written constitution etc.,) that demonstrate intent of (the) organization to continue in existence. (2004, p. 6)
This defi nition, or perspective, of what we mean by global civil society is the one that locates the actors within the wider policy process and the institutions of governance.
Global civil society clearly developed partly as a response to the imposition of the liberal economic agenda following the fall of the communist bloc of the former Soviet Union and its satellites. The resulting social and economic dislocation in more vulnerable societies
meant that their governments were unable to supply vital health, education and welfare functions and ‘civil society actors came forward to take over the functions reserved for the states and to advocate for harnessing processes of globalization by placing checks and controls on the global market’ by seeking to introduce good governance in the form of ‘accountability, transparency and democracy on the global scale’ (2004, pp. 6–7). Organizations that must be included in these activities, however, include UNHCR and a welter of EU initiatives, suggesting that we are witnessing something more akin to Rhodes’ version of the differentiated polity and multi-level governance. (Massey, 2005, p. 9)
In order to understand the impact of this on policy making in democratic societies, it is necessary to explore individual policy areas, and that is the important contribution supplied by the policy case study chapters in the rest of this book.
economic liberalism that is outstripping the political capacity of states adequately to deal with its consequences. In Europe this is referred to as Europeanization and it refl ects (as noted in a preceding section) the European (but not British) perspective of the existence of public administration as emanating from reasons of state (Stillman, 1999, p. 258). The Anglo- American approach, by inducing the state from public administration, is a more institutional and institutionalist approach than the European one based as it is upon a corpus of administrative law (Stillman, 1999, pp. 247–59; Massey, 1993; Price, 1983). Despite the different British and continental European traditions, there is a convergence in the policy-making and institutional decision-making structures and procedures.
As we have noted elsewhere, though now largely out of fashion the functionalists and neo-functionalists of the 1950s and 1960s performed a useful analytical role when their analysis was deployed to describe and make sense of the evolving structures in Western Europe, especially those of the young European Communities (Adshead, 2002; Chryssochoou, 1999;
2001). In other words, as a descriptive tool of analysis, indeed a stylized map of the political and administrative terrain, their approach assisted understanding of the political processes at work (Massey, 2003, pp. 62–3).
Neofunctionalism is sometimes wrongly associated with the gradualist approach to European unity adopted by Monnet and his successors, a kind of ‘functionalist federalism’ (Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 53). Neofunctionalism adopts an abstract conception of politics and sees it as an inherently confl ictual process in terms of allocating values in the community. It may be seen that there is throughout this perspective an administrative fl avour to the political process: institutions are established to advance the political goals of a federal, integrative and politically élitist process (ibid.). Both here and within the intergovernmentalist perspective may be found the infamous democratic defi cit of the EU, a defi cit neofunctionalism not only does little to address, but would also actually perceive as a necessary price for European integration (Massey, 2003, pp. 63–4). It is this politically élitist view that has come in for so much criticism in recent years.
Indeed, the neofunctionalists went further than this and advocated a deepening of the elite socialization, ‘the process by which infl uential actors of policy- and decision-making from different national settings learn to work with each other within a larger management setting’ (Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 54). Such an approach engendered criticism from various observers for its ‘supranationally biased image of Community arrangements and dynamics, (and) underestimating the role of “summit diplomacy” in putting together complex package deals’, it also generally overestimated the importance of the Commission and other supranational institutions and institutional actors (Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 57).
(Massey, 2003, p. 63)
By the late 1990s, theory building had advanced to take account of these realities and included the construction of elaborate theories of ‘confederal consociation’, the belief that the EU is best understood as
a compound polity whose distinct culturally defi ned and politically organized units are bound together in a consensually pre-arranged form of union for specifi c purposes, without either losing their national identity or resigning their individual sovereignty to a higher authority. (Chryssochoou, 1999, p. 25)
It is this intergovernmentalist approach, replete with several varieties, that has found most favour with analysts. It may be further refi ned to state
‘the distribution of preferences and the conduct of bargaining among the governments of the member states broadly explain the nature, pace and scope of integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 3, quoted in Massey, 2003, p. 64).
The development of the concept of Europeanization refl ects the sheer complexity of supranational governance in the EU and the global situation in general. For example, the World Trade Organization and a host of international NGOs are organizations designed to bring a measure of order and predictability to global governance. Within the EU
the nature and extent of supranational governance varies along a number of dimensions. In some sectors, the competence to govern is held exclusively by the Community; in others, national institutions are the primary sites of policymaking;
and in many domains, the transfer of power from the national to the supranational level has been only partial. Within the same policy sector, the answer to the question ‘who governs?’ has changed over time. And in those areas in which (EU) institutions have become sites of policy innovation and change, one fi nds variation in the relative capacity of the member state governments. (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 4, quoted in Massey, 2003, pp. 63–4)
It may be argued that at its grandest Europeanization resurrects some of the neofunctionalist dynamic for supranationalism through institutional integration (with EU law as represented through the Union’s own court (and national courts’ compliance) being a key element (Stone Sweet, 2000)).
