The Middle East poses a complex challenge for the security interests of the European Union. It combines the politics of energy dependence with the Arab–Israeli confl ict and the question of Palestine. The Cold War polarized the region, enhanced its strategic signifi cance and compounded local confl icts. Secular nationalism has competed with Islamic movements to lead Arab politics and respond to Israel and Western intervention. Radical and revolutionary forces have also contested the legitimacy of states and traditional authority. After 9/11 the region’s local politics have global consequences predicating an enhanced strategic interest by the Western powers. The US response to the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has divided Europe and sustains concern with regard to Iran and other regional powers.
The Development of the European Role
The EU has looked to promote stability on its southern fl ank, ensure energy access and supply, develop trade, and address migration pressures. The EU contribution to confl ict management and resolution in the region, however, has been constrained by the predominant role of Washington, the seemingly intractable nature of the confl ict and the limitations of CFSP.
The EEC did not have an agreed common position on the Arab–Israeli confl ict when EPC was inaugurated in 1969 (Dosenrode and Stubkjær, 2002, p. 83). In 1972 the Community adopted its ‘Global Mediterranean Policy’ (GMP) which provided a framework for commercial relations with individual Mediterranean states and was a precursor of later initiatives.
It was the oil crisis of 1973, and Europe’s oil dependence on the Middle East, that stimulated a political initiative and a declaration which referred to the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinians (ibid., p. 86). The signifi cance of this statement can be gauged by comparison with UN Security Council Resolution 242, which had set the prevailing norms for resolution of the Arab–Israeli confl ict. Resolution 242 spoke only of a ‘just settlement of the refugee problem’ (Laqueur and Rubin, 1984, p. 365) and did not place Palestinian rights into its equation for settlement. Arab states promptly recognized the signifi cance of the European position and sent a delegation
of ministers to the EC Copenhagen Summit in December 1973. This was the birth of the ‘Euro-Arab dialogue’, which refl ected a simple balance of interests: European concerns about oil and Arab desires to see Europe support the Palestinian cause.
Israel fi rst called upon the EEC to remain neutral (Dosenrode and Stubkjær, 2002, p. 82) but ‘several EU actions, positions and declarations on the MEPP (Middle East Peace Process) so adversely affected Israel’s vital national security interests that Israel never accepted the EU as a mediator’
(Ginsberg, 2001, p. 107). While the EEC signed an Association Agreement with Israel in 1975 the European Council in 1977 called for Palestinian representation in the peace process and a Palestinian ‘homeland’ (Aoun, 2003, p. 291). Washington’s response was to try to maintain the autonomy of Camp David in the peace process and pressure Europe to modify its stance (Dosenrode and Stubkjær, 2002, pp. 96–7). None the less the Community’s Venice Declaration of June 1980 stated that a ‘just solution must fi nally be found to the Palestinian problem which is not simply one of refugees …’.
The Palestinian people, it further declared, ‘must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defi ned within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self determination’. The Community also saw the need for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), not recognized by the USA or Israel, to play a part in the settlement (European Council, 1980). In Israel virtually the whole political spectrum condemned the Declaration (Alpher, 2000, p. 196) and the government clung to the American-brokered process which eventually de-linked Palestinian autonomy from a settlement with Egypt.
Europe may not have become a signifi cant peacemaker (Aoun, 2003), but it did make an important contribution to how the confl ict was defi ned.
The USA and UN had predominantly focused on the relations of states and the consequences of the 1967 War in their approach to the diplomatic resolution of the confl ict. After the oil crisis Kissinger had sustained the bargaining process that linked return of Arab land for peace and oil.
President Carter had sought a more comprehensive settlement but allowed Palestinian autonomy to be relegated to a letter of intent in the Camp David negotiations. It was Europe that had placed the Palestinians and their right to self-determination at the centre of any potential confl ict resolution.
