The Clash of Civilizations: a Myth?

Au MUHAMMAo // The clash of civilization:A Llt'th?

The Clash

of

Civilizations:

a

Myth?

Ali

Muhanzmad,l

AESTBACT:

"The clash of civilizations" is a powerful metaphor of the post cold war global polihcs. lntroduc€d by Samuel Huntington, the metaphor suggested that world polrtics were being reconfigured with 'tault line' between cultures replacing political and ideological boundaries as the flashpoints of crisis and bloodshed'. The purpose of this article is to

critic€lly examine the propositions and theoretical assumptions underpinning the thesis. lt shows that the propositions are groundless and the theoretical assumptions behind the argument are dubious. lt argues that the "clash of civilizations" is a myth.

Key wotds civilizations, contlict, the West, lslam

INTROOUCTION

tics. \44ren the communist states in

East-ALI [/UHAI\/|\4AD, [/A is a leclurer al ke Depaftnenl al

lnlernalional Belali7ns, Muhannadiyah Unversily a[

Yogyaka a.

ern Europe fell, the Soviet Union

col-lapsed, and the Cold War finally ended,

global politics enters a new phase. Politi-ca] scientists competed to draw meta-phors what the world politics

will

be. The end

of

history' the coming

anar-chy,3 the unipolar moment,a

globalizati-on,5 are among others. Huntington

re-jects those metaphors because they all

miss the crucial aspect

of

what global politics is

lilely

to be and olJbrs a contro-versial, provocative image

of

the post-Cold War globa.l politics: the dasrl of

civr'-lizations.i The purpose

of

this article is to challenge Huntington's thesis and to show the danger

if

we are trapped into

his scenario: the clash of civilizarionis a m1th.

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIOTIS

HuntiDgton's main aim to write the book(The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of Wodd Oder) is, first, to draw

a map

of

the post-cold war world

poLi-tics, secondly, to warn the West of the rise

Ju r tiuoGd lrtrnrrsDMr //Volume IN0 2 Desember2004

f<rrmer enenry (conrmur.rist block)

with-ered awayi and

thidly

to ofler a policy guidc

lor

policymakers

in

the \Alest

ol

the new envilonn.rcnts o1'global politics.

Borrowing his lr'ords ". ..aspire to

pre-rertt

r

frrnr.r,rc,rk. a _{Par.rdigrrr.lor} rierr-irrg _{qlobel lrulitir} s rlr.rt r,r'ill he rneaning-hrl ro

', lrul;rrs and rrseful to

poli,^1m:'-kcrs"./

He is sure that his is thc bcst paradigm to unders[irnd post cold war

world politics and challcnges the

cri-tiques by asking rhetoriczLll,v,

"...if

not [the clash

o!

cir,ilizations, what? "Got il better idea?"8

But, lvhat

ex:rctly arc

his

argu-nrcnts."'l

lre , nd

,,f

tlre cold raar is a

significant phase

of

world politics. He

argues that the most inrpoltant of

grou-ping

of

states

ir

thc

rlorld

politics are no longer drc three blocs of the cold war era- -.the First \Abrld. the Sccond

\{orld,

and the Third

[rorld,

but ncu' blocs

of

seven or eight cir.ilizations. r'r The

fun-dameltal sources of conflict in the post cold war world politics, he continues to argue, will not be primarily ideological

or primarily economic. The great

divi-sions among human kind and the domi-nating source of conflict will be cultural and the principlc conflict of global poli-tics

will

occur between nations and

groups of drf?re-nt c:rllLzatr'ors. The clash

of

cir.ilizations r,vill be a batde line

of

thc luturer r.

