4.5 Great Lakes countries’ intervention in support of Kabila against the Mobutu regime
4.5.1 Democratic Republic of Congo under Laurent Kabila and the Great Lakes region
Having changed the country’s name from Zaire to Democratic Republic of Congo after assuming the Presidency, Kabila’s first assignment was to make political, economic and military security reforms as part and parcel of meeting the expectations of the Congolese populace, the great lakes regional countries which had backed him into power as well as the international community (Dunn, 2002: 54-55). Thus, what that implied was that Kabila was to deal with all the issues related to governance, service delivery as well human and state security aspects that the Mobutu regime was finding difficult to address in order to gain support from the Congolese, regional neighbouring countries as well as the international community. There were a lot of expectations from these various constituencies on the new regime of Kabila to deliver. Whilst Kabila could have thought that the first step towards these reforms was to appease those countries which had supported him during his march to Kinshasa that initiative proved otherwise later on.36
These appointments did not in any way address the concerns of Kabila’s former backers notably the Kigali government. The reason being that just like during the Mobutu era, the
36 According to Faustin Bosenge, a Senior Researcher in Conflict, Peace and Security studies with the University of Kinshasa’s UNESCO Programme, Kabila gave five influential posts to Rwandese Tutsis in order to please the Kigali government. These posts were allocated as follows; Commander James Kabarebe as the Congolese Army Chief of Staff (the top military job in the DRC at the time); Bizimama Karaha was made the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Douglas Bugera was made the Minister of State and Secretary General of the AFDL; Moise Ngawengabe as the Chief Executive Officer for Procurement and Acquisition of all capital goods;
Michel Tadangwaha was made the Director of Finance in the president’s Office (Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010).
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eastern Congo continued to be an operational launching pad against the Rwandan government by the armed militias including the ex-armed forces of Rwanda that had fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide.37 The fact that these militias and the ex-Rwandese soldiers were belligerently hostile to the governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda possibly meant that the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi expected significant respective bilateral security cooperation from the Kabila government as opposed to what they had experienced from the Mobutu regime.
Whilst the new Kinshasa regime was facing such a tricky situation on the diplomatic front in regards to its relations with neighbouring countries on border security issues, attempts at domestic reforms by Kabila worsened the situation. The regime was found wanting on issues related to democratic governance such as media freedom, human rights, opposition political party participation as well as service delivery (Havermans, 1999:238). Coupled with criticism from local opposition on lack of tangible political, economic and security reforms, Kabila’s relations with national, regional and international community began to unfold to the disadvantage of his government. The US and some European countries such as Britain, France and Belgium were beginning to show reservations with Kabila’s efforts in as far as reforms were concerned. The DRC government’s relations with the governments of neighbouring countries were beginning to turn hostile. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda seem to have been convinced that Kabila was not an effective leader who could address their concerns hence the need to craft for a more allegiant replacement.38
What proved to be of advantage to the above Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian governments’ plan was the costly military security reform efforts that Kabila had made. The
37 Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.
38 Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010, (see also Le groupe Lavenir. 16 March 1999).
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decommissioning of all Congolese military, navy air force and police rank structures had effect on those former Mobutu soldiers particularly officers of senior ranks. Kabila’s attempt at reforming the military security as a way of diluting and perhaps promote and improve allegiance on him from his former rebel troops who had fought the AFDL war to oust Mobutu had negative impact on the military’s loyalty to his regime. The initiative created disgruntlemt among senior ex Mobutu officers who had been incorporated into the Kabila government.39 In fact, this arbitrary decommissioning of trained officers naturally caused widespread disillusionment within the new army.40 That disillusionment meant that Kabila’s army could not fight as a fully unified force and defend any external attempt to oust the regime. Thus, this disgruntlement from some elements in the Congolese military could have been taken advantage of by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments whose ploy to oust Kabila from power were by then at an advanced stage. The leadership of the great lakes region seem to have been convinced that Kabila could not deliver as per their initial expectations in respect to the protection and guaranteeing of their interests in relation to the new regime in the Kinshasa. They hence saw the need for the crafting of another military intervention against the Kabila regime.
Despite awarding significant appointments as rewards to his former backers41, the general actions and statements from the Kigali and Kampala political leadership were frustrating the
39 Author is indebted to this analytical comments made to him by Bosenge during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.
40 Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.
