‘Rationality’ and ‘irrationality’ belong to a group of dyadic terms of oppositional nature that, throughout the history of humankind, have characterized two kinds of thinking and knowing. Other examples of terms characterizing these two kinds are
‘logos and mythos’, ‘episteme and doxa’, ‘science and common sense’ and ‘elitist and popular thought’, among others (Marková, 2016). Although there are vast varia- tions among meanings of these pairs of words and epistemologies attached to them, the first term in each of these pairs refers to what may be characterized as ‘superior’
thinking and knowing and the second as ‘inferior’ thinking and knowing (Moscovici, 2011). According to this perspective, rationality is a ‘superior’ way of thinking and knowing, fundamental for science. Logical reasoning is strictly separated from
‘inferior’ ‘irrationality’ that dominates popular thinking, myth and common sense.
This generalization is associated with the commonly adopted assumption that, on its historical journey, humankind progressed from mythos, irrationality and non- scientific thinking to logos, rationality and scientific thinking (e.g. Cassirer, 1946;
Nestle, 1942; Singer, 1958). Although not everybody has adopted this idea of the historical growth of rationality (e.g. Buxton, 1999; Guthrie, 1962; Most, 1999), throughout history one can find a pervasive preoccupation with the questions con- cerning rationality and irrationality in humans and rationality and irrationality in human and social sciences.
the process in modernity that transforms human experience in the lifeworld into the effective and anonymous system operated by bureaucracy, machines and artificial objects. This issue is discussed later in this chapter.
Are Humans Rational or Irrational?
Ever since Aristotle, scholars have provided different answers to the question as to whether the nature of humanity is, or is not, rational. Consider some examples.
Some scholars presuppose that humans are born with the capacity for rationality and that, therefore, rationality is a norm. In the seventeenth century, René Descartes (1637/1955) viewed individual rationality as being based on the capacity of think- ing and doubting, and it is this capacity that constitutes the proof of the existence of humanity. If humans do not think rationally, it is due to Others who drive the ratio- nal individual towards irrationality. Likewise, the ‘example and custom’ of Others pave the road towards irrationality (Descartes, 1637/1955, p. 9). More recently, although on different grounds than Descartes, Carl Rogers (1961) based his person- centred therapy on the idea that humans are basically rational. He argues that the tendency towards rational thought is a fundamental feature of personality and does not sympathize with those who argued that humans are irrational. Rationality rises in favourable psychosocial conditions; destructive, anti-social and immature behaviour may arise in situations in which the individual is defensive and fearful (Rogers, 1961).
In contrast, Sigmund Freud (1960) claims that humans are basically driven by irrational tendencies seated in the ‘id’, which they cannot control. Although the
‘ego’ has some degree of rationality, it has to struggle with both the irrational ‘id’
and also with irrational demands of the ‘superego’ (Ziegler, 2002, p. 82). Stuart Sutherland (1992) systematically explores the widespread forms of, and reasons for, irrationality among people. He discusses diverse forms of irrationality among ordi- nary citizens, medical professionals, judges, engineers and others; he refers to fol- lies and irrationalities studied by social psychologists (e.g. obedience to authority or in-group and out-group conformities, like stereotypes). Sutherland carefully distin- guishes between acting irrationally and making mistakes. He views irrationality as an intentional, deliberate act. An error, on the other hand, is an act based on insuf- ficient knowledge. For example, someone with minimal knowledge of astronomy would not rationally climb a tree to reach the moon; on the other hand, a child might try to do that but that would not count as an irrational action because the child lacks the relevant knowledge. Sutherland describes multiple causes of irrationality, rang- ing from social and emotional causes to cognitive ones, like making false infer- ences, ignoring and distorting evidence. In general, his catalogue of irrationalities does not have any theoretical basis; it is purely empirical. He acknowledges that what he calls irrationalities would not be acceptable to all readers.
Steuer (2011) likewise differentiates between irrationality and making errors in thinking. He assumes that irrationality, ‘wilfully maintaining a contradiction’, e.g.
by claiming that something is relevant to an event when, in fact, it is not (and vice versa), defines humans more precisely than does rationality (p. 26).