Ler" look lurther ar the nrain

pro-positions he set forth.

firrt,

lor the first

tin.re in history globa.l

politics/interna-tiona.l relations are both mulalolar and

n u I ti ci,iliz ati o n s. T\le process of

modcrn-ization outside the

\{cst

is producing

ncither a universa.l cir,ilization nor the

westernization. Instead,

it

produces

indigenization: reaffirmation

ol

their own cultures and r.alues. Secoldll; the halance ol' power

anrolg

r irilizations is shiltirrg. The \\'r-sr i5 ieclirrirrg

in

its relative influence, but Asian (especiall; Ciolfucian) cir.-ilizations are expanding dreir econornic,

military

and political strength- Islam is exploding

denogrl-1;l.rically

with

the destabilizing

conse-qucnces for N{uslim countries and their

neiglrbors. Thirdly, a citilizaion-based rvorld order is emerging. Societics shar-ing cultural a{finity cooperate \'\..ith each

other; effort to shift society from one cir''ilization to another are unsuccesslul;

and countries group themselves around the core states

of

their cir-ilization.

Foultily, the we st's uni\€rsa.l prctcn-sions increasingly bring

it

into conflict

with other cir.ilizations, most seriously

with Islam and China; at the local line

fault line wars largely betr,veen \.Ioslem

and non-l\rIuslim, generate

"kin-coun-try

rallying"

the threat

of

broader

es-calation, and hence effort by core states

to lralt the wars. Finally, the survi\/al

of

unique, not universal, and how solidly

the \,Vest unites against challenges lrom "the Rest-"r'!

THE GROUI.IDTESS PROPOSITIONS

Huntington's propositions are se-rious lallacies and oversimplification

of

complexities

of

rvorld civilizations so that thcy are ol little use lor understand-ing the complexity of post cold war glo-bal politics. Lets have a look at each propostion. ,Firs1 rl e r.ise of muhi-pohr and

mdti-ci

izittion glob.dpofi acs. Huntington

argues that modernization and

global-ization produces neither a universal civi-lization nor westernization of

non-west-ern

society.

Instead,

it

produces

indigenization: cultural and religious resurgence. So, he is

a

globalization

skeptic.rr Bassam Tibi in his book Kneg

der Ciuilizationen confirms dris

observa-tion.rr

Lets look at Huntington's dia-gram bellow:r

j

Huntir.r$on continues to argue that the difference

of

cultural identity

aro-und the globe promotes new cultural

and civilizational blocs, replacing the old

Au IV1UHAMMAD //fte Clash ol Crvilization A lrylh?

blocs of ideologies during the cold war.

A cirilizatjon is defined as a \ubjective

self-identification

of

people, as well as

by such lactors as language, l.ristory

re-ligion, customs, and institution.

It

is,

therefore, the broadest level

of

hunan

species. Cir.ilization are long lived, they evolve and adapt.rb He points out that currently there are seven or eight

ma-jor

"block" of civilizations:

Sinic,Japa-nese, Hindu, Islam, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, and possibly African.rT This fragmentation

of

the world along civilizational blocs leads to the danger

of

conflict. Huntington argues,

"...the

nost

dangerous cultural conflicts are rJlose along the lault lines between civi-lizations."rB He constructs a clear-cut

boundary between the west and ortho-dox Christianiq' and Islam from Finland in the north and the former Yugoslavia

in the south. Using the realist model

of

billiard balls, he shows as

if

there are

clear-cut boundaries among eight civi-lizations.

However, there is a serious prob-lem here. The block-based thinking

of

civilizations is really unpersuasive. He arbitrary demarcates the seven or eight "civilizations" as

if

they were monoliths,

as

if

they did not overlap in reality and

frequently interpe ne trate.

r!

In

fact,

nearly er ery civilizatjon that

Hunring-ton nentions invoh'ed absorption,

inter-Jun Hu8Lirdr hrERflasroMr // Volume lN0 2 Oesember2004

penetration one another20 For instance,

through centuries of exchange with the west, Islam laid the foundation for the growth

of

mathematics, science, medi-cine, agriculture, and industry in Medi-eval _{Europe. Islam in practice} contrib-uted to strengthening the foundations

of

the European Renaissance.2r And

today, some

of

rhe leading ideas and institutions that have gained currelcy

within the Muslim world are imported

from the West. So, each civilization pcn-etrates one another Relations between

Hindu and Islam provide another

ex-ample . Islam impacted upon the

archi-tecture, Iaw, the literature and attire

of

segment

of

the Hindu population just

as Hinduism also influences Muslim

mysticism, food and music.22 So, con-structing a clear-cut demarcation and block-based

riinking

ol

civilizations is

not persuasive.