Europeanization, through European (supranational) integration
is the process by which the EC (EU) gradually but comprehensively replaces the nation-state in all of its functions … (rejecting) … the comparative statics of intergovernmentalists as a mode of analysis incapable of capturing crucial temporal elements of European integration. … The expansion of transnational exchange, and the associated push to substitute supranational for national rules, generates pressure on the EC’s organizations to act. ... [EU] organizations, such as the Commission and the Court, respond to this pressure by working to extend
the domain of supranational rules, in order to achieve collective (transnational) gains. (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 4, quoted in Massey, 2003, p. 64) We can see this in action across a range of strategic policy areas, such as competition policy (Dunford et al., 2001), the Common Agricultural Policy (Tarditi and Zanias, 2001) and structural policies (Mairate and Hall, 2001) and as outlined in the case study chapters in this volume. But it is also apparent in more low-level areas such as the toy directive, the machine directive, and directives and rules on medical devices and construction products, which impose common European standards and regulations in these arcane fi elds (Egan, 2001).
Despite the wry warning by Schmitter, with which we began this chapter, academics developing theoretical and empirical work on Europeanization have evolved a range of defi nitions to take into account the supranational nature of the policy process and its impact on domestic structures. Yet we may state it simply as a ‘situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics’ (Buller and Gamble, 2002, p. 17). This most closely refl ects the reality of the policy process in the supranational polity and is as good a place to start as any. Governance in this usage is the process of governing which brings about conditions for ordered rule and collective action (ibid., p. 18). This defi nition allows a linkage to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s attempt to create a general theory of supranational governance and takes account of the impact of institutional changes designed to accelerate the demise of national institutions at odds with the integration programme in the Treaties of Rome, Maastricht and Amsterdam. It also, crucially, defi nes Europeanization
not as a process, but as a situation, ‘where certain effects can be shown to have occurred’ (Buller and Gamble, 2002, p. 17). An implication of this is not that Europeanization is inevitable, but is contingent upon social, political and economic interactions, while giving ‘analytical primacy to the impact of European developments at the domestic level’ (Buller and Gamble, 2002, p. 18). Thus, ‘in its crudest sense, Europeanization [is used] to denote a condition of becoming “like Europe”’ and the term implies change or transformation in domestic politics and institutions that may be ‘through “positive”, “negative”, or “framing” integration’
(Buller and Gamble, 2002, p. 18). (Massey, 2003, pp. 64–5)
Europeanization therefore impacts upon and takes place at several levels to induce the ‘modernization’ of Europe, both of EU members and others in the region. It does this at the level of supranational integration and that of a domestic transformative dynamic. It may be explained by noting that
as transnational exchange rises in any specifi c domain (or cluster of related domains), so do the costs, for the governments, of maintaining disparate national
rules. As these costs rise, so do the incentives for governments to adjust their policy positions in ways that favour the expansion of supranational governance.
Once fi xed in a given domain, European rules – such as relevant treaty provisions, secondary legislation, and the ECJ’s case law – generate a self-sustaining dynamic, that leads to the gradual deepening of integration in that sector and, not uncommonly, to spillovers into other sectors (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p. 5). (Massey, 2003, p. 65)
Examples include monetary union, regional policy, and the development of civil nuclear fusion technology (Massey, 1999).
At the global level environmental law (Wildavsky, 1995; Spragia, 1998) and world trade and consumer legislation illustrate similar incentives to supranational rules. In the European context, the domestic impact of modernization is institutionally
greater because of the existence of more (and more binding) treaty obligations and the corresponding incentives to conform and comply. ‘In a fundamental sense, governments are reactive, constantly adjusting to the integration that is going on all around them’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p. 12). Europeanization is often a fundamental constituent of analyses that argue the power of national governments and the nation state are being hollowed out and transferred up to supranational institutions and down to the regions (Rhodes, 1994; Rhodes, Carmichael, McMillan and Massey, 2003). But there is no reason, as Stone Sweet and Sandholtz strongly imply (1998 pp. 5–12), why intergovernmental approaches such as Moravcsik’s (1991; 1993) are in confl ict with this view of Europeanization.
Indeed, intergovernmental approaches may be seen as a sub-set of the institu- tionalist approach adopted in supranationalism. (Massey, 2003, p. 66)
Integration varies over time, place and policy area and may rely as much on intergovernmental diplomacy and multi-level governance as on grand treaties, and all approaches appear as likely or unlikely to succeed in different times and different contexts and all ‘are as evasive of the control of individual national governments’ (ibid.).
Lodge (2002, pp. 48–9) identifi es four dynamics to the Europeanization of the policy process:
1. Coercive triggers. These include at least three subsets; requirements to comply with European legislation; rulings by the European Court of Justice; European Commission executive acts.
2. Mimetic triggers. There are two sub-sets within this group; increased interaction among civil servants leading to the adoption of ‘best-practice’;
national co-ordination networks through things like peer-group review for the implementation of EU employment policy and monetary policy, among other fi elds.
