evidence we can muster in support of the possible explanations. But what do we do, when we have an infinite number of plausible conjectures? An extreme claim is that
“for any set of facts, there is an infinite number of explanations which are consistent with those facts” (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 40). How do we, then, choose from these?
Luckily, there is also an infinite number of explanations that does not fit, so we can exclude a whole lot of possibilities (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 41). We must choose the best one, and this we usually do by finding out which ones fit the best with facts – which one has the best neatness of fit (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 41). We might “adopt the simplest explanation which maps on to the most facts most neatly”, but then we are left with a debate about which one that is (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 41). In the end, we have some explanation that we consider the best, but it is nothing more than our theory, unproven. It is our best guess and a most plausible conjecture. The prob- lem of underdetermination is very real when dealing with conscious reasons and evidence, but Occam’s razor is one useful way of arriving at a limited set of plau- sible explanations (Næss, 1966, p. 177–8).
While social scientists are surely interested in explaining human behaviour, some would object to the idea that all can be explained through individual human action. While it might be hypothetically possible to explain all social phenomena through an analysis of individuals, it is practically impossible and thus insufficient.
This is due to our lack of complete knowledge of the causal chains that takes us from individuals to complex social phenomenon, and such things as emergence. I return to the limits of methodological individualism and the limits of relying on conscious reasons as causes towards the end of this chapter.
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explaining social phenomenon through an understanding of catalytic processes.
With regard to causes, he seems inclined to share Russell’s opinion that the word cause “is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its com- plete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable” (Russell, 1912, p. 1).
Valsiner draws our attention to the history of philosophy of chemistry. There the idea of catalysis is said to have displaced the discourse of causality, and he proposes a similar move in the social sciences (Cabell & Valsiner, 2011; Valsiner, 2014, 2019). We are given various reasons for making the suggested move, and I’ll attempt a brief summary before dealing with the notion of catalysis.
The first is that human beings are intentional. In this respect, Malnes and Valsiner share a focus on people’s conscious ideas and purposive action. This means that the social sciences are different from the physical sciences, but not so different that we cannot learn from chemistry. He uses the example that atoms jumping from one orbit to another is different from a human being jumping from an airplane with a piece of fabric to ease his fall. Explaining the latter involves understanding a per- son’s goal orientations, intentions, and future expectations (Valsiner, 2019). An atom, presumably, has no such cognitive processes for us to consider.
Malnes and Valsiner share the need to explain the subjective processes that give rise to various phenomena. Valsiner points to the role of subjective causal chains that lead from I want, I will, I do. In order to understand how a desire leads to action, we must understand the catalytic conditions that make the action both possible and meaningful. This, then is where we find the main difference in focus between the first two contributions: while Malnes is mostly focused on the reasons for our actions, Valsiner is intent on finding a way of describing the conditions in which reasons give way to various forms of action.
This is where we get to social normativity. Social norms and pressures affect our actions, and he relates Brinkman’s example of a person rushing to the aid of a woman who dropped her bag of groceries (Brinkmann, 2016). The reason a person might help is not, for example, that that bag itself dropped, but the various norms relating to reciprocity, helping people in need etc.
This would be akin to Malnes’ attempt to explain why a nail is in the wood by saying it was caused by it being hit with a hammer. While technically sufficient, it is very far from satisfactory, because it immediately becomes clear that there are further causes preceding the strike of the hammer. Who did this? Why?
Thomas Hobbes was once involved in a dispute involving an air pump and the concept of vacuum (Shapin & Schaffer, 1989). Of greater importance was Thomas Hobbes’ insistence that philosophy had to have a causal agenda, in opposition to the experimental science performed by his opponent in this dispute, Robert Boyle of the Royal Society. One problem of causality is that it opens the door to the never-ending race for the ultimate causes. The hammer struck the nail, but why? Because a person picked it up and swung it. Why did the person do this? Perhaps he was paid to do so.
Why was he paid to do so? And so it goes, on and on. Hobbes stated that the search for deeper causes stopped once he got to an “external cause”, but this criterion seems not to cut it. Where do we stop? And this is part of the problem with the social sciences. Where do we stop when we attempt to trace the causal chains back to the
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ultimate causes? Recent developments in many social sciences involve a move very far back in the chain, assisted by neuroscience, and I return to this issue in the final section of the chapter.
Valsiner could be seen as having a dual agenda in his chapter: one positive agenda of explaining the ontology of the social world as the basis for including catalysis in our explanation of social phenomenon and one negative, where he criticizes science based on the concept of causality. I argue that the first undertaking is both important and successful, while the success of the criticism is less certain.
Problems Inherent in the Casual Approach
The problem with the causal approach is portrayed as (a) leading to a focus on simple causal connections, (b) problematic due to the impossibility of random sam- pling, and (c) suffering from an illusion of power leading to a misattribution of causality.
