4.5 Great Lakes countries’ intervention in support of Kabila against the Mobutu regime
4.5.1 The Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi strategy to oust Kabila: Operation “Plan Bravo”
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Having stated and analysed the concerns of the three great lakes countries against the Kabila government, it is now prudent to briefly discuss the strategy that these countries employed in an effort to address their interests.
4.5.1 The Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi strategy to oust Kabila: Operation “Plan
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regime, Kabila took the initiative to replace those seconded officials with Congolese nationals. A notable replacement was James Kabarerebe or “Commander James” who had been seconded as the Congolese Army Chief of Staff responsible “for giving military technical advice in the training and operations” of Congolese military under Kabila.58 In addition to the replacement of Kabarebe, President Kabila ordered the expulsion of all Rwandese troops who were deployed in Kinshasa.
It could have been through expertise and experience in military strategic planning that saw Kabarebe taking time to leave Kinshasa after his replacement possibly under the guise of preparing the withdrawal and transportation of his troops back to Kigali.59 Perhaps having noted that there was tension in the Congolese army generally following the continued disadvantaging of the former Mobutu soldiers (ex FAZ) and Congolese troops of Tutsi origin over the Kadogos60 in terms of promotions to higher ranks, Kabarebe capitalised on these developments.61 Without the knowledge of the Congolese government, and with covert coordination with the political and military leadership in Kigali, Kampala and Bujumbura, Kabarebe managed to reinforce Rwandese troops who were deployed at Kitona military base as well as Matadi in the western DRC on the border with Angola.62 The reinforcement was
58 Interview with anonymous former DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010
59 Author’s interview with anonymous DRC senior military operations officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010. The officer, who served under Mobutu, revealed to author during the same interview that they attended a number of military staff courses with Kabarebe in related international military schools.
60 In Swahili street lingo, “Kadogos” refers to those young AFDL rebel fighters who were by then aged between 8-15 years during Kabila’s advance to Kinshasa to oust Mobutu.
61 Interview with same anonymous senior Congolese Military Intelligence official, 17 June 2010 (see also Chniyanganya, 2006:110).
62 This reinforcement followed a major unstable security development in the DRC capital when members of the Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) who were based at Tshatshi military base in Kinshasa advanced to the headquarters of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC HQ) on 2 August 1998. Their aim was to capture the Army HQ as this was the centre of gravity to the armed rebellion to fight the Kabila regime. The plan did not succeed, following the successful crushing of the rebellion, the capture and killing of the mutineers by troops loyal to Kabila .Through the crafting of Rwandese strategists based in Goma, the Congolese troops in the eastern Congo
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executed through the diversion of a military cargo plane to Kitona military airbase that was carrying Rwandan troops from Kinshasa. Having been the Chief of Staff, Kaberebe was possibly knowledgeable of the fact that most senior ex FAZ officers had access to security installations such as military logistical depots, armouries and fuel points. This was a significant advantage to Kaberebe’s military plan for an armed rebellion to oust Kabila which was as previously noted being covertly coordinated from Kigali, Kampala and Burundi. 63
The great lakes countries’ Rwanda led strategy was so rapid to the extent that within a few days the rebel troops had already captured Kitona, DRC’s only port of Matadi harbour and other vital installations like the Inga hydroelectric power station (Chinyanganya, 2006:111).
The capture of these western towns and more specifically installations such as the Inga hydroelectric power station had an effect on the Kinshasa regime’s administration. This is so considering that the movement of goods from the sea as well as the provision of electricity to the capital was significantly affected. Initially, morale was reportedly high in the rebel camps in the western DRC, with information reaching them through their military communication channels that the other DRC strategic towns of Goma and Bukavu in the east were now under rebel control.64 In an effort to enhance the attainment of their grand aim of replacing Kabila (whose chances of addressing their concerns were next to the “zero mark), the political leadership in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, most probably with another covert coordination and “green light” from the US and some western countries identified Professor Ernest
announced that they were now against the Kabila government and were ready to remove it through an armed rebellion. Besides being a rebellion that was militarily crafted by Rwanda and Uganda as well as Burundi, there were reports that countries like France and to some extent the US covertly provided financial assistance for logistics to the armed rebellion. (Information obtained through author’s discussion with Major General John Numbi, on the sidelines of the conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration DDRRR in the DRC, Kinshasa 05 March 2009).
63 Interview with Major General Numbi, Kinshasa, 05 March 2009.
64 Interview with Major General Numbi, Kinshasa, 05 March 2009.
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Wamaba dia Wamba as the political leader of the armed rebellion that was meant to oust Kabila from power. 65
It should be observed that the strategy adopted by the three great lakes countries in attaining their grand objective of ousting Kabila from power through an armed rebellion was systematically organised and executed through the following structures; The governments of three countries through the covert support of the US and other western countries influenced, controlled and supported the political leadership of the armed rebellion through the provision of a mobile command centre with its headquarters in Goma.66 It cannot be ruled out that this command centre was composed of advisors and to some extent experts from the three great lakes countries as well as the US and other western countries. Militarily, Goma was the operational headquarters of the armed rebellion, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RDC).
