The relationship between society and social sciences is complex and multidirectional, and social sciences remain grounded in social worlds in various ways. Two contribu- tions in this volume explore the intrinsic relationship between society and sciences:
in Chap. 2, David Carre (2019) problematizes manifold ways in which society and science interact with each other, while in Chap. 5, Reber and Bullot (2019) explore complexities and pitfalls of the process of making recommendations based on empirical evidence.
Drawing on the notion of guidance (Valsiner, 2012 in Carre, 2019), which sug- gests that scientific activity develops in different, sometimes opposite directions
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while trying to address societal needs, Carre addresses one of the most disputed and divisive issues among scientists, examining of what kind of knowledge social sci- ences (should) give back to societies supporting their work. The classic division between applied and “basic” social research is, as Carre puts it, only a fraction of a broader conversation about the knowledge created by contemporary social sciences.
This question, as he observes, often leads to polarization alongside three opposite pairs: return of investment vs. value in itself, applied vs. basic social research, and citizen vs. academic relevance. Carre notices that different subdisciplines and research areas within social sciences may point towards very different directions regarding their purposes. On the one hand, scientists may wish to address “real- world issues” and create innovative solutions (p. 9). On the other hand, they might become detached from society and create knowledge for the sake of publishing, in order to comply with the “publish or perish” trend in social science. He proposes a common ground among those different approaches and suggests that such positions should be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. He further attempts to bring attention to the existence of manifold ways in which the relationship between society and science unfolds.
One of the ways in which society can influence science, Carre argues, is through administrative organizations that tend to promote certain categories and purposes of research, and frameworks created by national and pan-national programs that fund scientific research. Carre warns that such a trend enforces scholars to adjust their scientific work to the topics, methodologies, and formats of the publishers (p. 5) and consequently increases the risk of diminishing the scientific and intellectual depth and quality of knowledge. On that note, I find it important to address the growing concerns over precarity in academia and the ways in which it affects academic knowledge (Gallas, 2018; Ivancheva, 2015; Pérez & Montoya, 2018).
Neoliberalization and projectification of academia affects scholars already at early stage of their career, facilitates inequalities within academia, and pushes academics towards activism and political involvement (Herschberg, Benschop, & van Brink, 2018; Ivancheva, 2015). At the same time, precarity is normalized through the meri- tocratic imaginary of academia, which, however, does not necessarily reflect the reality (Gallas, 2018). Increasing instability in academic jobs, work overload, and economic dependence on short-term external grants creates hierarchies of knowl- edge production (Pérez & Montoya, 2018) and makes academic knowledge suscep- tible to market pressures (Ivancheva, 2015).
What strikes me in Carre’s contribution is his sober awareness of the institutional and economic realities that greatly affect contemporary sciences. Establishing a common ground between the needs of citizens and standards of academia appears to be a process of constant negotiations over “(ir)relevance” of social sciences research, in which certain voices become the arbiters who determine what is (not) relevant in social sciences. While Carre’s contribution does not directly problematize power relationships, it appears from his discussion of relevance and usability of social sciences that science is not only embedded in social context but also in complex power relations that operate within both sciences and societies. Hence, “society”
and “science” should not be seen as separate and homogenous entities. Rather, each one delineates diverse and mutually contested voices, aims, and points of view.
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Thus, I suggest that the question of “what social science should give to societies”
could be further problematized through explicitly recognizing that scientific knowl- edge does not necessarily serve common societal or scientific purposes and societ- ies are not homogenous potential beneficiaries of science2: behind the common imagination of “a society” loom cultural and social diversity and hierarchies of power. Failing to recognize complexities of a social context, including power rela- tions, may create more harm than good, and there are countless historical examples of how science can serve or justify taking advantage of others, “conquering” others’
lands, or exploiting their resources. “Others” here refers not only to different “soci- eties” but also minorities within one’s society (Abu-Lughod, 1991) and to non- human living beings (Nibert, 2003; Noske, 1993). The most vivid cases of historical wrongdoings of science come from colonialism (Lewis, 1973) or Nazism (Beyerchen, 1992), or from the academics’ involvement in secret services (Boas, 2005; Fluehr-Lobban, 2008), but it would be naïve to believe that science today is free from the impact of political and economic powers or to assume that it necessar- ily serves a “common” good.