The first problem is the focus on simple causal connections and thus overlooking the systemic organization of social phenomena. This is a problem because all such phenomena have an “open-systemic nature” (Valsiner, 2019). Every phenomenon
“from biology upwards” shares this trait, which makes the search for simple causal connections insufficient (Valsiner, 2019). Here one might object that even in open systems one can search for causal mechanisms, even if we are unable to discover their exact nature. Critical realism shares Valsiner’s focus on open systems but still claims that experimentational and the search for constant conjunctions and the likes are of interest. However, these “[c]onstant conjunctions are produced not found”
(Bhaskar, 1998, p. xii–xiii). Brady points towards mechanisms and the possibility of considering multiple causes in a traditional framework (Brady, 2009, p. 1083).
Valsiner dismisses such attempts, as he claims that any endeavour that does not consider agency, and resistance, is doomed to fail.
Secondly, researchers in the traditional sciences are portrayed as beggars of data – unable to find what they desire in forms of random samples. They struggle to find these random samples, so that they can perform statistical generalizations and work their magic, but Valsiner claims that what they search for is impossible (Valsiner, 2019). This problem of causal science seems exaggerated. While there are certainly many examples of researchers doing bad science like Valsiner describes, it is possible to imagine research where this is not an issue. One possibility, in this age of big data, is to include everyone we are interested in in the “sample”, and another possibility is to do sampling in a more serious manner than the one portrayed by Valsiner. At least in certain limited populations, it seems possible to do proper sam- pling from complete population lists. While it may be a problem in practice, it is not a universal or necessary problem with causality as such.
The final objection is the illusion of power and misattribution of causality. Here, again, the problem is one that may constitute a problem for researchers involved in explanations based on statistical methods. If, for example, gender or socio- economic
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status is examined as the independent variable, Valsiner’s suggestion that scientists treat them as something that can actually be changed and experimented with is, again, more a criticism of bad practice than this form of science in principle.
Another objection that I will not cover in detail here is that Valsiner considers all social phenomena non-linear, while causality is portrayed as necessarily linear. If this is correct, the causal approach is obviously ill-suited for explaining social phenomena. It is, however, possible to suggest that many human inventions, also in the hard sciences such as mathematics, give good causal explanations of non-linear functions, fractals etc.
A Notion of Catalysis Compatible with Causality and Mechanism
The catalytic approach is concerned with the “recurrent reproduction of the system that produces outcomes”, and outcomes are considered “by-products of the processes of such reproduction” (Valsiner, 2019). While Valsiner proposes that we discard causality as we know it and replace it with catalysis, it seems that a slightly less ambitious agenda might be compatible with his position.
I posit that causality is not the culprit that leads people to lose sight of the com- plexity of social phenomena. It is possible to maintain the notion of causal processes and simultaneously focus on the catalytic forces that accelerate such processes. In such an approach, we focus on the systems in which people live, and the various processes that make some actions possible and meaningful – the things that facili- tate and accelerate action. Causality as such need not be discarded, because we will always require a description of the mechanisms that made an action ripe for accel- eration – mechanisms that create what we could label potentialities. I want to point out that once again, like with the open systemic nature of social phenomena, Valsiner seems to be aligned with much of critical realism and the search for “aspects of real- ity that underpin, generate or facilitate the actual phenomena that we may (or may not) experience” (Bhaskar & Lawson, 1998).
At any point in time, I have the capacity for innumerable actions that are explain- able by reasons and possible, but only some are activated. Understanding why this occurs is of great importance in social science, and as such Valsiner’s contribution is important.
The example of paintings and music is discussed, and these are very apt illustra- tions. Music does not cause me to work faster, but I may attribute the speed of my work to the music I hear. As such, our attributions of causal factors are of little inter- est, if we assume that we are very often mistaken, and unable to identify the true causes. My ability to work, and my desire to do so, may be driven by both uncon- scious and conscious processes, but they may easily be accelerated by the catalytic force of music. A painting itself does not cause certain cognitive processes, but it can function as a catalytic force that accelerates certain processes and inhibit others.
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What, then, is the actual causal chain? We rationalize, make explanations that make us appear responsive to reasons, and make explanations that we can under- stand. Such accounts, as I return to later, should never be the end of our search for causes, as they are often the consequence of a lack of understanding of the reasons we behave as we do, along with an incessant desire to feel that what we do actually has meaning, and is reasonable. Any of the myriad of possible reasons we may construct seems better to us than nothing. Any explanation that takes the subjective perception of causation to be the complete, and correct, account of the causes involved seems to be vulnerable to overlooking true underlying causes.
In sum, I applaud Valsiner’s grand vision, but I ask if it may be possible to intro- duce some of the useful concepts of catalysis to social science without abandoning the notion of causality and cause. Firstly, catalysis does not necessarily require the complete abandonment of the notion of causality. Secondly, causality may also have a role in open system, as seen in, for example, critical realism. Finally, while the criticism of traditional social science is important, it reads more as a criticism of science done badly than of the particular form for science in itself. As such, Valsiner’s objections to causal social science may just as well lead to causal social science being done in ways that circumvent these objections as to the its demise.