rational or even irrational. Ernest Gellner (1992) explicitly notes that, commenting that a rational person methodically augments cognitive and financial capital and turns profits into pleasure, power or status. The life of a rational person is a dynamic progression of achievements and enjoyment, conditioned by accumulation of profits and fulfilment of goals and of an ascribed status. Analysing contributions of Durkheim and Weber, Gellner considers Weber as more a more rationalist scholar.
Durkheim tackled the problem of why all humans are rational, while Weber exam- ined why some humans are more rational than others. It clearly follows from Weber’s perspective of rationality that some values, goals and actions are more rational than others. Rational values of modernity esteem, above all, benefits based on self-interest leading to economic welfare and standards focusing on technologi- cal and scientific progress.
Ichheiser’s set of values is hugely diverse from those based on self-interest and making profits. His perspective corroborates that of other phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger and Patočka, among others. These scholars consider the over- emphasis on the growth of technical advancements and markets and the expansion of bureaucracy to be particularly destructive. It encouraged the emergence of a non- social individual (e.g. Dumont, 1986; Patočka, 1973/1989; Sorokin, 1992). The expanding market forces during the last three centuries gave rise to a new discipline of economics, in which money and commercial values obtained a highly significant meaning and produced a modern form of egoistic individualism (e.g. Bauman, 1989; Dumont, 1986; Minogue, 2010). A nonsocial individual, who has become a feature of modernity, is characterized by greed and an insatiable desire for con- sumption. In other words, the driving forces of modernity, which are guided by beneficial relationships between the Self and Others, have transformed into rela- tions dominated by the Self and the Object of desire and consumption. These devel- opments have created a form of the modern rationalistic moral order.
Ichheiser (1968) rejects this kind of rationalism—or pseudo-rationalism, as he calls it—which has its basic roots in the ideology of commercialism and which con- siders material profit as the supreme and only ‘fully rational’ criterion of the purpose and meaning of human existence. Instead, he emphasizes ‘higher, deeper, subtle, intangible, purely cultural-spiritual values’, without which society cannot progress (p. 100). In the concluding part of his piece on the six meanings of irrationality, Ichheiser refers to the French Renaissance writer Michel de Montaigne, who once wrote, ‘It would mean the end of our civilization if the upcoming class of merchants and businessmen would not only become rich (which might be quite in order) but would also be admired and honoured in our society’. Ichheiser wondered how Montaigne would respond to ‘our new brave world in its age of “reason”’ (p. 100).
which already were at the centre of Ichheiser’s attention, were endlessly analysed and discussed (e.g. Gentile, 2000; Halfin, 2003, among many others). Second, expanding means of communication have increased awareness of and interest in cultural and national differences with respect to what has become considered as rational and irrational. Another dominating issue has become the question as to how to maintain the concept of the unique mind of humankind, given the diversities of lifestyles, views, understanding and practices. Ethical questions and ensuing prob- lems of ethnic groups and of multiculturalism (e.g. Donnelly, 2007; Shweder, Minow, & Marku, 2002) continue to govern disputes concerning universal rational- ity versus cultural relativism. Finally, the belief in the progress of rationality in modernity continues to occupy educational and political ideologies. Let us briefly consider some of these issues and their relevance to Ichheiser’s concerns.
The question of universal rationality—its growth in individuals, societies and cultures—has been widely discussed since the Second World War, although the con- tents of debates change due to the intermingling of social scientific issues and politi- cal agendas. It amounts to the search for universals that apply to all humans and to all cultures, and it raises questions about the sources of relativism and of irrational beliefs (Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Wilson, 1970). The contributors to the latter volume suggest that the problem of understanding relativism and irrational beliefs arises from the fact that different cultures, languages and minds of others can be under- stood only within their own idiosyncratic socio-historical situations, rather than uni- versally. This raises doubt about the possibility of identifying anything transcultural among humans, and this doubt is a challenge ‘to the very idea of a single world’
(Hollis & Lukes, 1982, p. 1). The dichotomy between the presupposition of univer- sal rationality and questions concerning the sources of irrational beliefs and their rich and extensive presence in different cultures have led to identifying different forms of relativism, e.g. weak and strong forms, types of representational beliefs (‘convictions’, ‘persuasion’, ‘opinions’) (Sperber, 1982) and different kinds of translation, interpretation and explanation of beliefs (Lukes, 1982).
