The Art of War has long been recognized as China’s oldest and most profound military treatise, all other works being relegated to secondary status at best. Traditionalists attribute the book to the historical Sun Wu, who is portrayed in the Shih chi and Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yüeh as active in the last years of the sixth century, beginning about 512 B.C. In their view the book preserves his strategic and tactical concepts and principles and should therefore be dated to this period. Over the ages, however, more skeptical scholars have questioned the work’s authenticity, citing certain historical discrepancies and anachronisms to justify their positions. Although all the arguments have varying degrees of merit and credibility, and will be separately considered at the end of the introduction, the most extreme not only deny Sun Wu’s military role, but even his very existence. The critical element in their argument is the absence of any material in the Tso chuan, the classic record of the period’s political events, which would confirm Sun Wu’s existence and corroborate his strategic role in the wars between Wu and Yüeh as preserved in the Shih chi biography.5
The Shih chi, famous throughout Asia as China’s first true history and a literary masterpiece, includes several biographies devoted to distinguished military strategists and generals, including Sun-tzu.6 However, the Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yüeh recount a very similar but somewhat more interesting version of Sun Wu’s career and experiences:
In the third year of King Ho-lü’s reign Wu’s generals wanted to attack Ch’u, but no action was taken. Wu Tzu-hsü7 and Po P’i8 spoke with each other: “We nurture officers and make plans on behalf of the king. These strategies will be advantageous to the state, and for this reason the king should attack Ch’u. But he has put off issuing the orders, and does not have any intention to mobilize the army. What should we do?”
After a while the King of Wu queried Wu Tzu-hsü and Po P’i: “I want to send forth the army. What do you think?” Wu-tzu Hsü and Po P’i replied: “We would like to receive the order.” The King of Wu secretly thought the two of them harbored great enmity for Ch’u. He was deeply afraid that they would take the army out only to be exterminated. He mounted his tower, faced into the southern wind and groaned. After a while he sighed. None of his ministers
understood the king’s thoughts. Wu Tzu-hsü secretly realized the king would not decide, so he recommended Sun-tzu to him.
Sun-tzu, whose name was Wu, was a native of Wu.9 He excelled at military strategy, but dwelled in secrecy far away from civilization, so ordinary people did not know of his ability. Wu Tzu-hsü, himself enlightened, wise, and skilled in discrimination, knew Sun-tzu could penetrate and destroy the enemy. One morning when he was discussing military affairs he recommended Sun-tzu seven times. The king of Wu said: “Since you have found an excuse to advance this shih, I want to have him brought in.” He questioned Sun-tzu about military strategy, and each time that he laid out a section of his book the king couldn’t praise him enough.
Greatly pleased, he inquired: “If possible, I would like a minor test of your military strategy.” Sun-tzu said: “It’s possible. We can conduct a minor test with women from the inner palace.” The king said, “I agree.” Sun-tzu said: “I would like to have two of your Majesty’s beloved concubines act as company commanders, each to direct a company.” He ordered all three hundred women to wear helmets and armor, to carry swords and shields, and stand. He instructed them in military methods, that in accord with the drum they should advance, withdraw, go left or right, or turn around. He had them know the prohibitions and then ordered, “At the first beating of the drum you should all assemble, at the second drumming you should advance with your weapons, and at the third deploy into military formation.” At this the palace women all covered their mouths and laughed.
Sun-tzu then personally took up the sticks and beat the drums, giving the orders three times, and explaining them five times. They laughed as before. Sun-tzu saw that the women laughed continuously, and wouldn’t stop.
Sun-tzu was enraged, his eyes suddenly opened wide, his sound was like a terrifying tiger, his hair stood on end under his cap, and his neck broke the tassels at the side. He said to the Master of Laws, “Get the executioner’s axes.”
Sun-tzu [then] said: “If the instructions are not clear, if the explanations and orders are not trusted, it is the general’s offense.
When they have already been instructed three times, and the orders
explained five times, if the troops still do not perform, it is the fault of the officers. According to the rescripts for military discipline, what is the procedure?” The Master of Laws said: “Decapitation!”
