2.1 Pre-colonial and Colonial Era .1 Early mining activity
2.2.1 Kaunda's governance and legacy
the idea that the mines under private control represented the country's greatest asset.125 Yet, once the mines came under Zambian control, mining management began to appear collectively hostile towards Oppenheimer' s Anglo-American—their former main shareholder.126 Kaunda's eventual voting out of office in 1991 culminated years of popular disillusionment with his socialist policies. But by the mid-2000s, public exposure to capitalist policies that had been applied shock treatment style produced a resurgence of popular affection for the vigorously fit, elder statesman known as "Super Ken" or simply
"KK."
That said, beyond most of his contemporaries and perhaps more than his successors Kaunda presented for Zambia and the world an overarching vision.127 That vision was based upon two inter-related principles. The first was a sympathetic stance towards the socialist values of Eastern bloc countries rather than the capitalist West. During the 1950s and 1960s Zambia, like most of Africa, was used in the super powers' Cold War standoff. "' Needing money and expertise for the new country but being familiar with colonial style economic development, Kaunda ultimately decided that friendship and resource sharing with the USSR
25 Martin, Minding Their Own Business, 115.
126 The mines under government ownership never profited sufficiently to warrant dividend distribution to Anglo and, during the privatization process, the Zambian government was averse to the idea of Anglo's re-engaging beyond its minority shareholder position. Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization project, 2006.
27 Interview with former ZCCM senior manager, 2004. Ellis and Ter Haar observe that Kaunda was generally portrayed sympathetically by the international media, as he was a skillful politician for most of his entire presidency as well as personally charming. Worlds of Power, 70.
128 For more on the Cold War's effects on sub-Saharan Africa, see Peter Schwab, Africa: A Continent Self- Destructs (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). Martin's Minding Their Own Business also contains an excellent recounting of the background for Zambia's transition to a socialist state. He maintains that Kaunda's stance towards the West shifted in part by disillusion over the way Zambia was treated by Britain following independence.
and China was preferable. So, as with most of Africa's first generation leaders, he recommended socialist economic policies for Zambia.129
The second principle was a Humanist philosophy that, when infused into governance, would help make Zambian society more like traditional African societies. '
The underlying motive of all our methods and policies is the creation of a modern African society—a society which will reflect the genius of our people.
Hence many of our ways of going about things will appear strange to Europeans, but that is not to say that we are wrong or that we do not know what we are doing...Our methods are different but it has yet to be proved that in the long run they are less effective.
In actual practice, both Kaunda's humanism and socialism seemed to look different from the vision. For one, the ordinary citizenry was not involved in deciding how Humanism and
1 'V)
socialism related to traditional cultural values. Further, the extent to which Kaunda meant socialism in the Biblical have-all-things-in-common133 sense or socialism in the Marxist control of the means of production sense seemed to shift. By the 1970s, Kaunda's strong links to the Marxist ideologies of the USSR and China were so beginning to affect policies and practices that Zambia's church leaders took strong public stances for alternative
129 Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization project, 2005. Some Zambians assert that the entire African independence movement should be interpreted from a socialist point of view in that political independence was an opportunity to reclaim the means of production from those who had been illegitimately taking the land and the people's wealth. Interview with former ZCCM senior manager, 2005. In Zambia's case, for example, during the ten years immediately preceding independence, the two major mine company owners in Northern Rhodesia had sent £260 million out of the country in dividends, interest and royalty payments. From 1923 to 1964, the BSAC received £82 million net for its mineral royalties. Pallister, Stewart, and Lepper, South Africa, Inc., 84.
130 Kaunda early on defined Humanism this way. "I have a passionate belief in the worth and possibilities of man and I expect him some day to achieve perfection. By perfection I do not mean sinlessness. But for all his weaknesses, man is growing in self-knowledge and will one day fully realize his capabilities." Humanist in Africa, 19. Kenneth D. Kaunda, "The Imperative of Human Dignity," Address presented at the Inaugural Session of the Non-Governmental Organisations International Conference on Human Rights, Paris September 15 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Service, 1968), 3. Elsewhere, he delineates the three key factors of tribal society as 1) mutuality, 2) acceptance, and 3) inclusiveness. Humanist in Africa, 24-26.
