Synthesis of social-ecological theory to develop conceptual tools with explanatory power
5.3 Human systems: cultural characteristics
5.3.6 Agency in ecological systems
Agency is the human ability to act for an intended outcome; it has a causal effect on the world, and indicates the human capacity to transform situations (Harvey 2002). These actions occur in a “pre-structured world of language, practices, norms and values, oppressions and distortions” (Mingers 2006: 246) that has particular constraints and enablements (Bhaskar 1998). Authors introduce the dual nature of power that can either be hegemonic and constraining, or enabling and productive (Foucault 1981; Bhaskar
1993). Hegemony refers to the domination of a ruling class by manipulating culture so that their worldview becomes the cultural norm (Gramsci 2000). This is elaborated by Bhaskar (1993) who identified two types of power: power1 and power2 relations.
Power1 is empowering and refers to
The general causal powers of human agency whose characteristics entail the possibility of human emancipation, such as our capacity to investigate, communicate, plan, construct moral and ethical systems, feel and care for others, and come to agreement based on judgmentally rational arguments directed at practices that transform our lived circumstances. (Hartwig 2007: 372)
Power2 relations are hegemonic, exploitative, dominating and are concerned with maintaining control. They are based on excluding alternatives or socialisation that negates an individual’s understanding of their real interests and needs (Hartwig 2007).
Forms of agency can influence the sustainability or degradation of cultural-ecological systems depending on the motivations, reflexivity, knowledge and power dynamics influencing action. The discussion now turns to an examination of five characteristics of modern society that reduce individuals’ agency to tackle the pervasive and far reaching social-ecological problems faced.
The first modern characteristic examined in some detail is what Giddens (1990) referred to as time-space distanciation, which he explained is an experience unique to modern society; in pre-modern societies time, space and place were interconnected and had meaning in relation to each other (Giddens 1990; Westley et al. 2002). It was through the invention of the clock that time was systematised and rationalised and society was able to keep track of it, regardless of place (Westley et al. 2002), while the development of universal maps resulted in space no longer being referenced to a particular place (Giddens 1990). Through this time-space distanciation, social institutions and relations are disembedded and de-territorialised from local place and re- embedded in new space configurations that have a more global reach linking the local and global in ways unthinkable in pre-modern societies (Giddens 1990; Westley et al.
2002). This powers the dynamism in modernity and disconnect from local place (Giddens 1990). Bauman (1994: 17) described the consequent space:time discontinuity between actions and their consequences:
What we and other people do may have profound, far-reaching and long-lasting consequences, which we can neither see directly nor predict with precision. Between the deeds and their outcomes there is a huge distance – both in time and in space – which we cannot fathom using our innate, ordinary powers of perception.
Environmental degradation is therefore often experienced indirectly, and enlightened self-interest is not a possible response to such degradations.
Fueled by this time:space distanciation, Hornborg (1996) stated that processes of disembedding and decontextualisation pervade modern society and highlighted their dangers, including a loss of local meaning and the objectification of that which was decontextualised. Objectification, Hornborg (1996: 51) stated, is “the ultimate foundation of power, repression and exploitation”.
A second characteristic of modern society is the highly differentiated division of labour:
“one can do something and continue doing it without having to take personal responsibility for it. It is as if one were acting while being personally absent. One acts physically, without acting morally or politically” (Beck 1992: 33). This supports a fragmented and floating sense of responsibility among citizens. The third aspect is the modern commitment to human progress (Taylor 2004) that becomes expressed as economic growth, consumerism and hedonistic lifestyles. These factors negatively impact our ability to act in our own best interests (Conradie 2011). The fourth aspect is large-scale technology that is directed towards the realisation of human progress, particularly from an economic perspective. Schumacher (1998: xiv) critiqued the obsession modern society has with large-scale technology with its highly detrimental human and ecological effects: “there are inherent thresholds in the scale of human activity that, when surpassed, produce second-and third-order effects that subtract, if not destroy, the quality of all life”. Fifthly, because the risks produced by modern socio-economic systems are so far reaching and hard for an individual to counteract, a feeling of fatalism can be adopted, reducing an individual’s agency to adequately respond to these threats (Giddens 1990), while responsibility is left nameless: “Sin without sinners, crime without criminals, guilt without culprits! Responsibility for the outcome is, so to speak, floating, nowhere finding its natural haven” (Bauman 1994:
18).
Max-Neef (1992) and Schumacher (1998) have both critiqued modern forms of agency that are encapsulated in the idea that bigger is better and aim to extract as much of a resource as quickly as possible. Max-Neef (1992: 133) highlighted the problematic nature of large-scale modern economies:
Economics has worshipped efficiency, and on its behalf we have evolved from economies of scale to what I would like to call ‘diseconomies of uncontrollable dimensions’. The economic efficiency of this process is incontestable and so is its power to pillage natural resources, its capacity to pollute and its contribution to the rise
in heart attacks and hypertension. And once dimensions of large scale have been consolidated, their evolution is possible only in terms of becoming even larger. The system no longer expands to meet the consumption needs of people; it is people who consume in order to meet the system's requirements of growth. As long as alienation, boredom, dissatisfaction, rural and urban decay, pollution, insecurity, anxiety and, finally, dehumanisation are not measured as costs of the process, it will continue to be seen as positive, efficient and successful in terms of the traditional criteria by which it is judged.
The large scale at which the technologies are promoted, economies grow and things are built, for example cities, is problematic partly because scale is another factor removing humans from the consequences of their actions:
The attainment of a dynamic equilibrium between nature, human beings and technology
… is only possible when humans, both at the collective and individual level, feel themselves directly responsible for the consequences of their actions within their environment, and this can only happen if the dimension of that environment remains within the human scale. (Max-Neef 1992: 132)
The degraded and risk-infused ecological condition of the present world system (Beck 1992; Rockstrom et al. 2009; Swilling & Annecke 2012) calls for change in forms of agency, patterns of identifying and types of knowledge. The highly complex, elusive nature of these problems, the time-space disconnect in society (Bauman 1994) and ideologies of progress, economic growth and consumerism (Conradie 2011) make this a difficult challenge.
The next section provides a generalised overview of western history from Plato to the present and indicates how ideas over time have lasting and profound effects on humanity’s relationship with ecological systems.