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Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:M:Mathematical Social Sciences:Vol40.Issue1.Jul2000:

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Fig. 1. The candidates’ votes shares when their positions are x , x , and x , where x 5 x 2, x , x , and1233112x 2 xis large enough.21
Fig. 2. The positions x*and x . The points* t and t are the tertiles of F: t 5 F(i/3)
Fig. 3. Candidate 2, at x , wins for all values of a between a and a], where a is determined by the conditionthat the shaded areas are equal and2]]] a is determined by a symmetric condition

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