phenomena. According to Ichheiser, the most important types of irrationalities stem from the different perspectives of the Self and Others. It is these differences in perspectives that make lives of individuals and collectives miserable and filled with disputes.
know are unreasonable and against their best interests, dimensions and discursive practices. Follies like bad decisions and foolish beliefs are committed by people of all levels of intelligence, including professionals and academics. As a concrete example of a folly in ‘scientific’ psychology is inferring an individual propensity from statistical distribution derived from the group of which that particular indi- vidual is a member (Harré, 2011). This also includes analysing a psychological phenomenon into a unit quite apart from the whole of which it is a part, making category mistakes and committing mereological fallacies.
Cognitive Versus Emotional Elements in Rationality and Irrationality
Ichheiser (1968) notes that the distinction between cognitive rationality and emo- tional irrationality is more ‘sensible’ than that of the expressive-exclamatory mean- ing, although it does not contribute to any conceptual clarification. This distinction, too, amounts to no more than a vague usage of both terms. Nevertheless, Ichheiser claims that because the cognitive-emotional distinction is so frequently used both in daily and professional life, it cannot be ignored. Despite this, his work shows that any particular behaviour is likely to involve both kinds of elements, cognitive and emotional ones, although they present themselves in various ways and to different degrees. In his critiques of Freud’s blind spots, Ichheiser (1970) argues that Freud did not conceive cognition and emotion as interdependent human capacities and did not see that, just as cognitive processes are influenced or distorted by emotions, so emotional processes are permeated or even dominated by cognitive factors. Instead, Ichheiser argues, Freud emphasized ‘the irrational, emotional, instinctual and unconscious components of mental life and overt behaviour’ (p. 143).
Ichheiser (1968) insists that all forms of social perception—ranging from aware- ness of the personality of Others and interpersonal relations to national and interna- tional interactions—involve both cognition and emotions. Some of these interdependencies are ambiguous and undefined, while others are quite concrete and refer to particular images and specific conceptions. While some forms of social perception are relatively accurate, others are various types and degrees of misperceptions.
Ichheiser insists throughout his various articles (e.g. 1949a, 1949b, 1970) inter- personal perception is guided by the dynamic oppositional processes of expression and impression. During any interpersonal interaction, the participant expresses his or her emotions, attitudes, tendencies and perspectives on various issues. These expressions make impressions upon the other interlocutor. Expressions of the speaker and impressions of the interlocutor are likely to differ. Both kinds of pro- cesses involve interdependent cognitions and emotions contributing to more or less accurate or inaccurate perceptual images, which are likely to be modified and trans- formed, as well as distorted and filled with illusions (Ichheiser, 1941).
Likewise, in intercultural and international relations, cognition and emotions manifest their interdependence. Emotions are culturally conditioned; they affect the organization of perceptions and, as Ichheiser (1951) states, in turn, ‘emotionally conditioned perceptions influence certain of our emotional reactions’ (p. 312). This means that ‘culture, emotions, perceptions, and again emotions’ are in play con- fronting humans with ‘numerous vicious circles’ (p. 312).
These dynamics are in the background of misperceptions and misunderstandings in international relations. Just like in interpersonal relations, members of each nation have more or less ambiguous images of other nations, which are stereotyped, simplified, distorted and largely produced by ‘irrational forces’ (Ichheiser, 1941, p. 431). Such irrational forces are conditioned by traditions, propaganda, illusions of historical nature, overestimations and underestimations of other nations and fear, mistrust and denigration of strangers. Such images tend to be projected at other nations, but not at one’s own. The stronger the political conflicts, the more distorted the views of the respective nations and races. Ichheiser regrets that although these issues are of a tremendous interpersonal, interracial and international significance, they have been very little explored by social scientists. Specifically, he states that
‘[S]uch a contribution by social psychology would have, in my opinion, theoreti- cally and practically, an enormously greater importance than a highly problematical psychology of the nations “in themselves”’ (pp. 341–342).
Purposive-Reflective Versus Impulsive-Instinctive Behaviour
This category does not vastly differ from the previous one except that, in the pres- ent case, the focus is on reflection versus impulse. The capacity of reflection is associated with rationality and, by implication, with the generalized belief that rationality is a ‘superior’ form of thinking and behaviour (see above in section
“Ichheiser on Rationality and Irrationality”). On the other hand, according to that view, acting on the basis of impulse is no more than a non-reflected emotion that is
‘inferior’ to reflected thought. Ichheiser (1968) insists that while the distinction between reflection and impulse is valid, it is wrong to assume that the purposive- reflective behaviour is superior to the impulsive-instinctive action. Indeed, he argues that the opposite is true when we consider that it is the impulsive intuition and not cold rationality that instigates generous actions, spontaneous help like act- ing on the spur of the moment to save someone’s life and even sacrificing one’s own life to save Others. From the point of view of someone who argues that it is rational to act on the basis of self-interest, acting on behalf of the Other would clearly be irrational. In other words, cold rationality induces self-centredness and prudence, and it does not inspire generosity. Ichheiser (1968) does not expect any
‘moral improvement from a triumph of reason’, which is nothing than the ‘ratio- nalistic delusion’ (p. 98). Despite that, he does not elaborate any further on this important issue that has been, both before Ichheiser and after him, a subject of deep
scholarly interest. Giambattista Vico was among those scholars preoccupied with reflection leading to self-centredness.
