4.1 Executive/managerial theories on why accidents occur
4.1.1 Inwardly directed causes of mine accidents
Before enumerating what the executive/managerial group had to say about the whys of accidents, it's important to note that they didn't talk so much about "accidents" as about
"safety." Mine safety, or accident prevention, was regarded as a shared concern of everyone in the industry. That is, managers thought all mine employees should feel a responsibility to
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guard their own lives and those of their fellow workers. Yet managers were frequently
12 See the statistics table in the appendices. Gathering information on accidents was instructive in itself. The most recent published information I could find at the Chamber of Mines library dated from 1987. Information from that point on that appears in the table was obtained through the direct intervention of a former ZCCM senior manager via connections at the Ministry of Mines. Even so, my source said that he would not vouch for the accuracy of the numbers provided. The privatization era is not the only one in which there has been a perception of increased accidents. In 1968, an inquiry investigated the industry's accident rate during the years right around independence. The Heron Report, as the results of this investigation became known, explored reasons why statistical evidence indicated a sharp and steady rise in serious injuries and fatalities from 1962 to 1967. Certain circumstances that Heron describes in the report closely resemble current conditions. This suggests that some issues raised by present day managers were long standing by nature. There is one major problem with the Heron Report, however, in that the casualty and fatality statistics upon which the report is built do not correspond to statistics kept by the Chamber of Mines or the Mines Safety Department. A present day safety manager at one of the Copperbelt mines considered the Heron Report statistics dubious at best. See graphs and charts in the appendices.
13 This viewpoint prevailed in private interviews with mine managers and contractors as well as public statements emanating from the mining companies. See for example, "Mine Safety is Not Management's Responsibility Alone—Henderson," Zambia Post (June 18, 2005): http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/
200506200211.html.
baffled at what they saw as a widespread cavalier lack of concern among Zambians for their own well-being. This wasn't true just in the mines; it prevailed throughout general society and was particularly evident on the roadways.
While they couldn't explain the risk taking they saw, managers generally speculated it had something to do with Zambian thought processes. "You've got to think safe to be safe,"
said one adding that the idea of being safe just didn't seem inherent in the Zambian psyche.14
Everybody has to think safely, offered another. Until everybody does, there will be accidents.15 That workers seemed not to think in this way was something managers credited to a combination of poor education, carelessness, and ill discipline. It wasn't that Zambia's mines were inherently more dangerous than others in the world. They were remarkably deadly because "stupid stuff was done in them or careless mistakes made.1 Poor discipline and carelessness were also considered reasons why some miners fell asleep on the job or arrived at work drunk despite heavy corporate pressure that included random alcohol testing and well-publicized penalties. Falling asleep near dangerous equipment or trying to operate machinery while inebriated, said managers, were open invitations to accidents and such incidents happened with more regularity than the general populace realized.
These same sorts of characteristics or behaviors appeared to be behind why workers would circumvent standard safety procedures on their own or allow men under their supervision to work in unsafe ways. Standard safety procedures are part of the industrial mining world because the work is so dangerous. But managers said one principal reason why
14 Interview with contracting company owner, 2004.
15 Interview with chief executive, Copperbelt mining company, 2005.
16 Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization process, 2005. The words
"stupid" and "lazy" were highly charged in this setting for reasons that will be discussed in chapter six. The possibility that physiological conditions such as poor nutrition and dehydration might affect miners' concentration and contribute to accidents was never mentioned by the executive/managerial group.
accidents did happen was that workers took short cuts with these procedures. For instance, the mines' blasting fuses were customarily cut in lengths that could burn for several minutes allowing time for the men who lit them to retreat before the charge detonated. But, occasionally workers would cut off a few minutes' worth of fuse. If something then delayed them on their retreat from the blasting area they could be injured or killed. Likewise, guarding against rock falls involved making sure that work areas were properly supported. If supports needed to be moved, workers were taught how to do so according to a standard procedure. Yet, this often didn't seem to happen. An executive once related in frustration that the company had just had a fatality because a miner hadn't done this. In fact, when told what to do, reports said he turned in a different direction and removed other supporting timbers obviously still needed where they were. The result was literally deadly. Since the potential risks were so obvious, why would anyone do such a thing? Short cuts or just not wanting to walk the extra few meters to get the proper posts were the only reasons that the executive could discern.
Similar problems seemed to prevail with worker supervision. The most basic level of supervision in the Copperbelt mines involved one man overseeing as few as ten others within his area. These first line supervisors, said some managers, were also at the front lines of monitoring safety procedures so they were the ones responsible for enforcing the standard practices. Laxity in this supervision was frequently behind mining accidents. As one executive observed,
guys don't get injured when they do something for the first time. I think you'll find the guys do something wrong everyday for ten times. Then he gets injured and then you want to nail a guy who got injured and that's not right because people have seen him do that and have done nothing about it.17
17 Interview with mine site manager, Copperbelt mining company, 2004.
Could there be other reasons for mining deaths, however, such as suicide or murder?
Members of the executive/managerial group said suicides did sometimes take place underground. But these incidents were statistically negligible. And, when post-accident investigations on suspicious fatalities took place, they usually uncovered motives such as trouble at home, too much drinking, or heavy financial debts. Murder, or "score settling,"
also occasionally happened and not just in Zambia's mines.19 But odd signs usually tipped off investigators to these sorts of deaths as well. A safety manager at one of the mines recalled some recent examples.
[I]t was claimed that [the miner] was decapitated by a train. And they found his body lying neatly here and his head lying about 3 metres down from his body. And the cut was surgical. Now if a train goes over your head, I mean, over your head it's—...Then we had the guy that fell down the shaft. Still don't know where he fell from. The rumor was going around...that he was involved with a lot of different women in town and—personal scores to settle over him...And I believe when we get a surgical cut around the neck it's a problem. When you get—when you cannot find a place from where a person
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fell when you have searched every single inch, it's very suspicious.