Sun-tzu then ordered the beheading of the two company commanders, the king’s favorite concubines.10
The King of Wu ascended his platform to observe just when they were about to behead his beloved concubines. He had an official hasten down to them with orders to say, “I already know the general is able to command forces. Without these two concubines my food will not be sweet. It would be appropriate not to behead them.”
Sun-tzu said: “I have already received my commission as commanding general. According to the rules for generals, when I, as a general, am in command of the army even though you issue orders to me, I do not [have to] accept them.” [He then had them beheaded.]
He again beat the drum, and they went left and right, advanced and withdrew, and turned around in accord with the prescribed standards without daring to blink an eye. The two companies were silent, not daring to look around. Thereupon Sun-tzu reported to the King of Wu: “The army is already well ordered. I would like your Majesty to observe them. However you might want to employ them, even sending them forth into fire and water, will not present any difficulty. They can be used to settle All under Heaven.”
The King of Wu was suddenly displeased. He said: “I know that you excel at employing the army. Even though I can thereby become a hegemon, there is no place to exercise them. General, please dismiss the army and return to your dwelling. I am unwilling to act further.”
Sun-tzu said: “Your Majesty only likes the words, he isn’t able to realize their substance.” Wu Tzu-hsü remonstrated: “I have heard that the army is an inauspicious affair11 and can not be wantonly tested. Thus if one forms an army but does not go forth to launch a punitive attack, then the military Tao will be unclear.
Now if Your Majesty sincerely seeks talented shih and wants to mobilize the army to execute the brutal state of Ch’u, become
hegemon of All under Heaven, and overawe the feudal lords, if you do not employ Sun-tzu as your general, who can ford the Huai, cross the Ssu, and traverse a thousand li to engage in battle?”
Thereupon the King of Wu was elated. He had the drum beaten to convene the army’s staff, assembled the troops, and attacked Ch’u.
Sun-tzu took Shu, killing the two renegade Wu generals, Princes Kai-yu and Chu-yung.12
The Shih chi biography differs from the above version in two fundamental respects: first, it identifies Sun-tzu as a native of Ch’i rather than Wu.13 This would place his background in the state that enjoyed the heritage of the T’ai Kung’s military thought. Accordingly, many traditional scholars have asserted that he was well versed in the Six Secret Teachings and similar writings, although it should be noted that the Six Secret Teachings was probably composed well after Sun-tzu’s Art of War.
Moreover, the state of Ch’i, originally on the periphery of the ancient Chou political world, was well known for nurturing a diversity of views and imaginative theories. Since the Art of War clearly reflects many Taoist conceptions14 and is philosophically sophisticated, he may well have been a man of Ch’i.
Second, the Shi chi biography adds a brief description of Sun-tzu’s achievements: “To the West [the king] defeated the powerful state of Ch’u, and advanced into Ying. To the north he overawed Ch’i and Chin, and manifested his name among the feudal lords. This was due to Sun-tzu imparting power to him.”15 Some military historians have identified Sun Wu with the campaigns against Ch’u that commenced in 511 B.C., the year after his initial interview with King Ho-lü. Although he is never mentioned in any recorded source as having sole command of the troops, following Wu’s conquest of Ying, the capital of Ch’u, his name completely disappears. Perhaps he realized the difficulty of surviving under the unstable political conditions of his time, or possibly feared he would be executed by the new king, Fu-ch’ai, after becoming entangled in Po P’i’s machinations, and set an example for later ages by retiring to obscurity, leaving his work behind. 16
The view that Sun-tzu simply vanished of his own volition was commonly held in later centuries, possibly reflecting the famous example of Fan Li, the great Yüeh strategist and commander who, eschewing
further service despite the impassioned entreaties of King Kou-chien once Yüeh had completed its lengthy conquest of Wu, willingly set off and disappeared at sea. The Tung-chou lieh-kuo-chih, a highly popular Ming dynasty novel closely based upon historical materials from the Eastern Chou period, romanticizes a similar departure for Sun-tzu:
When Ho-lü discussed comparative achievement in Ch’u’s destruction, he ranked Sun Wu first. Sun Wu was unwilling to occupy an official position, so he steadfastly requested permission to return to the mountains. The king had Wu Tzu-hsü detain him.
