Japan and the Environment Yasuko Kameyama
2. Japan’s Reponses to the Climate Change Issue
Kyoto Convention and by 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol took effect, it became known that combined emissions by countries for which emissions reduction targets have been set under the Kyoto Protocol account for only about 30% of total global emissions.
Since the Kyoto Protocol sets emissions reduction targets only until 2012, negotiations have been under way since 2007 on international efforts to reduce emissions from 2013 onward.
However, prospects are not so good for these negotiations to be concluded within the next several years.
(2) Japan’s Stance in Climate Change Negotiations
Japan’s position in climate change negotiations is complex. From the viewpoint of the magnitude of efforts put into energy-saving, Japan is close to the European level. Thus, Japan is in a position to argue strongly that the United States and Canada have much room to reduce emissions in the sense of wasteful use of energy. In multilateral negotiations, however, from the perspective of foreign policy, Japan becomes strongly aware of its position as a close ally of the United States.
This means that Japan is not in a position to simply criticize and pressure the United States easily.
The United States is the second largest CO2 emitter in the world, and any international convention in which the United States does not participate would be meaningless. However, given the American people’s strong reaction to constraints on energy consumption, it is necessary to considerably ease the terms of the agreement in order to draw the United States into it. It is difficult to gain the understanding of other countries for the Japanese stance of calling for relaxed terms of the agreement citing the importance of participation by the United States while at the same time refraining from criticizing the United States. Simple logic has it that if Japan recognizes climate change as an important issue, Japan should criticize the United States which among developed countries has the most desired potential in terms of energy saving. Japan’s stance of seeking to dilute the terms of the agreement by emphasizing the importance of the US participation is open to misunderstanding in that Japan is trying to “escape necessary measures under the shadow of the United States.”
In Japan, with the business community’s opposition to the Kyoto Protocol rising, objections to the Kyoto Protocol persist in discussions on an international framework in 2013 and onward.
However, we have yet to thoroughly examine and discuss which part of the Kyoto Protocol presents real problems to Japan and what revisions to the Kyoto Protocol would resolve those problems and are also likely to obtain international consensus. For example, which is the real
problem with the Kyoto Protocol—the emissions reduction target level of 6%, the non-participation of the United States and China, or the approach itself of setting the emissions caps and introducing the emissions trading system? The future framework truly desirable for Japan depends on which part of the Kyoto Protocol Japan will seek to change.
In Japan, in 2007 then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his “Cool Earth 50” initiative proposed to halve total global CO2 emissions by 2050. At the Davos Forum in January 2008, then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda representing the Japanese government officially accepted the approach of setting emissions caps and in June 2008 came up with the Fukuda Vision that included Japan’s emissions reduction target of 60-80% by 2050. The initiatives of Prime Ministers Abe and Fukuda were also designed as preparations to host the summit meeting of the Group of Eight major economies to be held in Toyako, Hokkaido, in July 2008, but Prime Minister Fukuda resigned immediately after the G8 summit. His successor, Prime Minister Taro Aso, set up a committee to consider a medium-term emissions reduction target in October 2008, and after the committee’s discussions on Japan’s 2020 reduction target, the government decided in June 2009 to cut Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions by 15% from 2005 levels by 2020 (8% reduction from 1990 levels). This target did not assume the purchase of emissions credits from other countries. However, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the reins of government in a general election immediately after that decision, and newly elected Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in September 2009 announced the new target of reducing emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2020. The new target includes the purchase of emissions credits and other offsetting measures acquired overseas.
The previous Aso Government emphasized the high cost of emission reduction, including “the national burden of ¥360,000 per capita required for the 25% reduction from 1990 levels,” but it was found later that the cost estimate resulted from the misuse of the model result by the Cabinet Office (while the cost of ¥220,000 in the model result included the heating and lighting cost of ¥140,000, the two costs were simply added up. And the positive factor of the increase of ¥760,000 in per-household disposable income over 2005 due to economic growth was not countedx). In 2010, the Bill of the Basic Act for Global Warming Countermeasures was submitted to the Diet for deliberation, but the bill was shelved for continuous deliberation amid the continued lack of political leadership, including another change of government to the one headed by new Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
As voices grew stronger in opposition of a simple extension of the Kyoto Protocol without considerations guided by the political leadership, Japan argued that it would “not support the
second commitment period under any conditions” at the 16th Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, in late 2010.