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the security of the DRC.85 Thus, the above discussion indicates that early warning, threat assessment and verification were carried out by the three intervening countries in relation to how this threat was going to be a risk to their respective interests. As will be observed in the later sections, the member countries’ decision for intervention were based on the level of the early warning to the impending threat in relation to the three countries’ respective interests.
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regime by a Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi led armed rebellion).87 The final decisions for intervention within the national context of the three intervening countries were taken by the respective Commanders-in-Chief of the FAA, ZDF and NDF. Although these decisions have been criticised by some scholars and policy practitioners, it is prudent to briefly discuss the constitutions of these respective intervening countries in relation to the Presidential powers on the decision to deploy troops.
As for the Angolan President, the powers to decide on the deployment of troops could have been based on Article 56(1) of the Constitution of Angola which the Commander-in-Chief of the country’s Defence forces and the President at the helm to declare war and make peace.88 Whilst criticism has been laid against the decision by the President of Angola that he violated the constitution because he was not authorised by the national assembly, counter arguments were made by the then Angolan government’s Minister of the Interior, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos "Nando", when he told the members of parliament that the decision by the President to undertake the military intervention was done for national state security reasons as the country was experiencing direct and indirect aggression from Congo Kinshasa and Congo Brazzaville (Likoti, 2006: 206).89
In the case Zimbabwe, the decision by the President to undertake a decision to commit troops in the Congo could have been done through Chapter X of the Constitution, which deals with
87 Author is indebted to this valuable information availed to him by an anonymous senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Namibia, 19 June, 2009.
88 See the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Angola August 1992 http://www.angola.org/referenc/constitution/constit.htm, accessed 25 July 2008.
89 See also Angola Parliament pursues debates on troops in DRC, http://www.reliefweb (accessed 25 July 2008).
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the defence forces.90 Section 96(2) of the Zimbabwean Constitution argues that the Commander-in-Chief shall make determinations for the defence of Zimbabwe. The section says that “The supreme command of the Defence Forces shall vest in the President as Commander-in-Chief and, in the exercise of his functions as such, the President shall have power to determine the operational use of the Defence Forces.91 However, there was much criticism from the Zimbabwe civil society, trade unions and human rights groups who generally felt that the decision to deploy troops was supposed to be first debated in parliament (Likoti, 2006:208).
In the case of Namibia, the decision to deploy troops in the Congo could be viewed in the context Article 26(7) of the Constitution of Namibia which gives the President some latitude to decide on the declaration of a state of national defence.92 It is this article which probably could have made President Nunjoma the sole decision maker when it comes to deployment of the NDF (Likoti, 2006: 203). However, some critics which include members of the Namibia opposition have argued that the decision by the President of Namibia to undertake military intervention in the Congo using the powers enshrined in above articles of the Constitution could “only be consistent with the declaration of martial law only if the DRC was at war with it, which was not the case in this DRC intervention” (Tapscott, 1997:3). The same critics argue that the decision by the Namibia President violated parliamentary democracy (Likoti, 2006: 203). They also argue that the decision could have been based on the historical personal friendship that existed between Kabila and Namibian when the South West People’s Organisation (Likoti, 2006:203).
90 See The Constitution of Zimbabwe, Revised Edition 1996, Printed by the Government Printer, Harare, http://confinder.richmond.edu/Zimbabwe.htm#31H (accessed, 25 July 2008).
91 See The Constitution of Zimbabwe, Revised Edition 1996, Printed by the Government Printer, Harare, http://confinder.richmond.edu/Zimbabwe.htm#31H (accessed, 25 July 2008).
92 See The Constitution of the Republic of Namibian Constitution, 2000.
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From the above discussion, it can be realised that the generality of the criticisms centre on parliamentary oversight of the defence forces. Most if not all are of the view that the decision to deploy troops should be debated in parliament first as part of the procedures to be adhered to on democratic control of the armed forces. However, some experts in defence and security studies argue that whilst the idea of parliamentary oversight sounds conventionally progressive, there are certain factors that need to be considered and prescribed to parliamentary debate when the lawmakers discuss issues related to the deployment of troops.
These factors include how urgent and quick are troops supposed to be deploy in order to successfully deal with a given threat. Considering the delays that parliamentary processes the world over take to come to an agreement on any given national issue, the case of delaying to deploy troops may compromise the principles of security of personnel, surprise, and mission accomplishment among others. One strategist argues that it would be good for the security of troops and accomplishment of a mission if parliamentary debates follow the deployment as that will not compromise the above mentioned critical principles of war.93 Having discussed the decision for intervention within the national contexts of the three SADC countries, it is now important to look at the decision for intervention within the SADC subregional context.