1 ' Kaunda, Humanist in Africa, 68-69.
132 Kaoma, "Democratic Crisis in Southern Africa," 18. There was also very little public discussion about copper and the mines in the early days of Zambia's existence. This was in marked contrast to the situation in other countries such as Chile. Martin, Minding Their Own Business, 132. Martin also states that Humanism's weakness was its vagueness and lack of applicability to concrete situations. Ibid., 107.
133 See, for example, Acts 4:32.
viewpoints.134 But in later life, Kaunda spoke of a clear compatibility between Christianity and what he had tried to do with Humanism.
[T]he humanism we are talking about is something which accepts human beings as a fellow human being regardless of anything artificial. And... when we were given the opportunity to lead ourselves—to rule ourselves—we came to analyze this this way and...our motto was "One Zambia, One Nation." All of us are the same nation regardless of 70 different tribes. More—because some other tribes came to join us. And the English, some French, the Americans, some Portuguese—all of us are his. So it's "One Zambia, One Nation." We all are one nation. His nation...[Y]es, some might say it's religious, well we're talking about God so it must be religious but it's not something that was saying we were going to be humanists and—but not Christians. Or we're going to be humanists but not Hindus, you know...I believe that that love of your neighbor simply means that love. And if you love your colleagues, you love your brother or your sister, you can't at the same time go against Christ's teaching, "love your neighbor."135
These shifts in thinking and discrepancies between ideal and actual may have been because the theories simply couldn't match practical constraints of the environment or Zambians' expectations.
Kaunda, like most national leaders in the third world had a generalized view of how things should be in this new independent state. In the quest of addressing the issue of under development, he developed an ideological program, which combined economics, politics, social relations, spiritual and international relations with the hope of transforming the country within the shortest possible time. Unfortunately, this vision does not fit in the grand vision of the State and though it blindly convinces the masses that a major transformation is possible, experience shows that such programmes are short lived.136
Too, outside events also limited the vision that Kaunda had for a rapid transformation of Zambian society. Shortly after Zambia's one-year anniversary, Southern Rhodesia's settler government made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain,
134 Kaoma asserts that this opposition took place in part because of the Churches' own foundations in Western Christianity. "Democratic Crisis in Southern Africa," 17. See also Zambia Episcopal Conference, Christian Council of Zambia, and Zambia Evangelical Fellowship, Marxism, Humanism, and Christianity (Lusaka:
Teresianum Press, 1979).
135 Interview with President Kenneth Kaunda, 2005.
136 Kaoma, "Democratic Crisis in Southern Africa," 21.
constituting itself as white-ruled Rhodesia. It had been scheduled for independence at around the same time as its two former Federation members. But Southern Rhodesia's European minority, realizing this would mean becoming a majority ruled black nation, went out on its own.137 A long civil war began as African nationalists decided to fight for independence.
Britain backed the African insurgents and requested Zambia's cooperation in isolating Rhodesia economically.138
Even though independence struggles were also going on in neighboring countries, the fight for Zimbabwe was particularly important given the sibling style history of the two Rhodesias. Zambia, operating under an official state of emergency from 1965 to 1990 harbored freedom fighters, brokered peace talks, and endured major damage to its own roads and bridges.139 Much of this latter hardship resulted from South African and Southern Rhodesian sympathizers who infiltrated Zambia and attempted to disrupt coordination between various African groups.140 Kaunda's resolute stance in support of African liberation put him out of favor with some Western countries. It also encouraged more expatriates to leave and both of these developments, in turn, had bad effects on Zambia's economy.141
UDI was declared in November, 1965. Similar to Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland had become independent Malawi in 1964.
13 "Roan Consolidated Mines," 4; Annual Report of the Mines Department for the Year 1968 (Lusaka:
Government Printer, 1969), 1.
139 During the early days, the effects of this situation were not so apparent on the white community that remained following independence. In fact, some recalled that era with a bit of nostalgia, for curfews imposed to accommodate African rebel troop movements became invitations to weekend house parties. As long as everyone bought enough supplies in advance and cleared off the roads before dark, an official curfew had little residual effects.