&ronQ the shiftof thebalanceofSnrt among civilizations. Huntington argues

that the west is in its peak, but currently

it

is declining

in

relative influence. On

the other hand, Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength. Islam is exploding

de-mographically

with

the destabilizing

consequences for N,Iuslim countries and

their neiqhbors.

It

seem Lhat Hunring-ton's obsen'ations is inspired by, firstly,

the story of East Asian economic

"mira-cle" (before

the

1997 financial crisis)

and, second,ly orientalism and dre

popu-lar discourse in the West

of

Islanric

re-vivalism since

the

1970s.

It

seems interesting that he uses

also the realist model

of

"the balance

of

power" to understand the relations

among civilizations.

In

anarchic world

politics23, the increase of power of "non-western civilizations" will pose a seri-ous danger and threat to the declining "western civilization.

"

Huntington at-tempts to prove his arguments-as other realists

do-by

comparing the power and capabilities

of

each civjUzation in

term

of

the total

territories,

popula-tions, economic products, the share

of

world manufacturing output, share

of

Gross Nationa] Product and the

mili-tary capabilities. All in all, he wants to show that the west civilization is in de-cline relative

to

the "Confucian" and

"Islamic" civilization.2l

However, the proposition has

seri-ous methodological f-allacies so that his arguments could not work.

If

he wants ro ma-ke valid comparison among civi-lizations he musr ensure that there is clear unity in each civilization.

In

fact, he cannot. There is no unity,

for

in-stance, within Cinic or Islamic

civiliza-tion. The split and division wrthin cach civilization is more apparent than

never been analytically useful."26 So, how comc Hundngton makes

compari-sons

of

power among civilizations to

produce an argument about the power

increase or the power decline

of

civili-zations? Let's put

it

in

another way.

It

does not make sense at all to argue that

the power

of

Cinic civilization

is

"the aggregation"

of

the economic, military

population and territories

of

China,

Taiwan, North Korea, and South Ko-rea.

It

a.lso does not make sense to say

thar rJte power of Islrmic civilizadon js "the agg'egation" of the military

capabili-ties, population, economic growth and

territories of,

lor

instance,

Iran,

Iraq,

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Realists can

conpare the porver

of

states because

states are clear entity and uniry but not the power

of

"civilizations"

because

thcy havc _{no clear-cut entity and uniry}

Accordingll; his argument aborrt "thc shift

of

balance

of

pou.er" is basically

groundless.

Third, the ise of ciuilization-based wotld order.Hunrtngton argucs rhar

soci-ety sharing cultural affinity cooperates

with

each other and countries group

themseh.es around the lead

or

corc .tales

of

lheir civilizrtions. By showing

the EU experience, he argues that

eco-nomic cooperation

will

succeed

if

it

is

based on civilization affrnity.'l7 He also

argues lhar the neu world order is

sus-tained by seven cenrer

of

civilization'

Au Muthuurn // nre Ctastr ol Civilization: A Myth?

gravity. E\/ery center has a concentric power structure and relies on network-ing among core states, member states,

and individua-ls or group members

re-siding in foreign country.

However, Huntington's construc-tion of civilization-based world order is

highly problematic. Although he notes that states are still the most important aclors

in

the world politic".'d

hi'

ana-Iyzes

of

the states behavior is mainly

orer determined by cirilizations

vari-able. In his word, "cultural commona.l-ties and differences s,hape the interest,

antagonisms,

and

association

of

states."2e Consequendy, he overlooks the

robustness of stafes and, in turn, fails to explain the con.rplexities of global

poli-tics. For example, his model cannot

ex-plain the viabrlity of cooperation among ASEAN states since 1967.

