If governance represents the inclusion of civil society (including the economic, professional and social interest groups) into the networks of the policy process, that inclusion is not comprehensive and neither is it on an equal basis as some groups and networks are exclusive and/or dominant. That is, some groups exercise leadership, or hegemony, or they retain control over scarce or valuable resources such as knowledge, in the case of professional groups (for example lawyers and doctors), and the power to raise money through taxation, in the case of governments.
The point is that these multifarious groups interact in a fl uid, dynamic way that refl ects their position in the policy process. This situation raises questions regarding the democratic legitimacy of some policies and the means by which both national governments and civil society may hold those involved in governance to account (Massey, 2005, pp. 3–17). The growth in the number and activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is a particular issue here, especially when sovereignty and therefore effective
(that is enforceable) law is located at the level of the nation-state, but the effi cacy of national systems within a global context is at best variable.
Smaller states and polities are often open to penetration of their policy process by larger states and powerful interest groups. These groups may be commercial, industrial, or indeed criminal.
A core concept of governance is the recognition that bureaucratized, that is hierarchical, centralized government is no longer the dominant method of organizing public administration. With the demise of
old fashioned command systems has come a more pluralistic concept of power and service delivery. But although it may be pluralistic, it is not immune to being dominated by powerful coalitions of interests. This diversity and complexity is sometimes explained as the differentiated polity; or to use another expression, governing without government. (Massey, 2005, p. 6)
This perspective argues that the role of the state has been transformed into an enabling role whereby the purpose of government is to ‘create the conditions in which other organizations, most notably those located in the private sector, can prosper’ (Richards and Smith, 2002, p. 20). In other words:
a nation’s core executive is less able to depend upon giving orders to ensure the effective implementation of its policies, but must rely instead on diplomacy and negotiation to ensure it gets its way. States’ membership of international organizations and their corresponding international commitments and obligations, has accelerated the dependency of governments across the globe upon these skills and underlined the interdependency of even global superpowers upon regional powers and also upon small nations (Rhodes, et al, 2003, pp. 23–35). Furthermore, this perspective recognizes the expansion and strengthening of the private sector, especially those NGOs and international corporations engaged in performing a role in the delivery of previously government-owned and run services; an example being the contracting by several governments of the US company EDS to deliver and run revenue and welfare software systems for government departments (Margetts, 1997, pp. 87–104; Dunleavy, 1997, pp. 16–46). Such relationships create interdependency, indeed dependency by governments upon internationally operating corporations for the delivery of their policies, where previously there was no such relationship. (Massey, 2005, p. 6)
It may be argued from these points that government and governance are multi-levelled and differentiated, with the location of sovereignty, power and legitimacy being a shifting, negotiated, multi-centred set of entities.
The differentiated polity perspective may be applied to a variety of political systems within the European (and broader international) community, with its emphasis on governance rather than government. It addresses issues of power dependence and exchange relationships within
and between networks and the actors that comprise those networks. Policy networks are seen as a medium of policy making where there is a segmented, even fractured, executive (sometimes referred to as the ‘hollowed-out’
state) and intergovernmental relations are conducted with an emphasis on diplomacy and negotiation (Rhodes et al., 2003, pp. 151–67; Richards and Smith, 2002, p. 6). Multi-level governance exists in several forms in different contexts and is more than simply recognizing the fact of the limitations to national sovereignty. States voluntarily limit their sovereignty in a number of ways:
and the notion of the differentiated polity recognizes the role of regional political organizations, devolution, federalism, professional groups, international corporations and other transnational organizations in governance. As a neutral model, it neither approves of this, nor disapproves of it; it simply draws attention to the reality of the situation. (Massey, 2005, p. 7)
In any discussion of how policies are made, implemented and evaluated within the modern European context, there needs to be recognition of the disparities of power, that is, the relative weakness of some nations (and groups of nations) to address wider issues. These issues may include crime, economic and social deprivation, health care issues and the problems of an ageing population, among others. But we need to recognize that multi- level governance
takes place at the supranational level, both global and regional; the national level, where sovereignty remains legally located, but from which much has migrated, and at the sub national level. Through policy networks powerful actors criss-cross the interstices that comprise the gaps around and between these levels and it is often diffi cult to track them, let alone to hold them to account. (Massey, 2005, p. 7) It is the notion of accountable government that is at the core of democratic government, the notion that public offi cials must account for their actions and be accountable in the sense that they must provide for the redress of legitimate grievance. In order for this to take place there needs to be an effective culture of political legitimacy, and this has traditionally been contingent upon national sovereignty: the ability of governments to exercise power in a geographically defi ned area and for them to be held to account for their actions therein.
At the global level, or beyond the level of pure national sovereignty, there has been a focus on
examining the evolving mechanisms of political coordination among states and private agencies that seek to resolve collective problems or realize common or complementary interests in an era of globalization (Held and McGrew, 2002a).