In his historical approach to the study of ethics, Vico (1744/1948) maintained that original communities lived in the unreflective ‘barbarism of sense’ (§ 1106), by which he meant the primitive simplicity of first people, their piety and their faith. However, over the course of time, people developed the ‘barbarism of reflection’ and ‘premedi- tated malice’. This is a historical stage in which human beings, in and through reflec- tion, started to think only of their private interests rather than about the interests of their communities. Despite superficial socializing with others, the individuals lived in a deep loneliness of spirit and ‘under soft words and embraces, plots against the life and fortune of friends and intimates’ (§ 1106). The barbarism of reflection, we could say, today refers not only to hypocritical behaviours but also to the attempts to ratio- nally justify irrational scientific theories like racism and Nazism.
Vico’s perspective on barbarism of reflection is not that far away from the views of the twentieth-century philosopher Bernard Williams (1985), who, in discussing differences between ethics and science, turns to the question of reflection. Williams shows that the aim of scientific knowledge since the philosophical insights of Socrates has been the acquisition of reflection and rational thought, and this per- spective has also been applied to ethical knowledge. For Socrates, reflective con- sciousness was inescapable because only reflection could advance knowledge, and nothing unreflective could count as knowledge. Reflection also involved commit- ment to morality and only an examined life was worth living (Williams, 1985).
Because self-consciousness and self-reflection examine the Self’s life, as well as that of Others, conscious effort for knowledge and reflection has become an essen- tial pillar in philosophy, science and ethics.
Substantially Rational Versus Substantially Irrational
Ichheiser (1968) derived this category from Mannheim’s (1940) substantially ratio- nal versus substantially irrational acts of thought. The former is concerned with an overall rational understanding of the inner relations within an event in a particular situation. In contrast, a substantially irrational act refers to false perception of a given situation or to impulses and drives. Here again, like in other categories, Ichheiser draws on the differences in the perspective-taking between the Self and Others. Due to these differences, humans tend to disagree with respect to what is an
‘intelligent insight’. Ichheiser (1968) does not develop this point any further in his article on six meanings of irrationality, but there are numerous examples in his work of the differences and contradictions between these two kinds of acts of thought showing the interdependence between them. For him, these contradictions are part of human nature, and very often they reveal themselves as contradictions between conscious (intentional) and unconscious (automatized) interpretations of events.
For example, the individuals’ substantial rationality enables them to well
understand (‘in principle’) that unemployment is due to the social and economic conditions in the country and that individuals have no control over that. However, in blaming people for their misfortune, e.g. for unemployment, they tend to infer per- sonal factors like traits or personal behaviour, rather than they consider situational factors preventing people to find jobs. Thus, while, ‘in principle’, humans know that the person in question should not be blamed, ‘the irrational interpretations’ persist in concrete situations (p. 152). And so, in contradiction to knowing the facts, humans emotionally react to the unemployed as if the person’s unemployment was the result of his personal fault.
Ichheiser (1943) notes that humans gather and select certain ‘facts’ on the basis of their feelings, which are influenced by unnoticed and individual conditions and emotions or by collectively and ideologically derived patterns of misinterpretations or false assumptions.
Means Versus Ends
In this category, too, Ichheiser (1968) bases on Mannheim’s (1940) classification.
It describes rational and irrational functionality and is concerned with the indi- viduals’ capacity to carry out actions that are appropriate to attaining goals, what- ever these goals may be. Irrational actions are those that are inappropriate to attaining these goals. The basic difference between rationality and irrationality refers here to ‘technique’ versus ‘magic’ (p. 99). Here again, Ichheiser points out that while theoretically this distinction is very meaningful, in concrete situations, problems arise. He speaks in particular about problems in international relations and foreign policy. These relations are highly unpredictable and uncertain. Above all, such events are highly ambiguous in nature, and therefore, different individuals perceive and misperceive them, as well as judge and misjudge them in many differ- ent and contradictory ways. Humans are agents and their activities, in particular across nations and cultures, cannot be predicted. But even if one makes a relatively correct prediction of human actions, their implications and side-effects cannot be predicted. Political, ideological and economic factors interfere with human activities and often contradict the intended goals. As a result, while rationality, ‘in principle’, is declared, this principle is, in practice, thwarted. Similar problems may arise in any social relationships, whether international or interpersonal, and thus ambiguity between rationality and irrationality is unlikely to be reduced.
Ichheiser (1941) points out that the rationalistic ideology tends to ignore the deeply rooted nature of different individual and group prejudices and their bearing on individual and social life. Above all, people try to unmask ideologies, mythologies and prejudices of Others and, at the same time, remain blind to their own prejudices and mythologies, as well as of those of their own groups. One’s own group is always the ‘real’ one and ‘naturally’ ordered. ‘The other’ is always subconsciously a distur- bance, a ‘deviation’ of the natural order, sometimes amounting to a positive ‘evil’.