In

fact, this econon.ric grouping

is

multiciviliza-tional-based:

it

includes Islam, Bud-dhist, Confucian, and Christian

civili-zations.'ro His model also fails to under-stand the need

of

Asia Pacific

commu-nity to

create

of

APEC, a

multicivil-izationai economic cooperation. Also,

the paradigm faccs other anomalies:

why conflicts occur

wdu

Islamic cir.ili-zation, for instance, war between Iran

(Islamic)-Iraq

(Islamic)

in

1980- l9BB,

and Iraqi (Islamic) invasion

of

Kuwait

llslamicr

in

I990.

\\-hat kind

of

JUB Al Husurca lrEnx^sro

^r//Volume N0 2 Oesember 2004

in the Gulf purchase weaponry

lron

the

United States (the \{est)? Because of the orer-deternrinecl b1 , ivilizations vari-able, Hrrntington's n.rodel of cir.ilizatio-nd-bascd r'r,orld politic faces too

nany

anonalies and fails to explain the

con-plexities

of

those phenomena.rr As a

natter of

Izrct, thc'jigsaw puzzle" can easily be understood from the politic, economic, and security interest of sfafes

rather civilizations. Slalc _'uvcrcignq is sdll one

of

the major rcelities

o[

inter-na tion a

I

relations,;rnd

the dccision nrakers

of

states tend

to lunction

in manner which obtains and protects the

national interest

of

the states. States

control the civilization, not vice versa.

In short, the serious weakness

of

Hun-ringron's model

is that.

borrowing

Ajami's words,

it

"misse s the slyness

of

sL1les."32

Fouth, "the Wesf ' domnance and the

challenge lront "the rest.

"

Huntington rvarns about danger and threat that the "the west" dominance is currently chal-lenged by the rise of "disgrunded civili-zations": Confucian and Islan.ric

civili-zation and the emergence

of

"Confu-cian-Islamic" alliance.ri But the

argu-me nts are very misleading. -Flr-st, as has

heen mentioned abovc, Confucian t

ivi-lization is not monolithic.

If

we look at

the conflict behveen China and Taiwan,

his obsenation

of

the Conlucian uniry

is

absolutely wrong. As

Liu

Binyan

shows the political and ideological

dif-ferences among them preventing the

formations

of

grelter'-Confucian

rvorld."rr The conflict betwecn North

and Soutl.r Korea is another clear cx-ample. Secord/;; thc worry aboul Islamic challenge is also a n.ryth.

The

Islamic "ciriliz-ation" is better characterizcd by "fragmenlation.r5

Il

is not an exaggera-tion to say thal history

of liliddle

East ("Islamic world") politics since the for-marion

of

nrtion-stares

in

the rcgion is

history

of

tension and conflicts among "Islamic states" themselves. Mahbubani rightly points out,

"it

is ironic that the West should increasingly

fear

Islam when daily the Muslim are reminded

of

their own weakness."36

In

his book, .Is-lam and the AIydt of Confiontation,Fred

Halliday

persuasively challcnges the

myth of Islamic threat

" . an Isl.mic rhrcat is itsclt chimcn, 1d toalkotnmccndnrigotnshistoicd l*

nveenthe 'I]arni" anl'\,ursrenl is nonrnsc "Or

thc Idarnic idc, it is absurtJ ro scc tr y'us.lLn corur

tnts as lr .''omc gurcraJscrlsc mcracjng drc i

rcsl-...ldAythc aml indsaogdt of ttu lrJ,lanic urltd

j: _{farlc:s tban tlnt ot} tlrc wcst, clrr ;aisumrrg drc

mo'r inpo,il,l" e,s.f lt"dilbnt ' ou trics

hrmingatalJiatccrc acr :aison. hrca1i4 Islatnic counlrr,. /rar" pursrr"d lndiridu,,. II.rrio^

states, and oltcn as lbugJrt cach othcr i' Unlortunately, Huntington

swal-lows uncritically Bernard Lewis' article,

distorts the current Islamic resurgence and depicts

it

as an irrational threat to the western heritage.3s

Tlxndiy, the existence of Confucian-lslamic alliancero is also seriously mis-leading. The trallic of arm from China to Libya, Iran, Syria does not represent Sinic-Islamic alliance, but merely

nor-mal business venture.{o Also, the

coop-eration

of

nuclear weapon between

China and Pakistan is not directed to-ward the west because of "civilizational

reasons"

but

because

of

geopolitical reasons

(it

is

directed

to

"balance"

India's nuclear capabilities).ar

Similar\

it

does not make sense to argues that

military

cooperation between rich-oil

(Islamic) countries

in

the Gulf and the

USA (west) is directed toward

Confu-cian Civilization.

