steppe horsemen, various perceptive commanders and rulers realized the need to develop their own cavalry. Although the history of the horse in China is still emerging, it appears that in 307 B.C. King Wu-ling of North Chao, over vehement objections, deliberately—to facilitate adoption of the cavalry—forced on his troops the “barbarian style of dress” (short jacket and trousers) instead of the indigenous and much- revered long coat of the Chinese. Since the fifth century mounted horsemen had apparently been challenging the Chinese states. The skill of riding probably evolved from Iran and the steppe region, and foreign horses had long been famous in China for their speed and endurance.
Wu-ling created the first known cavalry, immediately providing the state with a vastly increased offensive potential.
The saddle, when there was one, was extremely primitive—only a rolled blanket, and stirrups did not appear until the end of the Han.
Consequently, the rider was burdened with the task of simultaneously controlling his horse and either shooting his bow or striking with his shock weapon. The effectiveness of the horsemen, acting from such an unstable platform, was inevitably limited and stemmed more from their great speed and mobility than inherent fighting power. However, the development of the cavalry—mentioned only briefly in the military books prior to T’ang T’ai-tsung—freed armies from being confined to open, chariot-accessible terrain and allowed their diffuse deployment in ravines, valleys, forests, hilly fields, and mountains, fully exploiting the terrain.99 Supported by vast hordes of armored infantrymen wielding spears, crossbows, and swords (possibly of iron),100 warfare on an unprecedented scale suddenly became both possible and inevitable. In the final century of conflict—the third century B.C., which witnessed the growth and decisive triumph of Ch’in—massive campaigns requiring hundreds of thousands of men executing both “explosive” and
“persisting” strategies decimated the populace and the countryside. In those days the strategies and methods of the famous tacticians were repeatedly tested and applied and were proven to have a timeless validity.
The history of Wei, an important participant in the politics of the era, reflects the evolution of military affairs during the Warring States period.
Wu Ch’i101 became a famous general and military administrator in Wei, whereas both Mencius, the early Confucian standard-bearer, and Wei Liao-tzu, reputed progenitor of the military classic bearing his name, squandered their persuasive skills on King Hui. One of the seven powers in the Warring States period, Wei had become an independent political entity in 434 B.C. when three powerful families carved the large, formerly mighty state of Chin into Wei, Chao, and Han. In 403 B.C. the Chou king recognized the de facto rulers as feudal lords, and in 376 B.C.
they completely exterminated the remnants of the Chin ruling house.
Situated in the central part of China between the contending powers of Ch’in to the west and Ch’i to the east, Wei was the strongest of the so- called three Chin. Initially, the capital was at An-i, but the fertile plains area in which it was located lacked such natural defenses as mountains and ravines, and the government suffered from constant pressure from hostile neighbors in all directions. When the government was strong and prosperous, it could retain control over the West Ho region and thus fend off any threat from the belligerent Ch’in; when weak—through the ruler’s ineptitude or some disaster—it suffered repeated defeats in the incessant warfare. Furthermore, whereas Ch’in had been successfully stymied by the strength of the great Chin, once the latter was segmented, the successor states—indifferent to mutual cooperation—lacked the power necessary for independent survival.
King Wen, who reigned from the inception of Wei until 387 B.C., realized the need for talented advisers and welcomed worthy men irrespective of their regional origin. Li K’o, one of the outsiders who responded to this policy, was appointed to high office and had great impact. He rewrote the laws, promulgated measures to increase agricultural production, established private property, and fostered a stable commodity-price policy. Hsi-men Pao focused his efforts upon irrigation, thereby greatly increasing the nation’s wealth. Wu Ch’i, appointed commanding general, conducted numerous successful campaigns against the Ch’in and secured the defense of the West Ho region. King Wen’s son King Wu continued Wu Ch’i’s basic policy, thereby compelling the other Chin states of Han and Chao to respect Wei’s might and prosperity, although Wu Ch’i was ignominiously forced by court intrigues to flee for his life.
