The three most feasible types of change in North Korea are derived from a combination of the variables “nuclear issues” and. These efforts aim to draw policy implications based on predicting North Korea's future macroscopic situations. In 1960, the Kapsanpa (Kapsan faction) of North Korea argued for the use of a provisional currency in line with post-Stalin trends.
Fourth, what is engraved in the North Korean policy decision-making system is the political sensitivity of the reform agenda. Historical experiences with North Korea's reforms were already taking place in the economic unit on the ground. Historical experiences with North Korea's reforms (stimulating factors), caused by the accumulated contradictions of economic management, have gradually come to dominate the restraining factors.
The real estate market will become a driving force behind the North Korean economy in the first phase of the reforms. Technically, a nuclear freeze indicates a "tacit recognition of North Korea's nuclear weapons state." The nuclear weapons state means maintaining Kim Jong Un's monolithic leadership system. Future changes in North Korea's external environment and internal conditions can be summarized in four characteristics.
The unyielding international sanctions imposed on North Korea, including those of the United States, will continue to pressure North Korea. North Korea's politics, economy and social sector would then face a dire situation that would be the same as the period. It is also possible that North Korea's nuclear policy and economic policy could experience some changes in direction.
Policy Implications for Each Type
Policy Implications for Each Type 61 When categorized by types, Type 1 is most likely to undergo a regime change. With such recognition of the situation in mind, the sections below will touch on the policy implications for each type.
Policy Implications of Type 1
A positive sign is that North Korea announced the end of the Byungin economy and nuclear weapons policy (parallel development), switched to a policy of concentrating all efforts on economic construction, and has expressed a willingness to engage in denuclearization negotiations. . The security guarantee, the first demand presented by North Korea, will inevitably affect the ROK-U.S. North Korea would naturally think that the balance of power between the two Koreas would collapse under that scenario.
As mentioned above, a serious review from North Korea's perspective will be necessary as to what extent the benefit of maintaining relations with South Korea will be when the North normalizes relations with the US South Korean companies hoping to enter North Korea may have to compete with a number of global companies, including those from the US, China, Japan and the EU. There is no guarantee that North Korea will prioritize the South-North economy over the global economy.
It would be delusional to assume that North Korea's denuclearization and openness to reform would naturally lead to unification. It is necessary for South Korea to actively seek how to maintain leverage not only in the denuclearization negotiation process, but also in the implementation phase.
Policy Implications of Type 2
North Korea requires a security guarantee and the removal of obstacles to economic development as measures related to a nuclear freeze (or the dismantling of nuclear facilities). Policy Implications for Each Type 65 Therefore, it is necessary to establish a system of multilateral cooperation to address North Korea's energy issues. What is crucial is whether a coherent North Korea policy can be maintained over that period.
However, North Korea's position will be distinctly different after it enters into a nuclear deal with the US. North Korea may no longer find the inter-Korean joint making of a development map attractive, as in the Gaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. , if inter-Korean cooperation resumes in the future, North Korea will no longer desire the kind of agricultural exchange and cooperation it did in the past.
We will still be under the nuclear threat of North Korea, although such measures would reduce the intensity somewhat. Policy Implications for Each Type 67 In addition, a convincing plan must be developed on how to fill the security vacuum when North Korea demands a halt to the ROK-U.S.
Policy Implications of Type 3
Overall Prospects and Responsive Measures
Overall Prospects
In terms of South Korea's national interests, however, Korea's influence and decision-making rights on Korean Peninsula issues could be weakened under this scenario for the following reasons: nuclear negotiations could determine South Korea's North Korea policy and inter-Korean relations; a nuclear-armed US, China and Russia, as well as a cutting-edge Japan seeking military power, could strengthen North Korea's bargaining power to maximize its own national interests; therefore, it could violate the national interests of South Korea. In line with this recognition, South Korea and the international community must consider the microscopic political aspects of North Korea's possible changes and provide support to ensure that North Korea's change patterns can develop in order. In reality, however, it is more likely that pattern changes would not gradually develop in this order.