These two perspectives on rationality and irrationality in humans have not been always viewed as totally separate from one another. Thus, Ichheiser (1968) views Sigmund Freud and Max Weber as inheritors both of rationalism and irrationalism.
Ichheiser notes that Freud was a follower of rationalistic Enlightenment, as well as a successor of irrational philosophers, like Schopenhauer. As for Weber (1968), who developed one of the most elaborated versions of a formal rationalistic system of economy and social organization, Ichheiser argues that ascetic Protestantism led to the rational effort of humans to achieve economic prosperity. At the same time, Weber was convinced that rationalism also involved unavoidable elements of irratio- nality due to the conflict of different rationalities in modern culture (Gronow, 1988).
Accordingly, the rationalistic system of economy cannot escape irrationality.
Rational and Irrational Sciences
During the seventeenth century, Blaise Pascal (1670/1995) coined the terms l’esprit de geometrie (spirit of geometry) and l’esprit de finesse (spirit of finesse). L’esprit de geometrie inspired the idea of scientific knowledge, which required rational, systematic and rigorous thought. The Age of Reason or Enlightenment of the eigh- teenth century pursued belief in the growth of universal rationality and the logical capacities of humans. The rapidly developing natural sciences, based on the mecha- nistic principles of Newtonian physics, became the leading power of rational thought and technological innovations. They enabled advancements in astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology. Despite being intermingled with astrology and alchemy in their beginnings, natural sciences in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies, nevertheless, started their careers as ‘rational’ disciplines aiming to discover the truth about the world and universe.
The other of Pascal’s term, l’esprit de finesse, refers to intuitive and creative features of the mind. Among the followers of Pascal, the nineteenth- and early twentieth- century philosopher Henri Bergson (1907/1998) took up the dichotomy between l’esprit de geometrie and l’esprit de finesse and developed it further as the distinction between intellect and intuition. Bergson was a critic of mechanistic phi- losophy and of materialism; his philosophy was founded on the concept of creative evolution and the uniqueness of human experience. Bergson characterized intelli- gence as the individual’s capacity to think or act with a goal. Intuition, on the other hand, referred to the direct experience by which the individual entered straight into the object of observation or his/her experience. Intuition was based on imagination, memory, emotions and creative impulses. With the development of these ideas in social sciences, l’esprit de finesse became associated with irrationality.
Social sciences originated in the eighteenth century as irrational disciplines (Moscovici, 1988/1993); as such, they started off with a significant disadvantage as
‘inferior’ disciplines. Moscovici reminds us that they commenced with the study of phenomena like nationalism, religion, myth and beliefs and communities—thus, with Pascal’s l’esprit de finesse. For example, Weber and Durkheim started from religion, Simmel from the relativity of values and Marx from a Hegelian concept of historical forces. Vico, Herder, Hamann and Humboldt were developing ideas about relations and cultures. Other social scientists, like Le Bon, Ortega y Gasset and
McDougall, preoccupied themselves studying collectives and crowds in which rational individuals turned themselves into irrational beings. Preoccupied with the unreason within the masses, with influences of charismatic leaders, with mass hyp- nosis and with the collective unconscious and impulsiveness of crowds, social sci- ences were far away from Cartesian’s ‘clear and distinct ideas’.
The question of rationality and irrationality has been haunting human and social sciences ever since. Its historical roots lie in the split between Gesellschaft as a rationalistic approach based on the concept of society and Gemeinshaft as an irra- tional approach based on the concept of community (cf. Tönnies, 1887/1957). The division between rationality and irrationality in human and social sciences became associated with the question of universalism versus relativism. It has been particu- larly prominent in anthropology, psychology and linguistics; it still occupies inter- ests of current social sciences (see below).
The ethos of the Enlightenment to eradicate irrational thinking kept inspiring human and social sciences. Immanuel Kant’s answer to his question, “What is Enlightenment?” (Kant, 1784/1996), was based on his assumption that each indi- vidual has the ability to use his or her own understanding without being directed by Others. Freedom of individuals will further expand through education, political tol- erance and freedom of speech. The general public should be encouraged to use its rational capacities to speak its own mind.