140 Anglo's transportation company, Freight Services, also supported Ian Smith's regime by helping oil companies evade British sanctions under UDI. Pallister, Stewart, and Lepper, South Africa, Inc., 66. See also Stiff, See You in November.
141 Interview with former ZCCM senior manager, 2005. Ultimately, Zambia helped free neighboring countries that then began their independence eras in better financial shape than Zambia found itself. Kaoma, "Democratic Crisis in Southern Africa," 15. The country's military budget increased 4 fold from the late 1960s through early 1970s. Armed forces grew from 5,000 in 1964 to 16,000 by 1973. Military expenditures as a percent of GNP doubled by the early 1970s and arms imports were more than $50 million USD by 1973. Kaplan, Zambia, 43.
Things got worse as the war and UDI dragged on. Transportation was especially hurt as Federation era rail routes through Southern Rhodesia could no longer be used. Following UN sanctions guidelines, Zambia now had to export copper by sending trains on circuitous routes south to Mozambique's ports. Also in the Federation days, oil imports had come in to Zambia by the same route. But, under UDI, until a pipeline could be constructed to Dar-Es-
149
Salaam, Zambia had to airlift in fuel. " And, before the north side power station was built at Kariba, the mines had an added worry. Their power source was on Rhodesian soil and could be switched off at any moment.143
In addition to these worries, Zambia had to contend with outright cash flow problems made worse on at least one occasion by a painful illustration of discrepancies in understanding. When Britain had asked for Zambia's cooperation with the United Nations embargo against Rhodesia, the UK government had promised its former colony compensation for sanctions-related expenses. These could amount up to £14 million by June
1967. More long-term support would come afterwards "for the duration of the emergency."
Such support would include financing for Zambia to build alternate transport routes and power supplies. In late 1967, however, the British government suddenly refused future payments. It also threatened to withhold the original promised amount because Zambia was being too slow in completing its work.144
Meanwhile, the mines continued producing' but problems for the country meant problems for the Copperbelt. Zambians' lack of educational preparedness was now obvious in how the country was being run. Where trained people could be found were in mine
142 The pipeline was financed by the Chinese, further entrenching the Kaunda government's relationship with Communist powers. Some Western sources had said the pipe was impossible to construct. Interview with former ZCCM senior manager, 2005.
143 Martin, Minding Their Own Business, 52-53.
144 Ibid., 79.
management positions. So with increasing frequency, government came to rely on mine personnel to take care of managerial needs everywhere. Many important mining administrative posts were already unfilled because there simply weren't enough skilled personnel to go around.145 Now the problem got worse. There was also the urgent need to reinvest in mine infrastructure. Government claimed this hadn't taken place under European management.146 But, it didn't happen after Independence either and exploration for new mineral deposits stopped, too. It also appeared as if mine accidents were on the increase. An independent investigator assigned to look into the matter said lax discipline and deteriorating standards seemed at least partially to blame.147
Any one of these issues could portend big problems for the industry, but there was also an entire country to consider. The people's general expectations for innumerable development projects from road construction to schools and hospitals remained extremely high.148 So, Kaunda's government took whatever it could from mine revenue to pay for things elsewhere. At first, the government's draw upon copper revenues was fairly painless because production was good. The world copper price was also high thanks in part to the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War. Then there was talk of the need to spread economic responsibility around so as not to overly depend on copper. But it soon began to appear that promises of diversifying by increasing agricultural activities were not being realized even though huge sums of money were allocated for the purpose.149
1 Bostock and Harvey, Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, 100.
146 In 1968, President Kaunda stated that the mining companies had been distributing over 80% of their annual profits as dividends and had not been recapitalizing the mines. Ibid., 123.
147 Alastair Heron, Accidents in the Zambian Mining Industry (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968), 17ff.
148 Roberts, History of Zambia, 229; Bostock and Harvey, Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, 91;
"Roan Consolidated Mines," 5ff.