Sun Wu personally addressed Wu Tzu-hsü “Do you know the Tao of Heaven? When summer goes winter comes; after spring returns autumn will arrive. The king now relies upon his strength flourishing; the four borders are free of worries; arrogance and pleasure will inevitably be born. Now when achievements are complete, failing to retire will invariably result in later misfortune.
I am not trying to preserve myself alone, but I also want to preserve you.” Wu Tzu-hsü said he didn’t find it to be so. Sun Wu subsequently drifted away. Having been presented with several carriages of gold and silks, he scattered them all among the impoverished common people along his route. Later no one knew how he ended up.17
Sun Wu remains an enigma not only because of the absence of historical data in the so-called authentic texts of the period, but also because his life never generated the anecdotes and illustrative stories frequently found about famous figures in the works of succeeding periods. In contrast, Wu Ch’i, the extraordinary general and likely progenitor of the Wu-tzu, became the focus of many incidents in such widely read compilations as the Shuo yüan, Han-shih wai-chuan, and Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu, as well as staid philosophical works like the Han Fei-tzu. Many theories have been vociferously advanced to explain Sun Wu’s invisibility, chief among them that most of the credit that was rightly his was attributed to his mentor, Wu Tzu-hsü, because the latter was more prominent and his life, a living melodrama writ large, provided a natural focal point for tales of intrigue and portraits of achievement. Remarkably, among those who deny Sun- tzu’s very existence, some have advanced the theory that he and Wu Tzu- hsü were identical, one and the same individual. These and other inseparable issues will be discussed in a subsequent section on the text and its dating.
Historical Background of Ch’u, Wu, and Yüeh
Whether or not Sun-tzu existed, in order to gain a better understanding of his era—including the nature of warfare, the complexities and astounding effects of political intrigue, and the significant historical figures with whom he would have interacted—it is worthwhile to reconstruct many facets of Spring and Autumn political and economic life and analyze the battles in which he purportedly served as strategist or commander. The period overflows with strong personalities, intrigue, murder, and machination on an extreme scale, creating human drama in which entire states perished at the whim of a single man. Since Wu Tzu-hsü was a pivotal figure in the clashes between Ch’u and Wu, and later a forlorn voice in the destructive wars between Wu and Yüeh, his biography provides an informative focal point for exploring Sun Wu’s world and era.
As discussed in the general historical introduction, from its inception the Chou had an avowed policy of dispatching royal clan groups to both enemy and unsettled domains. Within a few generations it also began experiencing pressure from nomadic “barbarian” peoples to the north and west; therefore, any further activity in the quest for allies, resources, and political strength tended to be directed toward the south and southeast.
Several Early Chou kings enthusiastically undertook military campaigns to the south (with mixed results), and King Chao, the fifth to reign, even perished mysteriously, leading to the frequently repeated charge that Ch’u had murdered him.18 While members of the Chi and Chiang clans emigrated to these areas for defensive purposes, the southern offensive became essentially a cultural one, gradually sinicizing the peoples around initial Chou enclaves, particularly as they acquired a need for Chou products and associated technology. Numerous small states proudly claimed descent from one or another Chou royal family member, and most at least nominally allied themselves with the Chou, and later with the stronger northern states that emerged when Chou power visibly declined.
The Spring and Autumn period witnessed the rise of the great families and their inevitable, often brutal conflict with the older ruling nobility in the various domains, as well as the destructive emergence of seven great states, each reputedly capable of fielding ten thousand chariots. In the early sixth century the state of Chin had already formed six armies, visibly usurping a Chou royal prerogative, and was probably capable of mobilizing seventy-five thousand men if necessary. (These same six
armies, under the direction of individual factions, would later split the state apart as the six ministerial families contended for ultimate authority.) Awesome Chin, originally also founded by the Chi clan—the royal house of Chou—claimed the role of hegemon in officially sustaining the Chou, coercing the other states into formally recognizing and even sanctifying its prestigious role.
