Ensuring That the Alliance Is Not Cast Adrift Toshihiro Nakayama
Chapter 4 Traditional Security
3. Specific Measures Japan Should Take
The above comments are based entirely on the trends in the international situation currently observed, and it cannot be entirely ruled out that a totally unexpected situation may emerge as a result of an unpredictable turn of events or the present trends evolve much faster than the presently foreseeable pace. For instance, in the 1980s, nobody could predict with high accuracy that China would become the world’s second largest economy in 2010. Similarly, a currently middle-standing development country (Iran, for example) may by 2030 become one of the military powers to confront the United States and China. Having said that, given that any country has to decide on future policies on the basis of future prospects at the present time, putting such future prospects into shape is still of great significance.
each of such events. From the perspective of Japan and the United States jointly dealing with a threat from China, it is necessary at the same time to maintain and strengthen the antisubmarine warfare (ASW), sea-based air defense and mine warfare capabilities, as discussed at the outset of this paper.
(2) Cooperation with Regional Partners and Development of the Security Architecture In order to deal with the threat from China and destabilization of Asia in the wake of the shift in the power balance between the United States and China, the strengthening of the Japan-US security alliance described above is not enough. Therefore, it is important for key countries in Asia, led by the United States, to develop and institutionalize a hedging network against China to contain its intentions to seek hegemony in Asia. Candidates for such key countries in Asia include Japan, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Korea. For example, Vietnam has already expressed its strong interest in boosting cooperation with US forces, while India and Indonesia can be expected to strengthen their naval and air powers as a strategic counterbalance against China. Russia already has capabilities to serve as a deterrent against China, and South Korea is currently building a base for US forces stationed in South Korea in an area facing the Yellow Sea and this, if developed so as to plug in the Japan-US alliance, can be expected to provide part of potent hedging network against China.
It is desirable for this sort of the hedging network against China to be transformed in the future and serve as the foundation of the regional security architecture as the de facto collective security system by component countries, creating a situation wherein China has no choice but to participate. If such a collective security system is realized, the stabilization of Asia, borne to date by the Japan-US alliance backed by the overwhelming military power of the United States, is to be taken over by the regional architecture, opening the possibility of US military bases being dispersed throughout the region to a certain extent.
(3) Strengthening of Sea-Lane Defense
In the international society with progressing globalization through 2030, it is absolutely imperative to continue to secure the freedom of navigation through the defense of sea lanes from the perspectives of global economic stability and stable supply of resources. While the sea-lane defense has been given importance until now mainly from the perspective of stable supply of crude oil, amid the expected spread of environmental energy going forward, the defense of sea
lanes is to be designed for the stable transportation of a broader scope of goods and the importance of sea-lane defense will likely be recognized more than ever in an international society that becomes increasingly interdependent.
While the United States is currently exerting various efforts to raise its self-sufficiency ratio for energy in the face of abnormally high prices of crude oil in recent years and is officially arguing that the freedom of navigation is a common global interest, it may still actually weaken its commitment to guaranteeing the freedom of navigation in a global commons. It is important for Japan on its part to strengthen support for groups that advocate the importance of the freedom of navigation in the United States and at the same time to make more active contributions to the defense of sea lanes together with other countries in the region.
(4) Response to Military and Diplomatic Competition (Including Cyber Warfare) in Peacetime
In the international society going forward, diplomatic pressures that do not involve the use of military power but still draw on the strength of that military power may be used frequently in gray zones between times of emergency and peace. This is nothing illegal as the military power in the first place is the means of conducting diplomacy advantageously. However, if Japan resorts to countermeasures on the strength of the SDF, it could give rise to a controversy over the “threat of force” banned by Article 9 of the Constitution. Under such circumstances, it is necessary for Japan to clarify the legal interpretation, including the confirmation that such countermeasures do not constitute a threat of force, and to develop a manual for responses and conduct simulations, training and exercises on a routine basis in order to possess military and diplomatic capabilities to take such countermeasures with agility. The “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond,” announced in December 2010, states that “…To this end, the Government will examine the functions and systems related to its decision-making and response, through initiatives such as regular simulation exercises of various contingencies and comprehensive training and exercises, and consider necessary policies, including legal measures,” (IV. 1(2)), making it necessary to conduct comprehensive and exhaustive examinations with the participation of experts in a wide range of fields, including military, diplomacy, law and economics.
In particular, it is important to have consultations promptly with other major countries over what countermeasures will be authorized under international law to respond to new sorts of
threats such as acts of terrorism and cyber attacks by non-state entities under the instructions of a certain state (for example, a highly probable case where a certain state disguised as a hacker launches an attack to paralyze Japan’s economic infrastructure).
(5) Strengthening of Crackdown on Terrorist Organizations (Criminal Organizations) The possibility cannot be excluded of Japan, one of the advanced democracies, becoming the target of attacks by terrorist groups. It is necessary to continue to bolster security to block the entry of terrorists into the territory of Japan and prevent nuclear-related materials in Japan from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. It is also very important for Japan to actively contribute to the crackdown on and eradication of terrorism by the international community since such efforts are ultimately conducive to the security of Japan. Specifically, as the use of military force against leaders of terrorist organizations remains a necessity, it is necessary for Japan to devise legal measures to enable the participation of SDF units in related operations. Japan is also required to strengthen the intelligence system for the collection of information overseas on activities of terrorist organizations, share with other countries its knowledge about and experiences in the management of nuclear-related materials in developing countries (for example, radioactive waste generated in association with the commercial use of nuclear energy) and reinforce support for state-building of failed states where terrorist organizations are operating.