In

fact,

it

is directed toward "radical" states (Iraq, possibly Iran) in the

region.

In short, his argu-ment about the threat from the "Con-fucian end Islamic civilizarion" is un-convincing and is based on groundless prejudice.

Fnally survival of the l'l/esl As a

con-sequence

of

his logic and arguments, Huntington warns drat to save the west, the US must reamrm its western

iden-tity

and must accept its civilization as unique, not universa-l. Huntington seem

skeptic because he argues that the west-ern values is unique so there is no need to impose the "western unique values"

Ar i/fuHA[rMrD // The clash ot civilizrtion: A ti,l(h?

to other civilizations to avoid the clash with the rest.

Howeveq Hunrington underrsdmates

t}le fact thatwestern values are also met

with approval in odlet non-western

so-ciery Not primarily because they origi-nated in the west, but because they are

oriented toward the protection of indi-viduals and their integrity.

In

a]l non-western societies there have been and there

will

be political and humanistic movements oriented to values, which, by change

or

not. have their roots in western civilization.a2

THE DUBIOUS ASSUMPTIONS

\\rhat are the main assumpdons

behind tJle Clash? -&rsr, it seems that logic

behind Huntington's ideas is conflict

paradigm

of

social theory.

The

logic perceives that conflict is regarded as

normal concomitanl oI group exislence.

Conflict paradigm perceives conflict is

not only integrated, but

it

helps to es-tablished group identiry clarifies group boundary and contributes to group co-hesion. Huntington assumes that con-flict is sen ing "positive" social purpose.

No wonder, the main discourse

in

dre

Clash is about danger, threat, and con-flict! Borrowrng Michael Dibdin words,

he naively believes that ". . . there can be

no true lriends without true enemi's.

Unless we hate what we are not, we can

Junll^t HuB0rcail lilItnr^snur // Volume I N0 2 oesember 2004

of

civilization-based world politrcs, he

argues, for people seeking identity and

reinventing

ethnicity,

enemies are

essen aa-[. . . _[udic fircm the writer] " (p.20).

Unsurprisingly, in *re clash, he coastruccs

new enemies for the west after its "old

ene

my"

collapse

d.

O'Haggan

aptly criticizes Huntington

in

her smarr

ar-ticle, "Looking a Cultural Enemy?"11

In

fact, constructing "us" and "them" or

"fliend"

and "encmy" are dangerous discourses

to

be used

to

analyze the world politics and policy gridance.a5 As Fred Halliday also indicates, the idea that the "wcst need enemv" is really a

myth. Yes, cerrain benefits arise from international and ideological/religious

confrontations:

arm

manufacturers.

That

erternal challenges have a

func-don to play rrithin a socicry was

possi-bly true in the case of cold rvar But this

does not means that the cold rvar arosc

as a result of pressure for such internal benefits. l{estern society as a whole has

never "needed" an enemy in some

sys-tematic sense.4o

Scroncl,/y. in relation ro the fintpoinr. he also uses the realist view

that

"the international realm is the realm

of

the recurrence and

repetition."

Conflict,

struggle for power and war happened in the past and wrZ always be repeated in the future-ai In the past, he argues,

cor-flicrs happened among prilcess- After

the emergence of modern nation states

(the Peace

of

Westphalia), conllicts oc-curred among nation states.

In

the sec-ond half of the twentieth centuries, con-flicts occurred among ideologies.as

Fol-lowing the logic, he is sure that after the

end of cold war there "must be" anodrer new form of conllicn. But what? He

*lnls

without a deep contemplation and

ar-gues that

"it

will

happen among

civili-zations!"

