the positions we take, on the basis of both our values and goals and our understanding of social theory. In this particular article, it is clear that he believes such an analysis to lead to particular positions within educational choices, namely, greater support for a realistic approach.
The manner in which Idealistic or realistic pedagogy (1934a) is written also nicely illustrates the tone that he believed scientific education, in general, should set. So as not to provoke defensiveness, Ichheiser believed that scientists should be careful not to talk down to others or to otherwise abuse their authority. As a piece of practical advice, he suggests that when communicating research findings, scientists should speak in terms of the inclusive “we” (using pluralis modestiae), saying “we think” rather than “I think” (which he follows in his own writings in Polish, German, and English). In more general terms, scientists should speak in what he calls the spirit of intellectual clarity (w duchu intelektualnej rzetelności) (p. 200), which involves the kind of intellectual bravery and honesty discussed earlier. While the choices we make are always goal directed, even in light of theory, in making such choices we should strive to pull our values out into the light, just as we strive to illuminate the workings of the external world. In other words:
Bravery in the face of reality in no way means […] reconciling oneself with reality as it is […] as agreeing with that which is given to us, and thus the desire to shape and transform the conditions in which we find ourselves are part of human nature.” (1936b, p. 150)
According to Ichheiser, a lack of intellectual honesty speaks to a fear of the world as it really is and to the inability to work so as to see it takes the shape that we would like to see. The point of the social sciences is to help shed light on that reality, the reality from which we often hide, and to help us hear our own voice. In encouraging others to analyze the world by means of the method of analyzing the consequences and to speak of what they find in the spirit of intellectual clarity, Ichheiser (1936/7a) believes that teachers have a unique role to play. What is more, they are in a unique position (along with social scientists) to educate us about the various other illusions and misunderstandings that color our social world, particularly how we perceive others and how others perceive us. In fact, the teacher “should know no more pressing undertaking than fundamentally breaking down the atmosphere that leads to the teaching of falsehood” (1936b, p. 153). It is to the topic of social perception, more specifically, that we now turn.
Understanding Our Social World: The Complex, Complicated,
from the objection. He calls this assumption pseudo-empiricism, or the collection of pseudo-facts, as we do not gather information as would a camera. More important than the (assumed) production of data supposedly representing parts of the object are the various processes involved on the side of the perceiver. For this reason, Ichheiser (1936a) defines the material (materiał) of interpersonal perception not as the information coming from the ostensible object, but rather as the material linked with the said object in the eyes of the perceiver. Ichheiser thought that the individual cannot be understood and should not be studied, apart from the social environment in which it always, necessarily, exists. This sentiment was reflected in his objection to the assumptions underlying much of laboratory psychology. In this sense, Ichheiser can be understood as an early proponent of perceptualism, arguing that categories and labels were the product of the perceiver rather than objective representations of the perceived.
When perceiving another, we can respond automatically, even instinctually, in a manner of which we are generally not aware (po prostu) (1936/7a, 1936/7b), or we consciously interpret the signs as we understand them. According to Ichheiser, the automatic reactions are stronger than the rational, conscious choices, and it is usually the former that influence the latter and not the other way around. While our unconscious or semiconscious thoughts can easily influence our conscious decisions, and generally do, it is not as easy consciously think ourselves into automatic reactions. Ichheiser also distinguishes between individual interpretations (interpretacje indywidualne), those tendencies that we have as a result of our own experiences, and general interpretations (interpretacje generalne), which are group-based interpretive tendencies that are dependent upon shared thinking within the in-group and not upon individual experience. In Ichheiser’s thinking, we thus see a foreshadowing of the extensive work on “fast” and “slow” thinking in our day (e.g., Kahneman, 2011).
Ichheiser (1936/7a, 1936/7b) also believes that when studying interpersonal or intergroup perception, we should be mindful of the distinction between interpretations made in concreto and those made in abstracto. Interpretations made in concreto deal with a concrete situation, while interpretations made in abstracto deal with an overall evaluation of a phenomenon. Ichheiser is careful to highlight that these two types of interpretations are independent of each other and that, even if apparently in contradiction, they can both be true. He gives the example that while someone can despise the notion of the aristocratic lifestyle in abstracto (e.g., as part of an unfair social arrangement), they can also be impressed by particular cases of it in concreto (e.g., by particular aristocrats). While we may be inclined to see an inconsistency here, Ichheiser argues that such is often the case and that no logical or psychological inconsistency exists at all.
This provides a nice example of how Ichheiser conceives of people as constella- tions of various influences, rather than as the singular, homogeneous entities, as we often take them to be. Much has been made of his seminal work on attribution the- ory (see Boski & Rudmin, 1989), and it is arguably the element of his work for which he is best known. While most of us think that our perception gives us an accurate picture of the social world and that errors are rare, Ichheiser suggests that
to err is actually the more common state of affairs. Again, we are not cameras or robots, recording and responding to incoming stimuli in a one-to-one manner, but living beings with affect, goals, values, etc., who are ourselves located within various, shifting social contexts. Thus, a gap always exists between our perceptions and that which we are purported to perceive. We will now discuss a number of the illusions (złudzenia) that, according to Ichheiser, result from the discrepancies between the social psychological processes by which we live and those by which we think we live.