However, responsible measures are needed with a consideration for the phased evolution of each type, as described below, in order to evolve the direction of North Korea's change.
Response Measure of the First Stage
Human and institutional networks need to be actively created, not only to alleviate North Korea's 'psychological resistance to abandoning their hard-earned nuclear arsenal', but also to address a 'regime anxiety about the results of reform and opening'. relieved. Current international sanctions exemptions include "any postal, telegraphic, telephonic or other personal communication, the importation from any country and the exportation to any country of any information or informational material, and transactions habitually incident to travel to or from any country " ( 31 CFR Part 510, North Korea Sanctions Regulations: 213 Exempt Transactions). Provisions on general exemptions by OFAC include the following (31 CFR Part 510, North Korea Sanctions Regulations emergency medical services (510.509);.
Focused on the various combination of “Nuclear Affairs” and “Reform‧ Opening of certain services in support of activities of non-governmental organizations official business of official activities of the United Nations Federal Government (except items subject to the Diplomatic Export Administration Regulations of third countries and consular funds transfer transactions related to telecommunications and by mail certain transactions related to patents, trademarks, copyrights and other intellectual property (Submission of any request to obtain...proprietary protection intellectual property;.Obtaining, renewing or maintaining...intellectual property protection and filing and prosecuting any objections or violations related to...intellectual property protection calling in certain vessels and landing certain aircraft (the Aircraft is being involved in a non-traffic stop or an emergency landing Sanctions imposed by UN Security Council resolutions are not subject to general exceptions). Fourth, all these measures should at least prevent additional nuclear and missile testing by North Korea.
Such responses include addressing the deepening of U.S.-China conflicts, causing Japan, and primarily and urgently dealing with the strengthening of an anti-U.S. More specifically, it is necessary to prevent China from intervening in Korean Peninsula issues and to use their North Korea policy as leverage in negotiations with the US.
Response Measure of the Second Stage
However, the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016' in the United States contains exemptions, waivers, and removal of designations subject to North Korea. Exemptions include all activities associated with the POW/MIA accounting mission in North Korea pursuant to 22 U.S. waivers, effective after the President, for periods extendable between 30 days and 1 year, may waive the application of the the sanctions authorized under subsection (b) , or 304(b), if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination that the waiver is necessary for humanitarian assistance or to carry out the humanitarian purposes specified in section 4 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802).
Fourth, it is necessary to continue the easing of sanctions in phases, which can help spur North Korea's denuclearization and build confidence. The second phase deals with the lifting of the designation as a country sponsor of terrorism and the restoration of the level of sanctions against North Korea to the level before 2016. The post-third phase strengthens the cooperation system with the international community, depending on North Korea's reform and opening level and helping the lifting of sanctions imposed on North Korea.
This stage involves joining international financial institutions and establishing normal trading relationship in accordance with international standard. Fourth, the following would be much more important for second-phase projects to advance to the third phase: the US.
Response Measure of the Third Stage
Overall Outlook and Responsive Measures 81 directly demands that there be a change in North Korea's monolithic leadership system. However, what underlies all the policies on North Korea and inter-Korean cooperation should be to drive decentralization in the process of North Korea's active denuclearization and reform and opening. Above all, it is important not to let radical changes in North Korea turn into a Russia-style exploitative capitalism.
Therefore, it is necessary to encourage North Korea to join the international organizations, including international financial institutions, in the process of North Korea's denuclearization and reform and opening up and lifting and easing of sanctions and to institutionalize changes in accordance with the international standards and norms. Aid to North Korea should be carried out in a direction that increases the strengthening of and solidarity with the groups that will create a structure of opportunities for positive change. Fourth, it is necessary to support the Donju, North Korea's new moneyed class, to grow into healthy businessmen and women who adapt to a new system.
Sixth, support should be given to a technology and development plan that would help North Korea achieve a balanced growth strategy based on the North's current class, generational and regional divides. Seventh, policy and technological support is needed to push North Korea's military technology to contribute to balanced industrial development on the Korean Peninsula and help transform it into civilian industry.