Regardless of the scientists’ own intentions, views, and awareness, scientists are politically positioned through their institutional affiliations and funding schemes (as Carre also suggests), because the boundaries between scholarship and engagement, or between research and politics, are continuously blurred (Eriksen, 2009: 28). Not only are the side effects of research hard to predict, but implicit optimism about and purposeful aiming at positive impact of research may even strengthen the inability to predict and deal with negative impact of research, leading to what Gemma Derrick and others (Derrick, Faria, Benneworth, Budtz-Petersen, & Sivertsen, 2018) call “grimpact.” The authors suggest that if scientists were held accountable for the impact of their research, this could help prevent “grimpact.” However, they do not explain how such accountability could work without further politicization of sci- ence. Moreover, what first appears as a positive impact might turn out to have nega- tive consequences over time.3 As an example, Derrick and others refer to the rather controversial research that falsely suggested a causal relationship between vaccina- tions and autism. Although the research was later discredited for lacking clear evi- dence and data falsification, and the publisher retracted the article, the author himself declined to replicate his research or to acknowledge its flaws and keeps on influencing anti-vaccination movements (Derrick et al., 2018). It is unclear whether the researcher intentionally allowed his a priori beliefs to shape his research results or he developed his beliefs after conducting the research. But even innovations with genuinely and purely scientific intentions can have unintended consequences, such as pesticides increasing food production but severely harming bees. As I further suggest in line with other contributions to this volume, such unintended conse- quences could be more often prevented if scientists become open towards holistic
2 Such idea of “social wholes” has been overdetermined in social science, and there is a risk that rhetorical wholes will be taken for social entities, which they are not (Thornton, 1988).
3 For example, some medicines are withdrawn from the market because they caused risk to patients.
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perspective (Watzl, 2019) and acknowledge different points of view and values that guide their research (Reber & Bullot, 2019).
The main insight from anthropology may be an invitation to modify or at least precede the question “what knowledge science should produce or give back,” with
“which harm science should avoid producing or giving back.” Because of its colo- nial past, a lot of attention in contemporary anthropology is devoted to discussing the negative effects of research. Anthropologists should avoid creating suffering and harm (Fluehr-Lobban, 2013), which means that researchers should be aware of potential impact research findings might have, if applied.4 Advocacy, whenever it is discussed, is, at a minimum, “an ethical position to try to protect and better the lives of the individuals we work with” (Mullings, Heller, Liebow, & Goodman, 2013).
Finding a balance between creating no harm and ethical behavior requires deep knowledge about the socio-political context in which the research takes place and recognizing what ethical and harmful behaviors should be (Abu-Lughod, 2002).
What I refer to here is neither moral relativism nor its opposite, normative determin- ism or absolutism. My aim is to emphasize that ethical standards and values can be subject to disagreement or debate within science in different sociocultural contexts and among various fields, which may be confusing especially when the researcher lacks experience.5
One of the ways in which anthropologists address these difficulties is through researchers’ immersion in their fields, which can ideally transform research into participatory, embodied experiences through which researchers can embrace differ- ent ontologies as ethnographers before they further distance themselves from their starting points as writers (Hastrup, 1995; Okely, 2012).
However, immersion in the field (e.g., Okely & Callaway, 1992) or collabora- tion (Rappaport, 2008) may facilitate understanding of a sociocultural context to the extent in which advocacy becomes inseparable from research (Mullings et al., 2013). What turns out as problematic is whether and to what extent ethnographers can “represent” the problems and issues of the people they worked with (Abu- Lughod, 1991; Fabian, 1990; Marcus & Fischer, 1986) and to what extent they should embrace their values. Such questions are often addressed within universal- ism vs. relativism debate, and anthropologists take different stands (similar to other scientists, as David Carre observed) that range from advocacy for universal human rights (e.g., Fluehr-Lobban, 1995) and values to, although much less fre- quently, cultural relativism (see Brown, 2008). The practice of reflexivity helps rec- ognizing own intellectual and moral inclinations, feelings, assumptions and actions, and provides the reader with information necessary to assesing our work (Salzman, 2002).
4 Some anthropologists decide to postpone publications (e.g. Verdery, 2012).
5 The Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences, Law, and the Humanities published by the National Committees for Research Ethics in Norway advises reaching out to a broader research community which shall help to clarify which ethical standards apply and what is or is not ethical (NESH, 2006, p. 6). Assessing potential harm, however, is more complex, because it is based on prediction and requires, again, a deep knowledge of the socio-political context.
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