Nations suggest solutions to international conflicts that suit their own or the group’s interests, wishes and expectations. This tendency to consider one’s own
position as the norm and the Other’s position as an evil is deeply rooted in human nature. The eminent anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1942), who wrote about the pre- history of racism, notes:
The formula “I belong to the Elect” has a far longer history than has modern racism. These are fighting words among the simplest naked savages. Among them this formula is an inte- gral part of their whole life-experience, which is, from our point of view incredibly limited.
(pp. 98–99)
She continues by noting that those not belonging to the members’ own group could be chased like animals: ‘They were not people with whom my own tribe had common cause’ (p. 99).
Benedict, of course, is not the only anthropologist who has drawn attention to what has become a common sense assumption in the history of mankind, namely, that my clan, my family or my group is superior to other clans, families or groups.
Ichheiser (1968) notes that such an attitude is difficult to eliminate but one can at least recognize that it exists. The preference for one’s own group is very deeply and unconsciously rooted and, therefore, very difficult to eliminate or even reflect upon.
We are all inclined to consider our own habits, ways of thought and of living, values, institutions and point of view as the norm while those of Others as evil. This pres- ents an enormous obstacle to an understanding between nations. Moreover, we are unwilling to admit to ourselves our bad qualities. Instead, we ‘rationalize’ our thoughts and behaviours. This means that instead of acknowledging our real motives underlying our behaviour, we invent fictitious notions and reasons to justify our behaviour. As individuals, we pretend that we are honest. Not only do we rationalize this attitude as individuals, but nations, too, try to hide their real motives behind their actions when these actions contradict their moral standards.
Again, this does not help solve international conflicts. It is much easier to see through the illusions and prejudices of Others rather than one’s own. Every indi- vidual and nation assumes one’s superiority over the Other. Each nation is com- pletely blind to its own collective illusions and images and prejudices. ‘Unconscious nationalism’ is another term for ethnocentrism (Ichheiser, 1951). It implies, again, seeing things from one’s point of view and disregarding the Other’s perspective and thus making understanding difficult. Nevertheless, Ichheiser concludes that we should stop lamenting and denouncing the ‘irrational factors’ in personality and society. What one calls ‘irrational factors’ forms the very core of humanity. In its roots lie values and sacred meanings accumulated over generations. Therefore, it would be impossible to find a society without irrational beliefs. Irrational beliefs are a feature of human thinking and serve practical purposes.
Rational Aspirations of Modernity
Ichheiser (1968) notes that different societies tend to esteem certain activities, goals, aspirations and values as more or less rational. The present society worships above all ‘material welfare, technological progress and enlightened “self-interest”’
(Ichheiser, 1968, p. 100), while other preferences and values are considered less
rational or even irrational. Ernest Gellner (1992) explicitly notes that, commenting that a rational person methodically augments cognitive and financial capital and turns profits into pleasure, power or status. The life of a rational person is a dynamic progression of achievements and enjoyment, conditioned by accumulation of profits and fulfilment of goals and of an ascribed status. Analysing contributions of Durkheim and Weber, Gellner considers Weber as more a more rationalist scholar.
Durkheim tackled the problem of why all humans are rational, while Weber exam- ined why some humans are more rational than others. It clearly follows from Weber’s perspective of rationality that some values, goals and actions are more rational than others. Rational values of modernity esteem, above all, benefits based on self-interest leading to economic welfare and standards focusing on technologi- cal and scientific progress.
Ichheiser’s set of values is hugely diverse from those based on self-interest and making profits. His perspective corroborates that of other phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger and Patočka, among others. These scholars consider the over- emphasis on the growth of technical advancements and markets and the expansion of bureaucracy to be particularly destructive. It encouraged the emergence of a non- social individual (e.g. Dumont, 1986; Patočka, 1973/1989; Sorokin, 1992). The expanding market forces during the last three centuries gave rise to a new discipline of economics, in which money and commercial values obtained a highly significant meaning and produced a modern form of egoistic individualism (e.g. Bauman, 1989; Dumont, 1986; Minogue, 2010). A nonsocial individual, who has become a feature of modernity, is characterized by greed and an insatiable desire for con- sumption. In other words, the driving forces of modernity, which are guided by beneficial relationships between the Self and Others, have transformed into rela- tions dominated by the Self and the Object of desire and consumption. These devel- opments have created a form of the modern rationalistic moral order.
Ichheiser (1968) rejects this kind of rationalism—or pseudo-rationalism, as he calls it—which has its basic roots in the ideology of commercialism and which con- siders material profit as the supreme and only ‘fully rational’ criterion of the purpose and meaning of human existence. Instead, he emphasizes ‘higher, deeper, subtle, intangible, purely cultural-spiritual values’, without which society cannot progress (p. 100). In the concluding part of his piece on the six meanings of irrationality, Ichheiser refers to the French Renaissance writer Michel de Montaigne, who once wrote, ‘It would mean the end of our civilization if the upcoming class of merchants and businessmen would not only become rich (which might be quite in order) but would also be admired and honoured in our society’. Ichheiser wondered how Montaigne would respond to ‘our new brave world in its age of “reason”’ (p. 100).