Overestimating the Unity of the Individual
Ichheiser repeatedly writes about our tendency to overestimate the unity of the indi- vidual. We are significantly more complex than we generally think, something that is true irrespective of the particular situation in which we currently find ourselves.
In The picture of personality from the point of view of social psychology (1936a), Ichheiser gives the example of a wife whose jealousy we may find unfounded while we are observing her husband in the military barracks, having never observed him in another context, with other goals, etc. Their relationship is far more complex than the simplistic picture we paint in our mind’s eye of the officer himself (i.e., in the sole role of an officer). Similarly, if a teacher has a bad student whose mother defends her before the teacher, the teacher may very well be inclined to interpret the mother’s actions as the unfounded and ill-advised reactions of an overprotective mother. This interpretation would be largely predicated on the unity of the child perceived by the teacher. In other words, the teacher would be characterizing the child by those bad behaviors in school, while being largely oblivious to the possibil- ity that the child may behave entirely differently elsewhere (e.g., with family or friends).
In illustrating this particular illusion, Ichheiser (1936a) also refers to what he believed to be the most commonly used criterion for such assessments in his day, namely, the work environment. He writes about how difficult it is to imagine that the people with whom we work can be different in different environments or when their goals shift. In other words, we tend to perceive a unity in others on the basis of the role to which we assign them or in which we interact with them. Ichheiser also provides an interesting thought experiment. Imagine that, when entering a white room, we would activate a light that would make the room appear red. In such a case, we would assume the room to be red. However, if when entering through another door, we were to activate a light making the room appear green, we would assume the room to be green. Ichheiser uses this example to illustrate our tendency to overlook the role that we ourselves play in creating the unity that we perceive in the outside world. While we want an absolute picture of the world, in reality we only have a relative one. Just as we tend to say that snow is white and that it only appears violet at sundown, we tend to see the social world from the point of view of our own relative and normative positions.
Not only do we perceive such (artificial) unity of the individual in the present moment, but we also use it to plan for the future. In anticipating future scenarios, we project stable selves onto the future. Ichheiser (1936/7a) gives the example of marriage to illustrate this point. The roles of these two individuals, as defined by marriage, are infinitely simplified when compared with the true complexity of the people involved. More specifically, Ichheiser writes that the expectation that both parties will continue to fulfill these simplified roles is what ensures that the two remain together, a rigid social arrangement that stands in sharp contrast to the complexity of our nature. In some such cases, the projection of such roles into the future can lead to the loss of psychological balance (równowaga psychologiczna, p. 200), especially if individuals feel pressure to conform to those social expectations, despite strong, fundamental internal objections.
In the example of marriage, we not only see the workings of wider, societal pres- sures, but also how both individuals within the pair, when oscillating between being observed and being the observer, also create the illusion of the unity of character and identity. Both people know that they are being observed and evaluated, but also that they, too, are observing and evaluating the other. Therefore, not only does each person put pressure on the other to conform to the simplified vision that they hold, but each additionally exerts pressure on him/herself to conform to the simplified picture the other holds. In other words, the masks we wear are not only forced upon us, but they are often willingly put on. While individual differences influence the people we are, such social psychological processes also considerably influence not only our perception of others but also our own sense of self.
It is important to point out that in describing these processes, Ichheiser is careful to underscore both the collective and the individual elements. On the one hand, this can be understood as an optimistic element of this writings. For example, in attempting to make sense out of the question—which of an individual’s perceived characteristics or roles are “really their own” and which have we thrust upon them?— Ichheiser (1939b) suggests we try to determine which are the most important for them and which best describe them as a whole or across various situations. We can increase our sensitivity to this by recognizing that we ourselves cannot determine what traits and roles are the most important for the other, as we can only judge from where we stand on the outside. At the same time, however, this can also be interpreted in a particularly negative light. It implies that behind this sea of masks and misunderstandings are individuals whose experiences and inner characters are ultimately their own and who thus come to recognize the artificiality of their social lives and the full extent of their isolation and even alienation.
Assigning Individuals to Groups and Stereotypes
According to Ichheiser (1936/7a, 1936/7b), sociologists had been leading the way on research in this area. When answering the question “Who is that person?” one of the most common answers is to identify the individual within some type of group.
“Oh, he is a teacher” or “That’s the new postman,” or “He is an immigrant from X.”
Ichheiser writes repeatedly about how people are most commonly defined by their job.
