2. Centre–periphery relations and the process of state formation
2.2 State and nation building in the West European periphery: Spain, the United Kingdom and Austria
2.2 State and nation building in the West European
Castile and Aragon. The lands of Aragon comprised Catalonia, Valencia and the Balearic Islands (Moreno 2001: 39). The lands of Leon, as well as the three Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa, Alava and Biscay, lived under Castilian rule. The process of early Spanish state formation was driven by the desire of Christian rulers to defeat the Moors (the so-called Reconquista), but the defeated often retained certain rights (fueros). Even under Habsburg rule, the internal kingdoms, principalities and lordly estates were allowed to keep their languages, regional institutions and laws (Moreno 2001: 42). For instance, the three Basque Provinces could raise their own taxes. Catalonia received a special status within the Kingdom of Aragon, and was exempted from certain forms of taxation (Keating 1998a: 19).
The Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808 fostered a stronger ‘Spanish’
identity and accelerated the Spanish ‘state-building’ process. After Napoleon’s defeat a more cohesive national political and administrative system was put into place. Between 1823 and 1857, a uniform system of local government was imposed, the Civil Guard was created, a ministerial system of government and a uniform system of secondary education were adopted and a dense railway network was constructed (Heywood 1995: 14).
Yet, because the special recognition of the Basque and Castilian provinces had such a long-standing history, the cultural homogenization of Spain was much more burdensome than that of France. The economic superiority of Catalonia and the Basque Country and the centre’s interest in overseas impe- rialism rather than domestic state-nation building contributed to these difficulties (Rokkan et al. 1987: 72). Furthermore, the two main dissenting regions (Catalonia and the Basque Country) and Galicia are marked by the presence of a regional language which exists alongside Castilian (Spanish).
The spread of printed media increased the possible channels in which their discontent could be voiced, for instance in local newspapers, using the vernacular.
The conservative and Catholic reactionists who opposed the liberal state building process came to be known as Carlists. The struggles between liber- als and Carlists provoked three civil wars between 1833 and 1875 (Moreno 2001: 46–7). Carlist support was strongest in the Basque Country, but it was also considerable in Catalonia. The relatively high economic growth of the ‘Catalan’ and ‘Basque’ economies boosted minority nationalism. The economic successes of these regions stood in sharp contrast to the achieve- ments of the ruling political classes in Madrid, whose political behaviour was often – correctly – perceived as corrupt and discriminatory. Even so, the social background of the Basque and Catalan nationalists was different in two major respects (Diez-Medrano 1995).
First, Catalan nationalism was primarily advanced by the successful local bourgeoisie. They reacted against the influence of the Castilian political and administrative elites and the presence of Andalucian landowners in their economic affairs. Catalan nationalists long stressed the peculiar position of
medieval Catalonia within the Crown of Aragon, and its de facto constitu- tional status fell little short of complete sovereignty (Keating 2001b: 43).
In their view, the historic unity of Castile and Aragon should be seen as a contract between equals, not as the recognition of Castilian dominance.
In contrast, Basque nationalism was agrarian, traditionalist, strongly linked to conservative Catholicism and more lower-class driven (Carr 1981: 62–70).
Basque nationalists reacted against the industrial and central banking elites, and the industrialization of the Basque Country which drove thousands of non-Basque speakers into its territory. Basque national traditions are based more strongly on oral legend. Sabino Arana, the founder of the Basque National Party (PNV), played a crucial role in framing a ‘common Basque historiography’. The fueralhistory of the Basque Provinces is continuously emphasized and sometimes even falsely portrayed as a tradition of full sovereignty. Fueroswere not granted by the Spanish state, but existed as original rights, so the Basque nationalists argue. In this sense, the calls for independence have always been stronger among Basque than Catalan nationalists.
Second, traditionally, Basque nationalism was more ‘inward-looking’ and ethnically framed than Catalonian nationalism. Arana for instance empha- sized the ‘racial’ traits of Basque national identity (Heywood 1995: 22). In part, this was so because the Basque language could not be easily played out as a mobilizing element. In contrast with most citizens who live in Catalonia, most citizens who live in the Basque Country do not speak Euskera, a non-Indo-European language (Heywood 1995: 22). In this sense,
‘Basque nationalism’ is more ‘ethnic’ or less ‘civic’ than Catalan nationalism (Keating 2001a). However, to define Basque nationality on the basis of racial superiority today would serve as a source of public embarrassment. Hence, contemporary Basque nationalists seek to portray themselves as relatively open and liberal (hence as more civic) as well (Keating 2001b: 45–6). The dif- ferent forms of minority nationalism generate different consequences in terms of their compatibility with the Spanish state. Catalan nationalism is less exclusivist and intense than Basque nationalism and can be reconciled more easily with the continued existence of the Spanish state. In contrast, Basque nationalists have more openly supported secession and its radical protagonists have turned to violence (ETA) to achieve their political objectives.