Oslo and Beyond
Following the Gulf War of 1990 the USA, with the Soviet Union as co- sponsor, convened the Madrid Conference to negotiate a peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states. The European community attended as an observer following Israeli objections to full participation. The EC did
chair the working group on Regional Economic Development (REDWG) and ‘between 1993 and 1997 allocated $15.2 million for preparation of feasibility studies of infrastructure and the establishment of communication networks between cities, universities and media’ (Dosenrode and Stubkjær, 2002, p. 122). This heralded the EU’s role in seeking to fi nancially and diplomatically underpin the peace process. This role was intensifi ed after the historic breakthrough in Oslo between Israel and the PLO leading to the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed in Washington in 1993 by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat. The EU now ‘concentrated its efforts on supporting the creation of an environment that would make possible lasting peace in the region rather than contributing directly to a political solution between the confl icting parties’ (Asseburg, 2003, p. 11). The EU and its member states quickly became the largest donors of fi nancial and technical aid to the new Palestinian Authority agreed in the DoP. Between 1994 and 1998 the EU provided over 50 per cent of the international assistance for Gaza and the West Bank (ibid., p. 12). European aid was focused on infrastructure projects including Gaza harbour and airport, hospitals and schools. In addition specifi c assistance was provided for Palestinian state building, such as the 17 million ECU for the 1996 elections (Dosenrode and Stubkjær, 2002, p. 136).
The EU has also invested in the promotion of regional multilateral frameworks. The 1995 Barcelona Conference brought together the EU with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The Conference agreed to create a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The three main chapters of the EMP covered the promotion of security, the creation of shared prosperity and the development of understanding between cultures. The participants agreed to establish a regular political dialogue, to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems and to respect human rights (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). The economic objectives were to be realized through the progressive establishment of a free trade area, regional cooperation and fi nancial assistance from the EU. The EMP looked to regular meetings, exchange agreements, education and the media to develop the dialogue between cultures and societies. Specifi c meetings were convened to address the issue of migration which sought to enhance job creation to reduce migratory pressures. The EMP adopted a work plan for each chapter and conducts its business via annual meetings of Foreign Ministers.
In June 2000 the European Council adopted a Common Strategy on the Mediterranean which endorsed the Barcelona Declaration but made more explicit the political and security aspects of the EMP. Specifi c objectives in the fi eld of justice and home affairs including migration were also added (European Council, 2000b). The Valencia Action Plan in April 2002
committed EMP members to further cooperation in the sectors of migration, reform of the judiciary and the fi ght against criminality. This refl ected the general emphasis of EU external relations upon good governance and the specifi c need to respond to the ‘internationalization of criminal networks, of terrorism and of modern management of migratory fl ows …’ (EMP, 2005–6, p. 21).
The Impact of EU Policy
The EU’s policy towards the Middle East has been critically affected by the deepening confl ict between Israel and the Palestinians, the polarization of the region after 9/11 and the Iraq War of 2003. Following Ariel Sharon’s
‘visit’ to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on 28 September 2000, the second intifada, the ‘Aqsa Intifada’, began. Violence and unrest spread through the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian suicide bombings targeted Israelis, whose government responded by reoccupying territory ceded to the Palestinian Authority, imposing curfews and restricting movement. Israel ‘closed’ the occupied territories and began building a ‘separation barrier’ in the West Bank. By the beginning of 2004 some 3300 people had been killed in the confl ict and 24 000 injured (European Commission, 2005).
In an attempt to halt the cycle of violence the Clinton Administration called for a summit which in turn led to the appointment of a fact-fi nding commission chaired by US senator George Mitchell and included the EU High Representative Javier Solana. Mitchell reported to the incoming President, G.W. Bush, who showed little enthusiasm to commit the USA to a resolution of the confl ict. The impact of 9/11, however, provided a new impetus in Washington to address the crisis. In 2003, the USA with its
‘Quartet’ partners (UN, EU and Russia) published a ‘Roadmap’ to peace.
The ‘Roadmap’ identifi ed a number of stages to a comprehensive settlement by 2005 based upon a ‘two-state’ solution. Events on the ground, though, took a different course and despite appeals from the Quartet, violence continued.