A Congolese General, Jean Pierre Ondekane who was based in Goma at the outbreak of the armed rebellion, defected from the DRC government forces and was appointed the military commander of the RCD.67 The strategy also included the opening up of interior lines of operations with units (battalions) and formations (brigades) from each of the three countries
65 It cannot be ruled out that Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi could (arguably) have received that covert political, economic and technical military support as well as advice for the crafting and execution of the armed rebellion from the US and other western countries because the Kabila regime had not shown significant promises and actions in terms of fulfilling the expectations of these countries.. The western nations support for the great lakes instigated rebellion could also have been caused by their perception of Kabila’s strident nationalism and his government’s efforts at blocking and frustrating UN investigations into the alleged massacres of about nine thousand Hutus by the AFDL during its advance to Kinshasa (Baregu, 2006:61; ICG 2001:18). The fact that the government in Kinshasa continued to publicly lay allegations against the governments of the three great lakes countries together with those governments of the US and other western nations of illegally exploiting valuable Congolese resources by smuggling minerals could have possibly led to that cooperation in ousting Kabila.
Author is indebted to these analytical comments made to him by Professor Mumba, DRC Special Presidential Advisor during interview, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009, also see Baregu, 2006:61; ICG 2001:18).
66 Interview with anonymous former DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010. The officer, who once served under Mobutu, revealed to author during the same interview that he was in Goma when the armed rebellion against the Kabila regime broke out. At the time of the interview the retired officer was running a private business enterprise in Kinshasa.
67 Interview with same anonymous former DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010.
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being deployed in respective tactical areas of responsibilities fighting alongside the Congolese rebels. Whilst some units and formations comprising of Rwandan troops and Congolese rebels were already deployed in the western DRC, and already in control of the strategic towns of Matadi and Kitona and the key installations such as the Inga dam, the other Rwandese units and formations were deployed and some advancing from the eastern DRC along the Goma- Bukavu-Uvira axis and Goma-Bukavu-Kindu axis as well Goma-Libutu- Kisangani axis. Transportation of troops and logistics from Kigali was through the use of cargo planes and armoured troop careers. The units from Burundi were mostly deployed along the Burundi/ DRC border in those positions immediately inside the DRC.68
As for the Uganda People’s Defence Forces’ units and formations, they were deployed in the northern Congo and advancing along the Bunia-Ituri-Watsa axis and the Bunia-Butambo- Kisangani axis.69 The UPDF like the RPF worked alongside the Congolese armed rebel units with most of the command at unit and formation levels being directed by the UPDF.70 Movement of troops and logistics from Kampala was through air cargo and road.71 Whilst the RPF units and troops deployed, advanced, attacked and captured those towns and cities such as Goma, Bukavu, and Kindu in the east and south east of the DRC alongside the RCD Goma rebels, the UPDF also deployed, advanced, attacked and captured those towns and cities such as Bunia, Ituri, Watsa, Buta, Aketi and Kisangani in the north and north west of the DRC
68 Author is indebted to this valuable information availed to him by means of the DRC map analysis and briefing on the general deployments and movements of the invading troops, Harare, 30 July 2010. Group Captain Chingono was deployed in Kinshasa as the Director of Air Operations based at the SADC coalition of the willing’s Task Force Headquarters.
69 Interview with anonymous DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009. The officer was part of those troops who were serving under the Kabila regime and later defected to join the rebel ranks in the rebellion against the Kinshasa government. At the outbreak of the armed rebellion against Kabila, the officer was based in Goma. At the time of the interview, he was serving in the DRC military under President Joseph Kabila, following the reintegration of former DRC rebel troops and government forces.
70 Interview with anonymous DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009.
71 Interview with anonymous DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009.
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alongside Movement for the Liberation of Congo rebels. The units from Burundi deployed and operated in the general areas of Uvira.72
As part of their strategy, the three great lakes countries initially denied that they had deployed troops in the Congo. This denial seems to have been corroborated by reports from the international news channels such as the Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which at first painted a picture that the armed rebellion was an internal matter.73 However, the three countries later accepted that their troops were deployed in the DRC perhaps because some of their troops were captured by the SADC coalition forces during the initial battles for the control of Kinshasa. It was after the capture of the invading troops that the DRC government and the SADC coalition took a common position that the three countries’ deployment of troops in the DRC in support of the armed rebellion was “an act of aggression”.74 The accusations that the three great lakes countries’
deployment of troops particularly the UPDF in the Congo constituted an act of aggression were publicly conveyed by the DRC government’s information ministry to the region and beyond. For example the Kinshasa regime’s information ministry counter argued to the region and the world against Uganda’s reasons for the deployment of troops.75
72It is should be noted that in the later stages of the operations Rwanda and Uganda supported two DRC armed rebel groups namely the RCD Goma and MLC respectively. Whilst such developments unfolded, the grand objective of the three great lakes countries (the ousting of Kabila from power through an armed rebellion) remained the same. Author acknowledges this information courtesy of the comments made to him by Bosenge during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.
73See www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13286306 and
articles.cnn.com/.../congo.atrocities.un.report_1_rwandan-forces-rwa (accessed 25 July 2008).
74 Interview with an anonymous exiled Ugandan senior opposition official, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.
75 The DRC Minister of Information under President Laurent Kabila, Dr Kikaya bin Karubi (now DRC Ambassador to India), argued that Uganda’s argument about border security concerns were unacceptable considering that Uganda had deployed UPDF troops of a brigade plus strength in Kisangani in eastern DRC which is inside the DRC and not along the two countries’ border (Interview with author, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010).
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From the foregoing discussion, it is yet to be established whether or not the deployment of the three great lakes countries in the DRC in support of an armed rebellion to oust Kabila as part of the strategy to attain and safeguard their interests constituted an act of aggression that warranted the three SADC countries to undertake decisions for military intervention in defence of the Kinshasa government under a coalition of the willing. It is also yet to be established whether or not the “act of aggression” argument became the common denominator that formed the basis of the respective interests that motivated the members of the SADC coalition of the willing to undertake the military intervention decisions.