blocked drainage channels frequently does not take place, with the result that stagnant water collects and, when flood- ing occurs, the new infrastructure works little better than did the old. This raises the question of who is respon- sible for maintenance, and the answer to this is far from clear. The.KlP units, themselves, have no responsibility for maintenance. The city administrations consider that it is the responsibility of the Kelurahan (ie of the resi- dents) to maintain the infrastructure (with the possible exception of the roads), while the residents consider that the city should maintain the infrastructure, just as it does elsewhere in the city. However, maintenance of kam- pung infrastructure clearly has a low priority in the budgets of cities concerned. The result is most unsatis- factory.
In some of the early KIP areas in Jakarta, the kip unit is now going back to re-upgrade the infrastructure to the
higher standards currently adopted; in many cases, this is a thin disguise for the need to reconstruct dilapidated infrastructure provided less than a decade earlier.
Aspects of project implementation Project organization and management
The Jakarta kip Unit does seem to have built up an ef- ficient organization capable of delivering a massive program. Both sets of external consultants (PARMAN, 1977 and RMI, January 1979) have commented most favorably on organizational arrangements and have re- commended no significant changes.
Staffing: The Kampung Improvement Programs employ mainly engineers and engineering technicians, plus a few architects and planners. Given the limited "sani- tization" objectives, these cadres would seem appropri- ate. However, it can hardly be regarded as a "multi- disciplinary approach" and, even without any specific
social or economic components in the program, the absence of any economists or sociologists to monitor economic and social impacts, seems regrettable. Given that the program does not solicit community involvement, or where it does, it does so through the established ma- chinery of the Camat and the Lurah, there has been no stimulus to establish community development skills within the organization.
Organizational structure: The management structure of the KIP Project Unit in Jakarta is clearly a very conven- tional, hierarchical form, typical of a public works depart-
ment, with clearly defined responsibilities and regular routines. There is an established pattern of senior management meetings within the Unit - with the Planning Division and the Camat/Lurah in each of the areas af- fected, during the preparation stage, and then weekly meetings with the Supervision Division during implemen- tation, to discuss any problems arising in the program.
However, there are no general staff meetings and no particular effort is made to encourage a corporate or participative style of management. The success of the KIP operation in Jakarta is, in large measure, due to the simplicity of the process involved and to the fact that this process is tied tightly to a yearly cycle which is deter- mined by the municipal budget cycle and to the need to carry out the construction work during the dry season.
The procedures and techniques used for organization and program control are set out in a manual for project preparation and execution, produced by the KIP Unit.
These procedures and techniques are much as would be expected of a public works program - surveys, detailed engineering drawings and bills of quantities, tender procedures and prequalification of contractors, daily, weekly and monthly work progress sheets, staged pay- ments to contractors, penalties, etc. Nevertheless, nume- rous changes in the work seem to be made as the con- tracts progress - often for good reason, given the need to adapt to specific local circumstances, but often for bad reasons (inadequate preparatory survey, unwilling- ness of office staff to visit the site, etc). All this makes control difficult and provides scope for abuse. In ad- dition, it seems (rmi, December 1977) that there is often a failure on the part of the contractors to employ qualified foremen to supervise their own work, which creates dif- ficulties. Despite these problems, the kip Unit has achieved a massive through-put of work and is generally reckoned to be considerably more effective and less corrupt than other public works organizations in the country.
The organization of the KIP Unit in Surabaya is essen- tially the same, although being so much smaller it main- tains a more informal and less hierarchical form, with staff meetings being both more frequent and more ad hoc. One particular problem mentioned by the con- sultants (RMI, December 1977) was the shortage of ex- perienced engineering staff to supervise the design work.
The relationship between
the projects and the community
Before attempting to analyze this aspect, it is worth ob- serving three important influences in Javanese culture,
as it relates to community life:
1. the hierarchical nature of society, with its system of patronage and its deference to those perceived as being of a higher social status; thus the tradition- al village leader, the Lurah, although now a paid official in urban areas, and the RW and RT heads are accorded a social status which gives them con- siderable authority; there will be an unwilllingness to dispute proposals put forward by such people;
2. the importance of consensus (mufakat) in decision making, and the avoidance of any open conflict;
thus even where people may disagree with pro- posals, there is an unwillingness to allow this to come out into the open;
3. the tradition of mutual self-help (gotong-royong) for the benefit of the community; while traditionally this meant the contribution of labor to a construc-
tion project, more recently it has come to include the contribution of money to any form of community activity.
As societies change, so their cultural values change, and this has certainly happened in Indonesia, particularly with urbanization. Thus, the traditional leadership pat- tern no longer holds the same authority, the traditional mechanisms of community decision making (musya- warat) have been eroded, and the concept of gotong- royong is often no more than a slogan. Nevertheless, they are still important influences, and ones which the government (at all levels) makes use of in its administra- tive system (for example, the appeal to gotong-royong for maintaining infrastructure). It is important to re- cognize these influences when looking at the relation- ship between the projects and the community, since it is all too easy to criticize these programs for not incor- porating a western-style participatory democratic system.
The World Bank-financed projects, with their clear "public works," physical Infrastructure approach, in- corporate a minimal role for the community. There is no direct consultation with or participation by the com- munity, and projects are executed entirely by contrac- tors. This lack of participation by the community in the decisions about, jand execution of the project has been a frequent source of criticism of the kip approach (eg SILAS, p. 10). However, it is also possible to argue that, for the most part, the issues are clear cut, the residents want the improvements which, at last, the municipality is proposing to provide; that extensive consultations would only delay implementation; and that the KIP unit should be allowed to get on with providing what everyone agrees is needed.