41 It should be noted that all the persons who were given the five influential posts were Rwandese. Being the Congolese Army chief of Staff would give Commander James Kabarebe the advantage of being in charge of all Congolese military operations that would take serious Rwandese considerations specifically Rwanda’s security concerns. This would include the deployment of Congolese troops in the Eastern DRC with the primary objective of fighting any rebel groups such as the 1994 genocidaires who were believed to be operating from the Congo at the time. As for Bizimama Karaha, being in charge of Foreign Affairs was possibly aimed at influencing the Congolese regional and international relations to Rwanda’s (and to some extent Uganda’s favour). By appointing Douglas Bugera to be the Minister of State and Secretary General of the AFDL, that would make him in charge of the daily administrative running of the Presidency (including the coordination of
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Kinshasa government. Uganda, Rwanda and to some extent Burundi had all indicated publicly their displeasure with Kabila’s desire to do away with their support against their expectations that he would safeguard their interests as a strategic reward for assisting him into power.
The Rwandese concerns against the Kabila regime revolved around the threat paused by the Interahamwe militias against the Kigali government. The government of Rwanda expected the new DRC government to be fully supportive in getting rid of the Interahamwe militias who were responsible for the 1994 Rwanda genocide. In the general view of the government of Rwanda, the fact that the Interahamwe flee into Congo after the genocide “logically meant that they were now able to operate from the eastern Congo and launch attacks against the Kigali regime, thus pausing a serious national security threat to the Rwandan government”.42 Again in the general view of the government of Rwanda, any regime in Kinshasa that could not significantly cooperate and support the national security concerns (particularly border security) of Rwanda would leave Kigali with no option but to try and deal with its security threats by deploying troops in the Congo in support of any government in Kinshasa that would cooperate with Kigali.43 In addition to the fact that the Interahamwe militias were
intelligence briefings). To have other Rwandese being the Chief Executive Officer for Procurement and Acquisition of all capital goods and the Director of Finance in the president’s Office could have been intended at making sure that Rwanda and Uganda intended economic and security projects with the Kabila regime would be logistically supported from within the Congolese government. Author acknowledges this analysis made to him by Professor Mumba during interview, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009).
42 Author is indebted to this analytical comments made to him by Bosenge during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.
43 For detailed arguments in regards to Rwanda’s support for the rebellion against Kabila and specifically its support for the RCD Goma, see President Paul Kagame’s lecture to the War College in Abuja, Nigeria. The Lecture was entitled: The Great Lakes Regional Conflict and it was presented in September 2002. The original version of the Lecture was published in The New Times of Rwanda, 22 September 2002. The Rwanda President argued that Rwanda’s support for the AFDL were based on it’s the country’s quest to see a peaceful Great lakes region. The same applied to its support for the rebel RDC against Kabila who in the view of the RPA’s Commander-in-Chief had failed to assist the Kigali regime in its effort to neutralise these security threats paused by the Interahamwe as these threats impacted negatively on Rwanda’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty (see also Maeresera, 2004:29).
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operating from the Congo to carry out attacks on Rwanda, the Kigali government also accused the Kinshasa regime of arming these militias.44 Perhaps the above argument by the government of Rwanda could have been based on the concept of pre-emptive strike that has become the norm in modern day national security strategy.45 However, the argument based on pre emptive strike was criticised by one senior FDLR rebel official who said that Rwanda’s national security threat (specifically the Interahamwe issue) could not have constituted its efforts to oust Kabila from power and its continued troop deployments presence in the Congo. 46
On a related note the Rwanda government denied accusations that its sudden about turn against the Kabila regime was meant to create instability in the Congo and that its support for the ouster of the Kabila regime was based on its quest to exploit the DRC mineral resources.47 Whilst the above counter argument against Rwanda are worth noting, it should be realised that the withdrawal of the RPF from the DRC between 2002 and 2003 could perhaps have been based on the fact that the DRC government under Joseph Kabila through regional and international security institutions, notably the AU and the UN, could have
44 Interview with Professor Mutombo, Kinshasa, 30 August 2009 (also see The New Times of Rwanda, 20 September 2002).
45 The concept of pre-emptive refers to “a military action which is designed to neutralize a potential threat, or to gain a distinct advantage against an enemy. The legality of pre-emptive strikes is questionable, as they are generally considered offensive actions except in very specific circumstances. For example, a pre-emptive strike against troops massing near a nation's border might be considered justified, while a random airstrike on a known enemy might not be legally acceptable. Despite debates over the legality of such actions, many nations throughout history have used pre-emptive attacks as military tools” (see. http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a- preemptive-strike.htm, accessed 28 June 2009).