The closure of the Palestinian territories has had a specific impact upon EU policy. The EU commitment to Palestinian development was designed to win popular support for the peace process, to ‘drain the sea’
from the radicals and help create a state that would be in Israel’s security interest (Asseburg, 2003, p. 12). Closure has meant the opposite of EU aims, poverty has increased and a humanitarian crisis has developed. The immediate effect of closure was the reduction by ‘approximately 70 per cent employment of Palestinians in Israel, Israeli settlements and industrial zones’ and the consequent lower demand for goods ‘caused an almost 20 per cent contraction of domestic employment’ (United Nations, 2002). By
2002 Palestinian gross national income ‘mounted to 40 per cent less than in 2000’, real per capita incomes were ‘only half of their September 2000 level’ and unemployment equalled ‘53 per cent of the workforce’ (World Bank, 2003). If a poverty line of US$2 per day is used, some 21 per cent of the Palestinian population were poor before the intifada began but by December 2002 that fi gure had risen to 60 per cent (World Bank, 2003). Real per capita food consumption had declined by 30 per cent, resulting in 9.3 per cent of Palestinian children suffering from acute malnutrition (DFID, 2004, p. 5). The severe decline of the Palestinian economy meant that the EU had to refocus its assistance to humanitarian and emergency aid. The EU has also provided critical funding for the Palestinian Authority, without which it would collapse. Accusations have been levied that this assistance has been used to fund terrorist activity. The EU has rejected these claims, fi nding no conclusive evidence (OLAF, 2005) but has pressed the Palestinian Authority for greater budget transparency and reform. The most likely factor fuelling Palestinian extremism is the consequences of Israeli closure policy, not EU assistance. The derailment of EU policy points to the limits of ‘soft power’
and norm setting without a clear momentum to confl ict resolution in the peace process. As the Arab world has long recognized, only Washington can deliver Israel and a concerted Western approach is needed. The basis for a common transatlantic understanding to the Middle East was, however, set back in the Iraq War, which also opened deep fi ssures in CFSP.
From 9/11 to the Axis of Evil
The immediate European reaction to 9/11 was to stress partnership, solidarity and cooperation with the USA. The joint EU–US Ministerial Statement on Combating Terrorism adopted on 20September 2001 spoke of ‘acting jointly’, in a ‘broad coalition to combat the evil of terrorism’
(European Union Bulletin, 2001). The European Council declared it ‘would cooperate with the United States in bringing to justice and punishing the perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices of such barbaric acts’ (European Council, 2001B). Tony Blair saw a battle ‘between the free democratic world and terrorism’ (The Guardian, 12 September 2001).
President Chirac pledged to do everything that ‘appears useful or necessary’ to eradicate terrorism. In policy terms Europe supported new anti-terror resolutions at the United Nations and the European Council criminalized the wilful collection of funds for terrorist activity, defi ned terrorist acts and groups and introduced a Europe-wide arrest warrant (Duke, 2002).
On the military front, Operation Enduring Freedom began on 7 October 2001 with strikes against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. European
support was forthcoming but the forces employed were predominantly American with some British assets. The USA saw allied support as valuable but not essential. The Bush Administration did not want the coalition to tie their hands; the ethos was that ‘the mission should defi ne the coalition, not the other way around’ (Woodward, 2002, p. 48). Transatlantic solidarity ended, however, when the focus of the ‘war on terror’ switched to Iraq.
In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, President Bush spoke of an ‘axis of evil’, identifying regimes such as Iraq which sought WMD and
‘could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred’ (Bush, 2002). The speech alarmed Europe, and Javier Solana warned against the ‘global unilateralism of the American leader’s confl ation of Iran, North Korea and Iraq as his next targets’ (The Guardian, 14 February 2002).
France and Germany warned that any strike against Iraq could be justifi ed only by a mandate from the United Nations. Chancellor Schröder, facing re- election, turned to outright opposition in line with German public opinion.
President Chirac pressed for the resumption of UN weapons inspectors to ascertain the WMD case.
Franco-German opposition to American military intentions was made public at the United Nations on 20 January 2003. The French Foreign Minister told Colin Powell ‘today nothing justifi es considering military action’ and that France would ‘not associate ourselves with military intervention that is not supported by the international community’ (Shawcross, 2003, p. 125).
In opposition to the Franco-German position, the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic signed a letter supporting the US campaign to disarm Iraq and calling for the UN Security Council ‘to face up to its responsibilities’ (The Guardian, 30 January 2003). The Vilnius Group of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia also declared their support for Washington in February 2003 (see Croci, 2003, p. 470).
With eight of the above (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) due to join the European Union, President Chirac reportedly rebuked their behaviour while US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld seized on the division, contrasting ‘an old and a new Europe’.
The differences between European and US policy approaches to the Middle East can be seen as a dichotomy between multilateralism and unilateralism. While the divide is not absolute, American power does grant Washington the ability, if it chooses, to resist the constraints of multilateral rules and institutions. In a ‘uni-polar’ international system the USA is afforded unprecedented opportunities to exercise military power and follow a strategic doctrine that emphasizes pre-emptive action (The White House,
2002). Europe’s approach, in contrast, refl ects a desire for a rule-based regional and international order (Cooper, 2003).