As a matter

of

fact, that kind

of

logics is a dangcrous way

of

thinking

Although there is a "fact" that the world politics was

.onfli(tual in

the pasr. ir

does not necessary mean that it will

al-ways conflictual

in

the future.

It

is

be-cause there is no such "social lact." The social

"

ct"

(e.g, "anarchy

of

global politics" and "a conflictual world," etc)

is sociaJly cons ucted How we think n'ill

shape how we practice. Precisely,

if

we

think that

the international realm is

conflictual it will materialize in the real world because we will behave to follow

the discourse.ae The Clash

of

Civiliza-tion is what Huntington ma-ke of it!

Tle

Clash exploits the differences among civilizations t.l.rat lead to the understand-ing that conflicts seems inevitable. This

is an intellectual setback because it con-structs and reifies "the social

fact" of

conflictual relationships among

civi.liza-tions in the global politrcs.

image. Roman Herzog

for

instance,

argues the need to emphasize the

com-monalties among civilization and to avoid the possibility

of

conflictual rela-tionships through the mutual under-standings and dialogue.5o In the Trans-bnnation of PoliticalCorrurrur'ryt' Andrtw

Linklater, the proponents

of

critical

theory

in

International relations, also

strongly argues for new forms of

politi-cal community which are cosmopolitan, sensitive to cultural difference, the im-portance of inclusiveness, dialogue and consent

rather than the

balance

of

power, conflict and clash.

AFIER THE SEPTEMSER 1-I

Huntington thesis is

of

litde use.

But,

te[orist

horrendous attacks at the

\VTC and the Pentagon (Scptember I

l)

nrake some

of

us

to

think, "possibly, Huntington is

right".

"It

is a clash be-tween Islanr and the \{e stl." This is how Osama

bin

Laden secs things: "this

battle is not behveen al-Qaeda and the

US", the Al-Qaeda leader said

in

Oc-tober 2001.

"This

is a battle

of

l\'fus-lims against the global cr-usaders". Fron.t

bin Laden perspective, it is a clash that

has been underway for centuries, with *re American as the latest incarnadon

of

the Christian

Crusaders

arrogant lvestern interloper out to oppress

NIus-lims-52

In

October 2001 interview on

al-Au MUHA MTD // The Clash of Civilizationi A My'th?

Jazeera Bin Laden talked about the Clzuh

ofCivilization thesis: i\.Iuslim, bin Laden

argues, must reverse a series of

humili-ations that they have endured siuce the Ottoman Empire, the last N{uslim great power, as dismantled alter the World War

I.

Al-Qaeda's l99B declaration

of

Jihad, or holy war" against 'Jervs and Crusaders" urge i\'{uslim to attack "the American and their allies, civilian and

dre military". Supposedly as a re sponse

to US policies that al-Qaida lcel oppress

N,{uslim: the stiitioning of troop in Saudi

Arabia. the backing ofthc UN sanction

against lraq, suppoft lor repressive Arab

regimes, support

for

Isr-ael, - .

.

Thesc

\{estern policies, according to

a1-Qae-da, added up to a clear declaration

of

war on Allah, his messenger, and

X{us-lins"l

Somc, not

all,

N,Iuslin

in

the world then see Osama is the hero.

On

the other hand, some pcople

i.n the Wcst have also uscd the Clash

of

Civilizations' thesis as justification

for-going toe-to-toe widr Islam

in

retalia-tion

lor

the

\\r'llC

attacks. Richard

Lowry wrote in the Natrbnal Reraew drat the \t'est should fighr back

in

defense

of its values, so did N{ichael Ryan in thc

Boston Globc. Nlany orher Aneriorn

Jun HuruNG x lxrEnil^sro'ur // Vollme tN0.2 Des€mber2004

But the fact is that the vast major-ity of the world's more than one billion

Muslim are peaceful people. Possibly,

many Muslims

in

the world disagree

with

many

US'

policy

in

the Middle

East. Butit does not mean that they

sup-port Osama bin Laden ofusingviolence

against the West. It is a tiny number

of

extremists who cause the trouble. Osa-ma bin Laden and his Al-qaeda

fanat-ics have _{twisted Islam's teaching to sewe}

their own ends.ia Bin Laden is no more representative of Islam than Oklahoma

Ciry

bomber

Timothy

McVeigh is

of

Christianity. The problem

is

that the volume

of

media coverage in the West often uses the word "terrorist" and "Is-lam" in the same sentence so that it looks as though Western society is in conflict with Islam. As has been shown, the clash

of civilizations is a

m)th.

