In contrast to the USA, the EU has pursued a strategy of ‘constructive engagement’ with Iran. This diplomatic approach has encompassed a number of areas: nuclear power; a human rights dialogue; trade; and investment. The EU has tried to link these areas with Patten’s warning, ‘we cannot simply ignore problems in one area and think that we can move rapidly in all the others’ (Patten, 2004b). Britain, France and Germany have represented the EU in negotiations with Iran concerning its nuclear programme. The ‘EU Three’ have promised access to civilian nuclear technology in return for Teheran suspending uranium enrichment and agreeing to short-notice IAEA inspections. In 2003 the EU looked to have secured Iranian agreement but, in August 2004, Teheran announced that it had restarted the building of uranium enrichment centrifuges (The Observer, 1 August 2004). Former President, Ali Akbar Hashami Rafsanjani, declared that Iran could not give up its enrichment programme, but indicated that a diplomatic solution could be found to assure its civilian use (The Guardian Unlimited, 11 February 2005).
The EU has pursued a diffi cult course seeking to secure measures that will lead to international confi dence in the Iranian nuclear programme.
Iranian politics have constrained the process and IAEA concerns about Teheran’s transparency are shared in both Europe and Washington. Europe’s engagement strategy would be more effective if directly supported by the USA. President Bush indicated a willingness to reconsider the European position in early 2005 but did not agree to a change of policy (FT.com, 24 February 2005). Despite these constraints EU engagement policy has remained consistent and, unlike on Iraq, held as a common position.
Patten has summarized European thinking: ‘One only has to look at its neighbourhood to see how important it is and to recognize that we cannot have a credible policy for the wider Middle East that does not embrace and include Iran’ (Patten, 2004b).
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
from that of the USA. At the same time Europe has not been a mediator in the dispute and does not have the leverage of the USA over Israel or the capacity to guarantee outcomes. Europe remains predominantly an economic power despite ESDP projected commitments. The European failure to find common ground in key crises such as the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Iraq War of 2003 also points to serious political fl aws in the making of European foreign policy. The issue is clearly about political will and consensus. The challenge for analysis is that the EU has gone beyond the ‘false dilemma of omnipotence or inexistence on the international scene’ (Gnesotto, 2002, p. 5) and has a ‘variable and multi-dimensional presence, which plays an active role in some areas of international interaction and a less active one in others’ (Allen and Smith, 1990, p. 20).
The interpretation of the EU’s international role has, unsurprisingly been contentious. In the early 1970s François Duchêne suggested that the European Community could become a ‘civilian power’:
the European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been associated almost exclusively with ‘home’
and not foreign, that is alien, affairs. (Duchêne, 1973, p. 20)
Hedley Bull, in contrast, asked whether ‘civilian power Europe’ was a contradiction in terms, asserting that ‘the power or infl uence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control’ (Bull, 1982, p. 151). In accord with the realist tradition, Bull saw states as the primary actors in international politics.
International organizations were but secondary bodies where states conducted their affairs:
‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one; the Europe with which I am concerned is the actual one of state governments, in which a minor role is played, chiefl y as instruments of cooperation among governments, by various committees, assemblies and secretariats bearing the designation ‘European’, including those of the EC among others. (Ibid) In this vein of thinking, intergovernmentalism, as in CFSP, may be seen as a constraint on the EU attaining the autonomy necessary for a true international actor. Hill, following Sjöstedt (1977), states, ‘an international actor can be said to be an entity which is (1) delimited from others, and
from its environment; which is (2) autonomous, in the sense of making its own laws and decisions ...; and which (3) possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level, such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties’ (Hill, 1993, p. 309).
The EU does, in part, meet these criteria. It has a legal personality in specifi cally defi ned policy areas (Brotherton and Vogler, 1999, pp. 16–18).
It has representation, conducts negotiations and has detailed decision- making procedures. It is at best, however, quasi-autonomous in that the
‘Europeanization’ of foreign policy is a matter of degree and affected by policy area.
Institutional theory points to the instrumental character of international organizations and regimes as a means to solve collective action problems (Young, 2002, p. 176). The state is seen as self-interested (as per realist theory) but preference is given to joint action given that independent policy could lead to ‘undesirable or sub-optimal outcomes’ (Stein, 1993, p. 120).
The typical approach is to see regimes less as ‘centralized enforcers of rules than as facilitators of agreement amongst governments’ (Keohane, 1984, p. 238). If institutionalism becomes embedded over time, as in the EU, policy networks can, however, establish norms and develop shared perceptions of political order. The propensity for cooperation in EU external relations has been seen as the result of institutional mechanisms which ‘have pre-empted the formation of fi xed national foreign policy preferences on an expanding number of issues and socialized its elite participants into articulating a common European policy on these issues’ (Smith, 2004, pp. 99–100). In this context it is important to emphasize that the EU has been seen as ‘less than a state, but more than a conventional intergovernmental organization
…’ (Hill, 1993, p. 309). It has been argued that while the EU shares with regimes qualities such as establishing common expectations, it is ‘much more centralized and institutionalized than an international regime and receives a much higher level of commitment from its members’ (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991, p. 10). The diffi culty of categorizing the EU arises because it is ‘essentially organized as a network that involves the pooling and sharing of sovereignty …’ (ibid., p. 13). In foreign policy terms Hill has suggested that Europe should be seen as a ‘system (ie: not a single actor) which generates international relations – collectively, individually, economically, politically …’ (Hill, 1993, p. 322). In this way member states simultaneously conduct ‘their persistently vigorous national policies, their sophisticated co-ordination and common initiatives through EPC (now CFSP); and the highly structured political economy dimension of collective commercial and development policies’ (ibid.). Crises such as the Iraq War expose the multi-level nature of European external policies but do not end
CFSP (Hill, 2004). The propensity to collaborate in security politics remains despite disagreement in specifi c issue areas.