The partial democratization of pre-Franco Spain visualized the support for regional autonomy in Catalonia. For instance, in the elections of 1908, the
‘Solidaritat Catalan’, a party which assembles Catalan nationalist interests obtained 31 of the 34 Catalan seats in the national parliament. Claims for self-government were honoured in the short-lived democratic Second Republic (1931–39) when the Catalan Generalitat (regional government) was restored. A proposal for Basque regional autonomy that gained the support of Navarra and each of the three Basque Provinces was never approved
by the Spanish national parliament because the Basque country had not explicitly endorsed the Second Republic’s founding act.
Next to Catalonia and the Basque Country, Galicia is considered as the third ‘historic’ Spanish region. Yet, of all three regions, it has the most weakly developed sense of political nationalism. This is so, despite the widely diffused knowledge of Galician, a language in its own right with similarities to Portuguese, traditional Celtic languages and Castilian. Unlike Catalonia and the Basque Country, Galicia retained its traditional character as a predominantly agrarian and strongly Catholic region. The rapid indus- trialization of the Basque Country provoked a nationalist response among the rural Basque population who felt threatened in their identity. Although the industrialization of Catalonia was controlled by Catalan elites, it also fed nationalism insofar as it was contrasted with the administrative and political tutelage of the Castilian centre and sparked an influx of non-Catalan speak- ing labourers. Being protected from such socio-economic shocks, Galicians continued their traditional way of living. A socio-economically weaker region, Galicia has been partially made dependent on central fiscal support.
The same applies to some of the other regions, which, although they had no separate language, shared the experience of some form of historic self-rule.
Yet, as these regions were relatively poor as well, they too depended on the centre for jobs in the army and civil administration. As a result, its working forces more easily internalized the political and social norms of the centre (Moreno 2001: 52–3).
During Franco’s authoritarian rule (1939–75), regionalism gained ground as a legitimate force of democratic resistance against the dictator’s assimila- tionist and unitary policies. Therefore, the claims of the Catalan and Basque minority nationalists were favourably looked upon when Spain embraced democracy. In the face of ETA violence, the drafters of a democratic consti- tution were forced to respond to the forces of minority nationalism. The Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia were recognized as historic regions and received some form of regional autonomy and a bilaterally negotiated regional statute. Navarra, which did not join the Basque Country, was given a special constitutional status as well. These 4 regions exist alongside 13 ‘ordinary’ regions without the status of ‘historical’ regions. This said, not all of these 13 regions are ‘a-historical’. Andalucia for instance had a strong regional identity long before Spain democratized. Navarra had been an inde- pendent kingdom. The geographic isolation of the Canary Islands and the Balearics resulted in some form of regional identity as well. However, León, which had been a kingdom in its own right, was subsumed in a new region with the name of Castille y León. Regions such as La Rioja, Cantabria or Murcia had no tradition of self-rule (Heywood 1995: 143). By now, Spain has acquired almost all the features of a federal state. In time the non-historic Communities have expanded their autonomy as well. They did not neces- sarily do this at the same pace, so that initially one could distinguish between
‘fast-track’, ‘intermediary-track’ and ‘slow-track’ regions (see Chapter 3).
Meanwhile the powers that were initially conferred upon the historic Communities have increased as well. However, the formal input of the regions in shaping or amending the rules that frame their autonomy is limited. In this sense, Spain still does not fulfil the criteria that were listed in Chapter 1. Table 2.2 lists all 17 Autonomous Communities (regions) of Spain and classifies them on the basis of their distinct political status.
The United Kingdom: the persistent strength of minority nationalism
Like Spain, the United Kingdom unified under the pressure of an adminis- trative, economic and military centre, England. Yet, Britain developed as a union statebinding together three territorial units. Therefore, the peculiari- ties of Scotland and Wales always found some form of political recognition, and efforts to homogenize the UK were never as strong as in France or pre-democratic Spain.