3. Professionalization as a trigger. The two sub-sets here include policy networks as part of the transnationalization of societal actors leading to the ‘logic of exchange’ in areas such as regulatory agencies for telecommunications; the emergence of policy communities, following on from the work of Sabatier (1988).
4. Domestic politics as a trigger. There are three sub-sets here, which include strategic competitive adjustment, whereby domestic institutions and regulations are adjusted to comply with European standards to ensure protection of domestic markets. Secondly there is the way Europeanization shapes domestic policy opportunities through legitimizing particular policy beliefs and options. Finally, domestic triggers are found in the lobbying of élite groups to force the adjustment of domestic laws, regulations and institutions to the European model in order to ensure access to resources and the global ‘playing fi eld’. (Quoted in Massey, 2003, p. 66)
A review of the implementation of regulatory reform in various EU jurisdictions, including Britain, illustrates all these triggers in action and what constitutes integration or Europeanization activity differs according to a complex constellation of factors (Lodge, 2002, pp. 48–60). For example:
in Sweden’s case, it was the desire of that country’s political and economic elite to join the EU that led to major reforms of its public administration (Lodge, 2002, pp. 58–60). In other words it was change engendered by the domestic elite in anticipation of what was required for entry that was the dynamic, a process being repeated by each tranche of aspirant nations. (Massey, 2003, p. 67) It may be argued, then, that the practical impact of Europeanization is a process of federalizing and we also need to recognize the temporal aspect of Europeanization. In other words, address what the entity is becoming and how space for national decision making is being compressed chronologically as well as institutionally (Ekengren, 2002). But the problem with any federal system is that it is a compromise between the centralizers and the devolutionists; each offi cial will have an allegiance somewhere and it may not always be where governments would wish. For example, the devolution that has occurred in the UK
has created separate institutions for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and it is clear the allegiance of offi cials in those countries has markedly shifted away from London (Rhodes, Carmichael, McMillan and Massey, 2003). Indeed, devolution combined with Europeanization has conspired to bypass the ‘heart’
of national government in London for the devolved countries to an extent that calls into question the continued ability of national government to perform its
traditional role. This is a pattern repeated elsewhere and represents modernization as Europeanization. (Massey, 2003, p. 67)
Whilst institutions are changed through Europeanization, it is the changing of the governance ‘software’ of a country that has a greater impact on the policy process. That is, Europeanization changes domestic beliefs and expectations. Even the language and comprehension of governance, and a nation’s policy-making timetable, are structured by the EU in that the EU’s meetings and directives structure domestic policy making: the concept of ‘European competence’, and the need for European education and socialization, are all implicit in national public administrations (Ekengren, 2002, pp. 3–60). It may be seen that
the daily reality for the national policy-makers of member states is a European one (Greenwood, Pyper and Wilson, 2002, pp. 186–192). Elected ministers spend a large proportion of their time shuttling to and from meetings in Brussels deliberating and negotiating with EU Commissioners and fellow ministers from other states, all national policy decisions are benchmarked against EU law and policy (Egan, 2001; Hall, Smith and Tsoukalis, 2001). All member governments and administrations are ‘severely constrained by policy outputs from the EU system’ (Greenwood, Pyper and Wilson, 2002, p. 189). … Even when new institutions themselves are not created as a specifi c result of EU measures, the existing institutional actors have had their behaviour substantially modifi ed by the EU reality. It is a continuing example of new wine in old bottles. (Massey, 2003, p. 68)
Given these points, returned to frequently in one guise or another in the case study chapters of this volume, it may be argued that aspects of the modernization process have run ahead of the institutionalization of democratic accountability.
Thus
offi cials at all levels have their lives structured by this reality, in taking into account EU rules and practice. With regard to the environment, for example, everything from the environmental impact of a new power station to the application of building regulations in individual cases of privately owned dwellings are located within their EU context. From national treasuries to local town halls, offi cials are influenced, guided and constrained by the Europeanization of public administration in the way in which they carry out their duties. To neglect this reality is to risk the invocation of the judicial review of a decision and it is here through the juridicalization of public administration, government by judges, that the imposition of Europeanization is keenly felt (Stone Sweet, 2000). Offi cials modify their behaviour to avoid the risk of such judicial review, ensuring that even when the EU’s laws and doctrine are not being explicitly applied, their application is nonetheless omnipresent. (Massey, 2003, p. 70)
The problems encountered by member states in attempting to obtain the consent of their citizens to the ratifi cation of the EU Constitution, and singularly failing to do so in several cases, do not refl ect a simple mistrust of the EU, a misunderstanding of the EU or even a sense of anomie. The problems refl ect all these things and very much more: a complexity of citizen response to refl ect the complexity of the EU. But clearly those who disapprove of the Constitution on the grounds that it advances the process of European integration, of federalism, have missed the point. That process has already advanced to the extent that the EU is a functioning political entity in its own right. National politics take place within that context and the EU’s Constitution would merely have recognized what has become a political, administrative and legal reality. Politics within the EU and indeed within Europe is now Europeanized.