In the Middle East context, this is typifi ed by the Barcelona process.
Chris Patten, EU External Relations Commissioner, hoped ‘that our friends across the Atlantic are recognizing that our long-term consensus-building approach has some value, based as it is on building common agendas that respect differences of approach in different countries and regions’ (Patten, 2004a). The ‘axis of evil’ agenda stands in stark contrast and sustains European concern, exemplifi ed after Iraq, with the Iranian case.
The USA has a long-standing antipathy towards the Iranian regime following the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the seizure of American hostages (Bill, 1988; Hiro, 1985). Washington imposed sanctions and designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism in 1983 after Teheran was linked to attacks on US forces in Lebanon (Marr, 2000, p. 274). In 1995 Iran began negotiations with Russia and China for the construction of nuclear power plants. Although the proposals fell under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, Washington feared that Iran was seeking to procure WMD. In the US Senate two bills were introduced, one to prevent US trade and investment in Iran and one to impose sanctions on foreign companies that were doing so. A fi nal version of the law embodied sanctions against foreign companies that involved US$40 million or more in Iran’s oil industry (Marr, 2000, p. 276). The EU protested as Britain, France, Germany and Italy (plus Japan) were Iran’s main trading partners (Ehteshami, 2000, p. 298). On the eve of the invasion of Iraq US offi cials claimed that Iran was pursuing a secret nuclear weapons programme (The Guardian, 14December 2002). In 2003 the Iranian President, Mohammed Khatami, announced that Iran was mining uranium ore and intended to take control of the fuel cycle (The Guardian Unlimited, 22 November 2004). Under NPT rules countries may develop enrichment but must place the full process under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to ensure civilian use. Washington suspected an illicit programme under the guise of civilian production and intensifi ed its coercive strategy. The USA has sought to politically isolate Iran, demanded vigorous action by the IAEA and the UN and escalated pressure on Teheran with reports of potential airstrikes and regime change circulated in the media (The Guardian, 20 June 2003 and 22 November 2004). Iran has rejected Washington’s claims and Foreign Minister Kharrazi has claimed that Iran wanted enrichment facilities to
‘produce fuel for our plants and we are not after nuclear weapons’ (The Observer, 1 August 2004). In a statement of principle, Kharrazi informed the United Nations, ‘it is unacceptable that some tend to limit access to peaceful nuclear technology to an exclusive club of technologically advanced states under the pretext of non-proliferation’ (Kharrazi, 2005).
In contrast to the USA, the EU has pursued a strategy of ‘constructive engagement’ with Iran. This diplomatic approach has encompassed a number of areas: nuclear power; a human rights dialogue; trade; and investment. The EU has tried to link these areas with Patten’s warning, ‘we cannot simply ignore problems in one area and think that we can move rapidly in all the others’ (Patten, 2004b). Britain, France and Germany have represented the EU in negotiations with Iran concerning its nuclear programme. The ‘EU Three’ have promised access to civilian nuclear technology in return for Teheran suspending uranium enrichment and agreeing to short-notice IAEA inspections. In 2003 the EU looked to have secured Iranian agreement but, in August 2004, Teheran announced that it had restarted the building of uranium enrichment centrifuges (The Observer, 1 August 2004). Former President, Ali Akbar Hashami Rafsanjani, declared that Iran could not give up its enrichment programme, but indicated that a diplomatic solution could be found to assure its civilian use (The Guardian Unlimited, 11 February 2005).
The EU has pursued a diffi cult course seeking to secure measures that will lead to international confi dence in the Iranian nuclear programme.
Iranian politics have constrained the process and IAEA concerns about Teheran’s transparency are shared in both Europe and Washington. Europe’s engagement strategy would be more effective if directly supported by the USA. President Bush indicated a willingness to reconsider the European position in early 2005 but did not agree to a change of policy (FT.com, 24 February 2005). Despite these constraints EU engagement policy has remained consistent and, unlike on Iraq, held as a common position.
Patten has summarized European thinking: ‘One only has to look at its neighbourhood to see how important it is and to recognize that we cannot have a credible policy for the wider Middle East that does not embrace and include Iran’ (Patten, 2004b).