Unfortunately, King Hui—who assumed power in 370 B.C.—was more successful in antagonizing people than in employing them, and he forfeited the services of many talented individuals, such as Lord Shang (who subsequently was instrumental in strengthening Ch’in). Instead of nurturing harmonious relations with his neighbors, he appears to have annoyed them constantly, greatly exacerbating the pressures and conflicts on all sides. Furthermore, he eventually lost the West Ho region, thereby opening the state to incursions by Ch’in, and was forced to move the capital to Ta-liang, thereafter calling the state Liang.
Two famous battles illustrate the nature of warfare in this period. The first, at Kui-ling, stemmed from King Hui’s desire to recoup losses suffered at the hands of Ch’in in the west. Wei’s army, under the command of P’ang Chüan, attacked Chao in the north. Finding itself hard-pressed, Chao requested aid from Ch’i, in the east, on the premise that as Chao presented a natural barrier and defense against Wei, it would be strategically advantageous for Ch’i to support Chao’s efforts.
Although the Ch’i ruler assented, Sun Pin—the famous strategist whose book has recently been rediscovered—advised waiting for the two antagonists to exhaust themselves, thereby ensuring maximum gain with minimum risk and effort. In 352 B.C., under the command of T’ien Chi, Ch’i mobilized an army to effect an indirect strike at the Wei homeland, the critical city of Ta-liang, in accord with the principles of “first seize what they love,” “attack vacuity,” and “strike where undefended.” P’ang Chüan, flushed with his victories in Chao, reacted as predicted, racing back to mount a counterattack. Ch’i then feigned concern and withdrew to its chosen battlefield to await the Wei army, thereby following a number of basic tactical principles from Sun-tzu and Sun Pin, such as
“with ease await the tired.” From its fortified positions and high terrain Ch’i was able to quickly defeat the exhausted Wei army, inflicting severe casualties at minimal cost.
Some years later, Wei found itself being increasingly squeezed by a newly vigorous Han, to the south; Ch’in, to the west; Ch’i, to the east;
and Chao, to the north. King Hui embarked on a campaign against Han, which had become formidable through the administrative efforts of the famous theorist Shen Pu-hai and by forming an alliance with and returning to Chao the cities previously lost. P’ang Chüan, again entrusted with command, struck directly at the Han capital. Han, as Chao had
before, sought aid from Ch’i, citing the benefits of mutual defense.
Again Sun Pin advised waiting for the forces to decimate each other, further weakening Wei. Han mounted a total defensive effort but lost five major battles in succession and was forced to submit to Ch’in in a desperate effort to survive. Ch’i then sallied forth, following the previous strategy, with Sun Pin as strategist and T’ien Chi in command. P’ang Chüan immediately abandoned his campaign in Han, turning back toward his home state. Meanwhile, King Hui mobilized all his resources, placing his son in command of the home-defense troops, with the sole aim of seeking a decisive confrontation with Ch’i.
Under Sun Pin’s direction the Ch’i armies, which were advancing into Wei, followed the dictum “Be deceptive.” P’ang Chüan arrogantly believed the men of Ch’i to be cowards who would flee rather than engage mighty Wei in battle. Therefore, Sun Pin daily reduced the number of cooking fires in the encampment to create a facade of ever- increasing desertion. He also effected a tactical withdrawal to further entice P’ang Chüan into the favorable terrain at Ma-ling where the Ch’i commander concealed ten thousand crossbowmen among the hills. P’ang Chüan, apparently afraid that he would miss an opportunity to inflict a severe blow on the retreating Ch’i army, abandoned his heavy forces and supply train and rushed forth with only light units. Arriving at night, the combined Wei forces were am-bushed as soon as they penetrated the killing zone. In addition to being decisively defeated by Ch’i’s withering crossbow fire, 100,000 Wei soldiers needlessly perished because of their commander’s character flaws and hasty judgment.102
Thereafter, Wei not only never regained its former power but also suffered numerous incursions by the now-unchecked mighty Ch’in, which would eventually subjugate all China. In 340 B.C. Wei was forced to cede 700 li to Ch’in after sustained defeats, and felt compelled to move its capital to Ta-liang to avoid the incessant danger. Although a strong figure occasionally emerged to effect a temporary resurgence in Wei’s strength, its territory continued to shrink until the state, together with the royal house, was finally extinguished in 225 B.C.