2.1 Pre-colonial and Colonial Era .1 Early mining activity
2.2.3 Zambianization of the workforce
The formal program of Zambianization that the Kaunda government initiated was described as a way of reducing the country's dependence on imported skills and promoting Zambian interests. Tied in spirit to the African Advancement initiatives of the 1950s Zambianization came officially into being in 1966.162 By the mid 1970s, it was producing mixed results. There were at least two major problems with the arrangement. One concerned the mechanics of having Zambians take over jobs formerly occupied by expatriates. The other concerned skills training for those jobs.
160 Dick Hobson, "ZCCM, the story that began at Matero about 13 years ago," Mining Mirror (March 26, 1982):
10; Email to author from former ZCCM general manager and current senior executive, Copperbelt mining company 2006.
161 Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. II, 104.
162 "Zambia's Mining Industry," 75.
By industry accounts, the logistics of coordinating such a shift were simply monumental. A Roan Selection Trust publication said that the operation involved over 60,000 people in more than 3,000 job categories.163 The industry's publication, Mining Mirror noted that at the program's outset there were about 7,800 expatriates occupying
skilled and semi-skilled positions. The Zambian workforce by comparison numbered about 41,000. But, at least 20% of that total had only primary school education and were "virtually illiterate."164
Zambianization also fueled the old 1950s resistance to African Advancement by European line workers.165 Expatriates, especially those in highly vulnerable day labor positions, were reluctant to train Zambians in the skills needed for their own jobs as it inevitably put themselves out of work.166
But, European resistance or not, all jobs held by expatriates were announced as vacancies and Zambians moved especially quickly into positions of authority within the mine personnel departments. To hasten things along, jobs formerly occupied by Europeans were also often fragmented. Two or three Zambians might assume duties that had previously all been assigned to one person. While this definitely sped up the transition, it also contributed to the eventual bloating of ZCCM's workforce.168
"Introduction to the Mining Industry for Students," Roan Selection Trust (Ndola: ZCCM Archives, 1979).
164 "Zambianizaton: Steps That Led to a Big Success," Mining Mirror (October 22, 1984): 6-7
165 A trend that Powdermaker noticed during the 1950s and that was also documented in a 1960 study revealed that salaried mine personnel and better educated Europeans were more inclined towards working and socializing with Africans than were daily paid white mine workers and those with less education. See Powdermaker, Copper Town, 69ff and "Attitudes of White Mining Employees." Many of those in higher positions, however, were from the UK and US while daily paid laborers came more frequently from the Afrikaner population.
Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization project, 2005.
166 Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization project, 2005.
167 Ibid.
168 Interview with former ZCCM senior manager, 2005.
By the early 1970s, outside resistance was joined by inside apathy that, according to an independent report, threatened the entire Zambianization process. In an ironic twist, the report claimed that apathy to Zambianization was coming from the African trade unions and the government. This meant that the mining companies themselves had responsibility for the program.
Recalling the long fight for African advancement and considering the nationalist aspirations that Zambians should control their own economy and in particular the mines, the legacy of African suspicion and mistrust of the mining companies, the widely held belief that expatriate miners have a vested interest in retaining their "lucrative" jobs, the costly business of recruiting expatriates from Europe and beyond, and the problem of a dual wage structure which follow in their wake—in view of all these factors it would appear paradoxical that the Government is so little interested in Zambianization.' 9
The mines did sponsor staff members for further training, but management maintained that finding enough secondary school graduates to take technical training was a constant problem. There were other problems relative to workers who received education and training overseas. Sometimes, the ones chosen to go for training were simply not the best candidates.171 Sometimes, the best candidates hardly completed their education before being "poached" by other companies and so never returned to Zambia at all.172
More and more expatriates began leaving the country and staff turnover at the mines continued at a "disturbing" rate.173 The companies reiterated concerns about being able to
169 Burawoy, Colour of Class, 99ff.
170
"Zambianization: Steps That Led to a Big Success," 6-7.
171 One analyst recalled an instance in which the mines sent six students for study in the UK, only three of whom passed, yet the news was greeted with apparent aplomb by Zambian mine managers. Interview with independent technical consultant assigned to ZCCM privatization project, 2005.
172 Mining Mirror (February 23, 1979): 10 & 11.
Annual Report of the Mines Department 1969, 1-2; Bostock and Harvey, Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, 124. At independence, the number of expatriate employees on the mines was approximately 7,300. Four years later, it had dropped to 4,800. Annual Report of the Mines Department 1968, 1. By 1970, the Zambian workforce had increased from 41,000 to 46,300, a 13% rise. "Zambianization: Steps That Led to a Big Success," 6-7. Wood recorded that the artisan and clerical class, many of whom were of Afrikaans descent, were "bitterly opposed" to African Advancement and began returning to South Africa in great numbers even before independence. Many had also either lived beyond their means while in Northern Rhodesia or
iiiiil^^S^^Ssli^
find suitably skilled replacements. Eventually, the remaining expatriates held largely financial and technical jobs174 while managerial jobs were frequently filled by loyal politicians without proper training or experience.175 The result, according to present day observers, was predictable.
If, by increasing production you have lowered your operating costs to where you are now making money this does not necessarily mean that the shareholders will be receiving dividends/getting their money back. A lot of it you have to put straight back in as capital investment to sustain and improve future operations. What happened in the early Kaunda days when the mines were making good money is that he used this money to build houses and do all the politically popular things he did to remain in power and neglected re- investing in the mines. Mines need continual investment in new equipment and infrastructure has to be maintained so they run properly. This is generally referred to as sustaining capital. The mines were making money but they didn't put enough back in—they sucked it all out and things started to breakdown/stop.
The copper price was good, the mines were working well and all they did is went and nationalized and Zambianized way too quickly with guys being stuck in positions they didn't have the experience to handle. The decline was gradual, but if you look at the statistics, it was continuous until they eventually re-privatized. Since privatization, it has gradually and continuously improved.176