While this tendency to define individuals by a group to which they belong is almost a truism according to Ichheiser, he questions its accuracy. Simply put, as groups speak to social roles and not to individuals, such judgments are primarily illusory. What is more, not only are individuals not encapsulated by the roles into which they fall, but individuals often develop in opposition to them. By our very natures, we are too complicated so as to be contained by a label. In response to being asked, “Who are you?”, Oscar Wilde has his 1890 character Dorian Grey famously reject the question by stating, “To define is to limit.” Similarly, Ichheiser (1936a) writes that “a teacher is not just a ‘teacher,’ but also an ‘anti-teacher,’ and a lawyer is not just a ‘lawyer’ but also an ‘anti-lawyer’ (“Nauczyciel, to nie tylko
‘nauczyciel’, ale właśnie także ‘anty-nauczyciel’, adwokat, to nietylko ‘adwokat’, lecz także właśnie ‘anty-adwokat’ itd.”) (p. 46).
Thus, argues Ichheiser (1936/7a, 1936/7b), we tend to understand others through typology (typizowanie), linking them with particular social “types” (e.g., teacher, soldier, etc.). From the point of view of the individual, such typologies are not only a simplification (uproszczenie) but also a deformation (zniekształcenie). At the same time, by putting actual people into these boxes, we pump air into the larger societal balloon. That is to say, society takes its shape not just from the general, abstract form we conceive, but also from the fact that we act upon that form in our actual social interactions. We generally accept these processes, or, what is more, we are often unaware that we are even involved in them (as both observer and observed).
Such processes can become deeply problematic for individuals if a strong disconnect exists between the types to which we are assigned and our own individual preferences. If such individuals are repeatedly socially pressured to play such role, it can turn life into a farce, a fiction (wówczas współżycie zatraca w ogóle swój sens bezpośredni i staje się jakąś fikcyjną maskaradą) (1936/7a, p. 197). People can, however, resist the social types to which they are assigned and they can also try to avoid classifying others.
Ichheiser (e.g., 1936b) lists other illusions as well, such as those regarding the notions of good and bad luck and success and failure. Why were illusions so important in his eyes? Ichheiser points to at least three major reasons why they are so important to social psychology. The first has to do with his understanding of their pathological nature. Ichheiser does not generally use the term pathological to mean
“abnormal” in a statistical or even in a normative sense. Rather, he uses it in a manner related to illusions and misperceptions. In as far as we are able to determine that something is “off” about them, that implies that we have at least some sense of what is, or would be, “right.” In this sense, much of our general knowledge about good health has been acquired by the study of poor health. We will return to the subject of pathology and psychological conflict in the next section.
Secondly, as we all experience illusions, Ichheiser (1936a) understands the mat- ter of experiencing illusions to be of intimate, personal importance to all of us and, thus, that we could all intuitively grasp their value. What is more, it is important that
we all understand the gap between who we actually are and how others see us. In this way, we are able to better understand the illusions and misattributions that regu- larly arise in human intercourse and thereby how to distance ourselves from the painful elements thereof. Such knowledge provides a form of psychotherapy.
A third reason Ichheiser (1936a) provides for the importance of the study of illu- sions is that such knowledge is invaluable for those explicitly tasked with evaluating others, such as teachers and psychologists. Were social psychology to actually raise awareness to these processes among such audiences, he thought that it would con- stitute a considerable success for the field.
A Tripartite Classification of Personality Characteristics
A central feature of Ichheiser’s theorizing is the value he places on classification schemes that might be employed to free us from the more rigid typologies that we tend to use. He attempts to provide clear classifications in a manner that allows the given scheme to serve as a flexible tool that illustrates the dynamic nature of the whole, rather than the fixed differences between the parts.
In this spirit, Ichheiser (1936a) provides a three-part classification of personality characteristics. This is not a hierarchy but, rather, all parts are on equal footing. The first type of qualities he calls real personality qualities (realne właściwości osobiste) (p. 50). These traits do not depend upon the situation and are rather stable. However, this does not mean that they cannot change or that they are totally independent of the given situation. Rather, they should be thought of as general tendencies, such as a general mathematical or musical talent. In keeping with his general approach to theory building, he believes that the relative stability captured by this classification of traits cannot be understood apart from the other two.
The second type of personality traits is categorized as illusory personality qual- ities (pozorne właściwości osobiste) (1936a, p. 51) and incorporates traits that oth- ers perceive in a given individual but which the individual actually does not possess. Ichheiser asks why these should be classified as personality traits if they are not actually possessed by the person in question. The reason is that the percep- tion of such non-existing traits can influence the individual and actually bring them into existence. In perceiving (non-existing) traits in others, we often begin to treat them accordingly. As personality becomes increasingly understood as the creation of social interaction, Ichheiser notes the matter of image as being particularly important. What is more, illusory personality qualities are not entirely random but they arise out of—or are reflections of—something else. He merely hints at pos- sible sources of these qualities, such as bluffs, hypocrisy, lies, being treated as a totem, etc.
Unlike real personality qualities, as-if personality qualities disappear as soon as the situation changes, as if they had been gifted by the situation. However, Ichheiser argues that these qualities do not just exist in the minds of others; they are far more real than that. Their borrowed nature speaks less to some sort of unreal quality and