Are we trap-ped in the Huntington's thesis?

***

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EI'IDNOTES

I _{Ati Muhammad, N{A is a lecturcr at dre}

De-partrnent of International Relarions, A{uhammadiFh Uni\€rsicy of Yog)€]erta.

'?The triumph of liberal-dcmocratic form of

gov-emarce over all rival forms of govcrnance because

of the "defeaC' of othcr altcrnative ideology

absolutism, fascism, nazism, commuuism." Liberal democracy was free of fundamenhl inrcrnal contradiction, so the uiumph mark the cnd of social

cvolulion Sce, Francis Fukuyarra, Thc End of

HistoryNational Intcrcst. No. 6, Summer, 1989

lThe _{coming of globa.l disorder because of} scar-ciry crimq ovcrpopulation, tribalism and diseasc dc-strcy drc social structurc of drc world. Seq Robert Ikplarr, The Coming Anuchy Thc Adantic Monthly

237(2), Fcbruarv 1994

+The end of drc cold rvar lcad to drc crnergeme

oa dre United States as sole supcrpowcr bccausc of

is combination of ecommrq pohtical, militarypolrer unrivaled by othcr powcrs. Scc, Charles Kraut-hammc! The Unipolar Moment, Foreign A.6lairs,

Vol 70. No l, l99l

5Globahzation refers to all those proccsses by

Au l ur ilifio // The Clash ol Civil arion. A Mylh?

which the people of the u,odd are incorporatc into sirgle uorld so, icry global soercq: Scc. for in*ance.

tr4artin Albrow,Globalization, Knowledge ard Soc;

ct)1 Irndon: Saga, 1990.

d _{Samuel Huntington,The}

Clash of Civilizacions

arrd the Remaking of \Vorld Ordcr, London:

Touch-stonc Books,l997

; Samuel Huntington, 1996, p 13

s

Samuel Hurtit,Igroll, If not Civiiiz^tions, \\hat? Paradigm of Post Cold war \Vorld, Foreign AIIairs, Nov /Dec, 1993:p. l9l

'!Elaborating his main argumenB in t}le fiIsr

sec-tion of this essay is so essenoal to avoid a "uselcss deba(cs." Fbrirbtdncc, Prof""sor Sr.ph"n Ch.n write<

a stmng critiques on Huntin$on Clash of CMliza-rions, (see. _{trlillcniurn,} 26,1. Ia97r. but Huntingron ctrdcally \rrites his response to the cricics, "Prcfessor Chcn. you cndcizc somcrhing rllar I did not wrire in rhe book [so, plcasc rcad my book again!]"

(N,tillc-nium, 26,1, 1997)

'o Saurucl Huntington, 1996 p.2l

rr

Samucl Huntington, 1996 p.29-30

rr _{Samucl Huntington, p.20}

rrHc bcLo'cs that modernization and globaliza-tion do not lead to e emergencc of "a global

vil-lage" but a fragmcutcd and, in turn, conllicnral wodd. 'r Bassam Tibi, Internatiolal Ntorality aJId Crcss

Culturzl Bridgn€, in Roman Hcrzog Prcvcntnrg drc Clashof Civilzatiom, NewYork St- I\,Iartin PrEsE 1999

In his boo( Tibi n:cognizcs drc cultural diftcrcnccs and indrgenizaton, but not like Hunrington rvho er?loia it, he s€ek for culnrral dia.logucs to avoid conllict.