The United Kingdom was formed out of three major unions: an Anglo- Welsh (1536), an Anglo-Scottish (1707) and an Anglo-Irish (1800) (Rokkan et al.
1987: 156–63). The failure of the Anglo-Irish union led to the separation of 26 Catholic counties and the formation in 1922 of a separate Irish state. The subjugation of Wales to England was in fact accomplished as early as 1284, when the English crown enacted the Statute of Wales. English dynastic rival- ries and England’s preoccupation with France stopped the crown from exer- cising direct authority in Wales. The Welsh origins of the Tudor monarchy helped to forge an act of union. Similarly, dynastic marriage brought the Scottish and English crowns together. The seeds of the Anglo-Scottish Act of Union should be traced to 1603, when the King of Scotland inherited Table 2.2 Overview of the Spanish regions (Autonomous Communities) and their constitutional route to regional autonomy
Historic
communities and Intermediary- Slow-track
special provision Fast-track regions track regions regions Basque Country Andalucia Canary Islands Aragon
Catalonia Valencia Asturias
Galicia Balearic Islands
Navarra (fueros) Cantabria
Castilla-La-Mancha Castilla-y-León Extremadura La Rioja Madrid Murcia
the English crown and moved his residence to the South (Rokkan et al.
1987: 158).
In practice, Wales and Scotland were left with significant autonomy. Until the second half of the nineteenth century there was no clear policy of Anglicizing the Welsh-speaking parts of Wales. Scotland retained a different educational and legal system, a separate (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland and a different system of local government (Keating 2001a: 200–1). These practices were allowed to continue after the union was formed, so that a British identity could develop alongside a Welsh or Scottish identity. Wales and Scotland not only gained representation in the UK Parliament, but they also received a disproportionately high share of seats there.
However, the dominance of England was felt more clearly from the nine- teenth century onwards. Colonialism and large-scale industrialization efforts necessitated a stronger sense of Britishness as a result of which England’s hegemonic influence became more obvious in the Scottish and Welsh peripheries. For instance, English became the unmistakable language of edu- cation, administration and commerce, contributing to a rapid decline of Welsh- and Gaelic-speakers. Scottish and Welsh nationalism thrived in part on the intensity of Catholic nationalism in Ireland where British, Protestant rule was heavily contested. The efforts of the then Liberal Prime Minister Gladstone to grant home rule (devolution) to Ireland inspired some radical forces in Scotland to argue for similar concessions. Scotland did not receive home rule, but in 1885 Scottish demands for better representation in the centre were honoured with the creation of a Scottish Office and a Secretary of State for Scotland. Wales did not receive similar concessions until the 1960s (Loughlin 2001: 38). The secession of Ireland from the union dealt a blow to the Scottish and Welsh nationalists. The main British parties removed Home Rule (devolution) from the political agenda. The struggle for Scottish autonomy would continue under the political leadership of the Scottish National Party (founded between 1928 and 1934).
Unlike in Catalonia or the Basque Country, language has never been a remarkable element in forging Scottish identity. The use of Gaelic is con- fined to the western Highlands and the Scottish islands. Scots, a Germanic language that is closely linked to English, is still used in some poetry and literature, but is certainly not widely spoken. The proliferation of mass education in English, as well as diglossia, that is, the confinement of their use ‘to the “kitchen”, but not in the parlour’ (Val Lorwin) has contributed to this process (Keating 1998a: 26). Today, the number of Scots who know Gaelic is estimated at no more than 80,000. Consequently, Scottish identity is linked more closely with certain elements that predate the Act of Union such as a different legal or church system. Furthermore, it is argued that support for Scottish nationalism strongly correlates with the supposed costs or benefits which the region stands to gain from the union in terms of economy, welfare, policy outputs and accountability.
Welsh nationalism has a stronger connection with language, despite the low share of Welsh citizens who claim to speak Welsh fluently or very well.