149 Roberts, History of Zambia, 23Iff. Economic diversification was also an area in which the Kaunda government was at a disadvantage due to Colonial Era policies. Throughout the period of BSAC administration and British protectorate status, the territory's development had been largely confined to the rail line leading
Years later, a technical consultant integrally involved in the re-privatization program speculated about why things began going the way they did. Zambians didn't reinvest in the mines; didn't explore for new deposits. They didn't go around to see what other countries in similar circumstances were doing. Instead, they talked as if all the copper had already been found. They seemed, he said, to have an attitude that God gave them the mines and so everything would work. They seemed to think, "Somehow magically we can do this."150
2.2.2 Nationalization
Only a few years after Independence it was becoming apparent that the Kaunda government's visions for creating a new African society weren't meeting expectations. The state wasn't creating jobs as hoped. Foreign private investors were also not coming to Zambia at the anticipated rate. Some of the investors already there were problems as well.
They were subsidiaries of Rhodesian companies and sympathetic to the Smith regime.151 A change in strategy seemed necessary.
By some accounts, Kaunda had repeatedly assured the public and mine executives that Zambia would not take over the mines.152 But, in late 1969 he invited the mining companies to sell 51% shares to the government effective January 1, 1970.153 The announcement came within a much longer speech to the UNIP National Council at Matero
from Southern Rhodesia up to Katanga. This meant that the route from Livingstone, through Lusaka and Kabwe and into the Copperbelt was most favored for infrastructure improvements while the vast expanses where rural dwellers stayed was largely ignored. Parastatal organizations instituted by the new Zambian government pressed President Kaunda for more and more subsidization as there were few means for establishing profitable enterprises in the rural areas. See Bates, "Patterns of Uneven Development," 15ff, for a comprehensive discussion of problems inherent in Zambia's early urban-rural development dilemma.
150 Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization project, 2005.
151 Ravi Gulhati, "Impasse in Zambia: The Economics and Politics of Reform" (EDI Development Policy Case Series, Analytical Case Studies, no. 2, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 1989), 14.
152 Kaplan, Zambia, 188. Nationalization of a number of other state enterprises was announced at a UNIP party conference at Mulungushi in early 1968. Martin, Minding Their Own Business, 94-97.
1 Annual Report of the Mines Department for the Year 1969 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1970), 1. This announcement took place 11 August. A fascinating and detailed account of the entire nationalization initiative is contained in Martin, Minding Their Own Business.
Hall, Lusaka. Looking back, some observers felt the announcement was such a surprise that it overshadowed other things Kaunda said about Zambian workplaces. He said, for instance, that there would be a complete wage freeze and that union strikes were banned. 5 Other observers were more prepared for nationalization. Perhaps the reason the mines had been distributing annual profits as dividends all along was in anticipation of eventually being taken over by the state.155
Following on Kaunda's announcement, a government pamphlet asserted that the nationalization plan really flowed from the original Colonial Era mineral concessions.
The Constitution granted to us at the time of Independence by the British government was so designed that it denied power to our government to act against such concessions and companies...[But the President] has announced he is abolishing all these concessions. And the rights to mine the minerals in our Zambia come back to where they belong: to us today; to our children tomorrow; and their children the day after—and so it will go on for all time.
Never again will these rights to our minerals belong to any foreign companies or any individual.15
At the time, the President indicated that nationalization would still allow significant capitalist involvement in mining. Government would become the majority shareholder, but various tax and foreign exchange incentives would keep the private companies interested.
Apparently unwilling to jeopardize the country's economic base just to make a political
Kaunda may have been prepared for direct and public opposition because he had disbanded the National Council several days earlier and instituted security measures immediately following the Matero speech. Martin, Minding Their Own Business, 156-157. Government pamphlets subsequently assured the public that the strike bans and wage freezes were temporary. Towards Complete Independence: What it all Means (Lusaka:
Government Printer, 1969), 7.
155 Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization project, 2005.
15 Towards Complete Independence, 4-5. Writing the year before and from an entirely different country Fanon (Wretched of the Earth, 152-153) analyzed nationalization quite prophetically. He observed that to ordinary Africans nationalization would represent, "the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period." Unfortunately, all that seemed usually to follow was an African bourgeoisie's assuming places formerly occupied by colonials without demonstrating any ambition to transform the situation for the common good. Instead, they seemed more like conduits between the citizenry and outside capitalist interests while, at the same time, benefiting handsomely on their own.