It is also important to remember that the relationships with the community are not the responsibility of the pro- ject unit itself, but take place through the normal local administrative structure of the Camat and the Lurah, and these relationships are essentially hierarchical and
paternalistic. As such they reflect both traditional life and contemporary political organization. The Camat and the Lurah are considered to "represent" the people within their area, although they are paid officials and are not elected. The Camat is responsible for reaching agree- ment with the project, on behalf of his local area, about the nature and location of improvements within his
Kecamatan. In reaching his decisions he will normally discuss with his Lurahs; they in turn may discuss with their RW heads, who in turn may hold discussions with RT heads and even with individual households, but the degree of consultation depends entirely on the indivi- duals concerned. Of course, the Camat is also respon- sible for ensuring that decisions can be implemented, and, in order to avoid delays and difficulties at the imple- mentation stage, it is likely to be in his interests to pursue discussion down to the lowest level. But the motivation
is problem avoidance, rather than any real attempt to ensure effective participation by all. There have been plenty of cases where problems have arisen, with resi-
dents objecting to proposals once contractors are on site, necessitating changes in contracts. Whether this is because they were unaware of what was being proposed or because this was the only moment at which an objec- tion could be effective, is not clear; however, it is hard to imagine that residents are wholly ignorant of pro- posals, given that all buildings which have to be cut back are clearly marked with paint beforehand. In Jakarta, these objections have rarely led to significant delays in the program, except in the case of school and clinic sites. During 1976/1977, for example, 135 ha of land was required for roads and footpaths, of which only 65 ha were already available; the other 70 ha had to be negotiated for in around 14,000 separate deals, yet there was no significant delay in the program (PARMAN, p. 34).
This is not only because of the strength of the spirit of consensus in Indonesian life, but also, probably, be- cause of pressure from other residents who wish to see the improvements carried out. There is no doubt that the program, as a whole, is widely understood and welcomed by kampung residents.
It could be argued that the way in which these projects operate does not actually enable communities to meet their own needs. The resources for upgrading are not made available to the communities directly, there are no self-help components to the programs, nor are contrac- tors even required to hire local labor, thereby recirculat- ing resources and developing skills within the kampung.
This approach has been criticized, not least in terms of the setting up of the UNEP project.
The lack of involvement of the community in the up- grading program is reflected in the attitude towards maintenance of the improved infrastructure. As indi- cated earlier, this has generally been poor with even elementary maintenance like clearing blocked drainage channels not being done. While there are legitimate questions about who should be responsible for main- tenance, the lack of identification by the community with the upgrading work does not encourage them to take responsibility for its maintenance.
Recouping of capital costs: Unlike schemes in many other countries, there is no attempt to recoup capital costs from beneficiaries; thus no problems arise over
collections and defaults.
Comparison with other areas of the city: The policy of not recouping the capital cost of infrastructure directly from residents in the main kampung improvement programs is justified on the basis that residents elsewhere in the
city (most of whom are likely to be better off than those in kip areas) receive infrastructure without any direct charge. There is, in fact, no easy mechanism for local authorities in Indonesia to recoup the costs of infrastruc- ture from private developers of new sites, and certainly the inadequacy of provision of infrastructure in newly developing areas is a widespread problem.
The effect on household costs and incomes: The World
Bank-financed programs do not have a very significant effect on household costs or incomes. For these
schemes, the main changes in costs, as far as kampung
residents are concerned are:
Water: In theory, the cost should be significantly re- duced, with the more adequate provision of water, since this will eliminate both monopoly pricing of standpipes
and the need for water vendors. The fact that this has
not happened represents a significant failure of the pro- ject. Nor has the municipal water undertaking been able to control the resale price of water from standpipes. In any case, many households already had access to wells or pumps for all but drinking water, at prices con- siderably lower than those being charged by kip stand- pipe holders. Only when a substantial increase in the level of water provision can be made (eg one tap per RT) is the price likely to fall significantly.
Sanitation: where MCKs have been introduced and a
charge is made for their use, this is a new cost to families
who have been using the canals and rivers at no charge;
although the charge is small (typicaliy Rp15 for bathing, Rp5 to 10 for use of the toilet), it soon adds up for a large family, and it will certainly be a disincentive to the use of MCKs (FENCO, 1979). In other places, a monthly charge
is made to households (eg Rp25 to 100 per household) to pay for cleaning and maintenance, which would seem to be a much more satisfactory solution in terms of en- couraging use of the facility.
Solid waste collection: kip does not necessarily result in any increased charge for this, although where kip coincides with the introduction of solid waste collection from households, this is likely to introduce a new cost to household budgets - anything from Rp50 to Rp1000 per family per month, depending on their income.
Maintenance: Inasmuch as new infrastructure requires maintenance for which the community is expected to contribute, some additional costs can be anticipated;
however, these are likely to be small, and to vary widely between areas.
Property tax : Increases in property values resulting from kip are reflected to some extent in increases in the pro- perty tax, Ipeda. Figures for one kampung in Surabaya showed an increase in Ipeda assessments of 170 per- cent after improvement (from an average of Rp170 per head before kip to Rp470 per head after kip); the city- wide increase in the same period was only 17 percent.
Fig. 10: Water vendors wait in a line at a stand pipe.