At present the share of self-reported Welsh-speakers is no higher than 16 per cent (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003: 162). At the beginning of the nineteenth century almost the entire indigenous population of Wales knew how to speak Welsh and even in the 1901 census half the Welsh population reported to speak it (Madgwick and Rawkins 1982: 67). As in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the make-up of the regional population (and with it the share of citizens who speak the regional language) has been strongly affected by immigration patterns. Wales rapidly industrialized in the nineteenth century. The exploitation of coal fields in the south and north-east sparked a dramatic immigration of English, Irish and foreign (Italian, Polish, Caribbean, … ) workers. In turn, the contraction of the Welsh economy dur- ing the Great Depression forced Welsh workers to emigrate to England or abroad. Apart from the Welsh language, Welsh identity is also marked by a different religious culture. More than England, Wales has a tradition of reli- gious nonconformity, leading for instance to the direct election of pastors by their chapel congregations and a strong emphasis on egalitarianism and social justice (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003: 164–5). Despite the presence of a regional language and some specific religious traditions, Welsh nationalism is less diffused than Scottish nationalism. Welsh society is too
‘cosmopolitan’ in outlook. It contains a substantial group of Anglo-Welsh (born in Wales) and English-speaking immigrants (born in England), each with specific geographic strongholds. Furthermore, the lower socio- economic strata of the population are as mixed in composition as the local elites. They comprise Welsh-speaking rural workers and Anglo-Welsh descen- dents from immigrant workers. The latter have always been less interested in preserving Welsh culture than in advancing their socio-economic status.
Therefore, many Welsh Labour leaders (such as Neil Kinnock) were not keen on devolution when it was first put to a referendum in 1979.
Until the late twentieth century, the British centre could neglect the forces of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. UK governments (including Labour gov- ernments) repeatedly stressed the advantages that Scotland and Wales gained from being part of the UK. Both regions received higher per capita welfare payments than England. The general elections of 1974 produced significant wins for two ethno-regionalist parties: Plaid Cymru (Wales) and the Scottish National Party (Scotland). By then, class issues alone could no longer bind all the Scottish and Welsh voters to the traditional state-wide parties. As a result of these elections, a minority Labour government came to rely on the support of the SNP and the Liberal-Democrats. Both parties insisted on some form of devolution, but Labour backbenchers, including those who represented Wales and Scotland, mildly opposed it (Bogdanor 1999). Devolution would hinder macroeconomic policy coordination, so they argued. Ultimately the government endorsed a proposal that would
have led to a directly elected Scottish parliament with legislative powers and to a Welsh assembly with a right of enacting secondary legislation (adminis- trative acts) in a number of centrally defined competence areas. In order to appease the rebellious government backbenchers, a clause was inserted into the devolution package, which required its approval in a referendum by 40 per cent of the registered Scottish and Welsh voters. In March 1979 nearly 80 per cent of the voters in Wales defeated the devolution package, but a slim majority of the Scottish voters endorsed it. Since the latter represented only about a third of the Scottish registered vote, the required majority for implementing Scottish devolution was not reached. The defeat of Labour in national elections by a Conservative landslide in the same year kept devolution off the agenda until 1997.
Labour discovered the political ‘capital’ of devolution when it continued to outperform the Conservatives in Scotland and Wales (and when the Conservatives, particularly under the neo-liberal policies of Margaret Thatcher, came to be seen as an English party). Welfare state retrenchment and the introduction of a highly regressive poll tax were at odds with the prevailing egalitarian and more left-wing leaning views of the Scottish electorate (McEwen 2002). The popular support for Scottish and Welsh nationalism increased the more the ‘material benefits’ of ‘Britishness’
decreased. Labour realized that the Scottish and Welsh vote could help it to obtain a UK parliamentary majority, but only so if the party more full-heartedly embraced devolution. Otherwise the ethno-regionalist parties may be the strongest beneficiaries of such feelings of discontent. A mildly nationalist discourse would no longer conflict with Labour policy and ideology. The devolution package which Labour put to a Scottish and Welsh vote in 1999, that is, two years after it had regained national power, is strikingly similar to its ancestor of 1979: legislative devolution for Scotland (this time round accompanied by some limited tax autonomy) and a more limited form of administrative autonomy for Wales.
Finally, Irish minority nationalism was a more acute force to be reckoned with. Following the partition of Ireland, the six counties that remained under British control (Ulster or Northern Ireland) received a form of self- government (Northern Ireland). A Northern Irish legislative assembly and executive operated between 1920 and 1972, that is, well before the first referendums on devolution for Scotland and Wales took place. Northern Irish autonomy resulted in a severe oppression of the Catholic minority there. The Northern Irish Protestants gained an absolute majority in the regional parlia- ment. To that purpose, they engaged in electoral gerrymandering (i.e. the redrawing of electoral districts so as to maximize the election of Protestant delegates). They also changed the electoral system for parliamentary elections from proportional representation into first past the post, and they gave the more affluent (and thus more likely Protestant) electors more than one vote.
Consequently, Protestants monopolized political power and controlled most