While all scholars hold the presupposition of the mental unity of mankind, rela- tivism and irrational beliefs, for them, arise from the fact that different cultures, languages and minds of others can be understood only within their own idiosyn- cratic socio-historical situations, rather than universally. This raises doubt about the possibility of identifying anything transcultural among humans, and this doubt they view as a challenge to the very idea of a single world. These concerns, based on the concepts of universalism and relativism, and asking questions how to bring these two concepts together, are founded on a totally different epistemology than that of Ichheiser. Not surprisingly, none of these works make any reference to Ichheiser.
As explained earlier, Ichheiser’s epistemology starts from interaction and the diver- sity of perspectives between the Self and Others. All humans have the capacity of rational and irrational thought and action, and the concepts of universalism and rela- tivism as independent entities play no role in Ichheiser’s epistemology.
In contrast to the researchers who struggle to maintain universal rationality and cultural relativism as separate concepts while, at the same time, searching for pos- sible relations between them, others propose a total reconceptualization of rational- ity, grounding it in alternative epistemologies. Shweder (1990), who is critical of
universalism based on fixed and abstract ideas of the psychic unity of humankind, proposes a dialectic concept of ‘thinking through others’. This concept includes intentionality; reconstruction of the Self and Others in and through transformation of beliefs, desires and practices; and thereby encouraging ‘an open-ended self- reflexive dialogic turn of mind’ (p. 34). According to Shweder, cultural psychology explores dyadic relations between the Self and Others, subject and object, psyche and culture, figure and ground and practitioner and practice, among others. These dyads are dynamically and dialectically interconnected because they make up each other.
Rosa and Valsiner (2007) reconceptualize rationality in terms of human agency, intentionality and ethics. Cultures are no longer isolated in their geographical ghet- tos. The contemporary world of societies is opened to other cultures; it is the world of uncertainties that moves cultures and individuals in different directions. These movements require making choices based on evaluations of possible consequences for the Self and Others. In such situations, the authors argue humans are constantly pushed towards making judgments between ethical and unethical acts and towards choosing actions to confront the ambiguities of life. It would be totally inadequate to conceive of reason as the private domain of the individual. Rather, reason must be negotiated in the world of ambiguities and uncertainties where individuals, groups and cultures have become interdependent and interfering with one another. In these confrontations, interdependence between humans and their sociocultural environ- ments transcends not only individual rationality but also a particular cultural ratio- nality; rationality, ethics and actions cannot be disentangled. Recent volumes on rationality and irrationality (Bauer, Harré & Jensen, 2013; Jensen & Harré, 2011) adopt, at least partly, the perspective of interdependent relations between rationality and irrationality. While these perspectives are much closer to Ichheiser’s interac- tional epistemology and his perspective of dynamic oppositional concepts, none of these researchers acknowledge his work. And yet he raised questions that, in many respects, go far beyond their conceptions of rationality and irrationality.
Two issues in Ichheiser’s analysis are particularly relevant to current concerns of social sciences.
First, Ichheiser is one of very few scholars who raised the question about differ- ent meanings of irrationality. Meanings of irrationality can hardly be systematized according to theoretically based criteria. Although some scholars, like Sutherland (1992) or Harré (2011), list different kinds of irrationalities, Ichheiser attempts to bring some order into this issue. He shows that although the word ‘rationality’ is often used in daily discourse as a rhetorical or exclamatory expression, it is illusory to distinguish rational and irrational thinking and action. Specifically, he shows that each meaning of irrationality can be understood only with respect to a specific meaning of rationality. Their meanings are mutually interdependent or complemen- tary, and under no circumstances can rationality and irrationality be treated as sepa- rate phenomena. In modern society, where fluctuation of values, beliefs and ideas precludes any secure and stable framework of thought and rationality, any fixed point of reference is lost. By acknowledging these issues and exploring their impli- cations, Ichheiser significantly contributes to the conceptualization of rationality and irrationality.
This brings us to the second of Ichheiser’s contributions. Ichheiser treats ratio- nalities and irrationalities as a perspectival issue of the Self-Other interdependence.
While social sciences usually focus on rationality as a cognitive and universal capacity of humans that can be objectively determined and measured, once we treat rationality as a feature of the Self-Other interdependence, we enter into a totally different conceptual framework. The relation between the Self and Others is not a neutral and ‘objective’ cognitive issue, but it is an ethical relation (Marková, 2016).
Humans not only take perspectives of one another, but they evaluate and judge one another, they search for social recognition, they imagine and construct intersubjec- tive relations and, above all, they communicate. Although humans may treat one another as neutral objects without face and ignore humanity of the Other, normal human relations are filled with concern for the Other, with emotion and passion. We can say that rather than being based on ‘cold rationality’, human relations are—or should be—based on dialogical rationality. This is Ichheiser’s message for human and social sciences, as well as for daily living.
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