Military organization in all its aspects—such as the development of administrative districts, population registration, and universal military service obligations—requires a separate study. Opinions on many aspects
—including fundamentals, questions of origin, and early history—are far from unanimous. However, because knowledge of the basic organizational methods and principles is helpful to understanding much of the Seven Military Classics, a brief overview is undertaken here.
The critical problem in characterizing organization in the Shang dynasty is the uncertain role the chariot played because some scholars believe the chariot comprised the core element around which the
company—the basic military unit—was formed. If chariots were insignificant or only played a transport role, this would obviously not be possible. Consequently, two theories must be considered: chariot- centered and clan-centered. In the former, the chariot—manned by three members of the nobility—would be accompanied by conscripted commoners, probably ten men per chariot.149 Their function was strictly supportive; because they would be drawn from the state’s farming and artisan populations as well as from each noble’s personal retainers—in an age when bronze weapons were expensive and limited in numbers—
they were only minimally armed.150 Based on burial patterns, this line of thought holds that the chariots were organized into squads of five, with either three or five squads to a company. Each squad would be supported by a one-hundred-man infantry company with (in some views) a complement of twenty-five officers. A battalion composed of three or five squads with associated infantry would constitute an operational unit.
(Conclusive evidence for these reconstructions is lacking.151)
Another view—based on excavated tombs—suggests the total number per tsu, or company, was one hundred: three officers for the chariot and seventy-two infantry organized into three platoons, supported by a supply vehicle staffed by twenty-five. However, this conceptualization seems to derive from the later idealization found in the Chou li and more likely describes the state of affairs late in the Spring and Autumn.152
Considerable textual evidence suggests that the clan composed the basic organizational unit, with the tsu (a different character than that above) again numbering one hundred men.153 The members would all be from the nobility, under the command of the clan chief—who would normally also be the king, an important vassal, or a local feudal lord.
Thus organized, they probably fought as infantry units, although chariots could also have been integrated for transport and command purposes.
(According to Hsü Cho-yün, clan units [tsu] still actively participated in the pitched battles of the Spring and Autumn. 154) Ten such companies probably comprised a shih, which was basically an army of one thousand men; in fact, the term shih should be considered synonymous with
“army” in this period.155 The word normally translated as “army”—
chün—does not appear until the Spring and Autumn.156
Early Western Chou military organization would have been essentially the same, but with the units definitely chariot-centered. As already noted, the three thousand famous Tiger Warriors at the epoch-making battle of Mu-yeh would appropriately work out to a ratio of ten men per chariot.
Thereafter, the infantry expanded as the number associated with each chariot gradually increased, until by the early Spring and Autumn the ratio was perhaps twenty, twenty-two, or even thirty foot soldiers per vehicle.157 In the Spring and Autumn period—the classic age of chariot warfare depicted in the Tso chuan—the systematic grouping of men into squads of five, with a vertical hierarchy mapped out on multiples of five, seems to have developed and become prevalent.158 This is the period described by passages in several of the Military Classics and the Chouli, during which seventy-two infantrymen accompanied each chariot, deployed in three platoons characterized as left, center, and right. (These designations were nominal; actual positioning depended on their function. For example, on easy terrain the center platoon would follow the chariot, whereas on difficult terrain it would precede it—both as a defensive measure and to clear obstacles.159) Whether the officers were included among the one hundred also seems to be a matter of debate.160
From the Chou li and some of the military writings, the following chart can be constructed, with rough Western equivalents as indicated:
The Western equivalents are relative; their definition depends on the era and country of organization.161 The columns represent a set of alternatives, so that if regiment is used for lü, then brigade (or perhaps division) should be used for shih. The term lü is an ancient one; it was originally used by the Shang to designate a military unit that reportedly expanded to ten thousand for one campaign, but it also may have referred to the standing army.162 Subsequently, in the Spring and
Autumn and Warring States periods, it was combined with the character for army—chün—as chün-lü to indicate the army or military units in general. In its original meaning, it apparently referred to “men serving under a flag.”
As already noted, the term for army—chün—appeared only in the Spring and Autumn and then only in the central states because the peripheral states, such as Ch’u, had their own distinct forms of organization.163 The term “Three Armies” (san chün) encountered throughout the military texts normally refers to the army in general, not just to three units of army strength according to the above chart.164 Early Chou theory asserted that the king alone had the right to maintain six armies (shih); a great feudal lord, three armies; lesser lords, two armies; and the least of them, one army. All of the vassal armies could and would be called on to supplement the royal forces and support the dynasty in the military campaigns that were generally mounted to suppress either rebellious states or nomadic peoples. With the rise of the hegemons in the Spring and Autumn period, states such as Chin simply disregarded both the Chou house and its prerogatives, eventually fielding as many as six armies.165
In the earliest stage of the Shang and Chou, force size was apparently irregular; it was enumerated, constituted, and organized to meet the situation and the demand. However, with the vastly augmented scope of conflict in the Warring States and the imposition of universal service obligations, military hierarchy and discipline became essential, as is evident from the emphasis on them in the Seven Military Classics.
Actual service demands made on the newly registered populace also increased from the Spring and Autumn into the Warring States; at first, only a single male in each family was required to serve, then all males were so required. This mirrored early Chou trends when all the people who dwelled within the state (kuo) trained and were obligated to fight but were universally mobilized in only the most dire circumstances.166 With the creation and imposition of hierarchical administrative systems for the populace (both variants—the village and district—began late in the Spring and Autumn in Chin and Ch’u, perhaps originating with Kuan Chung), the male population could be quickly summoned for active duty.
The village and district groups of five and twenty-five were immediately
translated into squads and platoons. Local officials at all levels would immediately become officers at the respective unit level, although there were professional military personnel for the higher ranks and a standing army to form the army’s core.167 This meant that the total qualified populace could be mobilized for military campaigns, and that virtually an entire country could go to war.168