The degree to which foreign policy is ‘Europeanized’ therefore varies according to issue areas and their sensitivity for member state governments, in turn affected by domestic politics. This is not to suggest direct lines of accountability for foreign policy; indeed the multi-level nature of decision making weakens the often tenuous relationship between executives and publics. Legitimizing European decisions poses a signifi cant challenge for member states and one that will grow with ESDP. The political history and capabilities of member states also affect the degree to which their foreign policy is Europeanized. For Britain and France, with their extensive networks of external relations outside the EU, membership can represent a
‘constriction or simply a means to amplify national foreign policy’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000, p. 263). Moreover, such states and other EU members have special interests, such as Britain’s relationship with the USA, which are kept separate from CFSP. For states without an extensive external network or with historical reasons to place national initiatives in a multilateral framework the EU represents an opportunity (ibid.). In this orientation
‘the member state involved often seeks to work with the EU or defers most foreign policy prerogatives to the Union’ (ibid.).
The post-Cold-War security environment has provided a powerful impetus to coordination of foreign policy in the EU and underlined the relevance of the European rationale. As contemporary security understandings have broadened to include political, economic and societal elements, the international environment is ‘uniquely conducive to EU actorness’
(Brotherton and Vogler, 1999, p. 257). The challenges of global fi nance, trade, poverty and terrorism can arguably require international and multilateral responses. For the European Union’s High Representative for CFSP, ‘not even the most powerful country can confront on its own the challenges the international community is facing. Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system’ (Solana, 2004). The EU’s contribution has been to seek to anchor political and economic stability for its members through ‘Association Agreements’, ‘Stability Pacts’, regional strategies and neighbourhood policy. Human rights and good governance also have become core criteria in EU external relations. The EU’s ambition is the ‘development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and rule based order’ (Solana, 2004). The EU can, therefore, be seen to be a ‘normative power’ in security provision.
After a century in which the European State system produced conflicts of catastrophic proportions, it is not surprising that European countries value an environment in which states operate within a legal framework and confl icts are
settled peacefully. The desire to spread this to the rest of the world is both natural and praiseworthy. (Cooper, 2003, p. 160)
Norm setting is fundamental to the European project embodied in treaty law and directing external relations. It has been argued that by ‘refocusing away from the debate over either civilian or military power, it is possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing normative power’ (Manners, 2002, p. 238).
The normative direction of EU external relations is closely associated with its soft power attributes. Soft power, ‘getting others to want what you want ...’ (Nye, 2002/3, p. 552), is essentially the notion of ‘co-optive power’
rather than ‘coercive’ or ‘command power’: ‘Soft power is also more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation’
(ibid.). Soft power can be seen as a relevant and an important instrument of diplomacy.
If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If it can establish international rules that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as many costly carrots and sticks. (Ibid., p. 553)
The potential of the EU to infl uence others on the basis of soft power has been optimistically interpreted in some quarters. Leonard, for example, has asserted that ‘the strength of the EU … is broad and deep: once sucked into its sphere of infl uence, countries are changed forever’ (Leonard, 2005, pp. 4–5). The ‘outreach’ of the EU is, however, variable, with degrees of influence permeating outwards from accession countries to the wider borderlands. The Middle East case study demonstrated that intense local confl icts are not swayed by norms codifi ed in the EMP or EU association agreements. The point is that soft power has its limits: while it is not to be derided, it is important to recognize that ‘foreign policy is about war and peace, and countries that only do peace are missing half of the story – perhaps the more important half ’ (Cooper, 2003, p. 162). The EU’s weakness in ‘hard power’ has been recognized by the European Council with its consequent commitment to ESDP. The planned investment in military resources should provide the means to signifi cantly redress the current defi ciency in capabilities. Europe will not be a match for the USA but will be able to deploy forces in support of a range of CFSP objectives, including crisis management roles. The parallel requirement is for political coherence and coordination to ensure effective use of resources. The draft European
Constitution sought to address this, but while institutional provision can facilitate outcomes, political will and consensus remain key elements in the successful attainment of European policies. Enlargement of the Union provides additional challenges to the process of attaining coordination and will make the establishment of consensus a harder exercise.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the European Union is a signifi cant international actor even though it defi es straightforward categorization by being neither a state nor a regime. The EU constitutes a new type of actor: it may be uneven in performance, at times inconsistent, but it remains important. It is the breadth of European external relations, refl ecting the internal integration of member states, and not just CFSP, that gives the EU political gravity. The constraints within the CFSP system – capabilities, consensus and political will – mean that it has not replaced national policy.
At the same time it remains in the interests of member states to pursue common strategies when Union initiatives are seen as appropriate. It is this multi-level and multi-issue nature of European foreign policy making that limits the EU to a partial or quasi-international actor role. This does not mean the role is insignifi cant, and when account is taken of the impact of the EU on third parties, when its ‘presence’ is measured, (Allen and Smith, 1990) the perspective of ‘outsiders’ confi rms the salience of the Union’s external role. The pattern is variable, as would be expected from Union external policy, but clearly demonstrable in international organizations, the diplomacy of political economy, the developing world and Europe’s
‘borderlands’. In a study of the EU’s external political impact in the 1990s, Ginsberg found the evidence undermined the conventional dichotomy of the EU as an ‘economic superpower–political dwarf ’ (Ginsberg, 2001, p. 278).
Although not a ‘dwarf’ in political affairs, the EU is unlikely to complete a transition from civilian power to fully fl edged international actor in the immediate future. ESDP will alter the balance of its policy instruments but elements of the current ‘imperfect union’ are likely to persist. The challenge for Europe’s élites is not only to manage this process – but to legitimize it.