What do we mean when we use the term explanation? One may, for example, explain what a stone is by stating that it is a hard substance composed of some sort of mineral. This would be what Malnes calls a constitutive explanation. This is akin to common definitions, which lets us put into words the defining characteristics that separate one phenomenon from another. These explanations are useful, but the ones
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we are really interested in here are the ones that attempt to shed light on why something is, or happens. According to Thomas Hobbes everything is motion, so separating being from action is perhaps harder than it may at first appear (Hobbes, 1946).
Nevertheless, Malnes is interested in explaining human action, which takes us right to the social sciences and our current topic of explanation. Etiological explana- tions are the main subject of Malnes’ chapter. While the search for causes might be part of an etiological explanation, Malnes prefers the term “giving a reason for” as the general description. However, a reason might mean a cause, as it is commonly defined as a “cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event” (Reason, 2018). Since reason can mean cause or explanation, and thus lead to a circular prob- lem when understood as something that explains, we might be better off with the concept of giving cause for. Reason might of course also refer to human beings’
capacity for reasoning and rationality, which we will return to later.
One form of etiological explanation is the one of Zickfeld and Schubert (2019) – the statistical explanation. Here, action is explained by correlations and regularity.
This neo-Humean form of explanation aims at uncovering reasons for what we attempt to explain by examining similar events from the past in order to see which phenomena occur together, so that we may deduce causal relationships. We search for constant conjunctions of causes and effects (Brady, 2009, p. 1).
This form of explanation can provide us with accounts of correlations and sym- metric connections. It cannot, however, easily explain the asymmetric connection, unless we examine how some connections where one variable necessarily come before another in time, and use temporal precedence in order to determine which factor is the cause and which is the effect (Brady, 2009, p. 1067–8).
This method lets us discern a causal connection, but Malnes says we need more.
In addition to stating that some phenomenon is causally connected to the action we intend to explain, we need to articulate the causal connection. Here he refers to Elster (2015), who demands articulation of causal mechanisms and informative value from what are to be labelled explanations proper. Elster deviates from Malnes’ use of the term explanation and states that explanation is necessarily causal (Elster, 2015, p. 1). This means that what Elster discusses is only a subset of the etiological explanations Malnes provides. Concerning the question of what an explanation is, we will shortly see that Valsiner would probably not agree with Elster on the necessity of causality in explanations.
Rational Choice and Methodological Individualism
If I were to explain why people save more when interest rates increase, how would I do that? Malnes suggests responsiveness to reason as a good way to start. Here we delve into the water of rational choice, and we assume that people act the way they do, because they had some conscious thoughts that lead them to do so. People are purposive, and consciously so, Malnes suggests.
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But how are we to arrive at these reasons? I do not have access to other peo- ple’s minds, but I do have access to my own. Introspection, and the assumption that we are reasonably similar, lets me uncover what reasons. I would have for acting in a certain way, and then hypothesize that these reasons are what causes other people to act.
A plausible reason why a particular person saves more with higher interest rates would be that it is now a more attractive way of maximizing one’s profit. We could of course also speak of utility and make profit a part of a person’s utility. If interest rates increase, it becomes more attractive than other ways of spending money, so I move some of my expenditure towards saving. When a large proportion of people do this, we get a net effect that let us state that increased interest rates cause people to save more. This is an explanation based on methodological individualism.
Malnes, along with Elster, seems to be an adherent to this philosophy of explaining social phenomenon through the actions of the individuals involved.
Human action is the source of causation, and we explain human action by assum- ing that humans are responsive to reasons and then give our plausible conjectures regarding what these reasons are.
Criteria for Evaluating Explanations
A goal for Malnes is to provide criteria for evaluating explanations. If I were to propose two single-factor explanations for why people save more with higher inter- est rates – (a) people are profit maximizers that respond to such incentives and (b) a higher interest rate is taken as a sign of economic uncertainty, leading people to put their money in safer positions – how do we evaluate these explanations?
The first criterion is that the explanation must be supported by the facts, and the other that it must facilitate proper understanding of the action explained. Both explanations seem to facilitate understanding, and if we ask people, we might find support for both explanations.
But what about causes that aren’t reasons in the way discussed by Malnes? If I am to explain why I am writing this chapter, I might venture an explanation based on the composition of the neurons in my brain, my personal history and experi- ences, and some chance encounter that led me to be in this position. I might myself believe that the reason is an instrumental consideration of career development com- bined with a genuine interest in explanations, but could factors below the conscious level be important causes for explaining why I am in this position, doing what I do?
The unconscious is certainly a problem for rational choice, if the theory is supposed to fit with the facts and be a realistic, and not merely instrumentally useful, way of explaining behaviour. Elster occupies himself with the unconscious and clearly states that he is not convinced that rational choice alone takes us where we need to be (Elster, 2015, p. 188).
Malnes is concerned with separating storytelling from plausible conjectures.
Finding plausible conjectures involves introspection, combined with what empirical
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evidence we can muster in support of the possible explanations. But what do we do, when we have an infinite number of plausible conjectures? An extreme claim is that
“for any set of facts, there is an infinite number of explanations which are consistent with those facts” (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 40). How do we, then, choose from these?
Luckily, there is also an infinite number of explanations that does not fit, so we can exclude a whole lot of possibilities (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 41). We must choose the best one, and this we usually do by finding out which ones fit the best with facts – which one has the best neatness of fit (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 41). We might “adopt the simplest explanation which maps on to the most facts most neatly”, but then we are left with a debate about which one that is (Rugg & Petre, 2006, p. 41). In the end, we have some explanation that we consider the best, but it is nothing more than our theory, unproven. It is our best guess and a most plausible conjecture. The prob- lem of underdetermination is very real when dealing with conscious reasons and evidence, but Occam’s razor is one useful way of arriving at a limited set of plau- sible explanations (Næss, 1966, p. 177–8).
While social scientists are surely interested in explaining human behaviour, some would object to the idea that all can be explained through individual human action. While it might be hypothetically possible to explain all social phenomena through an analysis of individuals, it is practically impossible and thus insufficient.
This is due to our lack of complete knowledge of the causal chains that takes us from individuals to complex social phenomenon, and such things as emergence. I return to the limits of methodological individualism and the limits of relying on conscious reasons as causes towards the end of this chapter.