Various systems of thought, beliefs and ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries supported the idea of the growth of rationality throughout the ontological and historical development of humans. They ranged from evolutionary ideas (Darwin, 1859/1974) to psychological development (e.g. Inhelder & Piaget, 1955/1958, 1959/1964), and they included ‘scientific’ Marxism. For example, Marxism firmly adopted the rationalistic outlook of theories of historical and dialec- tical materialism, economy and politics. Historical materialism was particularly rel- evant to sociology and social psychology, defined as a science describing and analysing gradual stages through which society passes on its way towards rational- ity and a prosperous future (e.g. Marková, 2012).
The question whether, and to what extent, human and social sciences are rational or irrational disciplines pertains to occupy social scientists until today. The sociolo- gist Milan Zafirovski (2005) observes that economists and rational choice theorists regard sociology as a science of the irrational, lacking a conception of rationality.
Zafirovski defends rationalism (rationalism is good; irrationalism is bad) in sociol- ogy, focusing on its conceptual and methodological pluralism.
The Polysemic Nature of Rationality and Irrationality
So far, apart from referring to the ‘superiority’ of ‘rationality’ and the ‘inferior’
status of ‘irrationality’, I have not characterized rationality and irrationality in any respects and have not referred to any criteria that might distinguish between them.
The difficulty with any effort to explain the nature of these two concepts is due to
the fact that rationality and irrationality have a number of different meanings and are used in diverse kinds of discourse.
With respect to the idea that throughout its historical development society becomes more rational, Moscovici (1988/93) observed, ‘To assert that society is becoming increasingly rational does not mean very much, if one does not make clear how, and in what, that consists’ (p. 329). Yet to specify what is rationality and irrationality proved to be very difficult. In studying rational and irrational elements in society, Karl Mannheim (1940) maintained that ‘few words are used in so many contradictory ways’ (p. 51). However, he thought that ‘rationality’ and ‘irrational- ity’ were indispensable concepts in sociological analysis and that the different meanings attached to them needed to be distinguished. But how could that be done?
In contrast to those who believed in human progress in terms of the growth of rationality, Mannheim (1940), instead, questioned an apparent growth of irrational- ity in modernity. He thought that it was not that modern humans would be more irrational than premodern humans, but that, in industrial society, the ambiguity of the question as to what are rational and irrational leads to a fragmentation of groups that have conflicting interests. Each group refers to rationality and irrationality on the basis of its own interests and values that it wishes to promote. The democratiza- tion processes penetrate private life as well as all social circles, no matter how small and narrow such circles might be; it is the small and narrow circles that make their conflicting interests even more visible. As a result it is difficult to typify the kinds of thinking and activities with which these circles are involved.
To bring some order into these difficulties, Mannheim (1940) identifies only two of the most important uses of the concepts of ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, which he views as fundamental in sociological analysis. He refers to them as substantial and functional rationality and irrationality (pp. 51–75). A substantially rational act of thought reveals an intelligent insight into the interrelations of events in a given situ- ation. In contrast, a substantially irrational act of thought defines what is false in a given situation or what cannot be called an act of thought, like impulses, drives or feelings. In speaking about functional rationality, Mannheim refers to a series of actions organized according to a previously designed plan to attain a particular goal.
In such a design each element has a particular position and role. Functional irratio- nality disrupts and breaks down functional ordering, for example, by daydreaming, violent actions or activities that do not harmonize with the designed plan.
Ichheiser (1968), who knew Mannheim’s work and was even more preoccupied with ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’, drew attention to the polysemic nature of these terms. Although he uses Mannheim’s categories in his classification, Ichheiser goes far beyond Mannheim’s ideas. His broadly based catalogue of irrationalities ranges from usages in social interactions, interpersonal relations in national and interna- tional conflicts and wars and peace. Ichheiser clearly sees the difficulty of drawing boundaries between different meanings of these terms, as well as pinpointing the rational and irrational perspectives in social scientific approaches. To make some progress in this issue, one must treat it seriously. One cannot ask, out of context, questions like “What is rationality?” or “What is irrationality?” One must conceive rationality and irrationality as mutually interdependent or at least as complementary
phenomena. According to Ichheiser, the most important types of irrationalities stem from the different perspectives of the Self and Others. It is these differences in perspectives that make lives of individuals and collectives miserable and filled with disputes.