3.3 National Interest in context
3.3.4 The elusiveness of National Interest as a political concept
Whilst the concept of national interest may sound ambiguous, it remains significant in any scholarly attempt to make descriptions, explanations, predictions, even prescriptions or recommendations pertaining to actions of nation states in the international political system. In fact, there is a general agreement among scholars and practitioners of international relations and security studies that the primary justification of a state’s action is premised on national interest. The disagreements among these scholars and practitioners start when conceptual or substantive issues about national interest are raised in relation to the generally acceptable definition of national interest. These issues include: what would constitute the national interest of a given country; consensus on who decides the priorities of state action and the framework implementation of these actions; definition of a given state’s threat level; by whom and how allies are chosen and the role of government when faced with internal disagreements regarding national goals and values (Krasner, 1978: 98).
The concept of National Interest is elusive for the following reasons:
1. National Interest needs to be differentiated from “group, class, elite establishment or foreign inspired interest” (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104). Thus,
“national interest is a compromise of conflicting political” interest or “a product of constant internal political competition” and the national interest oriented policies are defined by the government through its various agencies (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104,);
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2. The “elusiveness of national interest as a political concept” revolves around the fact that a country’s national interest must be in proportion to the scope and range of its capabilities (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104);
3. A country’s national interest should “be related to the interests of other countries”
(Roskin, 1994:76). This is important in the field of diplomacy where there is a need to assess one’s own needs and aspirations together with a clear balance between those needs and the aspirations of others.
According to Coulombis and Wolfers, the “national interest of a nation that is conscious not only to its own interest but also to that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter. In a multinational world, this is a requirement of political morality. In an age of total war, it is also a condition of total survival” (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104; see also Morgenthau, 1958:74-75). The same point is emphasized by Roskin who sees the international system as not being peaceful nor being able to prevent wars and the varying levels of continual conflict and threats of war can be minimized by the “piecemeal and prudent adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action” (1994:89).
However, the important issue is how national interest should be related to the requirements of collective or global security. Morgenthau is against actions of a state that are not good and have nothing to do national interests. If the security of every rich state in the world is put on par with the security of poor or developing countries, as seemingly agitated for by the collective security theory, then there is a likelihood of having no localized disputes, thus setting a dangerous and suicidal precedent in the age of nuclear weaponry (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104). Morgenthau is sceptical of “political leaders who justify their policies on the basis of collective security rather than plain national interest” (see Couloumbis and
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Wolfers, 1990:104). Based on the above, it would appear that Morgenthau would oppose an American military intervention in any country in order to restore democracy or collective security. He would also have opposed any Soviet military intervention in support of communism or in solidarity with socialism.8
As Morgenthau puts it, national interests take precedence over regional interests in as far as the relationship between national interests and regional alliance interests are concerned because useful alliances are best supported by “foundations of reciprocal advantage and mutual security of participating nation states rather than by ideological or moralistic frameworks” (1958:74-75). However, Couloumbis and Wolfers (1990:105) argue that a military alliance organization like NATO’s primary role is not only for the protection of the territorial security of member nations but also for the protection of political, economic and cultural identities of states. Thus a regional alliance that does not serve the interests of the member states as pursued by their government will likely not be effective in the long run and its survival is not guaranteed.
This research will also identify the national interests of the countries that intervened in the DRC within the context of the above raised issues, namely how the respective national interests of members of the coalition were differentiated from group, class, elite establishment or foreign inspired interest; whether the national interests of the intervening countries were in proportion to the scope and range of their capabilities, how each country’s national interest was related to the interests of other members of the coalition, and how the respective national interests that informed the governments of the coalition to take the
8 However, Morgenthau fails to consider the fact that leaders often find it useful “to dress interest motivated policies into moral, legal, or ideological garb” (See Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104).
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decision for military intervention were related to the requirements of collective or global security.
3.4 Decision Making Determinants in the Formulation and Implementation criteria of