Advocates of global governance contend that its domain includes states, international governmental organizations (IGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) – all of which seek to advance common international activities through regulation (Cutler, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2002b). Global governance marks the acceptance of regulations at the global level out of a conviction that such regulations will enable actors to seek wealth in an orderly fashion and in accordance with the norms of the international system. (Halabi, 2004, p. 21)
In this perspective global governance as an attempt to ‘manipulate the forces of globalization’ in order to ‘mitigate globalization’s negative effects, and privilege states that follow global rules’ and globalizations effects and long-term consequences ‘are often beyond the control of states that can merely react to them’ (ibid., p. 23).
For most states globalization is something external: it happens to them and they are affected by it. The gradual development of global governance is an attempt to deal with the challenges raised by globalization through a series of mechanisms to govern and mediate its impact, to coordinate
‘among various local and global actors (states, MNCs, INGOs and so on)’
(Halabi, 2004, p. 23, quoted in Massey, 2005, p. 8). It is something internalized by states both individually, through their adherence to new rules, regulations and laws, and collectively, through the adoption of these new rules together as a concerted and coordinated attempt to deal with the issues of globalization; global governance thereby being intentionally created to address the impact of the unintended and often unforeseen consequences of globalization.
As such it may be seen to have a close approximation to the process of Europeanization addressed in the next section of this chapter; indeed Europeanization is itself fuelled by globalization and may be considered a regional variant of it.
National governments are wary of losing their ability to control the policy process within their own borders, but this is precisely what has happened to an accelerating extent. Governments have responded by reforming the intergovernmental organizations responsible for dealing with the more prominent policy areas such as the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, as well as the (regional) institutions of the European Union, among others (Halibi, 2004, p. 25; Howse and Nicolaidis, 2003). But the erosion of states’, or more precisely, national governments’ ability to control the policy process has
made policy coordination among states an important but diffi cult task. Decision- makers and even bureaucrats are in many ways unqualifi ed to cope with the range of problems. Moreover, some global concerns such as those of global warming,
HIV/AIDS, and contagious fi nancial crises are affecting domestic politics. Much of this political void has been fi lled by INGOs, each specializing in one issue area and consulting with states on strategies for coping with that set of concerns.
The elevation of INGOs to this prominent role in world affairs has often been referred to as the creation of a global civil society (Lipschutz, 1996). (Halabi, 2004, pp. 24–5)
There remains an obvious problem, however, sometimes referred to as a
‘democratic defi cit’, but it could also be seen as a crisis of popular citizen confi dence in terms of holding to account the policy makers in national and international/supranational institutions.
Attempts to address this issue have been tried through the institutional reform of international organizations per se (Howse and Nicolaidis, 2003), and through efforts to develop global civic society in order to nurture good governance. Examples of attempts to defi ne what is meant by the term
‘global civic society’ are provided by, among others, Omelicheva. Most such defi nitions are really descriptive lists of traits or actors. Omelicheva’s descriptive defi nition makes it a useful tool for understanding the institutions, issues and civil society actors involved. She argues
that global civil does not have territorial boundaries in the way states do, but operates globally through NGOs and complex networks of civil society actors and institutions. ‘Global civil society is composed of various interacting units that are often referred to as “agents” or “actors”’, but it is neither defi ned by international law nor given a legal status (Omelicheva, 2004, p. 5). She specifi cally excludes those institutions created by intergovernmental treaty from the realm of civil society, but this is perhaps an area open for debate. (Massey, 2005, p. 8) Taking these points into account, Omelicheva argues global civil society actors may be considered to be:
1. non-governmental, i.e., institutionally separate from the system of states, uncontrolled by a governmental entity, and not established by an intergovernmental agreement;
2. not-for-profit, meaning that profit making plays a secondary and subsidiary role in a spectrum of activities of global civil society organizations; and profits received from commercial activities are not distributed for the benefit of the members, boards, staff or shareholders;
3. voluntary, i.e., the human and material resources come from voluntary contributions of time and money, membership is not legally required, and the members can leave the organization at any time;
4. having some institutional presence and structure expressed through the relative persistence of goals, activities, and/or a legal charter (bylaws, a
written constitution etc.,) that demonstrate intent of (the) organization to continue in existence. (2004, p. 6)
This defi nition, or perspective, of what we mean by global civil society is the one that locates the actors within the wider policy process and the institutions of governance.
Global civil society clearly developed partly as a response to the imposition of the liberal economic agenda following the fall of the communist bloc of the former Soviet Union and its satellites. The resulting social and economic dislocation in more vulnerable societies
meant that their governments were unable to supply vital health, education and welfare functions and ‘civil society actors came forward to take over the functions reserved for the states and to advocate for harnessing processes of globalization by placing checks and controls on the global market’ by seeking to introduce good governance in the form of ‘accountability, transparency and democracy on the global scale’ (2004, pp. 6–7). Organizations that must be included in these activities, however, include UNHCR and a welter of EU initiatives, suggesting that we are witnessing something more akin to Rhodes’ version of the differentiated polity and multi-level governance. (Massey, 2005, p. 9)
In order to understand the impact of this on policy making in democratic societies, it is necessary to explore individual policy areas, and that is the important contribution supplied by the policy case study chapters in the rest of this book.