Conceptual framework – a Foucauldian lens
3.9 Troubling critical reflection with Foucault
3.9.1 A governmentality perspective: Reflection as confession in the context of pastoral power
In addition to Brookfield and Baptiste, various other authors have problematised reflection from a Foucauldian perspective (Besley, 2005; Cotton, 2001; Fejes, 2008a; 2011; Gilbert, 2001; Macfarlane & Gourlay, 2009; Rolfe & Gardner, 2006). These authors have expressed concerns about the hegemony surrounding reflection as a good and positive activity, where little attention is paid to the fact that reflection activities demand that the private is made public, and in so doing, become technologies of the self. The potential dangers of such practices for individuals are largely ignored:
In asserting the respective benefits of reflective practice and clinical supervision, these practices are beginning to achieve a status where they move beyond question. … A consequence of this hegemony is that the debate has become sterile. Criticism is limited to comparisons between the efficacy of differing mechanisms of reflection or supervision. (Gilbert, 2001, pp. 199- 200)
3.9.1.1 Reflection practices in nursing
From the field of nursing, Cotton (2001) highlighted the ambiguity of the term reflection and how different definitions position individuals differently. She argued that, despite the lack of conceptual clarity, the predominant discourse about reflection and reflective practice is that it is good and helpful and assists professionals to develop into good practitioners. She emphasised that “scant attention is paid in the literature to the negative aspects of
reflection” (Cotton, 2001, p. 516) and cautioned that demands for reflection may constitute nurses as “productive, docile, conforming workers … who think in the way that the
institution wants them to” (Cotton, 2001, p. 514).
Cotton (2001) (like Brookfield) highlighted the fact that the micro-technologies of reflection (e.g. debriefing, supervision, reflective journals, logs or diaries) ensure that the private thoughts of individuals are brought into the public domain and subjected to scrutiny and judgement. Thus, reflection is understood as a confessional technology of the self, “a form of truth telling that constitutes the self” (Besley, 2005, p. 365).
Gilbert (2001) examined reflective practice and clinical supervision in nursing, arguing that they are forms of government which aim to produce nursing practitioners who are capable of self-regulation. He described these practices as “lighter touch” surveillance techniques where individuals are incited to tell the truth about themselves (Gilbert, 2001, p. 201).
Gilbert (2001) warned that the impression of emancipation, through encouraging reflective practice and the development of autonomy in nurses, is merely the “exchange of one form of subjectivity for another, as both are equally the products of the effects of power” (p.
202). Gilbert (2001) pointed out that discourses about empowering individuals assume the existence of disempowered subjects who are trapped by tradition and rules. These damaged subjects require intervention and remediation through reflection.
Rolfe and Gardner (2006) attempted to address the concerns regarding the repressive role of reflection by differentiating between epistemological reflection and ontological
reflection. They argued that epistemological reflection focusses on conscious thought, whilst ontological reflection concerns ways of being. Ontological reflection thus focusses on
the person of the practitioner who is guided by another in a process of developing
awareness of the self. Epistemological reflection, they contended, is more concerned with practice knowledge and cognition, and not with confessions of shortcomings to a supervisor.
They therefore proposed that ontological reflection is more prone to “normalisation of thought” (p. 597), and to prescribing acceptable ways of being. Epistemological reflection, on the other hand, focuses on meta-cognitive processes and aims to assist the practitioner with improving his/her practice. These distinctions between these two forms of reflection seem spurious, especially with respect to how reflection works in practice. The role of the other in the process of epistemological reflection is not sufficiently problematised to argue that the process does not try to produce certain subjectivities – meta-cognitive processes are, after all, ways of knowing which prescribe ways of being. Fejes (2011) also questioned this distinction, querying whether it is possible to separate the person from the actions of that person.
3.9.1.2 Reflection practices in educational contexts
Proponents of reflection in educational and workplace contexts tend to overlook the role of the practice in positioning students/practitioners as self-governing subjects. The term reflection presumes that there is an active subject whose behaviour can be modified (Fejes, 2011). Discourses of reflection dictate that this subject should be reflective and self-
regulating.