46 In an interview with author, Lubumbashi, 25 March 2010, a FDLR high ranking political official (who opted to remain anonymous for his personal security reasons) if the Rwanda government was serious about its security concerns, it could by now have opted for an Inter-Rwandese Dialogue, rather than trying to label every Hutu of Rwandan origin who is based in Congo as Interahamwe. In the official’ s, view what the Rwandese government should do is to “cooperate with the regional and international community in dealing with the issue of the Interahamwe militias and stop the victimisation of non Rwandese Tutsis based in the eastern Congo”(sic).
47 Interview with Professor Mutombo, Kinshasa, 30 August 2009 (see also The New Times of Rwanda, 20 September 2002).
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reached an agreement that Rwanda’s security concerns would be addressed as a result of the support that the Congolese government would get to disarm these militias after the deployment of the MONUC troops in Congo. However, when MONUC and the Congolese government did not disarm these militias, the security situation in the eastern Congo continued to be unstable, thus result in Rwanda crafting the provision of logistic and technical military support to the Congolese rebel militias in the DRC led by Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi. Despite carrying out a joint military operation with the Congolese army in the eastern DRC in early 2009, Rwanda seems to have reneged on the bilateral agreement to extradite Nkunda to the DRC.48
As has been noted earlier, the Ugandan government was part of the great lakes countries that supported the rebel coalition against Kabila. The Ugandan government seem to have followed Rwanda’s national security strategy of deploying troops in the DRC in support of the rebels as part of pre-emptive attacks on those groups that were operating from the Congo and launching attacks in Uganda particularly the northern part of the country.49 Like the government of Rwanda, the Kampala regime argued that its troops were supporting the rebellion against Kabila as a strategy for self-defence against attacks on Uganda by the Lord resistance Army (LRA).50 Thus, in the view of the Ugandan government, the Kabila regime had to fall and be replaced by the one which could support its concerns.51 Despite these
48 I am indebted to Dr/Col Max John Chinyanganya, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Defence Staff College for reminding me of these important points.
49 Interview with anonymous security analyst, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.
50 Interview with anonymous security analyst, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.
51 The Ugandan government’s argument was further reiterated by the then Chief of Ugandan Military Intelligence, the late Colonel Noble Mayombo, in a voice recorded version of the News Bulletin on BBC Kiswahili Africa programme given to the author (Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010) by the same senior Ugandan opposition politician living in exile in the DRC (the exiled opposition politician preferred to be referred to as
“Afande”, a pseudonym for his personal safety). In his address to the Joint UPDF/MLC rebel officers meeting on the DRC/Ugandan border, Mayombo said that the military officers were expected to be prepared to reach
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arguments, the government of Uganda was however accused of deploying in the Congo as a ploy by President Museveni to try and create the Hema-Tutsi Empire thereby giving the Kampala regime access to control the mineral resources of the Congo as well as establishing political control, authority and influence in the Great Lakes region.52
Just like Rwanda and Uganda, the Burundi government was also concerned with it border security threats paused by the armed rebel group, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) who were launching attacks from the Congo.53 Though Tanzania did not deploy any troops in the Congo in support of the rebels against the Kabila regime, information obtained showed that the government of Tanzania withdrew its troops from the DRC’s Kamina military training school when the three great lakes countries turned against the DRC government. These elements of the Tanzania Peoples’ Defence Forces (TPDF) were involved in the training and reintegration of the new Congolese army under Kabila.54 The withdrawal was perhaps prompted by Dar es Salaam’s realisation of the combat indicators which showed that the security situation in the Congo was becoming unstable and that the Kabila government was about to face an armed rebellion supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Perhaps the Tanzanian government wanted to remain neutral in the conflict.55
Kinshasa with all the determination and zeal that is expected from troops who are fighting for a national security cause. The Ugandan Military Intelligence Chief emphatically said Uganda could only be safe if a buffer zone was established against Ugandan rebel armed groups from launching infiltration attacks into the Ugandan territory. According to the voice recorded broadcast, the UPDF/MLC meeting took place in Bunia, on 20 May 2000 (see also Maeresera, 2004:32).
52 Interview with an anonymous exiled Ugandan senior opposition official, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010 (also see the Ugandan Mercury, 25 November 1999).
53 Interview with an anonymous exiled Ugandan senior opposition official, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.
54 Author’s interview with anonymous DRC senior military training officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009. The officer, who served under Mobutu, revealed to author during the same interview that he was part of the training team of the new Congolese army under Kabila.
55 Author is indebted to this analytical comment made to him by an anonymous senior Congolese military official during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010. The official worked with the Tanzania People’s Defence
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Having stated and analysed the concerns of the three great lakes countries against the Kabila government, it is now prudent to briefly discuss the strategy that these countries employed in an effort to address their interests.
4.5.1 The Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi strategy to oust Kabila: Operation “Plan