traditional textual scholarship and recent tomb discoveries. The relative order of books in the third period (which probably coincides with the latter half of the third century B.C.) remains to be defined.103 A summary discussion of the various viewpoints on the Art of War and their purported justifications, as well as a consideration of whether Sun- tzu even existed and what historical role he might have played, will be found at the end of the introduction to the translation.
spokes—sometimes as many as forty-eight; wheel shape is conical; and the chariot box is rectangular and larger than is the case in the West and can accommodate three men standing in triangular formation.107 (Some of these developments are also seen in an intermediate stage in the Trans-Caucasus versions discovered in this century. 108) No major alterations occur after its introduction, although there was a historical tendency toward stronger, heavier, swifter vehicles. Significant minor innovations and refinements naturally continued over the centuries, such as in the method of mounting the chariot box on the axle and in the yoking, with a continuing differentiation into types by use. (Even the Shang apparently had specialized chariots or carriages for ordinary transport, chariots designed for combat and the hunt—perhaps in limited numbers—and something similar to wagons for conveying goods.109)
In the Shang the chariot was a highly visible symbol of rank and power and was elaborately decorated, often being covered with imperial gifts of insignia. However, perhaps because of their greater numbers, chariots in the Chou were more pragmatic and functional, although they still conspicuously displayed marks of royal favor.110 Finally, in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, highly specialized chariots and other wheeled vehicles were created to suit the requirements of siege warfare and other specialized assault tasks; they were equipped with large shields, towers, battering rams, movable ladders, and multiple arrow crossbows.111
Tradition holds that Hsi Chung—either as a minister under the Yellow Emperor or in the Hsia dynasty—created the chariot. The Shang reputedly employed either seventy or three hundred chariots to overthrow the Hsia, but this is improbable. The actual degree to which the Shang employed chariots remains somewhat controversial; some scholars find no evidence that the Shang employed chariots as a battle element,112 whereas others—especially traditionally oriented experts such as Ku Chieh-kang—maintain qualified opposing views.113 However, certain facts are known. For example, even in the later years of the dynasty, Shang knights were apparently fighting on foot as infantrymen rather than from chariots. Some of their enemies, however,
seem to have employed them in substantial numbers compared with their overall forces.114
The Chou are traditionally noted for increasing the horsepower of their assault chariots, using four rather than two horses.115 (Shang tombs also have chariots with four horses, but these may have been for funerary display rather than for actual use.) One explanation for the Chou’s startling victory—apart from their superior Virtue and the support of the people—is the swiftness of their movement and the unexpected crossing of the Yellow River to the south, thereby avoiding Shang defenses to the west. (According to the Shih chi, the Shang ruler significantly furthered the Chou’s efforts by consciously ignoring their approach until they were suddenly upon him.) In the actual battle three hundred chariots were probably employed, which matches the reported three thousand members of the Tiger Guard, assuming the ten-to-one ratio that is frequently suggested.116 The swiftness and ferocity of the assault surprised the Shang and might be attributed to the Chou’s superior and perhaps first effective use of chariot power.
Significant clashes between the Chou and their steppe neighbors in which considerable numbers of chariots were employed apparently commenced in the first centuries of Chou rule; in one such encounter 130 enemy vehicles were reportedly captured.117 Massed chariot battles were occurring by the ninth century B.C. and continued throughout the Western Chou era and into the Spring and Autumn period. However, the effectiveness of the chariot under actual combat conditions has been questioned in recent decades by Creel118 and others. Although the chariot promised power, speed, and mobility—at least in contrast to foot movement—it may have been more symbolic and have served largely as a command platform rather than an overwhelming assault weapon. This is not to deny that chariot combat—often involving great numbers—took place. However, as Yang Hung has discussed, the chariot demanded a large area, and the warriors positioned on either side in the back (especially the one on the right who wielded the halberd) could only engage the enemy when the chariots passed each other perfectly—
neither too far apart nor too head on.119 In addition, their stability and maneuvering ability—which were restricted by a fixed axle that rendered turning extremely difficult, especially at speed—were minimal, even on
the flatest plain. (Imagine racing across a corn field without shock absorbers and attempting to fire a bow or strike a moving, equally unpredictable opponent with a shock weapon at the last instant.)
The failure of Wu and Yüeh to adopt the chariot, despite explicit efforts to inculcate them in their use around 541 B.C., further indicates a realization of terrain-imposed limitations; both states were mountainous regions crisscrossed by rivers and streams and marked by lakes, ponds, and marshes.120 In response to these insurmountable constraints, Wu and Yüeh stressed infantry and naval forces and developed weapons for close combat—such as the sword—to such a high degree that they were famous throughout the realm; when unearthed today, they still retain their surface and edge qualities.121
Despite their inherent faults, chariots did permit the comparatively rapid conveyance of men, and under the direction of a skilled driver and reasonable conditions of terrain, they could undoubtedly be formidable.
The romantic image of courageous knights challenging each other from their glistening, leather armored chariots rings as true for China as the West, and the chariot was particularly suited to individuals valiantly racing out and provoking the enemy into hasty action. (However, Creel has observed that the Age of Chivalry did not begin until the Spring and Autumn period.122)
The difficulty of maintaining close formations required advancing at a measured pace (as edicted by King Wu in his prebattle instructions preserved in the Shih chi and Ssu-ma Fa) in order to coordinate not only chariots with chariots but also chariots with supporting infantry. The necessary imposition and observance of such constraints must have severely tempered an assault thrust’s maximum speed and, insofar as the book reflects antique practices, no doubt underlies the Ssu-ma Fa’s repeated stress on adhering to proper measures. It was possible for coordinated infantry to take advantage of the chariot’s difficulties and surround, overturn, or otherwise obstruct it; according to the Tso chuan, they also constantly failed of their own accord—suffering broken axles, becoming mired, getting tangled in branches, and falling into unseen gullies. Perhaps because of these limitations, coupled with their cost and extensive training requirements, the only effective way for armies to expand was with infantrymen. However, the growth of infantry divisions
obviously reflected changing social and political conditions as well as a number of other factors, and experts such as Yang Hung explicitly deny that the problems of chariot employment caused them to be replaced.123