Macfarlane and Gourlay (2009) used the analogy of a reality TV show to elucidate the
‘game’ of reflection that students are expected to engage in. They argued that reflective writing can be prone to inauthenticity as students learn which hoops to jump through to pass a course or satisfy lecturer requirements. They warned that the outputs of the game of reflection may be exercises in self-justification of conformity. They also expressed the concern that the reflection game may be tantamount to the “colonisation of the private self” (p. 458), or “control through self-regulation” (p. 458):
What is implicitly rewarded is initial fragility, tentativeness and penitence, followed by uncritical adherence to some deeply flawed and outdated rules of thumb. The forced enactment of this can result in a grotesque simalcrum (sic) of authenticity in response to a powerful normative regime of
surveillance, at root unconcerned with individual or context. The details may vary - but the ‘journey’ has to reach the ‘right’ destination, via the correct stages … Only then is the ‘transformation’ complete. (Macfarlane & Gourlay, 2009, p. 458)
Foucauldian critiques highlight the role of reflection in making the private public. “By reflecting about oneself with others, we make visible our inner desires as an object of knowledge production, contributing to the subjectification of ourselves” Fejes (2008a, p.
660). Macfarlane and Gourlay (2009), above, outlined the stages required of the participant in the reflection game, which move from penitence through to conversion and conformity.
Besley (2005) also emphasised the importance of acknowledging one’s faults to attain forgiveness through the reflection process.
The role of the other (real or virtual) in this process of confession is highly ambiguous due to the many roles the other may occupy: “witness, accomplice, recipient, mediator, judge and enabler” (Besley, 2005, p. 370). Cotton (2001) referred to a “coach”, “guide”, “reflective participant” or “critical friend” (p. 516). Fejes (2011) explained the virtual other is always present and therefore an expert other eventually is no longer essential as the individual internalises the norms for evaluating their actions.
Like Cotton (2001), Fejes (2011) problematised reflective practices as practices of
confession. He scrutinised learning conversations, log books and reflection as individualising technologies. In learning conversations the individual is encouraged to share (confess) their knowledge and experiences with others and in so doing make him/herself visible for
scrutiny. Fejes (2011) explained:
[B]y making the confession public, the participant is internalising the norm at the same time as she/he is positioning her/himself as a ‘good’ example of how to behave. Thus work is being done upon the self and upon others—a conduct of conduct. Drawing on a governmentality perspective inspired by Foucault, here, subjectivity is not determined but rather elicited, fostered and shaped. (Fejes, 2011, p. 806)
Log-books are private journals where the individual does not confess to others, the journal instead facilitates self-scrutiny in relation to an internalised norm (a virtual other). Fejes (2011) suggested that “[w]riting the log-book is about writing the self – of becoming a new
and improved self” (p. 807). Lastly, Fejes (2011) argued that encouraging reflection as an everyday practice is about shaping reflective subjects who continuously work on improving themselves.
Fejes (2011) proposed that, through the process of reflection, subjects are shaped in a context of freedom to make choices to improve themselves; they are “invited to work upon the self to become that which is desirable” (p. 810). Consequently, “a new subject is being shaped, one who is not only responsible for desiring to become better and better, but also the one who supports her/himself in such an enterprise” (Fejes, 2011, p. 809).
Siebert and Walsh (2013) examined the potentially problematic role of reflective practice in work-based learning. They argued that reflection can be understood as an exercise in self- discipline which brings one’s behaviour in line with being governed (Siebert & Walsh, 2013).
They also queried the authenticity of the reflection process, pointing out that it would take a
“bold student” (Siebert & Walsh, 2013, p. 107) to expose an alternative set of beliefs to scrutiny and evaluation in the context of reflection. To those who would argue that reflection provides an opportunity for students to voice their perspectives, they debated whose voice is actually heard through this process, as students feel that they need to present a certain image of themselves – and that the subjects construct themselves in the form of the preferred image (Siebert & Walsh, 2013).
Devas (2004) was also cautious about reflection and tools designed to promote reflective practice, which she claimed are technologies of surveillance which apparently encourage student development but which exist to produce docile, self-managing subjects. Thus, for Devas:
Reflection is a process by which the student subjects her/himself to a microdynamics of power which they bring to bear upon her/himself; it is a process which begins long before they enter the university, but which is re- encountered and reinforced by practices of reflection which they are increasingly being encouraged to adopt. (Devas, 2004, p. 44)
This exploration of the key mechanism in service-learning reveals that, even though the concept is disputed, it is widely used in a variety of educational and professional fields.
However, even though it is viewed as a beneficent practice, upon closer examination it appears to be a device for coercing participants towards particular ideological or political goals. This is done through effective use of apparently neutral techniques like discussion, participation and sharing. From a governmentality perspective, reflection can be viewed as a technique of the self, where through internalising the other, the student subjects herself to scrutiny and self-governance, always aiming to achieved the desired norm. From the perspective of pastoral power, reflection can be viewed as confession – making the private available for public scrutiny, appraisal and judgement, requesting absolution, and shaping oneself into the desirable subject.