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These arguments reminisce feminist scholars and philosophers of science who identify the sciences as both a source and a locus of gender inequalities, and bring attention to the relationships among science, gender, race, class, sexuality, dis- ability, and colonialism as constructed within and applied by science (Crasnow, Wylie, Bauchspies, & Potter, 2018). Consequently, they question the conventional understanding of science as objective and free of non-epistemic values and opt for conducting research as reflexive and inclusive, preferably interdisciplinary and case-study based (Richardson, 2010). Science has also received criticism for its culturally “western” bias, as being “produced in western nations, by western authors, for western audiences” (Young, 2014: 29 also Abu-Lughod, 2002;
Streeby, 2018). Such bias may result in ill- conceived policy practices, as it has been in case of, for instance, initiatives undertaken to empower women in India, where research applied to study women was based on gender categories and theo- retical understandings of power relations produced in the West (Jakimow &
Kilby, 2006).
Returning to Reber and Bullot, I think that implementing conditional objectivism in both social and natural sciences would greatly benefit them by facilitating trans- parency and limiting abuses of power in sciences. Conditional statements would require the researchers to include the diverse voices that exist within societies and necessitate that they reflect on their own presumptions and beliefs. Nevertheless, such practice might not be welcomed by those beneficiaries of science who aim at achieving concrete results or at implementing certain political agendas and legiti- mizing them through science. Moreover, it is not clear how to implement condi- tional objectivism in interdisciplinary contexts, when different disciplines may aim at achieving mutually contested and at times exclusive goals, or if their practitioners are unwilling to compromise with each other or engage in conditional objectivism on their own. My studies in environmental protection were interdisciplinary, and I experienced that scholars from different disciplines were not eager to reformulate their way of reasoning towards different goals. For example, experts in animal pro- duction who aim at increasing production of meat while minimizing costs were oblivious to the need to address the negative impact meat production has on envi- ronment. Another issue worth addressing here is that scientists do not only work academia, and although they do not necessarily represent “science” (if understood narrowly within the bounds of academic institutions), they are trained to practice
“science,” however with different agendas. For example, whereas environmental scientists work towards finding solutions to the climate crisis or to the growing plastic pollution, the focus of scientists employed at food industry is to increase production, and environmental concerns remain often marginal.
The ways in which sciences are organized into humanities and natural sciences and then further into separate disciplines reflect ontological drives behind the Cartesian divide that imputes an opposition between nature and culture (Haila, 2000), and the very need to systematize and categorize. Social sciences have already received criticism for being profoundly anthropocentric (Nibert, 2003;
Noske, 1993) and narrowly defined to study human society as if it were separated and independent from or dominant over other species, ecosystem, and environment.
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Most attempts at including particular animals or species into scientific inquiry within social sciences tend to be reductionist and consider animals as passive sub- jects of study (Noske, 1993). Such speciesism has been compared to racism and sexism (Nibert, 2003) because it establishes hierarchies between different species, positioning humans on the top. Establishing hierarchies between different species (or “races”) can justify practices which otherwise would be condemned as unethi- cal. For example, positioning animals as not having consciousness and as being less sophisticated than humans justifies practices such as testing drugs and cosmetics on animals or killing animals for recreation, meat, and fur. The ontological claims, based on which such practices are endorsed in Western sociocultural contexts, are strikingly different, for example, from “deep ecology”, Indigenous science (Streeby, 2018) or the view of animals in Rajasthan in India.8 But non-reductionist studies of animals and of animal-human relations remain at the peripheries of social sci- ences. John Law and Marianne Elizabeth Linen maintain that certain practices, including science, create categories and divisive textures that make certain things or beings as passive or active, with or without agency (Law & Lien, 2012).9 As they argue, it is time to give attention to the textures on the margins and to ontologies as enacted in practice.
Attempts at including animals, plants, and other species into societies may bring up a redefinition of the notion of society itself, and may reposition the question over the proper contribution of scientific knowledge to society. If scientists redefine soci- eties beyond speciesism, should they also consider the potential risks and benefits that their research may create on all species, or even the whole ecosystems? If we agree that science should equally contribute to all parts of the non-anthropocentric, planetary society, what would happen to scientific endeavors and practices that lead to exploitation of non-human others and of natural resources?
These are pressing questions, which yet lack straightforward, satisfactory answers. However, one should highlight the different ontological claims and prac- tices inscribed into the ways we conceptualize society and science, as well as the inequalities, hierarchies of power, and competing interests that often stand behind science or lay at the very core of scientific research. Parallel to focusing on the mutual relationships between science and society, I would suggest conducting a more specific inquiry about potential beneficiaries of academic knowledge and, consequently, power hierarchies involved in its production. Consequently, assessing potential (gr)impact of research, one should reflect far beyond the boundaries of one’s own discipline (as suggested by Strand, 2019) and consider one’s own posi- tionality, the broader contexts in which science and particular institutions are embedded, and hierarchies of power that exist within science and society, which may stand behind or show interest in particular research outcomes. One should also remain ethical, after a careful consideration of what “ethical” really means.
8 In Rajasthan, not killing any animals is among the main sociocultural principles.
9 In their research on salmon farming, Law and Lien explore how salmon is made through different practices oriented towards producing a healthy salmon, juxtaposed to a “nearly salmon” which is otherized and killed in consequence of different modalities of practice.
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