rr _{Samuel Hultington, p.76}

'6 Huntington, p. 43

' Hunungton, p. 45-48

13

Huncington, p.l3

rq _{Hans Kung, Iutcrcultural Dralogue Versus}

Confrontation, in Roman Herzog, p I01

JuuMr HUBU" { lxrtnxrsroMr //Volune IN0 2 Desember 2004

or Camouflaging Dominalcc,Asian Studies Ro,iew,

Juln 1994 p.] I

:rJohn _{Esposrto,The Islalric Thrcat, Oxford:} Oxford Ud'crsin Prcss, 1995, p 207-8

': Chandra A{uzzafar, p.l I

} _{'Anarchy" is a tcrrr rn Intcmational Relations} that lcfcrs to a coldirion in drc norld politics which

" Samuel Huntrngron, p.83-88

)5 _{Carl Gcrshman, The Clash \Virhin} CivilizationsJournalof Dcmocracy8.4,

1997p.165-170, Hans Kung Intcrcultural Dialope versus Con-frontauor, 1999, p.l0l

!6 _{Dicter Scnghass, A Clah ol Civilizarions: An}

Idee Fxc?Journal of peace rcs€arch, Vol 35 No.l,

1998 p I30

r? _{Samucl Hunrington, p.l3l}

rB _{Samucl Hunongtor, p. 28}

" Samuel Huntington, p. 29

o Chandra Muzzafar, p I2

3' _{In Kuhnian logic, if a paradrgm faces so many}

aromalics, it is in crisis, and will emerge oiher new paradigm rhat can ollcr bcttcr answcr to the

ques-tions and, in turn, it wil become dominant in thc

acadcmic debate until it fac€s o[her anomalies

3r _{Fouad Aja mi, Thc Summoning, Forcign Affain,}

Sepr/Ocr, 1993, p.2

3r _{Huntingon, p 238-240}

s _{Bin)larr, Civilizations Gnfcing, Foreign Alfain,} Sepr/Ocr 1993

3r _{Chubin, 'A}

Pa.rr Islamic Movcmcnt-Unity or Fragmcntaoor," See also, Simor) Murdcn, "Culhrrrl Con{licr in InErnational Rclaoorx: The West and Islam", inJohn Baylis, I998

36 _{Kishore \4ahbubani, p.}

l 2

' Frcd Halhday Idam and the tr4)'th of Con-fmntatior, London, I.B Tauns Publisher, 1996,

p-n3

33 _{Bernard Invis, Ncw Pcrspectivc}

Quartcft I 0,

3, Summea 1993

3'o _Huntirgrol,

238-241

s FouadAj^mi, p-6

+r _{See, Desmod Ball and tr4ohaD Malik, Thc}

Nuclcar Crisis in Asia Thc Indian and Pakistani Nuclcar Programs,\Vorking Papcr No 32s, Carbcrra

Augr.rsts, 1998 Chapter I

D _{Dicter Sehnghaas, An Idee Fixe,}

Joumal oI

Pcace Research 35, No I, 1998. p.130

13

Samuel Huntington, p.20

sJacinta O'Hagan, Lookrng for Cultural Encrn_v?

Third \Vord _Quarrcrll; \ro1. 16 No l, 1994

15 _{tuchard Dcvctak, Cnrical Theory in Scott}

Burchill, et.al, Theories of Internadonal Rclatiois,

1996, New York: St\4artrn Press, p 168

s _{Fred Halliday, p. I I 3}

*' _{See dre rcalist posiuon, for imrance Kenncth} \Valz, The Theory oI Interlarional Policics,

Massa-chusctts, Addison-Wcslcy Publishing Company,

1979:66.

€ _{Huntington, 1993i23}

{s _{See the logic of che consrucri\.ist position abour}

"a social fact" in intcrnationd rclations: ararchy In Alexander \Vend, Auarchy is vhat state make of

ir,International OBanizatioll 46, 2 Spring I992 $ Roman Herzog, Preventing the Ctash of Civi-lizarions: a Pcace SEatcgy for thc Twenty First Cclr-tury New York: SMartin Press; I 999

5r _{Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of}

Po-litical Communiry Blackwe Publisher Ltd, Polity

Press, 1998.

5' _{"Thc Clash ot Civllizatio$?" Christian Sc;}

ence Monior, 2003

s lbid.