Ensuring That the Alliance Is Not Cast Adrift Toshihiro Nakayama
4. Can the Disjunction between Esoteric Canons and Open Knowledge Be Surmounted in Japan? xvi
Finally, Japan itself must naturally be discussed. Japan-US relations have been shaky since the inauguration of the administration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in September 2009. The cross-purposes between Japan and the United States surrounding the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was an indication of this turmoil. But nailing down the contours of the
significance of this turmoil is extremely important in terms of thinking about future Japan-US relations. The majority of this problem can certainly be blamed on the confused response of the Hatoyama Administration (or rather on Prime Minister Hatoyama himself). There is no doubt that the mixed messages sent out by Prime Minister Hatoyama conveyed the wrong message to both Japan and the United States, and especially to Okinawa. But was this “drift in the alliance” really nothing more than “Hatoyama adrift”? While Prime Minister Hatoyama’s confused response was deliberately highlighted, the fact is that a certain coherence could be glimpsed behind it all. This is that, while casting the Japan-US alliance as the cornerstone, he apparently regarded this as a hurdle that Japan had to surmount. At the meeting of DPJ members of the two Houses of the Diet on June 2, 2010, which served as his de facto resignation address, Prime Minister Hatoyama clearly stated,
“At some point we must strive for the day when the Japanese people forge peace on their own, as I do not think that we should continue to rely on the United States.”
The concept of “Japan’s unhealthy overdependence on the United States” was also apparent within his Voice essay (from the September 2009 edition) which was published before the inauguration of his administration.xvii A summary version of this essay was uploaded to the New York Times’ web edition, and it is famous for provoking anxiety in the United States over whether Yukio Hatoyama was an anti-American politician. In the end, was Prime Minister Hatoyama an anti-American politician? Did the drift in Japan-US relations that occurred under his administration originate solely from Prime Minister Hatoyama’s singular thinking toward the United States? Or rather, was Prime Minister Hatoyama’s view of the United States the latest manifestation of the instability inherent to postwar Japan-US relations?
There is a public opinion poll that is frequently referenced any time that views are exchanged on Japan-US relations. This is a public opinion poll that has been carried out by the Cabinet Office since 1978 which has asked a fixed question on respondents’ affinity toward the United States.xviii This has at times slumped down to the 60% range as an exception, but it holds largely consistent in the 70% range. Looking at this, there is certainly no mistake to the view that Japan-US relations are considerably favorable and stable. However, these figures fail to capture a subtle nuance that is concealed within Japan-US relations. To be sure, there is little in the way of politically determined anti-American sentiment in Japan. Nationwide anti-base struggles rooted in anti-American sentiment are likewise absent. However, this public opinion poll overlooks the “anti-Americanism Lite” (or anti-American mood) that is surprisingly widespread.
In postwar Japan there have been severely strained ties between an idealistic pacifism and the
government’s realistic choice in the form of the Japan-US security alliance. Postwar Japan sealed off the Japan-US security alliance as an esoteric canon without having adequately verbalized the logic underwriting it. On the other hand, there is the fiction that claims that it was an aspiration for peace alone that sustained postwar Japan’s peaceful reconstruction. There was an inherent contortion in the uneasy coexistence of these two schools, which found its expression in
“anti-Americanism Lite.” In other words, when this latter notion, which has been elevated to the status of a civil gospel in postwar Japan, and the realities of the esoteric canons of the Japan-US security alliance came into conflict with one another, it manifested itself as a simplistic yet real sense of discomfort. It was enough to make one blurt out, “Why does the sovereign nation of Japan have bases of foreign troops? It must be because Japan still has not yet freed itself from its occupation.” Nevertheless, it could be concluded that these esoteric canons have the potential to intrinsically repudiate the view of peace found in this civil gospel, which is akin to a pre-established harmony.
The protagonist in this popular gospel of peace driven by this aspiration is not the “state,” but rather it must be the “people.” There is little wonder then that Prime Minister Hatoyama kicked off a debate about the Japan-US security alliance from the grief of the residents of Okinawa Prefecture.
Ordinarily, it is rare for this “anti-Americanism Lite” to manifest itself as political sentiment, and so it tends not to reach those who manage the alliance. Yet it is also true that such sentiments lie in the undercurrent beneath postwar Japan-US relations, and it was this that Prime Minister Hatoyama unleashed unknowingly (or irresponsibly), so to speak. But when faced with the overwhelming reality of the Japan-US alliance, this notion once again crawled back inside its cocoon.