Although the central states vigorously contended among themselves for relative supremacy, they retained a joint sense of identity, consciously distinguishing themselves from the uncivilized “barbarian” areas and peoples. Consequently, with both disdain and trepidation they observed the rapid development of the wild southern areas where the states of Ch’u, Wu, and Yüh were forming, and also feared the ever less-submissive state of Ch’in in the old Chou heartland. The south was not only distinctly different, it also enjoyed numerous advantages. First, the climate was warmer, resulting in a greater variety of plants, crops, and products.
Second, the longer growing season, coupled with plentiful water resources, provided the populace with bountiful harvests, including rice.
Third, the area was crisscrossed by rivers, filled with lakes, and dense with mountains and forests; the latter provided abundant wild life, the former seafood, to supplement the agricultural diet. A natural bastion that made chariot-centered land warfare—which was feasible only on the relatively flat, open land of the northern plains—frequently useless, the terrain compelled the development of extensive naval forces. These early, essentially inland navies capitalized upon the indigenous skills that had evolved to exploit the Yangtze, Han, and Huai rivers, the numerous lakes, and expansive marshes.19
Even though there was a natural tension between the original culture of the central plains area and that of the “wild, uncivilized, and forbidding south,” the south also enjoyed a virtual monopoly on many resources, ensuring that the “northern states” could not ignore trade possibilities. For example, copper mainly derived from the south, and when iron technology evolved late in the Spring and Autumn period, the main production centers arose in the southern states. In fact, claims have been advanced that Wu and Yüeh became prosperous not only through trade, but also because they were the first states to employ iron tools in agriculture, significantly increasing the yields. Furthermore, their bronze weapon technology was spectacularly advanced, with the most famous swords of the era coming from Wu and Yüeh in the fifth century B.C. 20
THE THREE STATES AND THEIR CONFLICTS
The three significant southern states, in the order of their emergence, were Ch’u, Wu, and Yüeh. Ch’u lay to the south of the northern plains area, generally in modern day Hupei, Hunan, Honan, and Anhui. While there were a number of smaller states between it and the “Chinese”
entities, Ch’u’s northern border was basically contiguous with the latter.
Wu lay to the east of Ch’u, and therefore to the southeast of the northern states, reaching to the sea. Its capital was in the Suchou area, and it occupied essentially present Chiangsu province. Yüeh lay to the south of Wu, largely falling in northern Chechiang, and was the last state to develop.
The state of Ch’u—Wu’s nemesis and the object of Wu Tzu-hsü’s and Sun Wu’s strategy and efforts—was originally a barbarian state, but by the middle of the Spring and Autumn period it had become largely sinicized.
The government had adopted many of the forms and practices of
“civilization,” including government organization and the li (the rites or forms of etiquette), although the populace remained a mixture of indigenous peoples, descendants of original Chou settlers, and later migrants. Its stronghold was the area between the Yangtze and Han rivers, with the capital located at Ying. In the seventh century B.C. it had already become militarily active, subjugating and obliterating various small Chou states, such as Ts’ai, Shen, and Cheng, with the total annexed or destroyed eventually rising to more than forty.21 A state marked by an aggressive, energetic populace, stimulated by terrain and sometimes harsh climatic conditions, and under often belligerent leadership, its expansionist policies threatened the northern states, especially Chin, its closest significant neighbor. By 632 B.C. its immense territory already covered a thousand li.
In that year—632 B.C.—at the famous great battle of Ch’eng-p’u, the allied states of Chin, Ch’i, Ch’in, and Sung defeated Ch’u’s army.22 This forced Ch’u, at least temporarily, to redirect their campaigns of expansion toward the south and southeast, whereupon they subjugated many smaller states along the Han River. The direction of this new thrust inevitably brought them into conflict with the state of Wu, particularly after they suffered another defeat at the hands of Chin in 575 B.C.
Even though Chin had been reasonably successful in its ongoing efforts to contain Ch’u, when confronted by additional threats from Ch’in’s