When considered in this light, Prime Minister Hatoyama symbolized the inherent contortion in postwar Japan that has not verbalized. This “anti-Americanism Lite” will by no means simply vanish along with Prime Minister Hatoyama’s resignation. Since the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has fairly consistently been the ruling party since the end of the war, they have sealed off debate concerning security as esoteric canons. Leaving aside whether this was the correct thing to do or not, this potential state of affairs has persisted for a long time. But assuming that changes of political administrations will become part of the everyday landscape in Japan in the future, it will be necessary to overcome this disjunction between esoteric canons and open knowledge. It will also be essential to actualize the Japan-US security alliance through the term security, and to forge a “security consensus” that does not waver with the change of political administrations. Of course, this security consensus must not be something that precludes policy modifications and revisions
due to the change of political administrations. Moreover, it is not realistic to consign the concrete management of security policy to sophisticated, expert knowledge, while also conducting national debates over its every last detail. Therefore, it will be essential to create some sort of intellectually elite circle. If the term “elite” is inappropriate, then perhaps this should be replaced with the phrase
“foreign affairs and security establishment.” But this elite circle must be open and must not consist of wardens who guard over esoteric canons like those seen thus far. They must also discuss this consensus in a language that the general public can understand. This establishment should comprise security-conscious politicians and experts across political party lines. Unless such a “security culture” is established, the sustainability of the alliance could be jeopardized. When viewed in this light, the greatest challenges to the alliance are actually internal factors, more so than the rise of China and the United States’ changing self-consciousness. It will become apparent that the greatest question for Japan is how it should go about facing up to this alliance.
i The Tokyo Foundation and the Center for a New American Security, Renewing Old Promises and Exploring New Frontiers: The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Liberal International Order (October 27, 2010).
ii Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, INSS Special Report: The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership (October 11, 2010), pp. 3-4.
iii George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (New York: Doubleday, 2009), pp. 139-144.
iv Gerald Curtis, Future Directions in US-Japan Relations, Background Paper Prepared for New Shimoda Conference organized by Japan Center for International Exchange, February 2011.
<http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/newshimoda/CurtisFinalE.pdf>. February 20, 2011.
v Fareed Zakaria, Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).
vi Hillary Clinton, Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2009.
< http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm>. February 14, 2011.
vii See The Tokyo Foundation, Asia-Pacific Security Architecture: Tiered Structure of Regional Security (August 2010) with regard to the multi-tiered development of security frameworks.
viii Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
ix The White House, National Security Strategy, (May 2010).
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.
February15, 2011.
x Michael Mandelbaum, “In an Era of Tightening Budgets, can America Remain a Superpower on the Cheap?,” The Washington Post, (February, 17, 2011).
xi See Walter Russell Mead, “The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Means for Globalism,” Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2011) with regard to the diplomatic implications of the rise of the Tea Party movement.
xii Paul Starobin, After America: Narratives for Next Global Age (New York: Viking, 2009).
xiii Conversely, 67% of the people still view the United States as superior militarily, which vastly outstrips the 16% who view China as superior in this regard. Pew Research Center, Strengthen Ties with China, but Get Tough on Trade, (January 21, 2011). < http://people-press.org/report/692/>.
February 15, 2011.
xiv Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views – 2010 Constrained Internationalism:
Adapting to New Realities, 2010.
<http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202010/Global
%20Views%202010.pdf>. February 15, 2011.
xv Toshihiro Nakayama, “US-China relations in the ‘post-American world,” [In Japanese.] Dong-a Ilbo No. 525 (March 2011), pages 2-3.
xvi This passage is a revision and reworking of Postwar Japan and ‘Anti-Americanism Lite,’ which was uploaded to the homepage of the English-Speaking Union of Japan
<http://www.esuj.gr.jp/jitow/eng/contents/0296.htm >. February 20, 2011.
xvii Yukio Hatoyama, “My Political Philosophy,” Voice (September 2009).
xviii Public Relations Office, Minister for the Cabinet Office, Public opinion poll on foreign affairs.
[In Japanese.] (Poll from October 2009) <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h21/h21-gaiko/index.html
>. February 20, 2011.